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Why Ratification?  
Questioning the Unexamined Constitution-making Procedure 
 
Jeffrey A. Lenowitz 
 
 
My dissertation focuses on ratification—the submission of a draft constitution to the people 
for their approval in an up or down vote—and has two central aims. First, it explores the me-
chanics, current usage, and possible effects of ratification and argues that despite its intuitive 
nature and ubiquity, it is in need of justification. Ratification is increasingly common and regu-
larly included within the framing recommendations given by consultants, NGOs, transnational 
institutions, and the like. In addition, the procedure has significant effects: it can influence the 
behavior of framers, subsequently alter the contents of what they produce, is expensive to im-
plement, and can lead to costly constitutional rejections. Despite this, both practitioners and 
scholars treat ratification as a given and provide no explanation or justification for its use. I 
argue that this is a mistake.  
Second, the primary aim of my dissertation is to ask what justifies the use of ratification, 
i.e. what reasons constitution-makers might have for implementing the procedure. Drawing 
from the history of ratification and the empirical and theoretical literature on constitution-
making, I explore a series of possible justifications for the procedure, each of which connects to 
a central topic or theme in democratic theory. First, I ask whether ratification plays a role in a 
representative process ongoing during constitution-making, and whether the importance of 
  
fostering representation justifies its use. Second, I examine whether the need for ratification 
stems from its function as a moment of constituent power, an instance where the people mani-
fest and exercise their will to make a constitution their own. Third, I explore whether ratifica-
tion helps legitimize constitutions; this entails articulating a three-part theory of legitimacy 
corresponding to the concept’s legal, moral, and sociological manifestations, and analyzing the 
role of ratification within this scheme. I test these potential justifications by looking at their 
theoretical coherence, applicability to cases of constitution-making from the 18th century to 
the present, and their compatibility with the actual dynamics and mechanisms of the constitu-
tion-making process.  
The results of my analysis are as follows. I argue that the only role ratification might play 
in a representative process is as an accountability mechanism, but that the possible divergence 
between how a voter evaluates a draft constitution and the behavior of his or her representa-
tive framer makes the procedure unable to take on this role. I find that theories of constituent 
power only justify ratification if the procedure is the sole moment during constitution-making 
in which the people take direct action on the constitution. This limits the justification to rati-
fication procedures involving referenda, and requires that voters make a meaningful choice on 
the proposed constitution, i.e. they must choose whether to accept or reject a constitution on 
the basis of their understanding of its contents and the likely result of its rejection. However, 
this standard of meaningful choice, which requires a far greater level of voter informedness 
than ordinary instances of direct democracy, is unlikely to be met because voters cannot be 
expected to possess or obtain the sort of highly technical and specialized information such 
constitutional evaluation requires. Finally, I show that legal legitimacy collapses into sociologi-
  
cal legitimacy when it comes to new constitutions and that ratification might produce socio-
logical and moral legitimacy by making the contents of a constitution more likely to fall within 
the bounds of actual or perceived legitimacy, or by procedurally legitimating the outcome re-
gardless of its substance. However, each of these pathways has considerable explanatory weak-
nesses and do not in themselves justify ratification.  
Thus, I ultimately conclude that there seems to be no convincing general justification 
available for ratification. The initially compelling arguments in favor of the procedure apply 
only occasionally, ignore differences between constitutional and ordinary lawmaking, contra-
dict some of our central theories and assumptions about constitutionalism and democracy, or 
assume the prior existence of robust democratic norms. This does not amount to a wholesale 
rejection of ratification, for contextual variables might produce reasons for its implementation 
and I explore what these might be, but it does give reason to question the automatic applica-
tion of this procedure, as well as the similar treatment of other peripheral components of con-
stitutional and institutional design processes the merits of which are assumed rather than crit-
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“Can the citizens give an assembly the power to establish a constitution or 
to accept one on their behalf without retaining the right to ratify it them-
selves, or should they retain this power?”1 
Marquis de Condorcet 
 
“As soon as the new constitution has been ratified by referendum, Syria will 
have accomplished the key step of laying down the legal and constitutional 
foundations necessary for the country to begin a new era of cooperation 
among all in society.” 2 
President Basher Al-Assad 
 
 
From the very beginning, ratification has been an essential component of democratic constitu-
tion-making. The Massachusetts constituent legislature of 1778, the first body popularly 
elected to serve as a constituent authority, submitted its draft constitutions to the people for 
ratification. This practice caught on, and today ratification procedures are ubiquitous. In the 
United States, a norm developed whereby all new state constitutions must be approved by a 
majority of the people through a referendum before enactment. Thus, only forty-five of the 
146 constitutions adopted by the states between 1776 and 2005 became effective without rati-
                                                
1 Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the 
Constitution," in Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory, trans. and ed. by Iain McLean and 
Fiona Hewitt (Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1994), 273.  
2 "Rejecting the Referendum," Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 23-29 February 2011. 
  
2 
fication and all but three of these cases took place in the 18th century.3 Moreover, there has 
been an increasing trend of popular ratification worldwide; since 1975, about forty percent of 
all new constitutions came into effect only after a successful referendum, and many others 
were enacted following ratification procedures of a different form.4 In addition, constitutional 
consultants, NGOs, international lawyers, and the like now include ratification procedures 
amongst their framing recommendations and constitution-making best practices manuals.  
In each instance of its use, ratification can influence the behavior of framers and subse-
quently alter the contents of what they produce. Further, ratification can lead to the rejection 
of a constitution, regardless of its political and social significance, the length and expense of its 
drafting process, the perceived legitimacy of its drafters, or the level of publicity surrounding 
its creation. Ratification is thus an influential and highly risky process, which suggests the 
question—why should constitutions be ratified? What reasons are there for using ratification 
procedures at all? These are the central questions addressed by this dissertation. In answering 
these, I seek to uncover the theoretical significance and institutional role played by ratification 
and the reasons that constitution-makers might have for deciding to implement the procedure. 
The main thesis of this project is that despite its popularity, and despite its apparent dem-
ocratic credentials, there is no clear general justification for including ratification procedures 
                                                
3 Albert Lee Sturm, Trends in state constitution-making, 1966-1972 [by] Albert L. Sturm  (Lexington, Ky.: Council 
of State Governments, 1973); "By Whom Shall a State Constitution be Adopted," Harvard Law Review 9, no. 
7 (Feb. 25, 1896); Albert Lee Sturm, "The Development of American State Constitutions," Publius 12, no. 1 
(1982). 
4Jennifer Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution Project," Princeton University Press, 
http://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/; Justin Blount, "Participation in Constitutional Design," in Comparative 
Constitutional Law, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind Dixon (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), 49. Jennifer 




within a constitution-making process. The best arguments for the procedure rely on just the 
sort of “everybody is doing it” reasoning that we are told never to use by our parents. These are 
not good reasons when it comes to personal life choices and, I argue, they are not good reasons 
when it comes to the design of constitution-making processes as well. To test my thesis I ex-
plore a series of interrelated potential justifications. This is made difficult because ratification 
is rarely discussed let alone justified, and because it is impossible to address every potential 
argument in favor of implementing the procedure. In response, drawing from the history of 
ratification, the limited empirical and theoretical literature on constitution-making, and sever-
al currents in democratic theory, I develop and analyze several of the most plausible arguments 
for the procedure. These relate to representation, constituent power, and legitimacy.  
Specifically, I ask whether ratification plays a role in a representative process ongoing dur-
ing constitution-making, and whether the importance of fostering representation justifies its 
use. I then examine whether the need for ratification stems from its function as a moment of 
constituent power, an instance where the people manifest and exercise their will to make a 
constitution their own. Finally, I explore whether ratification helps legitimize constitutions 
and constitution-making procedures. This entails articulating a three-part theory of legitimacy 
corresponding to the concept’s legal, moral, and sociological manifestations, and analyzing the 
role of ratification within this scheme. Ultimately, as I explain below, I find none of these ar-
guments persuasive. This does not mean that ratification is always a mistake, but rather that 
the procedure should be used with care and its likely effects and intended goal considered in 
each instance of potential usage.  
  
4 
In the reminder of this chapter I do the following: first, I define ratification, explain its 
types, and situate it within the various stages of constitution-making. Second, I argue that rati-
fication demands justification. This involves noting the increasing literature on the importance 
of constitution-making processes, the complete neglect of ratification within it, and describing 
the effects that the procedure can have. Third, I explain what it is I mean by justifying ratifica-
tion, and what sort of explanations and arguments I am not addressing. Fourth and finally, I 
sketch out the remaining chapters.  
1. WHAT IS RATIFICATION? 
This project focuses on ratification procedures used in the process of democratic constitution-
making for sovereign states.5 By constitution-making, I mean the attempt to write a new body 
of higher law that specifies the organization and structural features of a state, enumerates the 
rights of citizens, and limits government organs and actors.6 This excludes cases in which 
states seek to amend or moderately revise an existing constitution, as well as all constitutions 
created through organic, evolutionary, or cumulative processes.7 By ‘democratic’ constitution-
making I refer to processes meant to create a working democratic constitution. This distinc-
tion is meant to exclude from consideration instances in which authoritarian or autocratic re-
                                                
5 By sovereign states, I mean states that are not part of a larger national political system. In other words, this pro-
ject is not primarily focused on provincial constitution-making within Federal systems such as the United 
States, Germany, and Canada. However, it is also not focused on constitution-making for transnational politi-
cal entities such as the EU. 
6 For a discussion of the difficulties in defining exactly what a constitution is using traditional designations such 
as a body of law that is harder to change, a document that addresses fundamental issues, or the legal code re-
ferred to as ‘the constitution,’ see Jon Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the Constitution-making process," 
Duke Law Review 45(1995): 264-367.. 
7 The most famous examples of organic constitutions are the British and Israeli bodies of higher law. For a dis-
cussion of organic constitutions, see John Alexander Jameson, The Constitutional Convention; Its History, 
Powers, and Modes of Proceeding  (New York: Charles Scribner and Company, 1867). 76. 
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gimes create sham constitutions meant to entrench their rule or serve as democratic window-
dressing.8 Usually, but not always, a portion of a democratic constitution-making process is 
transparent or public. Ratification, as I explain below, is the final step used to create a consti-
tution. 
Modern constitution-making processes divide roughly into five stages: initiation, drafting, 
debating, approval, and ratification. In the initiation stage, existing or new power holders de-
cide to create a constitution and then plan the process. Initiation sometimes involves establish-
ing constitutional commissions, creating interim constitutions, holding round table talks, and 
adopting guiding principles. In post-conflict contexts, the initiation stage often evolves from or 
is part of a prior peace-making process. This stage ends with the convocation or designation of 
the constitution-making bodies. 
The first draft constitution is written in the drafting stage. Its authors are usually a desig-
nated constituent body such as a constitutional convention, constitutional commission, or 
constituent legislature, or a subsidiary body they or the existing government appoints. Drafters 
often seek the assistance of international lawyers, constitutional experts, and NGO or IGO con-
sultants. On occasion, political parties or civil society organizations develop a rival draft in 
tandem. The debating stage follows drafting; here, the draft constitution and any alternatives 
are discussed, combined, and amended. Actors can include the initial drafters, a newly created 
                                                
8 For an interesting analysis of such sham constitutions, see  David S. Law and Mila Versteeg, "Sham 
Constitutions," California Law Review 101 (forthcoming)(2013).On the subject of sham constitutions, it is 
worth noting that this is one main reason to be skeptical about the Comparative Constitutions Project run by 
Melton, Elkins, and Blount, in which all constitutions from 1775 to the present have been coded according to 
substance and design-making procedures. They include many constitutions, such as those written by Soviet 
states, which were never intended to function or constrain a government. Elster makes a similar point in Jon 




constitution-making body, existing governmental organs, special meetings with party, ethnic, 
or religious leaders, and even the people themselves through workshops, town meetings, com-
ment solicitation mechanisms, or consultative referenda.9 In the approval stage a final version 
of the constitution-making text is settled upon. This is usually done by the main constitution-
making body in response to the outcome of the prior stage. 
Ratification procedures are used in the ratification stage. I define ratification as follows: 
Ratification: the submission of a constitution to an agent or group for their approval 
before final enactment, provided that: the ratifier is neither identical to nor controlled 
by the drafters; plausibly claims to act for or in the name of the people; and does noth-
ing more than approve or reject the constitution. 
The first condition excludes the final vote of a constituent assembly from counting as ratifica-
tion, the second excludes instances of autocrats deciding whether a constitution is to their lik-
ing, and the third distinguishes ratification from particular procedures within the debating and 
approving stages during which the constitution is amended and approved by agents distinct 
from the initial drafters.10 We can distinguish between five different types of ratification based 
on the identity of the ratifying agent: (R1) ratification referendum; (R2) ratification conven-
                                                
9 Such a referenda was held very recently on October 20, 2012 in Iceland, when voters were asked their thoughts 
on a draft constitution in a non-binding referendum consisting of six constitution-related questions. These 
questions related to issues such as natural resources, the role of the state church, and the use of referenda in the 
future.  
10 Note that the term ‘ratification’ is sometimes used differently. Widner for example counts the last vote in the 
body responsible for preparing the final draft as ratification when no referendum occurs. Etymologically, this is 
a misuse of the term, for ratification was originally a common law concept meaning to adopt an action that was 
done on one’s behalf and treating that action as if it had been authorized before it occurred. This is represented 
in the oft quoted second law of agency: omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur et mandato priori aequiparatur (every ratifi-
cation relates back to and is taken to be equal of prior authority). Philip Mechem, "The Rationale of 
Ratification," University of Pennsylvania Law Review 100, no. 5 (1952); W. W. Buckland, Arnold D. McNair, 
and F. H. Lawson, Roman Law & Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1952). 
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tion; (R3) provincial ratification conventions; (R4) ratification by government body; and (R5) 
ratification by provincial assemblies.11  
 R1, ratification by referendum, is the most common type, and involves the constitution-
making body or sitting government submitting the constitution to the people for their explicit 
approval or rejection. The people, more precisely those with suffrage, serve as the ratifying 
agent. Ratification referenda have been increasingly popular since the late 20th century; recent 
examples include referenda held in Kenya, Niger, and Madagascar in 2010, Kyrgyzstan and 
Thailand in 2007, and Iraq and Burundi in 2005.12 Most ratification referenda use a simple 
majority threshold, though exceptions do exist. The 2010 Kenyan constitutional referendum 
required both an overall majority of all those voting and at least 25 percent approval in five out 
of eight provinces. All Australian constitutional referenda require a double majority consisting 
of a majority of all those voting as well as a majority within four out of six states. Even more 
complicated, the Iraqi ratification referendum required the approval of a simple majority of all 
those voting, as well as approval by more than one third of all registered voters in sixteen out 
of eighteen governorates.13  
                                                
11 Sometimes a ratification procedure will be a combination of these types. For instance, the ratification processes 
in Estonia in 1992 and Rwanda in 2003 made use of referendum and existing governmental organs. 
12 In addition to Widner’s calculation mentioned above, Suksi claims that over half of all constitution-making 
processes since 1998 have made use of a referendum to decide on the constitution. Ginsburg, Elkins, and 
Blount provide a graphical representation of the increase of referenda. Markkhu Suksi, Bringing in the People: A 
Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum  (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993). 2008; Jennifer Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution," (UNU-
WIDER, 2005); Tom Ginsburg, Zachary Elking, and Justin Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-
Making Matter?," Annual Review of Law and Social Science 5(2009). 
13 Michele Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process, (Switzerland: Interpeace, 
2011). 299; John Higley and Ian McAllister, "Elite Division and Voter Confusion: Australia's Republic 
Referendum in 1999," European Journal of Political Research 41(2002); U.S. Institute of Peace, "Iraq's 




 R2 entails the submission of a constitution to a national body elected for the sole purpose 
of ratifying the constitution. The Assembleé Nationale briefly considered this procedure before 
dissolving.14 More recently, both the Ethiopian constitution-making process in 1994 and the 
Somali constitution-making process in 2012 made use of this ratification type. Voters chose 
members to the Ethiopian Constituent Assembly in a national election, while 135 tribal lead-
ers chose delegates to the Somali National Constituent Assembly.15 R3 is similar to R2, but 
involves each province of a larger state calling its own ratification convention, with the approv-
al of a majority or supermajority of these conventions needed for successful ratification. To my 
knowledge, the ratification of the U.S. constitution is the only example of this type.16 
The final two types of ratification involve the submission of a constitution to existing gov-
ernmental bodies for approval. R5 makes use of an existing organ of a national government, 
and is most common in instances where the existing governmental bodies are provisional, such 
as during an internationally controlled peace process or secession effort. For example, the 
Transitional National Assembly created by the Arusha Peace Accords ratified the Rwandan 
Constitution, and a constituent assembly consisting of the transitional government and the 
                                                
14 Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution." 
15 "Somalia: National Constituent Assembly Adopts New Constitution,"  Shabelle Media Network(2012), 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201208020038.html; Adnan Hussein, "Somalia faces tough road in its transition 
to federal rule,"  Sabahi(2012), 
http://sabahionline.com/en_GB/articles/hoa/articles/features/2012/05/21/feature-01; Tesfatsion 
Medhanie, "Constitution-making, Legitimacy and Regional Integration: An Approach to Eritrea's Predicament 
and Relations with Ethiopia," in DIIPER Research Series (Aalborg University, Denmark: Development, 
Innovation and International Political Economy Research, 2008); Kassahun Berhanu, "Ethiopia elects a 
constituent assembly," Review of African Political Economy 22, no. 63 (1995). Note that, as Berhanu illustrates, 
the constituent assembly elections in Ethiopia were manipulated by the incumbent, the Ethiopian People’s 
Democratic Front.  
16 In a working paper, Axel Domeyer and I argue that ratification by constitutional convention is probably the 
best means of creating a future constitution for Europe. A version of this appears as chapter 5 of Axel Domeyer, 




Bougainville People’s Congress ratified the constitution of Bougainville following the country’s 
partial secession from Papua New Guinea in 2002.17 R4 involves provincial legislative bodies 
or assemblies assuming the role of ratifying agent. Article XIII of the Articles of Confedera-
tion called for version of this procedure, albeit an extreme one using a unanimity requirement, 
but the Federal Convention used R3 instead.18 However, in 1949, the Parlamentarischer Rat, 
wanting to make clear the provisional nature of any constitution created during occupation 
within their divided country, ignored the Allied request for R1 and instead submitted the 
Grundgesetz to the West German Landtage (state parliaments). 19   
 For the most part, this project focuses on justifications for the implementation of R1, 
but many of the arguments also address R2 and R3. I intentionally deemphasize R4 and R5 
for two reasons. First, both ratification types require that an existing government or govern-
                                                
17 Bougainville created a constitution for its own autonomous government, but remains tied to Papua New Guin-
ea in several ways. An independence referendum is slated to occur between 2015 and 2020. Edward P. Wolfers, 
"'Joint Creation': The Bougainville Peace Agreement and Beyond," Accord 12(2010); Priscilla Yachat Ankut, 
"The Role of Constitution-Building Processes in Democratization: Case Study - Rwanda," (Stockholm, 
Sweden: International IDEA, 2005); Felip Reyntjens, "Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: 
The Case of Rwanda and Burundi," Journal of African Law 40, no. 2 (1996). 
18 Madison planned to bypass the state legislatures even before the convention began. According to his letters to 
Washington and Jefferson, and his speeches at the convention, he thought constitutional conventions were su-
perior because: (1) giving legislatures the power to change the grounds of their own authority is pernicious; (2) 
the U.S. constitution would necessarily make inroads on state power and state legislatures would be against 
this; (3) ratification by legislatures is appropriate for creating treaties and the U.S. constitution should not be 
considered a treaty, for it needs to be treated as juridically superior to all state law and a single violation cannot 
have the effect of freeing all parties to the agreement. Note that Madison, as well as the other framers, did not 
seem to consider popular ratification through referendum, though this might have to due with the physical dif-
ficulty of organizing such a scheme in the 18th century. See Madison’s letters to Thomas Jefferson on 18 March 
1786 and 19 March 1787 and to George Washington on 16 April 1787 as published in James Madison, The 
Writings of James Madison: 1787-1790, 9 vols., vol. 2 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1901). 229, 324, 49. 
Madison gave his longest recorded speech on ratification, according to this own notes, on 23 July 1787. James 
Madison, The Writings of James Madison: 1787-1790, 9 vols., vol. 4 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1903). 
44.  
19 H.W. Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries  (New York: 
Longman, 1984). 339-55; Peter Merkl, The Origins of the West German Republic  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1963). 114-16. 
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ments be somewhat legitimate, still standing, and not in complete control of the constitution-
making process. This is a rare occurrence to say the least. Second, both R4 and R5 are general-
ly undesirable for the same reason that Madison gave for refusing to submit the U.S. constitu-
tion to the state legislatures. Namely, constitutional change will necessarily make “inroads” on 
existing political authorities. Perhaps Randolph, another member of the convention, explained 
this reason best when he claimed: “Whose opposition will most likely be excited against the 
System? That of the local demagogues who will be degraded by it from the importance they 
hold. …It is of great importance therefore that the consideration of the subject [ratification] 
should be transferred from the Legislatures where this class of men, have their full influence to 
a field in which their efforts can be less mischievous.”20 Assuming, as I do, that the primary 
purpose of constitution-making is to create a constitution that is conducive to the public good, 
that benefits as much as possible all of the inhabitants of a given state, and not to assist stand-
ing political authorities, there is no good general argument for recommending a ratification 
procedure which necessarily introduces institutional bias and control into the process.21  
 
2. WHY CARE ABOUT RATIFICATION? 
Almost two decades ago, Jon Elster lamented that “Surprisingly, there is no body of literature 
that deals with the constitution-making process in a positive, explanatory perspective” and that 
                                                
20 Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention, Vol 2, 84. 
21 At times, a government in power might only agree to a constitution-making process if ones of its organs has the 
final say through ratification, and unlike Louis XVI and state legislatures, actually have the power to enforce 
this demand. This was likely the case in Fiji in 1998 and Mongolia in 1992. In such instances ratification by R4 
or R5 might be unavoidable. In circumstances such as these there is no point in discussing which ratification 
procedure is best, let alone whether ratification should occur.  
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there “is the absence of normative discussions of the constitution-making process” as well.22 
Elster’s contributions on constitution-making brought attention to the topic and things slowly 
changed. Today, scholars increasingly recognize that process matters in the creation of consti-
tutions. Choices concerning the institutions and methods used to make decisions when creat-
ing and implementing a constitution help determine its content and affect both the perception 
and reception of the process and the constitution itself. There is now a wealth of detailed pro-
cess-oriented comparative case studies of constitution-making events, a growing body of em-
pirical work on how procedural design choices affect the contents and durability of constitu-
tions, and an entire field dedicated to applying formal economic methods to the study of con-
stitutional change. In addition, various NGOS, academic centers, and transnational bodies 
regularly publish constitution-making reports, best practices manuals, and guidebooks meant 
to assist those engaged in constitution-making.23  
                                                
22 Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the Constitution-making process," 364. 
23 I quote from this literature throughout this dissertation and thus only list a few highlights here. Goran Hyden 
and Denis Venter, "Constitution-Making in Africa: Political and Theoretical Challenges," in Constitution-
making and Democratisation in Africa, ed. Goran Hyden and Denis Venter (Pretoria: African Institute of South 
Africa, 2001); Ginsburg, Elking, and Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?."; Tom 
Ginsburg, "Constitutional Endurance," in Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Tom Ginsburg and Rosalind 
Dixon (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011); Devra C. Moehler, Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory 
Constitution Making  (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008); Laurel E. Miller, ed. Framing the State 
in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2010); Jon Elster, "The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly," in Collective Wisdom: Principles and 
Mechanisms, ed. Helene Landemore and Jon Elster (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); John M. 
Carey, "Does it matter how a constitution is created?," in Exporting Democracy: What democracies can and cannot 
do (University of Texas2007); Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process; Kirsti 
Samuels, "Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: a Discussion of Twelve Case Studies," 
(International IDEA: Democracy-building & Conflict Managment, 2006); Kirsti Samuels, "Post-Conflict 
Peace-Building and Constitution-Making," Chicago Journal of International Law 6, no. 2 (2006); Katharina 
Diehl et al., "Structures and Principles of a Constitution," in Max Planck Manuals on Constitution Building 
(Heidelberg, Germany: Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, 2009); 
Stefan Voigt, Explaining Constitutional Change: A Positive Economic Approach  (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
1999); Andrew Reynolds, ed. The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management, and 
Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Andrew Arato, Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy  
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000), Book; Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict 
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Amidst this and older constitutional literature, ratification is an overlooked subject of 
analysis; it is treated as epiphenomenal and ignored completed, reduced to a strategic device, 
seen as a vestige of previous constitutional or political authority, or simply accepted without 
serious explanation. At the height of the French Revolution in 1789, almost a year after New 
Hampshire became the ninth state to ratify the U.S. constitution, Condorcet wrote an essay to 
the members of the Assembleé Nationale discussing whether it might be useful to have the 
upcoming French constitution ratified. His short essay, a combination of rigorous social sci-
ence and Enlightenment idealism, was not only the first serious reflection on the procedure of 
ratification, but also the last.24 In short, the state of the literature on the purpose of constitu-
tional ratification is more or less nonexistent.25 
                                                                                                                                            
Resolution Project"; Yash Ghai and Guido Galli, "Constitution Building Processes and Democratization," 
(Stockholm: International IDEA, 2006); Alicia L. Bannon, "Note: Designing a Constitution-drafting Process: 
Lessons from Kenya," Yale Law Journal 116(2007). 
24 To my knowledge, two significant recorded discussions of constitutional ratification took place before Condor-
cet’s essay. First, a group of political dissidents known as the Berkshire Constitutionalists invented the proce-
dure and called for it in the years preceding the creation of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. Though I 
believe a theory of ratification predicated on contractualism and a conception of constituent power can be 
worked out from their pamphlets and speeches, in fact I devote chapter four to doing just that, the Constitu-
tionalists did not seem to engage in any sustained analysis of the procedure. Second, by my calculation, the 
framers of the U.S. Constitution discussed ratification on thirteen different days during the Federal Conven-
tion. However, all of their discussions, as recorded by Madison, assumed that ratification had to take place and 
focused not on the merits of the procedure, but rather on the best form it should take. Madison, The Writings 
of James Madison: 1787-1790, 4.  
25 Some exceptions exist. Richards discusses the meaning of ratification following the Philadelphia Convention 
extensively, but his account focuses solely on one particular instance of ratification, and reaches conclusions that 
are not in any way generalizable. Riker and like-minded political scientists focus on how instances of ratification 
were “won,” but this assumes the existence of or overlooks the reasons for implementation in the first place. Re-
cently, scholars associated with the Comparative Constitutions Project have included referendums as a variable 
in their empirical work, but thus far have done little to explain the reasons for and against the procedure be-
yond vague references to the importance of participation and legitimacy. B. A. Richards, Foundations of 
American Constitutionalism  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989). 139-42; William H. Riker, "The Lessons 
of 1787," Public Choice 55(1987); Denise L. Anthony, Douglas D. Heckathorn, and Steven Maser, "Rational 
Rhetoric in Politics: The Debate Over Ratfiying the U.S. Constitution," Rationality and Society 6(1994); 
Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and James Melton, "The Lifespan of Written Constitutions," in World Justice 
Forum (ViennaJuly 2-5, 2008); Carey, "Does it matter how a constitution is created?."; Tom Ginsburg, Zachary 
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This project presumes that this oversight is problematic. Ratification does not come from 
nowhere. Constitution-makers and the designers of constitution-making processes that incor-
porate ratification procedures choose to do so. The process is optional; constitutions can and 
have been made without ever undergoing formal ratification. For example, the creation of the 
South Africa constitution in 1996, arguably the most influential and lauded constitution-
making process in a century, did not make use of a ratification procedure. Ratification is thus 
an overlooked and optional procedure that constitution-makers are increasingly deciding to 
use, and this in itself gives reason to ask whether or not such decisions are made for good rea-
sons.  
Perhaps we would not need to inquire about ratification procedures if they had little or no 
effect. If ratification simply rubber stamped the work of drafters—if it were a mere formality, 
historical remnant, of superficially symbolic process—than its oversight in the literature might 
be understandable. However, this reasoning is deficient, for ratification can have several con-
crete effects on constitution-making. First, by definition, it can lead to the rejection of consti-
tutions; sometimes the people or their delegate ratifiers say ‘No.’ In the United States, where 
233 constitutional conventions have produced only 146 different constitutions, rejection by 
ratification is somewhat of a regular occurrence. Other examples of ratification outside the 
United States exist. In 1946, voters in France overwhelmingly rejected a constitution crafted 
by a left-assembly, perhaps because it gave too much power to the parliament.26 In 1999, de-
                                                                                                                                            
Elkins, and Justin Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?," Annual Review of Law and 
Social Science 5(2009): 49-51. Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process. 296-305. 




spite a vigorous government-led campaign to promote it, voters in Zimbabwe rejected a draft 
constitution by 54 percent.27 Other examples of rejection include Switzerland in 1872, Estonia 
in 1992, Albania in 1994, Australia in 1998, and Kenya in 2005. While such occurrences are 
relatively infrequent worldwide, ratification has and continues to lead to rejected constitu-
tions.28   
The rejection of a constitution in a ratification process has two subsidiary effects. On the 
one hand, in more cases than not, it puts an end to the constitution-making process, regardless 
of its length, importance, or the margin of defeat. On the other hand, rejections can be quite 
costly. These costs might include the resources and time consumed by future constitution-
making attempts, an increase in the difficulty of successfully creating a constitution in the fu-
ture, the continued persistence of a state of anarchy or an outdated and harmful constitution 
and regime, and even an influx or resumption of violence in areas prone to conflict. Both Zim-
babwe and Kenya saw a massive increase of violence seemingly related to the rejection of con-
stitutions in referenda. In the former case, Mugabe encouraged supporters to invade white-
owned farms and attack members of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), the rival 
party to the President’s own party. In the latter, the rejection of the referendum in 2005 com-
                                                
27 Muna Ndulo, "Zimbabwe's Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order," in Framing the State in 
Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2010); John Hatchard, "Some Lessons on Constitution-making from Zimbabwe," 
Journal of African Law 54, no. 2 (2001). 
28 I do not mean to imply that the rejection of a constitution, or the termination of a constitution-making process, 
is necessarily a bad or a good thing. Good and bad constitutions, insofar as such evaluations are even possible, 
are both rejected and accepted during ratification. My point is that rejections can occur, that this is a possible 
effect from a procedural choice, and that therefore we need reasons for making that choice.  
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bined with contested presidential elections soon after led to a wave of violence in which 1,000 
were killed and 500,000 displaced.29  
Second, ratification likely affects the text of a constitution by altering constitution-makers’ 
goals. Framers will downgrade or restrict their goal constitution to a range they believe is ac-
ceptable, or can be made acceptable, to the designated authorities.30 As Elster explains, “the 
knowledge of that possibility [rejection] will keep framers within designated limits. Not want-
ing to be overruled, they will anticipate and feel constrained by the possible censure.”31 This 
holds true regardless of what motivates a framer or what kind of constitution she wants to cre-
ate. A framer only interested in pursuing her self-interest must heed the limits set by the rati-
fying authority as much as a framer purely interested in contributing to the public good. For 
both of them, success only comes from an approved constitution, and therefore what the rati-
fying authority will accept, or what they believe the ratifying authority will accept, becomes 
critical.32  
Third, ratification also influences the behavior of framers and the text they produce in a 
more indirect manner, for the sort of provisions they can write when ratification is on the 
                                                
29 Greg Linington, Constitutional Law of Zimbabwe  (Harare, Zimbabwe: Legal Resources Foundation, 2001); 
Bard Anders Andresassen and Arne Tostensen, "Of Oranges and Bananas: the 2005 Kenyan Referendum of 
the Constitution," CHR - Michelsen Institution WP 13(2006); Beth Elise Whitaker and Jason Giersch, "Voting 
on a constitution: Implications for Democracy in Kenya," Journal of Contemporary African Studies 27, no. 1 
(2009). 
30 Alternatively, framers might simply decide to forego ratification altogether or else designate a new ratifiers.  
31 Jon Elster, "Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris," in Constitutionalism, Identity, Difference, 
and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Michel Rosenfeld (Durham: Duke University press, 1994), 80. 
32 Framers have reason to learn the preferences of their ratifiers and make a constitution that will be acceptable to 
them. It is thus quite that so many constitutions are rejected in the United States, specifically in the 1970s and 
1980s. I discuss, and other aspects of state constutiton-making, in Jeffrey A. Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: 
Failed U.S. State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s," in Western Political Science Association 




horizon are limited by the existing norms of appropriate reasoning or argument in the given 
context. If constitution-making occurs in a state in which norms of impartiality surround the 
drafting process, meaning that the constitution is envisioned as an impartial document meant 
to structure the future operation of the state in a fair and equal manner, framers will be forced 
to shroud their proposals, and their arguments if the drafting is public, in the language of neu-
trality. In other words, if the public or their ratifiers believe that constitutional choices are only 
valid if they can be explained in a public forum using impartial arguments, this restricts fram-
ers to a set of possible constitutions that admit to such public justification. These and other 
normative expectations regarding how constitutional provisions can be defended will act as a 
filter on the text even before ratification occurs.33 Again, this mechanism would function re-
gardless of what a framer actually believes or wants; framers do not need to actually want to 
make an impartial constitution for their behavior to be altered by it.34 
Fourth, ratification procedures, even those that are successful, are costly. They extend the 
time period of constitution-making, and in the case of ratification referenda and conventions, 
the procedure can require a considerable amount of money and resources. Fifth, ratification 
might have a variety of contextual effects. Previous civic education efforts, increasingly present 
in recent cases of participatory constitution-making, are regularly undone by the divisive and 
                                                
33 {Elster Explaining@406-407; Elster 1998@109-11. See also Tim Groseclose and Nolan McCarty, “The Poli-
tics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience,” 100-119, in which the authors argue that for bargaining prob-
lems involving two negotiators who send signals to a third party, the third party influences the proposals that 
the negotiators offer and their decisions to accept or reject proposals. 
34 Elster seems to assume that norms of impartiality are the only such norms that will affect decision-making in 
this way. In chapter 6, I suggest that this might not be the case, thereby casting doubt on the idea that ratifica-
tion pushes framers to create more impartial or neutral constitutions. 
  
17 
distortive campaigns that accompany ratification, particular for referenda.35 More generally, 
ratification can turn a process designed and meant to promote consensus, ease conflict, and 
establish a new beginning, into something resembling a normal political competition.  
3. WHAT KIND OF JUSTIFICATION?  
Ratification is an optional procedure with significant effects, a procedure that is recommended 
by constitutional consultants and increasingly used in constitution-making process across the 
globe. Because of this, I argue, ratification is in need of justification. I use the loaded term ‘jus-
tification’ to make clear that what we are after is not explanation in the classically social scien-
tific sense. Seeking explanations for ratification in particular instances is a perfectly valid exer-
cise. Such an investigation would focus on the actors responsible for implementing the proce-
dure and their motivations and expectations, and then attempt to describe the various causal 
pathways that led to the ratification moment. For example, one might inquire why, after a 
four-year closed drafting process, Emir Sheik Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani decided to submit 
the final draft constitution of Qatar to the people in a referendum when neither the 1972 pro-
visional constitution or the people demanded it.36  
Similarly, one might conduct a comparative study of several constitution-making processes 
and generalize about the various strategic reasons particular actors might have for pushing for 
ratification procedures of a certain type. For instance, a self-interested member of an ethnic 
group commanding a large majority of the population of a particular state might push for rati-
fication via referendum with a simple majority threshold, while a member of a minority group 
                                                
35 I discuss this occurrence in chapter 5. 
36 Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution Project". 
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in command of the legislature might seek legislative ratification. The development of Iraq’s 
odd referendum threshold, mentioned above, demonstrates such strategic logic. The stipula-
tion that the constitution would only come into force if, among other requirements, there was 
no more than two governorates in which two-thirds or more registered voters rejected the con-
stitution, was specifically designed to give Kurds influence in the process. 37  
These sorts of explanations for ratification, while interesting lines of inquiry, are not my 
focus here. Instead, I am seeking context-independent justification for incorporating ratifica-
tion procedures in the beginning of a constitution-making process. Such a justification would 
appeal to values, and uses these values to produce defeasible reasons for implementing ratifica-
tion. Context-specific circumstances might override these reasons, just as they might produce 
reasons for using ratification procedures unrelated to the more general justification. 
Jon Elster’s discussion of the optimal design of a constituent assembly is an example of the 
sort of justification I am looking for, though he did not use the term. This work is an exten-
sion of his larger project on the various ways in which self-interest and irrationality (passion, 
prejudice, and bias) can pollute collective decision-making, and how procedures can be de-
signed to prevent this as much as possible.38 Elster emphasizes the importance of such a focus 
                                                
37 Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process. 299; Andrew Arato, Constitution making 
under occupation : the politics of imposed revolution in Iraq, Columbia studies in political thought/political 
history. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), Book; U.S. Institute of Peace, "Iraq's Constitutional 
Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future."Of course, this backfired, for it almost led to Sunni rejec-
tion of the text and was one of the contributing factors to the violence that arouse during and after the referen-
dum process. 
38 Jon Elster, "Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the boat in the open sea," Public 
Administration 71(1993); Elster, "Constitutional Bootstrapping in Philadelphia and Paris."; Elster, "Forces and 
mechanisms in the Constitution-making process."; Jon Elster, "The Role of Institutional Interest in East 
European Constitution-making," East European Constitutional Review 5, no. 1 (1996); Jon Elster, "Arguing and 
Bargaining in Two Constituent Assemblies," University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law 354(1999-
2000); Jon Elster, "Legislatures as Constituent Assemblies," in The Least Examined Branch: The Role of 
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because of the frequent double-indeterminacy that plagues institutional evaluation from the 
standpoint of good outcomes. To evaluate an institution by its outcome we need, on the one 
hand, a normative theory that tells us what a good outcome is, and on the other hand, a causal 
theory that tells us if an institution is likely to lead to this desired outcome. A chief problem is 
that there are competing plausible normative and causal theories, and little agreed upon way to 
choose between them. In response, Elster suggests that we should shift our focus to the proce-
dures likely to lead to good design, i.e. procedures that diminish partiality and irrationality 
from decision-making.39 
 Applied to constitutional design, this line of thinking emphasizes the importance of focus-
ing on the constitution-making process, rather than simply dwelling on what an ideal constitu-
tion might look like.40 Given that there is no independent criterion that tells us exactly what a 
good constitution is for a particular polity, Elster suggests, the best we can do is design a con-
stitution-making process that eliminates biases and other sources of irrationality and partiali-
ty. In pursuit of this goal, Elster outlines a series of procedures and conditions for constitu-
tion-making designed to amplify the collective wisdom of framers, defined as “impartial moti-
vation conjoined with rational beliefs.”41 For example, he explains that ensuring that the as-
sembly is not too small, instituting time limits, and separating the constitution-making body 
                                                                                                                                            
Legislatures in the Constitutional State, ed. Richard W. Bauman and Tsvi Kahana (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006); Jon Elster, "The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly," in Collective Wisdom 
(College de France2008); Elster, "Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections." 
39 Elster, "Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections," 11-16. 
40 Elster’s suggestions were and remain quite influential, launching a virtual cottage industry on constitution-
making design, of which this dissertation seeks to be a part. For a general review see Ginsburg, Elkins, and 
Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?." 
41 Elster, "The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly," 151. 
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from the legislature reduces the effects of partial self or group interest. Locating the constitu-
ent assembly away from major cities and cloaking the proceedings in full or partial secrecy 
tempers passions such as fear and vanity. In addition, designing selection mechanisms to an 
assembly in a way that encourages diversity and representativeness increases epistemic quality 
by facilitating optimal information gathering.   
 Each of the arguments Elster makes for his constitution-making suggestions are general 
and appeal to values—mainly the elimination of bias and other sources of irrationality—to 
produce reasons in support of his recommendations. My goal in this project is to investigate 
whether similar ex ante justifications can be found in favor of implementing ratification. In 
other words, I ask: why should constitution-makers use ratification? 
4. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Ratification is likely used without explanation because on its face it is entirely intuitive. In 
many ways, submitting a constitution to ratification just seems like the proper thing to do. 
Everyone in a polity cannot create their constitution, so by necessity they are created by some 
sort of elites. Since this is the case, ratification seems like a necessary means of holding them 
accountable. In addition, if we are committed to creating a constitutional democracy, why 
should the ultimate basis for governmental authority not be approved through the ultimate 
democratic or representative act? Democratic constitutions are meant to rest on popular au-
thority, this is why so many of them contain a variant of ‘We the People,’ and ratification 
seems like a surefire way to accomplish this. Finally, the entire point of constitution-making is 
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to create not just a mere constitution, but also a legitimate constitution, and ratification seems 
like an excellent way to foster legitimacy. 
These intuitions appeal to what appear to be the most plausible sources of justification for 
ratification: the value of representation, the necessity of constituent power constitution-
making, and the importance of legitimacy. In the chapters that follow I test these justificatory 
sources and intuitions by constructing and analyzing arguments based on them. In the process, 
I sometimes take seriously arguments that no one has made and that no one is likely to ever 
make. My goal in these instances is not to construct straw men that I can easily knock down, 
but instead to show that fuzzy intuitions about normative democratic concepts are much 
harder to use to justify political decisions and institutions than they are normally believed to 
be.  
CHAPTER 2: HOLDING FRAMERS TO ACCOUNT 
In this chapter I investigate whether ratification receives its justification from the role it plays 
in a constitution-making representative process. Specifically, I develop and analyze a represen-
tation justification of ratification (RJR), which consists of three propositions: (1) constitution-
makers can be representatives; (2) framers should be representatives; and (3) ratification pro-
cedures enable constitution-makers to be representatives. Briefly put, I argue that an account-
ability mechanism is a necessary institutional feature of any plausible account of political rep-
resentation, that constitution-makers can be representatives only if such a mechanism exists, 
that ratification is the only existing procedure that might serve this purpose, and that this is 
the only role that ratification might play in a constitutional representative process. I then show 
that ratification cannot serve as an accountability mechanism because of the potential diver-
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gence between how a principle evaluates his representative and a draft constitution. This 
means that RJR fails because ratification cannot be an accountability mechanism. In addition, 
it suggests that framers are not representatives. I end the chapter exploring the possibility of 
creating an accountability mechanism for constitution-makers, but questioning the underlying 
assumption that constitution-makers should be conceptualized as representatives at all.  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTITUENT POWER SPEAKS 
This chapter is the first of three to analyze the justificatory force of the concept and theory of 
constituent power for ratification. First, I begin by exploring the theoretical background of the 
theory and drawing out its chief characteristics. Constituent power theory extends the distinc-
tion between extraordinary and ordinary law to the political realm, positing the existence of an 
ultimate source of authority that creates the constitution and thereby legitimizes the state. 
This constituent power, identified solely with the people, legitimizes itself, cannot be con-
strained by external authority, and remains independent from the constituted powers it pro-
duces. Second, I explain how constituent power might justify ratification. A constituent power 
justification (CPJ) claims that the people must create the constitution and justifies ratification 
by identifying it as a moment in constitution-making process where the people can manifest 
and take action.  
Third, starting from a discussion of Sieyès’ attempt to explain how the people can write a 
constitution when a mass assembly is impossible, I posit three possible CPJs: a multiple mo-
ments justification claims that ratification serves as one of several essential moments of con-
stituent power in the constitution-making process; the ameliorative function justification de-
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fends ratification by characterizing it as a moment of constituent power made necessary by 
prior deficiencies in the constitution-making process; and a multiple attempts justification 
portrays ratification as one of several imperfect attempts at creating, manifesting, and enabling 
constituent power to act. I conclude the chapter explaining how each of these justifications fail 
in different ways, but how the deficiencies of each push us towards a final CPJ that characteriz-
es ratification as the single moment of constituent power in the constitution-making process. 
CHAPTER 4: THE SINGLE MOMENT OF CONSTITUENT POWER 
This chapter develops the single moment justification (SMJ) pointed to by the conclusions of 
the prior chapter. I argue that such a justification actually exists within the constitutional the-
ory of the Berkshire Constitutionalists, a political faction in Western Massachusetts that suc-
cessfully prevented the local courts of law from sitting in Berkshire County and the surround-
ing towns from 1774 to 1780. In the course of their battle with the provisional state authori-
ties, the Constitutionalists articulated a version of SMJ to explain why a constitution should be 
ratified, and their writings remain the most extensive and powerful theoretical discussion of 
ratification to date. Put simply, the Berkshire Constitutionalists argue that the exercise of con-
stituent power is unalienable, emerging solely during ratification and never penetrating the 
drafting process. This chapter introduces the Berkshire Constitutionalists, explains their role 
in Massachusetts constitutional, reconstructs their theory of constituent power and the sole 
moment justification, and shows how it avoids the problems of incoherence and redundancy 
faced by Sieyès’ theory and the other constituent power justification. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE FATE OF SMJ 
Concluding the discussion of constituent power justification, this chapter argues that the sole 
moment justification fails to justify ratification. I first explain how SMJ is premised on the idea 
that constituent power is inalienable, and therefore only applies to ratification by referenda. 
Second, I argue that in order for a referendum vote to serve as a site of constituent action, in-
dividual voters must make what I call a ‘meaningful choice’ on the constitution. That it, they 
must choose whether to accept a proposed constitution on the basis of their understanding of 
the document and the likely results of rejection. Third, I argue that the standard of meaningful 
choice is unlikely to be met in constitutional ratification referenda, for voters will almost cer-
tainly be too ignorant to make the necessary evaluation. I explain that this has nothing to do 
with the stupidity of voters, but stems from the fact that the information needed to evaluate a 
constitution is technical, hard to obtain, and without value for the average citizen in any other 
circumstance. I also explain why this is not an anti-democratic argument, for the standard of 
meaningful choice only applies to ratification referenda because of the particular nature of 
SMJ. Fourth, I rebut a series of likely objection to my dismissal of SMJ on the basis of igno-
rance. These include the claim that the standard of meaningful choice is so high that constitu-
tion-makers will not even meet it, that information shortcuts enable voters to make informed 
ratification choices even if they are ignorant, and that education campaigns can combat voter 
ignorance. I conclude the chapter explaining why, in the end, constituent power does not pro-
vide a reason for implementing ratification. 
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CHAPTER 6: RATIFICATION & LEGITIMACY 
In chapter six, I examine a justification for ratification based on legitimacy. Such an argument 
claims that ratification should be implemented because it helps create a legitimate constitu-
tion. First, however, I break down the concept of legitimacy into three interrelated types: 
something is morally legitimate if there is an acceptable moral justification for its claim to au-
thority; sociologically legitimate is a significant portion of the relevant population believes it to 
be morally legitimate; and legally legitimate if it is lawful according to the legal system of which 
it is a part. I then apply these types of legitimacy to constitutions, and argue that when it 
comes to constitution-making, legal legitimacy is either irrelevant or collapses into sociological 
legitimacy. Next, I explain that a procedure might affect the legitimacy of an outcome, in this 
case the legitimacy of a constitution, in one of two ways: it can serve as a normative criterion 
itself and validate its own outcome (procedural effect); or it can affect the substance of the out-
come such that it meets or comes closer to meeting some independent normative criterion 
(substantive effect). Combined with the two relevant types of legitimacy, this distinction pro-
duces four pathways through which ratification might legitimate a constitution: procedural 
moral legitimation; procedural sociological legitimation; substantive moral legitimation; and 
substantive sociological legitimation. In the remainder of this chapter I sketch out and exam-
ine arguments that fit into each one of these pathways. I conclude that more work needs to be 
done on examining whether ratification helps legitimate a constitution, but that upon initial 




The conclusion examines the implications of my analysis. I begin suggesting that there is no 
generally applicable justification for submitting constitutions to ratification, but that this is 
necessarily a preliminary conclusion since it is impossible to demonstrate that all possible ar-
guments fail to provide good reasons for the procedure. Of the justifications I analyzed, those 
pertaining to legitimacy seem most persuasive. Specifically, the claims that ratification might 
involve procedural social legitimation or substantive social legitimation (by constraining fram-
ers) are plausible, but both effects might be accomplished through the implementation of oth-
er constitution-making procedures that heighten the publicity and inclusiveness of the consti-
tution-making process without letting a possibly arbitrary voting outcome decide the fate of 
the constitution. In addition, both effects may be contingent on a particular nexus of political 
values absent in certain contexts. I end by examining the other implications of the project, spe-
cifically the potential difficulties associated with conceptualizing framers as representatives 






HOLDING FRAMERS TO ACCOUNT: 
Ratification within Representation 
 
“[T]he most balanced system of electoral representation does not, in itself, 
ensure continuing accountability to the public throughout a [constitution] 
drafting process, which can be expected to throw up new problems, solu-
tions, and compromises along the way. The constitution-making body may 
be entrusted to act as it sees fit, required to return to public scrutiny during 
its proceedings, or required to subject the draft constitution to parliamen-
tary, judicial, or electoral review before promulgation. Whatever the chosen 
mechanism, the principle of the accountability of decision makers does re-
quire that the ‘process is made receptive’ and that the public be ‘regularly 




This chapter asks whether ratification can be justified by the role it plays in maintaining a rep-
resentative relationship between framers and their constituents. This might seem counterintu-
itive at first. An instance in the constitution-making process in which citizens or their dele-
gates directly vote the constitution up or down seems to be a primary site of action itself, one 
in which ratifiers serve as central actors, and not merely a mechanism or element in a larger 
representative process.43 In this sense, ratification seems as likely to play a role in constitution-
making representation as citizen referendums play in the normal workings of contemporary 
representative democracies.  
                                                
42 Vivien Hart, "Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair," in Framing the State in 
Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 33. 
43 I thank Bernard Manin for pointing this out. 
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However, several connections between ratification and representation challenge this skep-
ticism. The conceptual and terminological history of ratification is the first. Ratification has 
been associated with representation since its inception in Roman law, where it served as a ret-
roactive means of creating a relationship very much like representation. According to the Di-
gest of Justinian, debtors could only pay off their debts directly to the creditor or to a mandated 
procurator. However, for certain matters, payment given to an unauthorized agent released 
the debtor if the creditor later ratified the transaction, for “ratification is likened to mandate.”44 
This conception of ratification migrated via canon law to English and American contract and 
tort law, where it became the second legal maxim of agency: ‘every ratification relates back, and 
is equivalent to a prior authority.’45 As with its Roman formulation, this maxim makes possible 
situations in which “an alleged principal by adopting an act which was unlawful when done can 
make it lawful.”46 In other words, ratification transforms an unauthorized action taken on an 
absent person’s behalf into an authorized one, causing “the transaction to be treated as if there 
had been authority in the first place,” and thus serves as an ex post means of creating something 
like representation.47 In more contemporary uses of the procedure, particularly those involving 
                                                
44 Alan Watson, Theodor Mommsen, and Paul Krueger, eds., The Digest of Justinian, vol. IV (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), Book 46, 3. Here, ‘ratification’ refers to formal acceptance. 
45 Omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitur, et mandato priori acquiparatur. See Edwin C. Goddard, "Ratification by an 
Undisclosed Principal," Michigan Law Review 2, no. 1 (1903): 25; Gualtiero Procaccia, "On the Theory and 
History of Ratification in the Law of Agency," Tel Aviv University Studies in Law 4(1978-1979). 
46 Dempsey v. Chambers, 154 Mass. 330, 332 (1891). Holmes goes on to trace the history of the doctrine from 
Roman law to Lord Coke. 
47 Mechem, "The Rationale of Ratification," 650. Perhaps the American founders used this ex post legitimating 
conception of ratification when implementing the procedure following the Philadelphia Convention, in that 
they saw ratification as an after the fact means of transforming their illegal or unsanctioned actions—for as 
Wilson said they had the “power to conclude nothing”—into those of properly authorized actors. Max Farrand, 
ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), I.266. 
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collective bargaining, ratification combines with authorization to complete a representative 
relationship, rather than serving as a corrective. For example, elected union leaders negotiate 
contracts with employers, but must get member approval before any contract goes into effect.48  
Second, constitution-makers are often identified as representatives. The popular imagina-
tion and news media certainly depict framers as such. For instance, The Ottawa Citizen ex-
plained to its readers that the constituent assembly proposed by a government task force in 
1991 was “a specially selected body of representatives… chosen to meet for the sole purpose of 
drafting the terms of a new constitution.”49 Academics and scholars writing on constitution-
making, both theorists and empiricists, describe framers similarly. Sieyès famously claimed 
that only “a number of genuinely extraordinary representatives” could “determine the constitu-
tion,” and Friedman and Stokes, in one of the few empirical studies about the behavior of 
framers, assume that they are representatives without discussion.50 Moreover, organizations 
assisting in contemporary constitution-making also portray framers as representatives. Con-
sider the UNDP’s involvement in Nepal’s ongoing efforts to create a constitution; they dis-
tributed workbooks to the 2008 Constituent Assembly describing it as “a body of representa-
                                                                                                                                            
Ackerman sometimes hints at this role for ratification, though he mostly sees the procedure as conferring legit-
imacy, which I discuss in chapter 6. See Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People 2: Transformations  (Cambridge, 
Mass ; London: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., 1998), Book. 57-64.     
48 See Hans Haller and Steinar Holden, "Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power," International 
Economic Review 38, no. 4 (1997); James E. Martin, James E. Martin Berthiaume, and Ruth D., "Predicting the 
Outcome of a Contract Ratification Vote," The Academy of Management Journal 38, no. 3 (1995). 
49 Robert Mason Lee, "Task force supports constituent assembly," The Ottawa Citizen, April 24, 1991. Similarly, 
over a century earlier, The New York Times described constitution-making in France as “the French nation” be-
ing “called upon to utter its will through its duly-elected representatives.” "The Constituent Assembly," The 
New York Times, November 6, 1870. 
50 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, "What is the Third Estate?," in Political Writings: Including the Debate between 
Sieyès and Tom Paine in 1791, trans. and ed. by Michael Sonenscher (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Com-
pany, 2003), 140; Robert S. Friedman and Susan Stokes, "The Role of Constitution-Maker as Representative," 
Midwest Journal of Political Science 9, no. 2 (May 1965): 149.  
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tives chosen by the people to manage the transition process,” and offered an “Effective Repre-
sentation” workshop.51  
Third, ratification is sometimes treated as an essential component of a constitution-
making representative process. In the above epigraph, Hart implies as much, for she includes 
ratification procedures amidst a list of potential accountability mechanisms for framers, later 
concluding: “a referendum can be a means of holding representatives to account and creating 
legitimacy for the constitution.”52 Similarly, in her analysis of constitution-making amidst con-
flict, Widner treats ratification via referendum as a factor in measuring the level of representa-
tion and participation.53 
The central task of this chapter is to probe the association suggested by these observations, 
to see whether framers are representatives, whether ratification plays some sort of role in a 
constitutional representative process, and whether this role might serve as a source for justifi-
cation. To do this, I develop and analyze what I call the representation justification for ratifi-
cation (RJ), which is the general form of an argument justifying or giving reasons for imple-
menting ratification based on its contribution to representation. RJ consists of four central 
propositions: 
                                                
51 See "Participatory Constitution Making Process,"  in Participatory Constitution Building in Nepal Booklet Series 
(Kathmandu: Centre for Constitutional Dialogue, 2009), 1; "Support to Constitution Building: Introductory 
Workshops/Interaction Programmes," United Nations Development Programme, Nepal, 
http://www.undp.org.np/constitutionbuilding-archive/newsundp/introductory.php. 
52 Hart, "Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair," 36. 
53 Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution," 7-8. 
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P1   Framers can be representatives 
P2   Framers should be representatives 
P3   Ratification procedures enable framers to be representatives. 
P4   One should implement ratification procedures. 
P4 follows from the previous propositions, and for the purposes of this analysis, I assume that 
P2 follows from P1. There are numerous arguments one could make supporting P2—perhaps 
representative framers increase the perceived legitimacy of the constitution-making process 
and/or are uniquely able to foster the widespread deliberation and discussion needed for prop-
er constitutional education—but for the moment these do not concern us.54  
This leaves P1 and P2, which I examine in the following manner. First, I sketch out a gen-
eral outline of democratic political representation. Second, after explaining ratification’s neces-
sarily procedural role in the representative process, I define an accountability mechanism and 
claim that P3 can only be true if ratification serves as one. Third, I argue that an accountability 
mechanism is a necessary component of any representative process, and that as a result RJ 
produces an extremely strong justification for ratification if P3 is true. Fourth, I show that rat-
ification is the only component of constitution-making that might serve as an accountability 
mechanism, but conclude that it cannot because of the potential divergence between how a 
principle evaluates his representative framer and the draft constitution. Fifth, I summarize my 
two main findings: RJ fails because ratification cannot be an accountability mechanism and 
that constitution-makers are unlikely to be democratic political representatives as a result. I 
                                                
54 Laurel E. Miller, "Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future," 
in Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 627; Vivien Hart, "Democratic Constitution 
Making," (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, July 2003), 3; Moehler, Distrusting Democrats: 
Outcomes of Participatory Constitution Making: 32-33. 
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conclude exploring the possibility of creating an accountability mechanism for framers, yet 
questioning the underlying impetus to conceptualize framers as representatives at all.  
1. REPRESENTATION & ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
Examining RJ requires some working conception of representation, specifically political repre-
sentation in its democratic form. I restrict the scope to politics because this is the core subject 
matter—what representation means in a court room or an Olympic playing field is of little 
concern—and I specify its democratic form because I am only interested in democratic consti-
tution-making.55 Here, as discussed in the introduction, ‘democratic’ simply means aligned 
with the norm that those affected by collective decisions should have an opportunity to influ-
ence their outcome.56 Any other form of political representation would invalidate P2. 
1.1 REPRESENTATION & THE REPRESENTATIVE PROCESS 
Most generally, political representation is an institutionalized relationship in which represent-
atives mediate between citizens and political decision-making.57 It involves an agent a, who 
                                                
55 This means my discussion of representation has normative elements, in that it concerns what it means to be a 
legitimate representative in a particular normative context, rather than a representative in general. As Rehfeld 
demonstrates this imposes limitations, for it renders my account unable to conceptualize illegitimate represen-
tation or understand representation outside democracy or traditional politics. However, while he makes a 
strong case for needing a non-normative descriptive account of representation, the limitations he details do not 
apply here. We are only interest in legitimate forms of representation, for illegitimate ones will not justify im-
plementing ratification, and as already noted we are only concerns with politics and democratic forms of consti-
tution-making. Andrew Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory of Political Representation," The Journal of 
Politics 68, no. 1 (2006). 
56 See Robert Alan Dahl, On Democracy  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000). 37-38; Jürgen Habermas, 
Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy, trans. William Rehg 
(Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1996). 107; Nadia Urbinati and Mark Warren, "The Concept of 
Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory," Annual Review of Political Science 11(2008): 395.  
57 This excludes any non-relational uses of representation. For example, in “Democracy in Iraq: Representation 
through Ratification,” the authors define representation as getting what one wants, claiming that during Iraq’s 
Constitutional Convention the numerically disadvantaged Kurds and Sunnis secured representation by extract-
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represents a constituency b for an audience c, for the purpose of some activity d, and is charac-
terized by a acting for or on behalf of b (x-ing) during d. In the constitution-making setting, a 
would be a framer, b the soon-to-be-governed populace or a portion of it, c the other framers 
and perhaps the members of their constituencies, and d the act of creating a constitution.58  
Specifying political representation further than this quickly becomes complicated, for the con-
cept has been mired in theoretical and interpretive controversy since its inception over two 
millennia ago. Today, representation stands for something more than a pragmatic solution to 
large states or the inevitable application of the division of labor to government, but exactly 
what this might be remains open to debate.59 Pitkin’s The Concept of Representation rejuvenat-
ed and gave shape to subsequent discussion, but while her claim that political representation is 
a particular form of acting for others is generally accepted, this description—as even she ad-
mitted—is broad and can mean any number of things.60 Thus, representation continues to be 
the subject of several on-going discussions in democratic theory, with scholars clashing over 
details such as appropriate representative behavior, representation’s ability to foster inclusion 
and exclusion, the compatibility of representation with democracy, and how existing theories 
                                                                                                                                            
ing compromises from Iraq’s political and ethnic majority. "Note: Democracy in Iraq: Representation through 
Ratification," Harvard Law Review 119(2005-06): 1202. This use of representation has nothing to do with a re-
lationship—it instead refers to the outcome of a decision-making process—and therefore falls outside the scope 
of the concept as I and most representation scholars define it. Malcolm E. Jewell, "Legislator-Constituency 
Relations and the Representative Process," Legislative Studies Quarterly 8, no. 3 (1983): 306. 
58 As I discuss below, x varies depending upon which robust conception of representation one endorses. For a 
discussion of the importance of audience in a general definition of representation, something frequently over-
looked, see Rehfeld, "Towards a General Theory," 4-11; David Runciman and Monica Brito Vieira, 
Representation  (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008). 69-70. 
59 Nadia Urbinati, "Representation as Advocacy," Political Theory 28, no. 6 (2000): 758. 
60 Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation  (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967). 
  
34 
can accommodate new political forms.61 As Brennan and Hamlin tersely explain, “Ideas of rep-
resentation in political theory are notoriously diffuse and recalcitrant.”62 
Fortunately, examining RJ does not require wading too far into this debate, much of which 
concerns the nature of the representative relationship and the proper activity of representatives 
(x). We can sidestep many of these and related discussions because our direct focus is on the 
potential role of a particular procedure in inducing representation, not representative behavior 
itself. Instead, we are concerned with the representative process, the combination of those in-
stitutions, procedures, and mechanisms that structure and foster representation. Moreover, 
the contents of the representative process are relatively uncontroversial and historically sta-
ble.63 As Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes point out, “what has been in contention since the es-
tablishment of representative government concerns primarily the nature of the activity of rep-
                                                
61 For an overview of representation literature in contemporary democratic theory, see Urbinati and Warren, 
"The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory." Seminal post-Pitkin works include: 
Suzanne Dovi, The Good Representative  (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2007); Bernard Manin, The 
Principles of Representative Democracy  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Jane Mansbridge, 
"Rethinking Representation," American Political Science Review 97, no. 4 (November, 2003); Anne Phillips, The 
Politics of Presence  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Andrew Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 
Political Representation, Democratic Legitimacy, and Institutional Design  (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005); Nancy Schwartz, The Blue Guitar: Political Representation and Community  (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1988); Urbinati and Warren, "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic 
Theory."; Melissa S. Williams, Voice, trust, and memory : marginalized groups and the failings of liberal 
representation  (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), Book; Iris Marion Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Difference  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
62 Geoffrey Brennan and Alex Hamlin, "On Political Representation," British Journal of Political Science 29, no. 1 
(Jan., 1999): 1. 
63 The mechanisms and procedures I describe are ancillary to representation and not part of it. To think other-
wise is, as Pitkin famously claimed, to endorse a flawed and formalistic account of representation. Pitkin, The 
Concept of Representation: chapter 3. 
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resenting, not the procedures and institutional relationship that induce political representa-
tion.”64  
 These procedures usually include at least the following: a popular selection or authoriza-
tion mechanism; some avenue through which principals can make demands of and communi-
cate with representatives; and an accountability mechanism.65 Each of these occurs at particu-
lar temporal moments in the representative process. For instance, selection mechanisms oper-
ate at the beginning because representatives do not exist and cannot act until chosen by their 
constituents. Among these three procedures and other less common components of represen-
tation, only accountability mechanisms occur after d.66 Since ratification necessarily follows the 
creation of a constitution, for the people cannot accept or reject a constitution until it is writ-
ten, the only procedural role in a representative process that ratification can play is as an ac-
countability mechanism. In fact, ratification is conceptualized as an accountability mechanism 
in the few existing discussions of the procedure. For instance, Elster notes “it is certainly desir-
able that self-created constituent legislatures should be held accountable in some way, either 
by reelection or by downstream ratification of the constitution.”67 Thus, P3 transforms into 
                                                
64
Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan Stokes, "Introduction," in Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Bernard Manin, and Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University press, 1999), 3.  
65 See ibid.; Urbinati and Warren, "The Concept of Representation in Contemporary Democratic Theory," 396; 
Dario Castiglione and Mark Warren, "Rethinking Democratic Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues," in 
Rethinking Democratic Representation (Centre for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of British 
ColumbiaMay 18-19, 2006), 6.  
66 This is not to say that accountability mechanisms solely operate after d, but rather that they are the only proce-
dures that can. For instance, the ability of constituent to hold recall elections serves as an accountability mecha-
nism that can operate during rather than after the representative activity.  
67 Elster, "Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections," 345. 
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“Ratification procedures enable constitution-makers to be representatives by serving as ac-
countability mechanisms” and necessitates a discussion of the nature of this mechanism.  
1.2 ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
An accountability mechanism is a procedure or set of procedures that gives principals the ex 
post ability to sanction and reward their agents on the basis of their performance, which in 
turn gives these principals incentives to justify and explain their actions.68 Of course, not every 
ex post action that evaluates representative behavior counts as an accountability mechanism. 
For example, the shouts and threats of violence from the streets of Paris and the galleries of 
the Estates-Generale in 1789 were public evaluative responses, but the ad-hoc, uncontrollable, 
and violent nature of such practices makes them too unpredictable to institute or plan for.69 
Thus, when we refer to accountability mechanisms, particularly from an institutional design 
perspective, we mean those integrated into the representative process, and ad-hoc responses to 
unfavorable actions taken by representatives cannot be so integrated. 
Accountability has roughly three interrelated dimensions: an explanatory dimension in 
which a representative explains his actions to his constituents, an evaluative dimension in which 
constituents form a judgment, and a sanctioning dimension in which constituents sanction (or 
                                                
68 The increasing tendency to use ‘accountability’ to stand for a myriad of concepts unrelated to holding an agent 
to account has diluted the meaning and force of the concept. See Richard Mulgan, "'Accountability': An Ever-
Expanding Concept," Public Administration 78, no. 3 (2000). One example can be seen in the CHRI’s consti-
tution-making recommendations, which reduce accountability to a combination of transparency and public ed-
ucation. See Hassen Ebrahim, Kayode Fayemi, and Stephanie Loomis, "Promoting a Culture of 
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa: Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of 
Government," (Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 1999), 16.  
69
See Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 168; Susan Maslan, "Resisting Representation: Theater 
and Democracy in Revolutionary France," Representations, no. 52 (Autumn 1995).  
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reward) their representative in accordance with this judgment.70 All three of these dimensions 
are important, and distorted conceptions of accountability arise from overemphasizing or ig-
noring one of them. For instance, recent strains of deliberative democratic theory have ignored 
sanctioning and overemphasized the explanatory dimension of accountability, focusing on the 
importance of representatives giving reasons for their decisions and the institutions that foster 
this occurrence.71 The resulting conception of accountability is insufficient, for an unelected 
autocrat immune from sanctioning might explain every detail of her decision-making process 
yet remain accountable to no one but herself. Accountability requires that constituents have 
power, and solely concentrating on the explanatory dimension deprives them of this.72   
Two additional features of accountability mechanisms are worth noting. First, as Grant 
and Keohane explain, accountability “implies that some actors have the right to hold other ac-
tors to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their responsibilities in light of 
these standards, and to impose sanctions if they determine that these responsibilities haves not 
been met.”73 In other words, accountability mechanisms require the existence of some standard 
of conduct for representatives to follow. Usually this standard of evaluation is x, which might 
include such variables as the proper aims of a, the means through which a defines these aims, 
                                                
70 Rehfeld and Maloy describe similar dimensions of accountability but neglect constituent evaluation and repre-
sentation explanation respectively. See Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 189; ibid.; J. S. Maloy, The 
Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 25. 
71 Amy Gutmann and Dennis F. Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996). As Maloy claims, they “depict the face of democratic accountability with a tongue but no teeth.” 
Maloy, The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought: 182. 
72 Rehfeld makes a similar point, when he explains how a representative who stole money from constituents una-
ble to sanction cannot claim to be accountable simply because she explains that she used the money to buy a 
new car. Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 189. 
73 Ruth W. Grant and Robert O. Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics," American 
Political Science Review 99, no. 1 (February 2005): 29. 
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and the source of judgment a is to use when trying to reach them.74 For instance, in a theory 
claiming that representatives should use their own personal judgment to maximize the public 
good as their constituents define it, constituents should base their evaluations of the actions 
and explanations of their representatives in accordance with how far they believe the repre-
sentatives adhered or deviated from this standard.75  
Second, accountability mechanisms must target particular representatives.76 Constituents 
use accountability mechanisms to evaluate the actions and behaviors of those acting for them. 
Such particularity is important, for the presence of multiple representatives in democratic set-
tings is predicated on the existence or constant possibility of pluralism, meaning that the ac-
tions needed to represent one constituency might be different than those needed to represent 
another.77 Thus, since representatives may act differently than one another even in perfect 
conditions, for their constituencies might make divergent demands, they should be evaluated 
independently. In a sense, accountability mechanisms would be unable to achieve their own 
purpose if their subject was the general behavior of all representatives or the outcome of the 
                                                
74 This is a modified version of the 3 distinctions Rehfeld finds in the trustee/delegate debate. Andrew Rehfeld, 
"Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the Study of Political Representation 
and Democracy," American Political Science Review 103, no. 2 (May 2009): 215. 
75
 Thus, Fearon defines accountability as the following: “We say that one person, A, is accountable to another, B, 
if two conditions are met. First, there is an understanding that A is obliged to act in some way on behalf of B. 
Second, B is empowered by some formal institutional or perhaps informal rules to sanction or reward A for her 
activities or performance in this capacity.” James D. Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of 
Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance," in Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Bernard Manin, and Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 55.  
76 However, note that this does not exclude accountability mechanisms from applying to more than one person, 
as they do in systems of party-list proportional representation. In these instances, the particularity of the ac-
countability remains, for except in extreme instances, a party only populates a proportion of the total number of 
all representatives. 
77 See Jürgen Habermas, The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory, trans. Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge, 
MA: The MIT Press, 1996). 108.  
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representative process, rather than particular representatives, insofar as this would sever the 
bond between any particular constituency and their representative, and treat all representatives 
equally even when their behavior differed.78  
2. THE NECESSITY OF ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS 
The importance of accountability mechanisms for political representation is one of the key 
factors in determining the strength of RJ. If, for example, accountability mechanisms are help-
ful but inessential, if a functioning representative process is made easier with accountability 
mechanisms but can occur in their absence, then the most RJ will produce is a weak justifica-
tion for ratification. However, such worries are misguided here, for RJ has the potential to 
show that ratification is a necessary component of any constitution-making process. This 
stems from the fact that, as I argue in this section, accountability mechanisms are necessary for 
any instance of political representation. 
Admittedly, despite my previous reservations, explaining why this is so requires comment-
ing further on the activity of political representation. In order to minimize the number of the-
ories that my argument excludes because of the conception of representation that I endorse, I 
only lay out what I assume to be a few standard features of any plausible comprehensive ac-
count of democratic political representation. This allows me to determine that a particular re-
                                                
78 Admittedly, principals often refer to the outcomes of collective decision-making bodies when evaluating their 
participant representatives, but this is for heuristical purposes and the subject of their sanctions and rewards 
remain a particular representative. I discuss this point further in §3.3. 
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lationship or institutional set-up is not or cannot foster political representation, without being 
forced to create or endorse any one specific comprehensive account.79  
2.1 ACCOUNTABILITY AS A MEANS OF CONTROL 
Why are accountability mechanisms necessary for political representation? The most popular 
explanation is representative control, the idea being that accountability mechanisms are one of 
the few ways that individuals can influence their representatives to behave in a desired way, i.e. 
to x.80 “Though they always operate ex post,” Grant and Keohane explain, “accountability 
mechanism can exert effects ex ante, since the anticipation of sanctions may deter the powerful 
from abusing their positions in the first place.”81 Here, the assumption is that representatives, 
if left to their own devices, might shirk their responsibility and not x.82 Thus, constituents dole 
out sanctions and rewards based on the degree to which their representatives x, with the inten-
tion of incentivizing their representatives to act in the desired manner. Specifically, the hope is 
that representatives will x because of their natural predilection to do what their constituents 
want, and because they are concerned about the retrospective judgments they anticipate their 
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 Thomas Pogge uses a similar strategy, which he calls a ‘modest criterion,’ when he attempts to bypass disa-
greements about the full content of justice by putting forth two minimal conditions that any plausible concep-
tion of justice might include. Thomas Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 2008). 43-44. Manin, et al. and Rehfeld claim to use a similar approach. See Manin, Przeworski, and 
Stokes, "Introduction," 2; Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 80. 
80 Some scholars even claim that accountability mechanisms are only about control. See Maloy, The Colonial 
American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought: 7; Terry Macdonald and Kate Macdonald, "Non-Electoral 
Accountability in Global Politics: Strengthening Democratic Control within the Global Garmet Industry," The 
European Journal of International Law 17, no. 1 (2006). 
81 Grant and Keohane, "Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics," 30. 
82 For discussions of shirking, seeJames B. Kau and Paul H. Rubin, "Ideology, voting, and shirking," Public Choice 
76(May 1993); Joseph P. Kalt and Mark A. Zupan, "The Apprent Ideological Behavior of Legislators: Testing 
for Principal-Agent Slack in Political Institutions," Journal of Law and Economics 33, no. 1 (1990). 
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constituents will make when deciding whether to sanction or reward.83 Though this explana-
tion is both intuitive and commonplace, control suffers from two debilitating problems when 
used as a justification for the necessity of accountability mechanisms for representation.   
On the one hand, the point of control is to get representatives to x, and accountability 
mechanisms are not necessary to secure this outcome. As Fearon has argued, if voters are able 
to choose candidates that already want to act like the voters want them to act—this involves 
identifying a candidate with similar issue preferences, personal integrity, and the ability to dis-
cern and implement optimal policies—, then the chosen representatives are likely to x without 
the presence of an accountability mechanism. Fearon writes: “If voters are able to distinguish 
politicians along these three dimensions, then this lack of accountability need not imply that 
the public will not get what it wants. The conclusion: Electoral accountability is not in principle 
necessary for elections to produce responsive public policy.”84  
Mansbridge articulates a similar point in her concept of gyroscopic representation, in 
which citizens gain influence in the political arena by selecting a representative who resembles 
them in a meaningful way. The idea is that such a representative “looks within…to a contextu-
ally derived understanding of interests, interpretive schemes (‘common sense’), conscience, and 
principles,” and takes a course of action that meets voter approval not because of accountabil-
                                                
83
 See Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 178-79; Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan 
Stokes, "Elections and Representation," in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Bernard Manin, 
Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 40-43. 
 Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 178-79,. and Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes, "Elections and 
Representation," 40-43. 
84
 Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning 
Poor Performance," 59. 
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ity mechanisms, but because of shared background, values, and experiences.85 Thus, for exam-
ple, a person who believes that political decisions should be made on the basis of their religion 
would want their political representative to feel the same way, and by choosing such a person, 
they might end up with a representative that x’s with or without an accountability mechanism.  
Besides not being necessary, accountability mechanisms are also not sufficient to induce 
representatives to x. For instance, if x involves assessing the preferences of constituents, repre-
sentatives might fail to x for several reasons. The preferences of constituents might change 
over time, be based on inaccurate or incomplete information, be partially formed or nonexist-
ent on some issues, or simply communicated ineffectively. When representing a group, some 
individuals might communicate their preferences more loudly than others, making it difficult 
to assess the majority opinion. Constituents might have preferences regarding both paths of 
actions and outcomes that only the representative knows are contradictory.86 These and simi-
lar problems can lead a representative to fail to x, regardless of how much motivation ex post 
sanctions and rewards provide. My senator might be driven by an intense desire to please her 
constituents and get reelected, but if misinformed about what we want, her actions will not be 
appropriately responsive. In addition, representatives might not x because voter myopia or ig-
norance causes a divergence between what actions constituents believe x-ing demands and 
                                                
85
 Mansbridge, "Rethinking Representation," 520-21.  See also Dovi, The Good Representative: 158. 
86 For instance, in her study of Latin America from 1982 – 1995, Stokes observes that in many occasions, “citi-
zens were seriously ill-informed about the choices they faced and about the likely consequences of these choic-
es.” Susan C. Stokes, "What do Policy Switches Tell Us About Democracy," in Democracy, Accountability, and 
Representation, ed. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), 126. 
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what the representative knows x-ing actually entails.87 Problems such as these plague almost 
any possible configuration of x. 
Some theorists argue that the above arguments only apply when elections are used as ac-
countability mechanisms. For instance, Maloy claims that the overreliance on elections, which 
are more apt for securing popular consent than control, leads to a lack of accountability in con-
temporary democratic politics. In their place, Maloy proposes something like the special in-
quest mechanism suggested by the Levelers, in which constituents investigate their representa-
tive through special commissions equipped with impeachment powers and the ability to levy 
fines.88 However, while alternative mechanisms might avoid some of the reasons why elections 
fail to make representatives x, they cannot overcome the inherent difficulty faced by a repre-
sentative trying to assess what constituents want or what may be in their best interest, or elim-
inate the effects of the inevitable informational asymmetries between the two.89 Thus, for these 
and other reasons, accountability mechanisms are neither necessary nor sufficient for inducing 
representatives to x and some additional explanation is needed to explain their necessity. 
                                                
87 Sometimes voter myopia drives politicians to influence rather than respond to public opinion: “Politicians 
might think that if their policies adhere to the ex ante configuration of preferences that are temporally incon-
sistent, they may pay the costs later on, when the long-term negative consequences emerge.” Jose Maria 
Maravall, "Accountability and Manipulation," in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Bernard 
Manin, Adam Przeworski, and Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 156. 
88 Maloy, The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought: 7-8, 45-49. 
89 For instance, midterm impeachment might be a greater deterrent than not being reelected, unscheduled in-
quests might prevent representatives from grouping popular and unpopular actions to evade electoral responsi-
bility, and targeted investigations might make it more difficult for representatives to play voters against one an-
other. See ibid., chapter 2; John Ferejohn, "Accountability and Authority: Toward a Political Theory of 
Accountability," in Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Bernard Manin, Adam Przeworski, and 
Susan C. Stokes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 132. 
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 2.2 PRESENCE AND REPRESENTATION 
A second reason for the necessity of accountability mechanisms is more complicated but ulti-
mately more persuasive: accountability mechanisms are necessary because they serve as the 
procedural means through which the paradox of representation is transcended by principles 
gaining non-physical presence in the actions of their partially independent representatives.90 
The ‘paradox of representation’ refers to Hannah Pitkin’s claim that the modern conception of 
representation demands “the making present in some sense of something which is nevertheless 
not present literally or in fact.”91  
The basic idea behind this claim is the following: representation involves one agent acting 
for (x-ing) another agent who is physically absent from the action in question, i.e. the repre-
sented is not literally present.92 However, this description applies to many relationships that 
are not representative in character. A person I hire to water my plant is not my representative, 
                                                
90 My reliance on presence as an explanation for the necessity of accountability mechanisms was inspired by a 
discussion in David Runciman’s article “The Paradox of Representation,” in which he argues that the possibility 
and ‘occurrence’ of non-objection is a crucial aspect of how Pitkin understood political representation and re-
solved its paradox. Runciman goes on to adapt this non-objection criterion to the representation of groups in 
order to apply Pitkin’s theory to the institutional arrangements of contemporary democracies. For the discus-
sion relevant to my argument, see David Runciman, "The Paradox of Political Representation," The Journal of 
Political Philosophy 15, no. 1 (2007): 93-99.  
91
 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation: 9; Hannah F. Pitkin, "Commentary: The Paradox of Representation," in 
Representation, ed. Roland J. Pennock and John W. Chapman (New York: Atherton, 1968), 41. Pitkin short-
ened her articulation of the paradox in her most recent article on representation, where she simply states: repre-
sentation “implies a paradox (being present and yet not present).” Hannah F. Pitkin, "Representation and 
Democracy: Uneasy Alliance," Scandinavian Political Studies 27, no. 3 (2004): 335. 
92 One response to this discussion might be that presence does not lead to a paradox at all, but rather a problem 
or a puzzle, and that Pitkin was somehow confused in thinking that representation involved “a philosophical 
paradox.” However, as David Runciman points out, Pitkin’s point was that a paradox exists, but that it is lin-
guistic, not simply formal or logical;  “‘re-presentation’ implies that something must be present in order to be re-
presented’ but also absent in order to be ‘re-presented’”. This feature of presence in representation is why, as I 
elaborate below, the mandate/independence controversy resists any conclusive resolution. As Pitkin writes, “It 
may be, as the notion of paradox in the meaning of representation suggests, that the issue is usually formulated 
in such a way that it cannot be answered and will not allow a consistent response.” See Pitkin, "Commentary: 
The Paradox of Representation," 41-42; Runciman, "The Paradox of Political Representation," 94-95.   
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nor is a friend who picks up my prescriptions when I am sick. In the political arena, a bureau-
crat who negotiates a favorable trade agreement for me and all other citizens of my country is 
not my representative either. Representation is unique because, among other things, the ac-
tions taken by my representative implicate me; in some way they are meant to be actions taken 
by me that I am responsible for. The actions of the plant caretaker, my friend, and the bureau-
crat do not have this effect. It is in this way, by implicating the represented and giving him a 
stake in the action, by granting a kind of artificial yet felt presence, that representation makes 
the non-present present. As Vieira and Runciman note, “It is my presence in the action of 
someone else—the fact that another person is not merely trying to help me but is acting for 
me—that allows me to call that person my representative.”93  
Examining the mandate/independence debate clarifies the meaning of non-physical pres-
ence and the type of representative that makes it possible.94 The two extremes of this some-
what staged debate are familiar. Mandate theorists claim that representation involves mandat-
ed delegates following the explicit instructions of their constituents, while independence theo-
rists claim that it involves independent trustees making decisions using only their own judg-
ment.95 As Pitkin suggests, both positions derive from misinterpreting the paradox of repre-
sentation in opposite yet equally flawed ways. 
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 Runciman and Vieira, Representation: 68. 
94 For a brief discussion of the history of this debate, see Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 217. 
95 The distinction between mandated delegates and independent trustees is widely used in political science, and 
not simply a construct deployed by political theorists. See for example Justin Fox and Kenneth W. Shotts, 
"Delegates or Trustees? A Theory of Political Accountability," The Journal of Politics 71, no. 4 (October 2009): 




Practical problems aside, the system of representation favored by mandate theorists hardly 
looks like representation at all. Constituents using imperative mandates deprive their delegates 
of autonomy and rule themselves; they take political action and their delegates merely serve as 
passive tools of execution.96 In this setup, nothing is absent, there is nothing to re-present, and 
thus no representation takes place.97 Thus, a theory of mandated delegates overemphasizes 
presence to such an extent that representation ceases to be a possibility, for delegates unable to 
make independent decisions cannot take actions for and be in a relationship with the constitu-
ents that control them completely.98 
Representation as independent trusteeship is deficient for the opposite reason: a lack of 
constituent presence and an emphasis on absence. Constituents empower trustees to take ac-
tions on their behalf using their own judgment, but while this grants a needed flexibility absent 
for mandated delegates, it also means that representatives can repeatedly deviate from x with-
out formal consequence. As Pitkin notes, “if the situation is such that we can no longer see the 
constituents as present there is no representation, and if the man habitually votes the opposite 
                                                
96 For some theorists, this is exactly what actual representation must entail. For instance, Hans Kelsen claims that 
“in order to establish a true relationship of representation…it is necessary that the representative be legally 
obliged to execute the will of the represented, and that the fulfillment of this obligation be legally guaranteed.” 
A similar idea is expressed by Rousseau, when he reluctantly outlines a system of representation with impera-
tive mandates for Poland. In addition, during the French Revolution, Francois Robert applied this conception 
of representation to constitution-making, arguing “that the deputies to the national assembly [France, 1790] 
must have imperative mandates.” See Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State  (New Brunswick: 
Transaction Publishers, 2006). 289-92; Francois Robert, "Republicanism Adapted to France," in Social and 
Political Thought of the French Revolution, 1788-1797: An Anthology of Original Texts, ed. Marc Allan Goldstein 
(New York: Peter Lang, 1997), 214; Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Government of Poland, trans. Willmoore 
Kendall (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1985). 36-37. 
97 This explains why theorists such as Weber classify imperative mandates as characteristics of direct democracy. 
See Max Weber, Economy and society : an outline of interpretive sociology, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1978), Book. 289; Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 163-66. 
98 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation: 151. 
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of their wishes we can no longer see them as present in his voting.”99 In other words, inde-
pendent trustees can repeatedly take actions contrary to what their constituency wants, which 
makes it both impossible to conceive of the constituency as present in their actions and intui-
tively farfetched to describe them as representatives. This problem is exacerbated by the fact 
that theories of trusteeship are silent when it comes to proper representative behavior, that 
they contain nothing about what it means to x or how it can be evaluated. This suggests, “that 
there is no such thing as not representing a person as one should” and that representatives al-
ways x as a result.100 Besides depriving presence of any real meaning, this further weakens trus-
teeship as a mode of representation because whatever the appropriate conception of represen-
tation may be, “It implies standards for, or limits on, the conduct of the representative.”101 
Neither of these positions conforms to the general concept of representation sketched 
above nor grants non-physical presence. Mandated delegates do not act on behalf of anyone, 
for they take no relevant action. Constituents do not have presence in the actions of fully con-
strained delegates, because they act themselves. Independent trustees do not x, because they 
act in the absence of any guidelines. Constituents do not have presence in trustees, for these 
representatives can act however they want and constituents cannot formally complain or point 
to standards being violated. Nonetheless, as Pitkin notes, “insofar as the mandate-
independence controversy contains a conceptual dispute based on the meaning of representa-
tion, both sides are right. …The representative must really act, be independent; yet the repre-
                                                
99 Ibid., 153. 
100
 Ibid., 55. 
101 Ibid., 33. 
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sented must be in some sense acting through him.”102 What is needed is an account, to use 
Manin’s term, of “partially independent” representatives, i.e. representatives occupying the 
middle ground between fully instructed automatons directly following the explicit orders of 
their constituents, and completely free actors making decisions and taking actions completely 
unconstrained from the will of those they represent.103 Only such partially independent repre-
sentatives are capable of giving non-physical presence to literally absent constituents.104  
 2.3 THE LINK BETWEEN PRESENCE & ACCOUNTABILITY 
Accountability mechanisms are necessary because they are the procedural means through 
which partially independent representatives become possible and constituents transcend the 
paradox of representation by being both absent and present. Pitkin’s claim that “the substance 
of the activity of representing seems to consist in promoting the interests of the represented, in 
a context where the latter is conceived as capable of action and judgment, but in such a way 
that he does not object to what is done in his name,” hints at how this occurs.105 
Put simply, accountability mechanisms give principals the opportunity to publicly declare 
whether or not they were present in the actions of their representatives, and to do so through 
the distribution of rewards or sanctions. This in turn motivates principals to evaluate their 
agents, which compels agents to align with and explain their actions in terms of x, and both of 
these effects combine to help foster and ensure a continual relationship between the repre-
                                                
102
 Ibid., 154. 
103 See Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 163-67. 
104 This description of representation is meant to sketch the conceptual boundaries of what counts as plausible 
political representation, i.e. it “only sets outer limits, within which there remains room for a wide range of 
views.” Pitkin, The Concept of Representation: 146.  
105 Ibid., 155. 
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sentative and the represented that avoids explicit instructions yet resists the equation of repre-
sentative action to constituent will. As Manin claims, “In representative government, the elec-
torate judges ex post facto the initiatives taken in a relative autonomous manner by those it has 
placed in power. Through their retrospective judgment, the people enjoy genuinely sovereign 
power.”106 
We know that the represented have presence, that they have a stake in and a partial re-
sponsibility for the actions of their representatives, when they reward or refrain from sanction-
ing their representatives during the moment of accountability. On the other hand, we know 
that political representation, in the relational sense, did not occur—for the represented were 
not present in the actions and behavior of their purported representatives—when constituents 
voice their objections through sanction.107 This absence of representation, the deterioration of 
the relationship of presence, is always a possibility, for as mentioned above no institutional set-
up or accountability mechanism can guarantee that delegates will behave appropriately, for 
many of the numerous factors that might lead representative to fail at x-ing are unstoppable or 
unpredictable. Thus, accountability mechanisms merely give constituents the chance to for-
mally declare that their formal representatives did or did not represent them, and it is this at-
tribute, and not the degree to which representatives x, that differentiates proper accounts of 
                                                
106 Manin, The Principles of Representative Democracy: 183. 
107 Of course, this may be put too strongly, in that even if individuals always reelect their representatives when 
they see themselves as having presence in their actions, all instances of reelection do not necessarily signal pres-
ence; i.e. other factors might lead to reelection. This is probably one of the reasons that Runciman concentrates 
on the “non-objection criterion”, the negative account of what constitutes the activity of representation, such 
that “representation takes place when there is no objection to what someone does on behalf of someone else.” 
Runciman, "The Paradox of Political Representation," 95. 
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representation from those inspired by authorization or mandate theories, and explains the ne-
cessity of accountability for representation.  
To summarize, the concept of presence, in which absent constituents are nonetheless pre-
sent and implicated in their representatives’ actions, serves as one component of the conceptual 
boundaries of acceptable theories of representation. Examining the mandate/ independence 
controversy helps make clear what this concept of presence means by, among other things, 
bringing to light the sort of conceptualizations of representation that we wish to avoid. Man-
date theorists emphasize the importance of representatives x-ing, yet their reliance on explicit 
instructions to ensure that this occurs turns representation into direct self-governance. Inde-
pendence theorists introduce the ideas of proper authorization and reliance on representative 
judgment, but run the risk of implying that the actions of authorized representatives define the 
proper behavior of representatives by virtue of their authorization, i.e. that there is no external 
standard of behavior that can be used to evaluate representatives and that there is no pattern 
of action which would make a representative no longer representative. An acceptable concept 
of representation must lie between these extreme positions, incorporating a conception of 
presence in which authorized representatives are supposed to x without explicit instructions 
yet remain connected to their constituents in some robust way. The concept of presence is 
made possible by, and thus demands, an accountability mechanism, for it uniquely gives con-
stituents the ability to announce and determine if they were present in the actions of their des-
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ignated representatives and simultaneously provides motivation for the cultivation of an ongo-
ing relationship between representative and represented.108 
3. ACCOUNTABILITY IN CONSTITUTION-MAKING 
We can now examine whether RJ justifies ratification. As previously stated, representation in a 
constitution-making setting is a relationship that involves a framer representing a portion of 
the soon-to-be-governed populace for an audience composed of the other framers and their 
constituents, and is characterized by the framer acting for or on behalf of his constituency for 
the purposes of creating a constitution. At this point, we can restate RJ as the following: P1 
Framers can be representatives; P2 framers should be representatives; P3 ratification proce-
dures enable constitution-makers to be representatives by serving as accountability mecha-
nisms; and therefore P4 one should implement ratification.  
3.1 CAN FRAMERS BE POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES? 
For now, let’s focus on P1. Is it possible for constitution writers to be political representa-
tives?109 This question seems to demand the consideration of several variables relevant to rep-
resentation as they occur in the constitution-making context. These variables are not only con-
                                                
108 Note that my claim that accountability mechanisms are necessary for democratic political representation is not 
akin to endorsing those theories of representation, referred to by Pitkin as ‘accountability views,’ which reduce 
representation to any principal-agent relationship in which the principal holds the agent to account. Such ac-
counts endorse accountability mechanisms as a means to their desired end, representatives x-ing in a certain 
way, but fail like all formalistic theories because while they hope to give a complete account of representation, 
“their defining criterion…lies outside the activity of representating itself—before it begins or after it ends” and 
there cannot “tell us anything about what goes on during representation.” Pitkin, The Concept of Representation: 
55-59. My claim is different insofar as I am simply designating an accountability mechanism as a necessary con-
dition for a particular type of representation, rather than as a sufficient one. See ibid., 55, 57, 58, 59. 
109 In this section, I am not addressing the Sieyesian argument that the will of the nation transforms into the will 
of extraordinary representatives, allowing these framers to exercise the otherwise inalienable constituent power 
of the people. This argument has more to do with constituent power than representation, and will be addressed 
in chapter 3. See Sieyès, "What is the Third Estate?," 138. 
  
52 
troversial themselves, but also quickly push one towards the laborious process of parsing out 
and considering all the different types of constitution-making procedures. For example, one 
such variable would be the sort of authorization demanded by representation. Can framers be 
authorized in the appropriate way? Are types of constitution-making processes excluded on 
the grounds of authorization? Are legislative bodies that transform themselves into constituent 
assemblies therefore unrepresentative? What about instances of multi-stepped constitution-
making, where numerous authorities such as a legislative assembly, a panel of experts, and an 
executive cabinet, revisit and revise the constitution? Do all of these agents count as represent-
atives, or only a select few?  
Our findings in the previous sections, however, allow us to bypass these sorts of complica-
tions, for we know that framers can only be representatives if they are subject to some sort of 
accountability mechanism. Is there or can there be an accountability mechanism in a constitu-
tion-making procedure? This would have to be an ex-post mechanism by which framers are 
rewarded or sanctioned on the basis of their performance drafting the constitution. Independ-
ent institutional mechanisms designed to serve this purpose have never been used in previous 
instances of constitution-making.110 In other words, there are no known instances in which 
framers are subjected to institutionalized procedures that serve the sole purpose of holding 
them to account for their actions during framing. However, two mechanisms common to con-
stitution-making might take on this additional role: elections and ratification.111  
                                                
110 To my knowledge. [At this point I am still figuring out how to cite such a claim] 
111 As cited earlier, Elster identifies elections and accountability mechanisms as the means of holding framers ac-
countable. Elster, "Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections," 345. 
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As we know from the previous section, ratification not only might serve as an accountabil-
ity mechanism, but doing so is the procedures’ only means of serving as a component of the 
representative process. This is why we reformulated P3. However, because the strength of RJ 
will vary depending on whether or not alternative procedures can serve as accountability 
mechanisms as well, it is worth examining elections in constitution-making before moving on 
to ratification.  
Elections, as is well known, are the most common accountability mechanism currently in 
use in representative systems of government.112 They serve the dual purpose of selecting new 
representatives and punishing/rewarding the old ones by rejection/reelection.113 Representa-
tive legislators are elected to take part in the repeated game of legislation, which involves the 
ongoing participation and completion of a constant series of discrete tasks. This gives constit-
uents the opportunity to hold their representatives accountable by deciding whether or not 
they should continue to be participants, that is, continue to be part of the ongoing activi-
ty/game of legislation. If they are happy with their representatives, if they see themselves as 
present in their actions, individuals are likely to reelect (reward) their legislators. If they are 
not happy, if they did not see themselves present in the actions of their legislators and there-
                                                
112 As Urbinati writes, “Elections, when associated with the right to call on new elections, are not simply meant to 
designate new representatives but to check over their representativity.”  
113 See Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus 
Sanctioning Poor Performance."; John Ferejohn, "Incumbent Performance and Electoral Control," Public Choice 
50(1986); Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections  (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1980); Maloy, The Colonial American Origins of Modern Democratic Thought: 16-18; Manin, 
Przeworski, and Stokes, "Elections and Representation."; Otto H. Swank and Bauke Visser, "Do Elections 
Lead to Informed Public Decisions?," Public Choice 129, no. 3/4 (Oct., 2006). 
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fore not represented, individuals will likely vote for someone else (sanction).114 Elections may 
be the prototypical accountability mechanism in ordinary representative processes, but they 
cannot play the same role during framing because writing a constitution is a one-shot game. 
Constitution-making ends as soon as the constitution is written and implemented, and thus 
there is no opportunity for constituents to signal whether they were or were not properly rep-
resented by reelecting or ejecting their representatives post constitution-making, for there is no 
further job to complete and thus no position for framers to gain or lose. 
A constitution-making process in which framers are subject to periodic elections would 
not avoid this conclusion.115 Consider a constitutional convention with n elections. Delegates 
involved in the convention would either be: (1) those elected in the nth election, (2) those that 
did not participate in the final drafting session due to losing reelection; and (3) those delegates 
who never lost a reelection. Type 1 delegates never faced reelection and thus were never sub-
                                                
114 Admittedly, one implication of my conception of representation and the necessity of accountability is that 
single or final term elected representatives are not in a relationship of political representation with their constit-
uents unless some other ex post accountability mechanism is present. For example, if retiring legislators were 
subject to a form of euthynai, those in their final term would be accountable and therefore remain political rep-
resentatives. However, such alternative mechanisms of accountability are quite rare, and thus most single and 
final term representatives are not representatives at all. Despite the counterintuitive nature of this claim, I en-
dorse it. Perhaps other means exist that hold one or final term delegates accountable; for example, reputation 
and future job opportunities might prevent a delegate from shirking in the final term and provide constituents 
with a means to articulate their presence in the actions of their delegates. Nonetheless, such incentive structure 
are unpredictable and not institutionalized, and therefore do not transform delegates into political representa-
tives as I define them.  
In addition, note that Fearon’s finding that unaccountable final term officials do not dramatically change their 
behavior does not weaken my argument, for control is only a partial reason why accountability mechanisms are 
necessary for representation. Moreover, recent work contradicts Fearon’s claims by showing that some final 
term legislators in the US do act differently. See Fearon, "Electoral Accountability and the Control of 
Politicians: Selecting Good Types versus Sanctioning Poor Performance," 63; Lawrence S. Rothenberg and 
Mitchell S. Sanders, "Lame-Duck Politics: Impending Departure and the Votes on Impeachment," Political 
Research Quarterly 3(September 2000); Charles Tien, "Representation, Voluntary Retirement, and Shirking in 
the Last Term," Public Choice 106, no. 1-2 (2001).  
115 I thank Melissa Schwartzberg for raising this objection. 
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ject to an accountability mechanism, and type 2 delegates were rejected, suggesting that at 
some point their constituents ceased seeing them as political representatives.116 Type 3 dele-
gates were subject to accountability mechanisms, which proved that they gave presence to their 
constituents and served as political representatives between each election, but were not repre-
sentatives in the final period—between the last election and the conclusion of the framing pro-
cess—for they were not held accountable for their behavior at this time. Moreover, in this final 
period their powers enlarged, for they obtained the ability to have the final say on the constitu-
tion. This means that the constitution was finalized by a group of unaccountable elected offi-
cials with powers of revision, some of who had been representatives in the past but were no 
longer in such a relationship with their constituents.  Thus, even in this stylized example, the 
determinate framers, those whom uniquely possessed the power to determine the contents of 
                                                
116 In one sense, the claim that constituents sanction their agents when they fail to represent them is absurd, for 
the fact that a legislator loses reelection does not mean that he was not a representative, but rather that he was a 
bad representative, or thought to be so by his constituents. My account seems to ignore such designations as 
‘bad representative’, and perhaps make them impossible, by treating representation as something to which the 
law of the excluded middle applies, i.e. implying that someone is either a representative or not a representative, 
rather than allowing for differentiations in the quality of representation.  
  Two clarifications are in order. First, a representative ejected from office is still a representative in the formal 
or technical sense, in that he held the position of representative. I do not mean to suggest otherwise. However, 
his rejection does suggest that a significant number of his constituents did not have presence in his actions, 
which means that, as a representative, he failed to represent his constituency. This sort of confusion is simply 
the result of linguistic ambiguity. Second, my approach to representation is constructed as a means of justifying 
RJ, for accountability is the sole role that ratification can play in a representative process, and its necessity 
would therefore provide a strong justification for ratification. The normative force of RJ stems from (ii), the 
claim that framers should be representatives, any substantiation of which would draw from a value attributed to 
the occurrence or possibility of good or legitimate representation. This means that for the purposes of RJ, bad 
representation is akin to no representation. So, in this sense, I am not interested in exploring the aspects of rep-
resentation that function as continuous variables, leading to evaluations of representatives as better or worse, or 
more or less legitimate. Representatives clearly differ along such continuums, which will vary from one full ac-
count of representation to the next, but we do not address these directly. I thank David Johnston for pointing 
these objections out. 
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the constitution by virtue of being the final drafters, are not subject to an accountability mech-
anism and are therefore not representatives.117  
One additional objection to this dismissal of elections is the following: elections serve as 
accountability mechanisms for members of constituent legislatures—bodies with both legisla-
tive and constituent powers—for though constitution-making might be a one shot event, the 
same is not true for legislation, and thus constituent legislators will be subject to reelection for 
the next legislative term.118 However, even if we accept this claim, these accountability elec-
tions only occur if constitution-makers fail to create a new constitution, for only then would 
the normal electoral schedule continue as usual. If the constituent assembly actually created a 
constitution it would initiate a new system of government, and though members of the con-
stituent legislature might decide to run for a position within it, this would be an election to an 
entirely new post, and therefore not a moment of institutionalized accountability within an 
ongoing process of legislating. Therefore, this objection falters, elections cannot serve as ac-
countability mechanisms for members of constituent legislatures, for an accountability mecha-
                                                
117 Another way, perhaps, of reaching the same conclusion is to consider a complex political decision-making pro-
cess that necessarily ends with the decision of an unaccountable entity with full revision and veto powers, and 
ask what can be done or added to such a procedure that would make it representative. The answer is nothing; 
as long as an unaccountable entity has the final decision and powers of alteration, the process can only approach 
but never become representative in nature. For example, imagine a country with a legislative process in which an 
elected assembly creates bills and submits them to a lifetime autocrat who can rewrite, eliminate, or put them 
into effect immediately. Clearly, this is not a representative legislative process, for the presence of the autocrat 
negates the representativeness of the delegates, turning them into mere consultants. This would be true even if 
the autocrat participated in the assembly before assuming his position as final arbiter. Thus, adding elected rep-
resentative framers earlier in the process, increasing citizen exposure, and other such procedures might make 
framing participatory or responsive, but never fully representative.  
118 The Beaudoin Edwards Report in Canada suggested that such constituent legislatures were preferable to spe-
cially elected conventions, for framers would be held accountable in the next term. See Hon. Gerald Beaudoin 
and Jim Edwards, "The Process for Amending the Constitution of Canada: The Report of the Special Joint 
Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons," (CanadaJune 20, 1991), 46, 49; Elster, "The Optimal 
Design of a Constituent Assembly," section III. 
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nism’s occurrence cannot depend upon the actions of those it is supposed to hold accountable.  
  
 3.2 RATIFICATION AS AN ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISM 
If elections cannot serve as an accountability mechanism for framers in the constitution-
making process, we are left with ratification. As already noted, this procedure is an ex post in-
stitutionalized evaluation of the product of the framers’ work. It therefore occurs at the correct 
moment in the constitution-making process, avoids the unpredictability and imprecision of 
informal mechanisms, and is carried out directly or indirectly by the people who are to live un-
der the constitution, i.e. the very people that representative framers would purportedly repre-
sent. Moreover, as discussed, this is the only way in which ratification might enable constitu-
tion-makers to be representatives, which is proposition P3 of RJ. If the implementation of 
ratification is to be justified by its role in representation, this role must be as an accountability 
mechanism.  
As discussed previously, there are two main reasons why an accountability mechanism is a 
minimum criterion for representation: to control representatives and to facilitate the presence 
of constituents in the actions of their agents.119 On its face, ratification seems poised to serve 
both of these functions. The procedure gives constituents control over their framers by serving 
as a downstream constraint to the constitution-making process, for the framers’ knowledge 
                                                
119 Though representative control is ultimately an unconvincing justification for the necessity of accountability 
(see the beginning of §2), its popularity in justifying the importance of accountability in general warrants its 
consideration when assessing ratification’s accountability credentials.  
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that their work must be approved by a final authority should influence the decisions that the 
make within the drafting process.120 We can think of two ways this influence operates.121 
First, ratification procedures directly affect framers by causing them to alter their goal con-
stitution—the constitution each framer would like the drafting process to produce—to one 
they believe is acceptable, or can be made acceptable, to the ratifying authorities.122 Such alter-
ations might include granting constitutional status to matters that would otherwise be left to 
ordinary legislative procedures, altering the contents of specific provisions, or specifying and 
entrenching assumed governing principles.123 This direct effect applies regardless of a framer’s 
motivation. A framer solely interested in creating a constitution that will forward his self-
                                                
120 For a more extended discussion of the direct and indirect effects of ratification, see chapter 1.  
121 For a discussion of upstream versus downstream constraints, see Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the 
Constitution-making process," 373-74; Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: Failed U.S. State Constitutional 
Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s," 15-20; Zachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, and Justin Blount, "The Citizen 
As Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional Approval," Temple Law Review 81, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 
378.  
 Of course, sometimes framers do not consider the need for ratificatory approval when drafting the constitution, 
or only realize it near the end of the proceedings. The latter occurred in Iraq, when Sunni support was solicited 
at the last moment and rejection almost occurred as a result. See Yash Ghai, "The Role of Constituent 
Assemblies in Constitution Making," (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007), 35. Also, 
sometimes the presence of additional upstream authorities may decrease the effect of ratification on framers. 
For example, members of the Estonian Constitutional Assembly were more likely concerned with pleasing the 
Supreme Court, which had to approve the constitution before submission to the people through referendum. 
See Ringa Raudla, "Explaining Constitution-makers' preferences: the cases of Estonia and the United States," 
Constitutional Political Economy wq(2010): 254-56. 
122 This is in addition to the constraint imposed by the expected preferences of other constitution-makers.  
123 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount suggest that popular ratification of constitutions is associated with “higher num-
ber of elected offices and greater use of referenda in ongoing governance,” with the implication that these insti-
tutional features were placed into the constitution by framers in order to ensure ratificatory success. Elkins, 
Ginsburg, and Blount, "The Citizen As Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional Approval." Similarly, 
Voigt hypothesizes that “if the citizens are the ultimate deciders on accepting the constitution, members of the 
constitutional assembly have more incentives to take the preferences of the citizens explicitly into account.” 
Stefan Voigt, "The Consequences of Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice: Towards a Comparative 
Analysis," in Deliberation and Decision: Economics, Constitutional Theory, and Deliberative Democracy, ed. Anne 
van Aaken, Christian List, and Christoph Luetge (New York: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd, 2004), 200. The Unit-
ed States Bill of Rights is an example of assumed principles of government constitutionally codified because, at 
least partially, of ratification needs.  
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interest has to confine himself to provisions that he believes are acceptable to the ratifying au-
thority, and the same is true of a framer motivated by his duty to x and his desire to create the 
best constitution possible.124  
Second, ratification has an indirect effect on framers, in that the high level of public expo-
sure and attention paid to the framing, which frequently accompanies constitution-making 
processes that are known to be followed by ratification, shapes the nature of the arguing and 
bargaining of the participants.125 The need for public approval, the likely transparence of at 
least some of the drafting procedures, and the need to explain decisions to constituents ratchet 
up norms of impartiality, and delegates whom desire to advance self-interested constitutional 
provisions and depart from x become even more likely to worry about sounding impartial as a 
result. Elster describes such a process as the ‘civilizing force of hypocrisy,’ “in which the effect 
of an audience is to replace the language of interest by the language of reason” and make “it 
especially hard to appear motivated by self-interest.”126 This in turn filters what framers can 
argue and what provisions they can write, for certain things would be impossible to advocate 
                                                
124 Of course, this assumes away the presence of constitution-wreckers and the possibility that framers might 
want to intentionally create a constitution that will be rejected. Ratification would still directly affect these 
framers, for they would use the expected preferences of the ratifying authority to ensure that the constitution 
they produce will get rejected, but not in a way that would grant constituents control. See Lenowitz, "Rejected 
by the People: Failed U.S. State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s," 15-16. 
125 This indirect effect is similar to one of the effects of signaling incentives described by Groseclose and McCarty. 
In the context of two-party negotiations in front of an outside audience, they found that the need to send sig-
nals to the third party influenced their decisions to accept or reject proposals. See Tim Groseclose and Nolan 
McCarty, "The Politics of Blame: Bargaining before an Audience," American Journal of Political Science 45, no. 1 
(Jan. 2001). 
126 Jon Elster, Explaining Social Behavior: More Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007). 406-07. See also Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 78; Elster, "Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: 
Rebuilding the boat in the open sea," 183. 
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on the grounds of public interest or x.127 These direct and indirect effects seem to impart some 
level of control over the behavior of representatives to the constituents.  
Can ratification help create the conditions necessary for constituents to have and express 
their presence in the actions of their representatives? Again, on its face, ratification seems like 
an apt procedure. Ratifiers signal that they were present in the actions of their representatives 
by approving the constitution, and that they were absent by rejecting the constitution. This 
appears to be a moment of accountability that encourages framers to x without explicit in-
struction, fosters two-way communication, and ultimately establishes presence and allows for 
the transcendence of Pitkin’s paradox of representation. Note that using ratification for this 
purpose links accountability to a discrete task of the representative. This would be problematic 
in most instances of ordinary representation, for representatives are frequently responsible for 
a variety of decisions and actions, and thus institutionally hitching their accountability to a 
particular task would mistakenly formalize an evaluative distortion. However, this distortion 
does not occur for representative framers, for their sole task (as a representative) is to write a 
new constitution.  
If the above arguments are true, RJ consists in something like the following: ‘the value of 
self-governance is not confined to the operation of an existing government, but also applies to 
the creation of a new government. Though direct participation is impossible, the people 
should still have as much of a say in the actual set-up of their future collective decision-making 
                                                
127 Note that it might be mistaken to assume that the civilizing force of hypocrisy, or other effects that stem from 
high degrees of transparency, are indubitably good. For instance, Prat argues that an agent might be driven to-
wards conformism (acting according to how an able agent is expected to act a priori) when his or her actions, 
rather than simply the consequences of those actions, are placed under scrutiny. See Andrea Prat, "The Wrong 
Kind of Transparency," The American Economic Review 95, no. 3 (June 2005). 
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process as they will within it. Therefore, as much as possible, constitution-makers should be 
representatives of those to whom a new constitution will apply.128 Representation requires the 
operation of an accountability mechanism, ratification is the procedure most or solely suited to 
this task, and therefore the procedure should or must be included in the constitution-making 
process.’ This is a powerful justification for ratification, in that the value of representation is 
more or less unquestioned, as is the importance of maximizing congruence between decision-
making during constitutional creation and decision-making in the government being set-up.129   
 3.3 NO ACCOUNTABILITY—THE PROBLEM OF DOUBLE DUTY 
Despite the above-mentioned strengths, RJ ultimately fails because ratification cannot serve as 
an accountability mechanism. There are several minor reasons for this; for example, it assumes 
that that all framers will see a rejected constitution as a personal sanction and an approved 
constitution as a reward and thereby dismisses the possibility that a framer unhappy with a 
draft constitution might welcome its rejection or recoil at its acceptance. In addition, RJ also 
overlooks the possibility that a framer might not translate the ratification vote into an evalua-
tion of his or her behavior.130 Putting these ancillary objections aside, however, I want to con-
                                                
128 This argument for the value of representative framers, which is an attempted explanation for (2), is variable. In 
other words, numerous different arguments might justify (2). I discuss such arguments in the conclusion. 
129 There are several possible reasons for making the constitution-making process similar to the desired outcome. 
For instance, drawing on Elster’s suggestion that constitution-making conducted by legislatures will create con-
stitutions with a hyper-empowered legislative branch, Voigt hypothesizes that the structure of a constitution 
will mirror the structure of its drafting body. Thus, democratic principles should govern the creation of a con-
stitution-making process that is intended to create a democratic constitution. See Voigt, "The Consequences of 
Popular Participation in Constitutional Choice: Towards a Comparative Analysis," 217; Elster, "The Role of 
Institutional Interest in East European Constitution-making."  
130 One additional minor problem might be the following: RJ disrupts the relationship between representatives 
and their constituents by giving individuals the ability to sanction and reward other people’s representatives. 
Rehfeld makes such an argument in support of his claim that electoral con constituencies should remain stable 
between elections. See Rehfeld, The Concept of Constituency: 190. 
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centrate on one central reason why ratification can never be a source of accountability: it 
would make the procedure responsible for two separate and possibly different evaluations. Let 
us call this problem evaluative divergence. Consider the following two situations, both of which 
occur in a framing process that includes a constitutional convention composed of elected dele-
gates followed by ratification via public referendum: 
 
Ex1: My delegate tries to create a constitutional provision that prohibits people of my 
ethnic background from holding political office and voting. Despite his best efforts, my 
delegate fails. At all other times during the convention, he acts just like I would want 
my representative to act (he x’s). I prefer the resultant constitution to the expected re-
sults of constitutional rejection.  
 
Ex2: My delegate acts like the delegate in Ex1, except he tries to prevent the creation 
of the provision excluding my ethnic group from political participation. Despite his 
best efforts, my delegate fails in his attempt, and the constitution presented to me for 
ratification is identical to the constitution in Ex1, except it includes the exclusionary 
provision. This is reason enough for me to reject the constitution. 
 
In both of these examples, there is a critical asymmetry in my evaluation of the ‘representative’ 
and the constitution. In Ex1, I would vote in favor of the constitution because I prefer it to the 
status quo or what I expect a rejection might lead to. However, if ratification serves as an ac-
countability mechanism, by approving the constitution I simultaneously reward my repre-
sentative delegate. This is problematic because, assuming that acting to exclude me from the 
political process violates x, I could not see myself present in the actions of such a representa-
tive. I am thus rewarding my representative for not being my representative.131 The opposite 
                                                
131 This also assumes that my delegate in Ex1 prefers the constitution to the status quo as well, despite failing to 
add the exclusionary provision, and therefore sees ratification failure as a sanction and ratification success as a 
reward. This creates a potential problem to the viability of ratification to serve as an accountability mechanism, 
but it is a relatively minor one. 
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problem emerges in Ex2, for I would vote against this constitution, yet in doing so sanction a 
representative that gave me real presence in the constitution-making process. I am thus sanc-
tioning my representative for representing. 
These two examples show the central deficiency of using ratification as an accountability 
mechanism: there is no necessarily correlation between a voter’s evaluation of a draft constitu-
tion and his evaluation of his constitutional representative, yet the ratification vote is supposed 
to signal both. This incongruence does not stem from there being other tasks that need to be 
taken into consideration when evaluating a framer, for there are none, but rather from several 
factors, the most influential of which is the fact that the outcome of a collective decision-
making process is not determined by the behavior of any single participant.132 The actions of 
other participants affect collective outcomes. This is evident in both of the above examples, 
where my constitutional delegate fails in regards to the exclusionary provision because of the 
actions of his fellow framers. Thus, because of the intervention of other framers, how a voter’s 
constitutional representative behaves will not fully determine the contents of the proposed 
constitution, and therefore evaluative divergence becomes possible because the voter’s assess-
ment of the latter may differ from his assessment of the former.  
If the ratification process serves as both an accountability mechanism and a means to ap-
prove or reject a constitution, voters are in an odd situation when transitioning from the evalu-
ative to the sanctioning dimension of accountability.133 They can use three basic strategies to 
                                                
132 Evaluating a representative solely on the basis of one of his many representative actions, rather the sum total of 
them, is relatively common in ordinary instances of political representation. I discuss the relevancy of this ob-
servation, as well as another factor that leads to evaluative divergence, below.  
133 See §1.2 for a discussion of these three dimensions of accountability 
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make their decision. First, a voter might give primacy to the constitutional choice, meaning 
that their vote solely reflects whether they prefer the proposed constitution to the expected 
results of rejection. However, the voter would fail to hold his representative accountable, or at 
least inaccurately hold him accountable, whenever his evaluation of the constitution and the 
representative diverged. Second, a voter might do the reverse and give primacy to representa-
tive accountability, therefore perversely making a decision about the future organization of his 
polity for reasons unrelated to constitutional content. In this instance, evaluative divergence 
would cause the voter to reject a constitution he likes or accept a constitution he dislikes. 
Third, a voter might somehow make his decision on the basis of both the behavior of his rep-
resentative and the proposed constitution, perhaps taking preference or evaluative intensity 
into account. Nonetheless, the voter would eventually make a decision, and if his evaluations 
diverged he would either fail to hold his representative accountable or inaccurately express his 
opinion on the proposed constitution, regardless of how he weighted the two. None of these 
outcomes are acceptable; ratification cannot function as an accountability mechanism, for do-
ing so collapses two different critical decisions into one action that becomes inadequate when-
ever they diverge. 
At this point, an objector might make the following argument: in representative govern-
ments, voters frequently rely on their evaluations of the outcomes of the legislative process—
bills and policies—when holding their individual representative accountable.134 Sometimes 
                                                
134 For instance, the foundational texts in the empirical literature on retrospective voting claim that voters use the 
state of the economy, an outcome, to evaluate political incumbents. See Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory 
of Democracy  (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National 
Elections; V.O. Key, The Responsible Electorate  (New York: Vintage, 1966). Admittedly, recent studies ques-
tion the generalizability of this model by showing its inapplicability to local rather than state and national elec-
  
65 
voters use outcomes as one of many inputs, other times they serve as the sole evaluative crite-
ria. Outcomes might be used in this manner when more detailed information about the specif-
ic behavior of individual representatives is unavailable, when voters are unwilling or unable to 
accept the costs associated with a closer evaluation, or when voters make evaluative mistakes 
out of ignorance, passion, manipulation, and the like. Regardless of the cause, voters frequently 
use collective decision-making outcomes to evaluate individual representatives, and according 
to the above argument this means that ordinary accountability mechanisms are deficient, and 
that representation is not present or not possible in most representative governments. If we 
want to resist this conclusion, than the above argument against ratification’s function as an 
accountability mechanism must be rejected. 
This objection challenges the critique of using ratification as an accountability mechanism 
by showing that constituents frequently rely on evaluations of outcomes during the operation 
of normal accountability mechanisms. The hypothetical objector thus assumes that the crux of 
our argument is the assertion that using one’s evaluation of a draft constitution is an imprecise 
or distortive means of judging the behavior of a representative. However, this misconstrues the 
critique, the central claim of which is that ratification cannot serve as an accountability mecha-
nism because this makes one action (voting yes or no to a proposed constitution) responsible 
for two tasks (holding framers accountable and accepting or rejecting a constitution) that 
might demand different responses because of evaluative divergence. In these instances, when 
representative behavior and the draft constitution demand opposite responses, it becomes im-
                                                                                                                                            
tions. See Christopher R. Berry and William G. Howell, "Accountability and Local Elections: Rethinking 
Retrospective Voting," The Journal Of Politics 69, no. 3 (August 2007). 
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possible for a constituent to meet both through the one action available to him. If he holds his 
representatives accountable, he destroys ratification’s function as a means to accept or reject a 
constitution; if he votes on the constitution itself, then ratification ceases to be an accountabil-
ity mechanism. 
In normal electoral accountability mechanisms, constituents might use outcomes to help 
them decide whether to keep their representative in office (reward) or replace him with some-
one else (sanction), but this does not make the election vote responsible for choosing legisla-
tion in addition to evaluating representatives. If a representative acts perfectly yet the legisla-
tive outcomes are undesirable, this does not make it impossible for voters to fulfill all of their 
responsibilities when voting. They are not expected to make a decision about the outcomes of 
previous legislative processes when they choose a person to be their representative. In other 
words, regardless of the degree to which outcomes inform a voter’s decision, they do not vote 
on the outcomes directly and their vote will not affect the fate of previous legislative deci-
sions.135 The hypothetical objector’s argument only seems plausible because the central reason 
that outcomes of collective decision-making processes are sometimes a bad means of judging 
the actions of a single participant is the same reason that a framer’s behavior and a draft consti-
tution might warrant different responses—the behavior of one participant does not fully de-
termine the outcome of a collective decision-making process.  
                                                
135 Similarly, retrospective voters solely interested in their economic welfare do not vote directly on the economy, 




Whether taken to be an institutional innovation designed to guarantee popular sovereignty, an 
instrumental substitute for stronger forms of democracy inconsonant with modern times, a 
means of securing a human right to participation demanded by international law, or some-
thing else entirely, representation occupies a central place within democratic theory today and 
is more or less unanimously treated as something worth institutionalizing in contemporary 
states.136 For this reason, a possible connection between representation and ratification, which 
is suggested by the frequent conceptualization of framers as representatives and the long-
standing association of ratification with representation, should be of interest to anyone looking 
for a possible source of justification for the latter. In this chapter I followed this intuition by 
sketching out a limited approach to representation, and then constructing and interrogating 
RJ, a justification for ratification based upon its relationship with political representation. RJ 
claims that ratification is justified because: (P1) framers can be representatives; (P2) and 
should be representatives; and (P3) ratification plays a crucial role in enabling this to happen.  
                                                
136 For examples of the first two arguments, see Nadia Urbinati, Representative Democracy: Principles and 
Genealogy  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008); Benjamin Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory 
Politics for  New Age  (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984). Brennan and Hamlin usefully catego-
rize arguments such as Urbinati and Barber’s as first-best arguments and second-best arguments respectively; 
first-best arguments see representation as a politically superior alternative to the imperfections of direct democ-
racy, and second-best arguments see representation as a practicable means of achieving an approximation of the 
unobtainable ideal of direct democracy. Brennan and Hamlin, "On Political Representation," 111.  
The argument that representation is demanded by international law, in its strongest form, stems from accepting 
the legal status of the ICCPR and interpreting article 25 to mean that only direct democracy or a representative 
government are acceptable modes of political decision-making. See International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, 999 U.N.T.S. 171(Dec. 16, 1966); Thomas M. Franck and Arun K. Thiruvengadam, "Norms of 
International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making Process," in Framing the State in Times of Transition: 
Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace 
Press, 2010), 6-7.  
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Ratification is an ex post procedure that occurs after the writing of the constitution, the 
would-be task of representative framers. This means that ratification’s role in a constitutional 
representative process must be similarly ex post. Out of the numerous mechanisms and proce-
dures that might contribute to institutionalizing political representation, an accountability 
mechanism is the only one that meets this criterion. This transforms P3 into: ratification plays 
an essential role in constitution-making by serving as an accountability mechanism. Moreover, 
an accountability mechanism is a necessary feature of any reasonable conception of political 
representation, primarily because it transcends the paradox of representation by giving con-
stituents the ability to formally declare whether or not they were present in the actions of their 
principals. This means that if ratification functions as an accountability mechanism, RJ pro-
vides a strong justification for its implementation. 
However, upon analysis, ratification is not up for this role. Despite its initial appearance as 
a viable means to secure representative control and make presence a possibility, ratification 
cannot serve as an accountability mechanism because it is unable to complete both of the tasks 
this would demand of it. If ratification serves as an accountability mechanism, a voter has one 
vote to signal his acceptance or rejection of a proposed constitution, and reward or sanction his 
representative framer. However, these two tasks might demand different actions, particularly 
because constitutions usually stem from collective decision-making processes, such that the 
behavior of a single representative may not correlate with the final constitution. A voter might 
want to accept the constitution yet sanction his representative, or reject a constitution yet re-
ward his representative. Such a divergence is always possible, and when it occurs ratification 
must fail at one of its given tasks. Thus, the first main conclusion of this chapter is that RJ fails 
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because ratification cannot serve as an accountability mechanism, and therefore does not serve 
a necessary function in a representation process. To put this in the terms of the formulation 
used earlier, even if P1 and P2 are correct, RJ fails because P3 is false. 
In the process of evaluating RJ by examining P3, P1 came under scrutiny as well. As ar-
gued, any reasonable concept of political representation requires an accountability mechanism. 
Therefore, if framers are political representatives, an accountability mechanism must be pre-
sent within the constitution-making process. These mechanisms come in a variety of forms, 
but actual instances of constitution-making only include one possible mechanism other than 
ratification that might be used to hold framers accountable: elections. However, the one-shot 
nature of constitution-making, the fact that constitution-making is a discrete task with a defi-
nite end, means that framers are not reelected and thus not held accountable by elections.137 
Attempting to introduce periodic elections within the drafting process does not help matters, 
for the final drafters lack accountability nonetheless. The fact that “there is no chance for the 
public to punish representatives who fail to fulfill their mandate” does not expose a “weakness 
of accountability” as one scholar suggests, but rather points to its complete absence.138 Thus, 
assuming that accountability mechanisms are necessary for representation, constitution-
makers have likely never been political representatives when drafting a constitution. This is the 
second main conclusion of this chapter, and it implies that historians, developmental scholars, 
and others are either mistaken in their attempts to portray and conceptualize framers as politi-
                                                
137 As Urbinati writes, “Delegates in the constitutional assembly… cannot be (and are not) electorally accountable 
(they are not subject to reelection)…” Urbinati, Representative Democracy: 57. 
138 Hart, "Constitution Making and the Right to Take Part in a Public Affair," 34. 
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cal representatives, or else using a concept of ‘representation’ that differs from the ones appro-
priate to the normative political connotations they are often attempting to bring forth.  
Of course, there are two limitations to this finding. First, in some instances of framing, in-
formal accountability mechanisms likely functioned and had the same effects as institutional-
ized accountability mechanisms. For instance, if a framer elected by a geographically defined 
constituency creates a constitution that provides for a legislative body consisting of representa-
tives elected by the same constituencies, then the first legislative election might serve as an ac-
countability mechanism for the framer if he chooses to run for office. He might alter his be-
havior during the constituent assembly because of his expectation of this election, and voters 
might consider his actions during framing when deciding how to cast their vote. To varying 
degrees, such informal mechanisms of accountability that rely on things such as reputation and 
political aspirations undoubtedly occur, making the claim that framers have never been repre-
sentatives slightly overstated. Nonetheless, note that these informal mechanisms cannot be 
relied upon or planned through institutional design, for they rely on specific desires of the 
framers, the production of predictable constitutions, and voters seeing the next election as an 
accountability mechanism. 
Second, this finding does not mean that it is impossible to design a representative constitu-
tion-making process with an accountability mechanism, but rather that this has yet to occur. 
What would such a mechanism look like? Like all accountability mechanisms, it would take 
place ex post to the representative action and provide principals with some means of sanction-
ing and rewarding their delegates. Several procedures would fit this description. After the 
drafting of constitution, each constituency might hold a referendum with the specific purpose 
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of punishing or rewarding their framer. Or, an independent commission might convene to re-
view the behavior and actions of each framer and levy the appropriate rewards or punishments. 
This latter possibility would be similar to the Athenian euthynai, which the Greeks used to 
hold retiring magistrates to account.139 In both of these mechanisms, the awards and punish-
ments could be anything from monetary rewards or fines to the commission or denial of politi-
cal positions.   
Such accountability mechanisms are theoretically possible, though the constitution-
making setting is bound to create complications not found in ordinary settings. For instance, it 
is unclear what evaluative criteria would be appropriate for judging the actions of framers, and 
the infrequency of constitution-making would prevent principals or members of a special 
commission from answering this question from experience. In addition, the legal authority of 
an accountability mechanism for framers is ambiguous, for on the one hand the implementa-
tion of a new constitution overrides previous institutional prescriptions, and on the other hand 
is it unlikely that framers would include a mechanism that might be used to punish them into 
the constitution that they write. This means that a constitutional accountability mechanism 
would likely have to operate between the drafting of the constitution and its implementation, 
which might cause undesirable and potentially fatal delays to the conclusion of the framing 
                                                
139 In this procedure, ten inspectors (logistai) and ten advocates (synegoroi) evaluated the accounts of the magis-
trate. The magistrate was next brought before a court of 501, where the auditors presented their findings and 
brought up any accusations. In the last two stages of the process, any citizen could bring up charges of bribery 
or embezzlement, or any changes of misconduct at all. Jon Elster, "Accountability in Athenian Politics," in 
Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, ed. Adam Przeworski, Bernard Manin, and Susan C. Stokes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 268; Mogens Herman Hansen, The Athenian Democracy in 
the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principle, and Ideology  (Oxford: Oxford University press, 1991). 222. See also 
Deirdre Dionysia Von Dornum, "The Straight and the Crooked: Legal Accountability in Ancient Greece," 
Columbia Law Review 97, no. 5 (Jun., 1997). 
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process or have an impact on the perceived legitimacy of the constitution.140 How would the 
public view a constitution implemented without problems, yet written by representatives 
found to be deficient during accountability procedures? These concerns and others like them 
are bound to arise, but might be resolved by adjusting the accountability mechanism and the 
surrounding framing procedures. 
Rather than continue to speculate about how to create an accountability mechanism for 
constitution-makers, I want to conclude this chapter by briefly looking at the assumption un-
derlying the impetus to do so. This assumption, a component of RJ, is the belief that P2 fram-
ers should be representatives. This is a common belief, but begs the question whether there are 
good reasons for holding it. Why should we conceptualize framers as, or want them to be, po-
litical representatives? The intuitive response is to make recourse to the burgeoning pool of 
arguments made in favor of representative government and the institution of representation 
more generally; or to ignore the issue and simply assume representation occurs whenever 
framers are elected because elections and representation go hand in hand in contemporary rep-
resentative democracies.141 However, either response is theoretically sloppy, for it involves 
equating the writing of a constitution with other instances of political decision-making that 
might benefit from representation, when constitution-making is clearly a unique enterprise of 
its own.  
                                                
140 Such delays are especially problematic given that constitution-making frequently occurs in turbulent settings. 
See Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the Constitution-making process," 394; Elster, "Legislatures as 
Constituent Assemblies," 185. 
141 Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount give an example of the latter tendency, when they reason as follows amidst a 
discussion of public participation in constitutional design: “…in either case the main deliberative body is select-
ed by the public. We can thus presume some level of representation in the decisions that the deliberative body 
undertakes.” Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount, "The Citizen As Founder: Public Participation in Constitutional 
Approval," 364. See also Ghai, "The Role of Constituent Assemblies in Constitution Making," 23. 
  
73 
Several possible arguments and reasons for thinking that framers should be representatives 
can be drawn from the constitution-making literature, but four seem central. The first argu-
ment claims that representative framers increase “the perceived legitimacy of a constitution-
making process” and the constitution that results.142 Due to the lack of consensus on what le-
gitimacy actually entails, this argument has multiple meanings.143 On the one hand, it might be 
an empirical or sociological claim that, for whatever reason, people will just perceive a constitu-
tion as more authoritative if political representatives create it. This could be the result of an 
already existing tradition of popular governance, or the influence of some international norm 
diffusion process. On the other hand, it might be a normative or moral claim that a constitu-
tion-making process involving political representatives is necessary for the creation of a legiti-
mate constitution.144 
Second, and related to the first, is the claim that the constitutional process should mirror 
the desired political process to be created, especially in the case of democracies. Here, repre-
sentative framers are desirable not because of the need to meet preexisting ideas about legiti-
macy in the populace, but in order to foster them. As Arato explains, “most democratic theo-
ries do not and cannot recognize any source of legitimacy other than direct or electoral partici-
pation by full members of the political community. If it is important that the rules of the game 
                                                
142 Miller, "Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future," 627. 
143 I address the lack of clarity in conceptions of legitimacy, and how it affects potential justifications of ratifica-
tion, in part 3 of this dissertation. 
144 For instance, one could interpret Waldron’s claim that “the theory…which maintains…that right-bearers have 
the right to resolve disagreements about what rights they have among themselves and on roughly equal terms, is 
the only plausible rights-based theory of authority…” as supporting the idea that a constitution must be created 
by representatives when a public drafting process in unavailable. Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). 254. 
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provide for democratic participation, it is equally or even more important that the rules of the 
game emerge in a democratic manner.”145 In other words, if one desires to create a democratic 
system of government, the corresponding democratic conception of legitimacy needs to be fos-
tered as early as possible, and insofar as representation is seen as an essential means of legiti-
mating democratic political decisions in the absence of direct citizen participation, it has to be 
present in constitution-making as well. Therefore, as Göreng notes, since “the indispensable 
tenet of contemporary democratic politics has been the participation of the people in making 
collective choices through their representatives,” “constitutional choices are no exceptions. 
They are generally made by the representatives of the people in modern democratic political 
systems.”146  
The third argument or reason for conceptualizing framers as representatives comes from 
the participatory constitution-making or ‘new constitutionalism’ movement, an approach to 
constitution-making design that seeks “to involve the public before, during, and after the text 
is finalized” to the highest degree possible, under the belief that this “educates citizens and 
empowers them to defend their constitutional rights, …strengthens democratic attitudes, en-
courages public consensus, facilitates citizens engagement, and build[s] support for state insti-
                                                
145 Arato, Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy: 230. Similarly, Hart writes that: “A democratic constitution is 
no longer simply one that establishes democratic governance. It is also a constitution that is made in a demo-
cratic process.” Hart, "Democratic Constitution Making," 3-4.  
146 Levent Göreng, Prospects for Constitutionalism in Post-Communist Countries  (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2002). 112. See also Jon Elster’s brief discussion of process legitimacy, in which he explains that “if 
the internal decision-making procedure of the assembly is perceived to be as undemocratic, the document may 
be lacking in democratic legitimacy.” Elster, "Constitution-making in Eastern Europe: Rebuilding the boat in 
the open sea," 178-79. 
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tutions.”147 For a variety of factors—minority prosecution, deep pluralism, the legacy of au-
thoritarianism, and a focus on deliberation—advocates of this approach claim that the drafting 
process must consider the actual viewpoints of every potentially affected societal group, such 
that the constitution becomes “the product of the integration of ideas from all the major stake-
holders,” and that this can only be accomplished by the direct participation of members of 
such groups in the drafting process.148 Jhala articulates this position clearly when summarizing 
the implications of constitution-making in South Africa, Uganda, and Ethiopia, writing that 
“Not all members of society are able to participate fully in the exercise [of constitution-
making] and that is why it is important that those who are chosen to frame and approve the 
constitution are representative of as wide a sample of society as possible.”149 Various efforts are 
taken to ensure the correct composition of the drafting body: proportional delegate selection 
(where proportionality applies to parties and genders/ groups), the expansion of suffrage, and 
                                                
147 Hart, "Democratic Constitution Making," 3; Moehler, Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory 
Constitution Making: 32-33. For other discussions of participatory constitution-making, see Angela M. Banks, 
"Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities," William and Mary Law 
Review 49, no. 4 (2008); Samuels, "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making."; Ebrahim, Fayemi, 
and Loomis, "Promoting a Culture of Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa: 
Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of Government."; ibid.; U.S. Institute of Peace, "Iraq's 
Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country's Future." 
148 Muna Ndulo, "The Democratic State in Africa: The Challenges for Institutional Building," National Black 
Law Journal 16(1998): 93. See also Jamal Benomar, "Constitution-Making and Peace Building: Lessons 
Learned From the Constitution-Making Processes of Post-Conflict Countries," (United Nations Development 
Programme, August 2003), 15. Neil Kritz’s testimony before a hearing on Iraqi constitution-making exhibits 
this perfectly: “When there is broad democratic representation, there is a greater likelihood that all aggrieved 
parties will have an opportunity to express their views on key constitutional issues of importance to them, and 
perhaps more importantly, there is a greater likelihood that their views will be taken into consideration in the 
drafting of the final document.” Neil Kritz, "Constitution-making Process: Lessons for Iraq.," in A Joint hearing 
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Property Rights, and 
the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations' Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Washington, 
DCJune 25, 2003).  
149 Eva Jhala, "Synthesis: The Principal Actors in Constitution-Making," in Constitution-making and 




the supplementation of an elected constituent assembly with appointees representing relevant 
social groups.150 This call for inclusive participation of group members in the framing process 
turns into a straightforward demand for political representation, as the constitution-making 
delegates are assumed to be political representatives of their individual groups.151  
Fourth and finally is the emerging tendency to “reconsider constitution-making as part of 
the process of conflict transformation,” which in extreme cases leads to conceptualizing the 
constitution as “partly a peace agreement and partly a framework setting up the rules by which 
the new democracy will operate.”152 This reconsideration is unsurprising, in that contemporary 
instances of constitution-making frequently follow or occur amidst conflict situations that 
arise after the erosion of previously legitimate governments and political authorities; examples 
include constitution-making in Guatemala (1997-1998); Afghanistan (2001-2004); and 
Rwanda (2002-2004).153 This conflation results in the extension of research questions associ-
                                                
150 The selection of delegates to the Nepali Constituent Assembly, scheduled to promulgate a draft constitution 
in May 2011, demonstrates all of these inclusivity fostering mechanisms: 240 delegates were elected in accord-
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mandated to meet precise percentages of candidates from women and minority groups when composing party 
lists. Suffrage was universal throughout the elections, and afterwards the Council of Ministers elected 26 addi-
tional members from among distinguished persons and from groups who failed to be represented through the 
elections and suffrage was universal. Yash Ghai and Jill Cottrell, eds., Creating the New Constitution: A Guide for 
Nepali Citizens (Stockholm: International IDEA, 2008), 49-52; "Election to Members of the Constituent 
Assembly Act,"  (Legislature-Parliament of Nepal, 2007 (2064)), 6-12. 
151 This equation of group delegates to political representatives is confused, insofar as reasons exist for having 
such delegates involved in the drafting process that have nothing to do with the particular relationship of politi-
cal representation. For instance, delegates might contribute “the knowledge of interest” of their respective 
groups, diverse viewpoints, and different problem-solving approaches, all of which might aid in the project of 
constitution-making. Elster, "The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly," 20; Scott E. Page, The 
Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools, and Societies  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2007). Note that Elster titles the contribution of different knowledge of interests by diverse 
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that a different term should be used to avoid confusion.  
152 Samuels, "Post-Conflict Peace-Building and Constitution-Making," 664. 
153 Samuels, "Constitution Building Processes and Democratization: a Discussion of Twelve Case Studies," 8. 
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ated with conflict resolution to the constitution-making process, such that “Policymakers have 
started to ask…whether some constitutional reform processes are more likely than others to 
deliver a reduction in violence.”154 Since the cessation and prevention of violence in conflict 
situations often involves placating the relevant parties, representation becomes a desirable fea-
ture of constitution-making, for it appears to provide a reliable way to negotiate a mutually 
acceptable and durable agreement that reflects current interests and power distributions.  
These are just four reasons contained in the constitution-making literature for why the 
framers of constitutions should be conceived of as political representatives, and all of them are 
abstract and imprecise, include unexplained normative concepts, and frequently equate no-
tions of inclusiveness, pluralism, and participation with the specific relationship between an 
agent and his principal(s) that political representation entails. Moreover, the tendency to treat 
constitution-makers as framers may have negative effects, for it can deemphasize the long-term 
role of constitutions in establishing the rules of the game for the political process in a coun-
try—by creating the basic institutions and procedures for political action, enumerating the 
fundamental rights of citizens, and setting out the procedures for its own revisions—and in-
stead place focus on the importance of giving current societal interests their say, fulfilling the 
already present needs of parties and groups,  and allowing for the expression of political disa-
greement. This is especially prevalent when constitution-making serves as a component of the 
conflict resolution process, for in these instances representative framers are most likely to “en-
trench disagreement without providing avenues for change,” and “incorporate too many inter-
                                                
154 Widner, "Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview," 1513. 
  
78 
ests of an already constituted future politics in the politics of constitution-making.”155  This is 
not to suggest that these new sites of focus are not of vital importance, but rather that the pro-
cess of creating a constitution might not be the best context for addressing them.  
To conclude, this brief discussion of P2 is not meant to be a knock-down argument 
against the belief that framers should be constitution-makers, for that is beyond the scope of 
this chapter and dissertation. Rather, I hope to make two additional points. First, that the se-
cond main conclusion of this chapter (that framers have never been political representatives) 
and its implications (that current procedures used to draft constitutions makes representative 
framers an impossibility) are not as problematic as they might initially seem. For though the 
treatment of framers as representatives is increasingly prevalent in the constitution-making 
literature, this tendency is based on ambiguous arguments in need of further elaboration, and 
might even have negative repercussions. Second, and perhaps more importantly, this discus-
sion suggests that ratification is not the only aspect of the constitution-making process that is 
taken for granted, assumed to be positive, and in need of explanation. As constitution-making 
events become increasingly frequent, and more and more scholars contribute to the creation of 
a best-practices literature, greater attention needs to be paid to analyzing the appropriateness 
of the straightforward application of concepts and procedures developed and justified in the 
domestic setting to the constitution-making context.  
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Processes of Post-Conflict Countries," 4; Arato, Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy: 148. Benomar makes 
an excellent argument against the use of constitution-making for conflict resolution, concluding that “past expe-
rience demonstrates that when the conflict has not ended and negotiations on a peace agreement and on the 
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THE CONSTITUENT POWER SPEAKS: 
Some Attempts to Justify Ratification  
 
The constitution-making power is the political will, whose power or au-
thority is capable of making the concrete, comprehensive decision over the 
type and form of its own political existence. 
Carl Schmitt156  
 
This, Mr. President, is not a government founded upon compact; it is 
founded upon the power of the people. They express in their name and 
their authority—‘We, the people, do ordain and establish, &c.; from their rat-
ification alone is it to take its constitutional authenticity, without that, it is 
no more than a tabula rasa. 
James Wilson157 
 
The concept of constituent power appears ready-made to provide an explanation for imple-
menting ratification procedures. For what, if anything, do ratification procedures involve if not 
the sovereign people exercising their will and accepting a constitution as their own? According 
to such a justification, any legitimate, authoritative, or rightful constitution must be the crea-
tion of the people, and ratification is the moment, or an essential moment, when this becomes 
a possibility. In other words, the reasons for implementing ratification stem from its intended 
function as a moment of higher law-making when the people are explicitly present. This con-
ceptualization of ratification as a moment of constituent power is both intuitive and expressed 
by a wide-range of constitutional actors: from James Wilson at the Pennsylvania Ratification 
Convention in 1787, whose words are excerpted above, to the Ukrainian Justice V.M Kampo, 
                                                
156 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory, trans. Jeffrey Seitzer (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 125. 
157 James Wilson, Collected works of James Wilson  (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2007), Book. 254.  
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who claimed in a noteworthy dissent that constituent referendums are based on “the exclusive 
right of the people to define and alter the constitutional order…that is, to realize constituent 
power.”158  
This chapter and the following two explore constituent power justifications of this sort.  
However, as we will see, this type of justification gains some of its intuitive bite by blurring or 
avoiding the actual mechanics of constitution-making. Thus, our analysis is anything but 
straightforward, for constituent power theorizing operates on a level of abstraction above actu-
al constitution-making procedures. In this chapter I first define the concept of constituent 
power and explain its relevance, explore some of the central questions that motivate its discus-
sion, and highlight the immiscible relation between constituent power and the mechanics of 
creating a constitution. I then investigate several ways in which ratification might serve as an 
instance of constituent power and analyze the strength of the resulting justifications. 
1.  WHAT IS A THEORY OF CONSTITUENT POWER? 
Before exploring whether a theory of constituent power justifies the use of ratification proce-
dures, we must ask a more basic question: what is constituent power? What does a theory of 
constituent power entail? Constituent power, also known as the pouvoir constituant or the con-
stitution-making power, is an old and central concept in constitutional theory. It arose in con-
junction with the creation of the first written constitutions, yet its roots date back to earlier 
                                                
158 V.M. Kampo, "Dissenting Opinion of Justice of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine V.M. Campo Pertaining 
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theoretical discussions of sovereignty, political resistance, authority, and the social contract.159 
Emmanuel Sieyès and Carl Schmitt are the most famous exponents of the fully developed con-
cept, while Hobbes, Lawson, Locke, Paine, and various American revolutionaries are frequent-
ly held to be important contributors.160  
Put simply, constituent power is the unique power of the people (or the people themselves 
when exercising this power) to make and unmake their constitution, the set of fundamental 
laws that undergirds and creates their state. A theory of constituent power claims that the 
constituent power must create the constitution for it to be authoritative, i.e. that the only valid 
constitution for a state is one made by its people. As Andreas Kalyvas notes: “The constituent 
power demands that those who are subject to a constitutional order co-institute it.”161 Both the 
                                                
159 The first use of the term ‘constituent power’ in a manner similar to how it is now understood is an object of 
debate. Some historians claims that Thomas Young, a New York Radical, was the first to use the term. In 1776 
he wrote “the people at large…are the supreme constituent power, and of Course their immediate Representa-
tives are the supreme Delegate power; and as soon as the delegate power gets too far out of the hands of the 
constituent power, a tyranny is in some degree established.” However, the British pamphleteer Junius used the 
term similarly six years earlier to refer to a type of power superior to the legislature. See Thomas Young, 
"Thomas Young to the People of the Grants," in The Documentary History of the State of New York, ed. 
Christopher Morgan (Albany: Charles Van Benthuysen, 1851), 563; Willi Paul Adams, The First American 
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The Letters of Junius (New York: Leavitt, Trow & Co, 1848), 29. 
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Contract from Hobbes to Rawls, ed. David Boucher and Paul Kelly (New York: Routledge Press, 1994), 42; 
Julian H. Franklin, John Locke and the Theory of Sovereignty: Mixed Monarchy and the Rights of Resistance in the 
Political Thought of the English Revolution  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978); Bronislaw Baczko, 
"The Social Contract of the French: Sieyes and Rousseau," The Journal of Modern History 60: 
Supplement(September 1988): 100; Andreas Kalyvas, "Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power," 
Constellations 12, no. 2 (2005): 227; Richard S. Kay, "Constituent Authority," American Journal of Comparative 
Law, Forthcoming (2010): 3-4; Ulrich K. Preuss, "Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some 
Deliberations on the Relations Between Constituent Power and the Constitution," in Constitutionalism, 
Identity, Difference, and Legitimacy: Theoretical Perspectives, ed. Michel Rosenfeld (Durham: Duke University 
Press, 1994); Claude Klein, "A propos Constituent Power: Some General Views in a Modern Context," in 
National Constitutions in the Era of Integration, ed. Antero Jyranki (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 
1999), 31-32. 
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theory and concept of constituent power rely on two critical presuppositions: the distinction 
between ordinary and extraordinary law and power, and the absence of any source of political 
authority other than the people themselves. I explore both of these below. 
1.1 ORDINARY VERSUS EXTRAORDINARY 
We can begin unpacking constituent power by looking at the ideal-typical distinction between 
ordinary and extraordinary law, two types of legal rules found in a constitutional system of 
government.162 Ordinary law is familiar law, the body of positive law or legal rules that com-
poses a working legal system; it contains anything from noise ordinances to tax codes to gun 
control regulations. Extraordinary law is constitutional law, the rules that determine how pub-
lic power it to be exercised by organizing, defining, and limiting the institutions of government 
and setting out the formal procedures through which these institutions both govern and create 
ordinary law.163  
Extraordinary law is ‘higher’ than ordinary law in two central ways. First, since “the consti-
tution is the highest level within national law,” as Kelsen notes, it overrides ordinary law with-
in a constitutional framework.164 Thus, extraordinary law is controlling in cases of conflict 
                                                
162 For general discussions of two legal orders, see H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Second ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 89-96; Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State: 115-19; Stephen Tierney, 
"Constitutional Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry," The Modern Law Review 72, no. 3 (2009): 362. 
163 Larry Alexander describes constitutional laws similarly. Larry Alexander, "What Are Constitutions, and 
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with ordinary law, as evidenced by the judicial invalidation of ordinary acts of legislation when 
found to contradict constitutional laws within the same jurisdiction.165  
Some of the first written constitutions were thought to be ‘supremely normative’ in this 
manner.166 For instance, in Federalist 78, Hamilton insists that whenever an irreconcilable var-
iance between two laws occurs, that which has the superior validity ought to be preferred, i.e. 
“the Constitution ought to be preferred to statute.”167 Today, it is increasingly common to 
stipulate this sort of legal and normative superiority directly within a constitution. The begin-
ning of Article 9 of the Ethiopian Constitution provides an example: “The Constitution is the 
supreme law of the land. Any law, customary practice or a decision of an organ of state or a 
public official which contravenes this Constitution shall be of no effect.”168 
Second, extraordinary law is higher because it authorizes and helps create ordinary law. 
This is why constitutional law occupies the top of Kelsen’s legal hierarchy. As he explains, if 
“one legal norm determines the way in which another norm is created…the norm determining 
the creation of another norm is the superior, the norm created according to this regulation, the 
inferior norm.”169 Put differently, extraordinary law has higher status because it regulates the 
rules of the political game, part of which entails indirectly creating ordinary law by setting out 
                                                
165 Of course, hierarchical superiority also exists between ordinary laws. For instance, in Federal systems such as 
the United States, valid federal legislation generally takes precedence over the statutes enacted by state legisla-
tures. Extraordinary law is what lies at the very top of the legal hierarchy of a constitutional state. See Thomas 
C. Grey, "Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework," in Constitutionalism, ed. Roland J. Pennock and John 
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166 Philipp Dann and Zaid Al-ali, "The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant - Constitution-Making Under 
External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor," Max Plank Yearbook of United Nations Law 10(2006): 427. 
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the legally legitimate process of legislating.170 Extraordinary law does this by constructing the 
institutions of government, outlining the rules they operate through, and assigning some of 
them the task of and the authority needed to legislate.  
For theories of constituent power, the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary ap-
plies to political actors and political power as well as law. This sets these theories apart from 
Kelsenian strains of legal positivism, where the validity of extraordinary law rests on an ab-
stract and assumed norm, rather than the decision of a primal authority.171 The legal and polit-
ical institutions created and governed by the constitution are constituted bodies; the power they 
use is constituted power. This ordinary power manifests within existing legal institutions and 
procedures that form and limit its operation, determine its characters, and invest it with au-
thority. All constituted bodies, from legislatures to judiciaries to the military, exercise consti-
tuted power in their day-to-day operation. 
Unlike constituted ordinary political power, extraordinary political power is exercised in-
frequently, and only to accomplish the very specific task of creating a constitution.172  Constitu-
ent power is the name given to both the author of extraordinary law and the extraordinary 
                                                
170 Hannah Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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power that it wields, though the former is also referred to as constituent authority.173 Put simp-
ly, the constituent authority exercises constituent power when creating its constitution. 
Admittedly, this definition of constituent power elides the distinction between pouvoir 
constituent originaire and pouvoir constituent derive, between the original constituent power that 
creates a constitution and the derived constituent power that amends a constitution within an 
existing constitutional framework.174 These twin concepts, developed by scholars such as 
Raymond Carre de Malberg and Rogern Bonnard, are common within French Constitutional 
Theory. However, as Schmitt forcibly argues, the power to amend the constituent is not con-
stituent power, and thus the distinction dissolves.175 Derived constituent power describes a 
type of power that operates within the confines of constituted bodies and constitutional rules. 
While a constitutional amendment, even one produced by a popular referendum, can alter the 
constitution, its process is dictated by the constitution and thus it leaves the normative superi-
ority and sovereignty of the constitution intact. Since, as I show below, constituent power is 
inherently unconstrained, derived constituent power is not constituent power at all.  
 1.2 CHARACTERISTICS AND SUBJECT OF CONSTITUENT POWER 
Three central characteristics of constituent power follow from the distinction between ex-
traordinary and ordinary law and power. First, constituent power cannot be regulated by law 
                                                
173 Sometimes constituent authority is used in a different sense. For instance, Kay uses it to refer to “that quality 
in a person or persons that enables them to produce an effective positive law constitution. Kay, "Constituent 
Authority," 7. 
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or constituted authority.176 On the one hand, the emergence of constituent power and the 
mere occurrence of constitution-making signal a deep dissatisfaction with the current mode of 
government. This, at least practically, deprives its components of their legitimacy, meaning 
that during the creation of a new constitution the constituted bodies, ordinary law, and consti-
tution of the old regime would lack whatever power regulating the constituent authority en-
tails.177  Elster describes this reasoning in regards to a constituent assembly invested with con-
stituent power: “Almost by definition, the old regime is part of the problem that a constituent 
assembly is convened to solve. There would be no need to have an assembly if the regime was 
not flawed. But if it is flawed, why should the assembly respect its instructions?”178  
On the other hand, the inability of constituent power to be regulated follows directly from 
the nature of the constitutional legal hierarchy; since constituent power is the source of consti-
tutional law, and thus the source of all authority in a legal system, nothing within this system 
has the power to constrain it. To claim otherwise is to mistakenly insist, in the words of Rich-
ard Price, that, “there ought to be a power in the state superior to that which gives it being, 
                                                
176 This includes international law as well, which is particularly at odds with the legal hierarchical logic of constit-
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Opportunities," 1051-55; Franck and Thiruvengadam, "Norms of International Law Relating to the 
Constitution-Making Process."  
177 Kalyvas, "Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power," 227; Andrew Arato, "Carl Schmitt and the 
Revival of the Constituent Power in the United States," Cardozo Law Review 21(1999-2000): 1741. 
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and from which all jurisdiction in it is derived.”179 Thus, extraordinary law is unable to regulate 
constituent power because it is the creation of said power, and creations are always inferior to 
their makers.180 This logic applies all the way down the hierarchy: constituted bodies and the 
ordinary law they create are unable to regulate constituent power because they cannot have a 
power or ability beyond that possessed by extraordinary law itself. As Vindiciae Contra Tyran-
nos explains, “He who is established by another is under that person, and he who receives his 
authority from another is less than the person from who he derives his power.”181  
Of course, despite the fact that constituted bodies and law cannot regulate constituent 
power, they often try.  In many instances, these attempts end in failure. Most famously, both 
the U.S. Federal Convention and the 1789 Assemblée Nationale Constituante violated the de-
mands and restrictions imposed upon them by constituted bodies and preexisting legal sys-
tems.182 However, in other cases, the constituent power acts in accordance with existing pro-
cedures or institutional directives. For instance, the creation of the South African constitution 
followed the procedures set out in the interim constitution enacted by the final apartheid Par-
liament and the 2010 Kenyan constitution-making process followed the procedures laid out in 
                                                
179 Richard Price, "Two Tracts on Civil Liberty, the War with America, and the Debts and Finances of the 
Kingdom," in Richard Price: Political Writings, ed. D.O. Thomas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 27. 
180 “No constitutional law can confer a constitution-making power and prescribe the form of its own initiation.” 
Schmitt, Constitutional Theory: 132. 
181 GET CITE. See Daniel Lee, "Private Law Models for Public Law Concepts: The Roman Law Theory of 
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a 2008 amendment to the existing constitution regarding the proper legal methods for replac-
ing the constitution.183  
A proponent of constituent power theory, in which the constituent power is immune to 
such attempts at constraint, has to interpret these events in one of two ways. She might claim 
that constituent power played no role in these processes, and that therefore either an illegiti-
mate constitution was created or an old constitution was simply altered by constituted powers. 
Or, she might claim that in each case the constituent power did create the constitution, and 
that it chose rather than was forced to manifest and act in accordance with preexisting proce-
dures.184  
A second characteristic of constituent power is that it is extra-legal and self-authorizing. It 
emerges ex nihilo and authorizes both itself and the resulting legal and political system by its 
sheer existence and action. Since “the power to constitute,”  Kalyvas states, “refers to the ori-
gins of higher constitutional norms, the very foundation of any valid legal system, it cannot be 
traced back to any juridical norm, simply because a norm does not yet exist.”185 Thus, constit-
uent power emerges from an “extra-legal zone” and is unsupported by any authoritative legal 
structure, yet serves as the source of all legal and political authority within a state. It therefore 
                                                
183 Ebrahim, Fayemi, and Loomis, "Promoting a Culture of Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth 
Africa: Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of Government," 120. “The Constitution of Kenya 
(Amendment) Bill, 2008.” See also Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process. 39. Al-
so notable is the creation of the 1978 Sri Lankan Constitution, which was adopted pursuant to section 51 of 
the Constitution of Sri Lanka of 1972. Kay, "Constituent Authority," 10. 
184 In addition, as Kay explains, sometimes the masking of an exercise of constituent authority behind a façade of 
legality serves important political interests. See Kay, "Constituent Authority," 22. 
185 Kalyvas, "Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power," 227. Kay writes something similar: “to inquire 
into the authority to make a new constitution is exactly to ask who may establish law without legal sanction.” 
Kay, "Constituent Authority," 20. 
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authorizes without being authorized, and founds without being founded.186 This is why, for 
theories of constituent power, constitution-making is described as a break, an exception, or a 
rupture, a radically creative event that results in the formation of a genuinely new political or-
der that traces its authority to nothing but the unauthorized constituent power and the fac-
ticity of its founding act.187  
Third and finally, the constituent power is irreducible to the established legal and political 
order that it substantiates. In other words, the constituent power creates, rather than trans-
forms into, constituted powers. It thus remains something distinct from the legal and political 
institutions of government it produces. Whether this means that constituent power disappears 
after the creation of a constitution is one of several central questions or ambiguities in the con-
stituent power literature that I discuss below. 
Who then is the constituent power? What can ground a political order by serving as the 
ultimate source of authority for its norms, legal rules, and institutions? What is self-
authorizing, immune to external constrains, and irreducible to government? The preamble to 
the German Basic Law gives us a clue: “…the German people, in the exercise of their constitu-
ent power, have adopted this Basic Law.”188 Constituent power resides in the people or na-
tion—if a constitution is to be made, Sieyès explains, “the Nation alone has the right to do 
                                                
186 John Ferejohn, "Why the People: A Reflection on Democratic Constitutionalism," (Stanford University, 
2004), 3. See also Andreas Kalyvas, Democracy and the Politics of the Extraordinary  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008). 93-94. 
187 Kalyvas, "Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power," 228. Note that here one can see the social 
contract origins of constituent power theory, for the extra-legal and pre-juridical zone inhabited by constituent 
power is very much like the contractual concept of the state of nature or state of civil society. As Baczko ex-
plains: “the doctrine of the constituent power thus linked the principle of the social contract to political practice 
and aided their translation into action.” Baczko, "The Social Contract of the French: Sieyes and Rousseau," 
106.  
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so.”189 For theories of constituent power, then, the body of individuals that inhabit the territo-
ry to be governed in accordance with the new constitution is the constituent authority.190  
The location of constituent power in the people stems from the above-mentioned presup-
position that no authority exists than can rightly create a coercive government other than the 
people to be ruled by it.191 This presupposition itself rests on a dismissal of all other sources of 
political authority (divine appointment, beneficial consequences, superior force, etc.) in favor 
of the political rightness of self-government, and in this sense theories of constituent power 
apply popular sovereignty to constitution-making.192 In fact, ‘popular sovereignty’ is frequently 
used interchangeably with or in place of ‘constituent power’ in discussions of constitution-
making. 
However, the type of sovereignty exercised by the people as constituent power is not the 
Bodinian type common to modernist accounts of the legal state. In other words, the constitu-
ent sovereignty of the people is not ‘command sovereignty,’ the absolute and perpetual power 
                                                
189 Sieyès, "What is the Third Estate?," 133. 
190 Recent examples of this identification include: Dann and Al-ali, "The Internationalized Pouvoir Constituant - 
Constitution-Making Under External Influence in Iraq, Sudan and East Timor," 426; Suksi, Bringing in the 
People: A Comparison of Constitutional Forms and Practices of the Referendum: 26. 
191 Of course, exceptions exist. Schmitt alleges that the 1815 monarchical restoration in France proceeded on the 
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Theory: 131. See also Renato Cristi, "The Metaphysics of Constituent Power: Schmitt and the Genesis of 
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of highest command within a commonwealth. Command sovereignty is the coercive force 
wielded by an absolute superior to his inferiors, and lies at the root of Austinian conceptions 
of law as command. Constituent sovereignty, the type of sovereignty held by the constituent 
power, is productive rather than repressive, and has as its model legislation rather than coer-
cive rule.193 
1.3 CENTRAL QUESTIONS 
Of course, no settled or uniform version of a theory of constituent power actually exists. In-
stead, there are several key puzzles and corresponding questions that divide different versions 
of the theory and drive debate. The three most central questions—relating to the identity, po-
tential for action, and outcome of constituent power—are worth mentioning, for not only do 
they serve as the subject of most contemporary discussions of the concept, but they also point 
to some of the weaknesses inherent in any version of the theory. 
The first question pertains to identity and poses the well-known democratic boundary 
problem, the question of who exactly should be included when making democratic decisions, 
to the process of constitution-making itself.194 It asks: what it meant by ‘the people’ or ‘the na-
tion?’ Who is the subject of constituent power?195 In the context of constitution-making, when 
polities are being remade or created, the identity of the people becomes even more important 
and real than in ordinary politics. Here it is a matter of deciding upon the people, rather than 
                                                
193 See Kalyvas, "Sovereignty, Democracy, and the Constituent Power." 
194 David Miller, "Democracy's Domain," Philosophy & Public Affairs 37, no. 3 (2009). 
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finding a way to glean their will. Two general answers to this identity question are common, 
each of which correlates to different conceptualizations of national identity and the relation 
between the people and their constitution.196  
On the one hand, the people can be cast as an ethnos, a pre-political community constitut-
ed by some sort of commonness such as race, religion, history, culture, and the like.197 This 
conception of the nation as ‘culture nation’, to use Meinecke’s terminology, was especially 
prominent in 20th century German and Eastern European constitutional theory198 It corre-
sponds to a ‘nation-state constitution,’ understood as a reflection and protector of the aspira-
tions, values, and culture of a pre-existing society.199 According to Preuss, Schmitt had this 
conception in mind when discussing the sort of constituent power capable of creating a demo-
cratic state.200 More recently, this conceptualization of the constituent power as ethnos ap-
peared rather literally within the Estonian constitution-making process, when the franchise 
specified for the 1992 Constitutional Referendum was limited to those born in Estonian in 
1940 and their descendants.201  
On the other hand, the people as constituent power can be conceptualized as a demos or 
state nation, a political construction consisting of the totality of citizens in an existing state or 
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one that emerges during the constitution-making process.202 Sieyès seems to understand the 
constituent power in just this way, describing the nation as the “body of associates living under 
a common law, represented by the same legislature, etc.,” and later as “the sum total of all the as-
sociates governed by, and obedient to, the law that is the work of their will.”203 The corre-
sponding vision of a constitution to this demotic conception is a ‘liberal constitution.’ Such a 
constitution expresses a shared civic identity consisting in the ground rules of democracy and 
lawmaking as agreed upon by either a preexisting citizenry or one formed during the constitu-
tion-making process itself.204 Recent constitution-making efforts in post-conflict settings, and 
the corresponding literature that arose alongside and in response to them, utilize and endorse 
this conception of the constituent power. Here, constitution-making is cast as a process 
through which competing social groups and communities unite as the constituent power and 
become a nation tied together through mutually agreed upon extraordinary law.205  
The second central question, the action question, asks: how can the constituent power act? 
This query stems from the observation that the people seem unable to act in ordinary politics 
without the presence of institutions and procedures designed to collect, form, and channel the 
popular will. However, these institutions are unavailable to the constituent power. On the one 
                                                
202 Kay, "Constituent Authority," 151; Preuss, "Constitutional Powermaking for the New Polity: Some 
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hand, the occurrence of constitution-making means that any existing constituted bodies are 
relics from a previous regime that, as evidenced by the constitution-making activity itself, is no 
longer authoritative.206 On the other hand, “no type of delegated power can modify the condi-
tions of its own delegation,” i.e. constituted bodies cannot be used as the means to modify the 
source of their own authority and the determinate of their own shape.  
Moreover, the use of any formal institutions to enact the popular will qualifies as some 
sort of constraint, and the constituent power is that which cannot be constrained. As Schmitt 
notes, “even the attempt to establish a definitive representative or interpreter of the people’s 
will in some binding manner contradicts this theory,” yet the “execution and formulation of a 
political decision reached by the people in unmediated form requires some organization, a pro-
cedure.”207 Thus, a paradox arises because the people seem unable to act without the constitut-
ed forms they have the sole authority to construct.208 This action question reveals that when it 
comes to constitution-making, as Count Joseph de Maistre writes, the people sometimes ap-
pear to be “a sovereign that cannot exercise sovereignty.”209  
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The third and final question, the outcome question, asks: what happens to the constituted 
power after the constituting act? Underlying this question is the fundamental tension between 
the formless extra-constitutional constituent power and the formal constituted power, and the 
apparent impossibility of the two existing simultaneously. The constituent power becomes 
visible in moments of constitution-making as the pre-juridical supreme source of all future 
constitutional legitimacy, yet it is unclear what happens to the constituent power once it births 
the constituted form. If the constituent power disappears, does this mean that constitution-
making involves a Hobbesian transfer of sovereignty to the constituted powers?210 If the con-
stituent power remains, how are constitutional laws more permanent and sacred than ordinary 
provisional legislation? Three answers to this outcome question are dominant: the constituent 
power is exhausted by and absorbed into the institutional and juridical sites of power that it 
constructs (Rawls, Dyzenhaus, Holmes); the constituent power remains as a latent revolu-
tionary potential underlying and in tension with the constituted legal authority (Negri, Agam-
ben); and the constituent power remains in the form of a commitment to popular sovereignty 
in constructive tension with the constituted powers (Habermas, Ackerman, Amar, Preuss).211 
These identity, action, and outcome questions, and the issues which they involve, are cru-
cial to discussions of constitutionalism and founding acts and important for understanding the 
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justificatory force of constituent power, yet none points directly to ratification. Here, our con-
cern is with the puzzling relationship between the constituent power and one of the mecha-
nisms through which it constitutes. The question we are concerned with is:  Does ratification 
serve as a vehicle through which the people exercise their constituent power and therefore 
come to create or own their constitution?  
2. FINDING CONSTITUENT POWER JUSTIFICATIONS  
The above discussion makes clear why constituent power theory is a likely candidate for justi-
fying the implementation of ratification procedures. Constituent power theory claims that on-
ly the constituent power can create a valid constitution, and ratification, in its various forms, 
seems to be a perfect example of the people doing just that. However, testing this intuition re-
quires bringing constituent power theory into contact with the actual procedures and institu-
tions of constitution-making, something avoided by both constitution-makers and constitu-
tional scholars. 
2.1 ABSTRACT NOT TECHNICAL 
Constitutions are made using fairly standardized institutions and procedures. Throughout the 
five phases of constitution-making—prefatory, drafting, consultative, review, and adoption—a 
variety of discrete tasks take place.212 These can include choosing the various decision-making 
procedures to be used, educating the public, creating and populating constituent bodies, draft-
ing the document itself, collecting public opinion, ensuring technical coherence, and ratifying 
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and implementing the finalized constitution.213 According to a theory of constituent power, 
somewhere amidst these tasks the constituent authority must emerge and act. The question is: 
where and when? 
Discussions of constituent power usually avoid this question. Instead, they stick to ab-
stract theorizing and generalities. Claims that a particular constitution is authoritative because 
it is the product of the popular constituent power or popular sovereign are rarely followed by a 
detailed discussion of how the actual constitution-making process validates this claim.214 
When process is mentioned in these discussions we mostly find vague statements such as “The 
Colombian people no doubt delegated their constituent power to the assembly” or unex-
plained equations of participatory creation with constituent power authorship.215 For instance, 
a pamphlet discussing the Nepalese process claims that participatory constitution-making re-
sults in “a constitution that is owned by the people.”216 Similarly, a constitution-making manu-
al written for Somali stakeholders emphasizes that participatory procedures create a constitu-
tion that is “the fundamental decision of the people to be governed.”217 What is missing from 
these sorts of statements is an explanation accompanying the claims. How did the Colombian 
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people delegate their constituent power to the assembly? Why does increasing participation 
necessarily lead to the constituent power acting? In which instances and how often does the 
constituent power act within the constitution-making process? 
Generally, authors tend to invoke the concept of constituent power, or to use popular sov-
ereignty to mean the same thing, when making a general descriptive claim, stating a normative 
ideal, or gesturing towards some vague conception of legitimacy that a particular constitutional 
moment or constitution meets or falls short of. For legal scholars, as Claude Klein notes, the 
constituent power serves as “the alchemists’ philosophers stone,” used to somehow “account 
for the transition from the ante-judicial to an institutionalized legal system.”218 For political 
theorists, philosophers, and others of the same ilk, constituent power and the image of popular 
founding serve as a means to reconcile the existence of fundamental rights and entrenched ex-
traordinary law with a conception of self-government based on the will and consent of the gov-
erned.219 When invoked for either of these purposes, constituent power is attributed to an en-
tire constitution-making process without any attention being paid to what actually transpires. 
From the perspective of procedural design, these treatments of constituent power are of little 
use. In order to be of help in designing a constitution-making process, in selecting certain pro-
cedures and rejecting others rather than evaluating an entire process ex post, constituent power 
theory must move from the abstract to the particular; it must embrace and discuss the actual 
procedures and institutions used to create constitutions.  
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Our central concern with constituent power is its potential use in justifying the inclusion 
of a ratification procedure within a constitution-making process. Such a justification would 
claim that ratification must be used because it plays a central role in enabling the people to act. 
The contemporary literature on constitution-making regularly alludes to such an argument. 
For instance, Interpeace’s recent handbook, Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the 
Process, explains that: “Modern democratic theory and emerging international norms, such as 
self-determination, proclaim that the sovereignty of a nation is vested in the people. Since the 
constitution is the supreme law, a manifestation of national sovereignty, it is appropriate that 
the final word should rest with the people.”220 Restated, such a constituent power justification 
(CPJ) claims that: only the constituent power can create a valid constitution; that ratification 
enables the constituent power to act; and that therefore ratification must be incorporated 
within the constitution-making process.  
Of course, as stated this justification is far too general to justify ratification. What does it 
mean for ratification to enable the constituent power to act? How exactly does the procedure 
give “the final word” to the people? In addition, where does constituent action occur? Does the 
constituent power manifest solely in the ratification process or in other moments within the 
constitution-making process as well? As all of this makes clear, exactly when, where, and how 
the constituent power acts during constitution-making is essential for clarifying and explaining 
just how exactly constituent power justifies ratification. Below I explore several different types 
of constituent power justifications that emerge from attempting to make some of these distinc-
tions. 
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2.2 SIEYÈS AND THE PROBLEM OF ASSEMBLING THE NATION  
The tendency for many discussions of constituent power and popular sovereignty to eschew 
the details of the constitution-making process likely results from a simple fact hinted at by the 
action question discussed above: the people cannot actually come together, draft a constitu-
tion, and enact it. At no point during the procedures and tasks commonly used to create a con-
stitution is it clear that the people, whether ethnos or demos, are actually present and creating 
their constitution. For instance, the actual writing of a constitution is usually completed by a 
subcommittee of a constituent assembly and or an appointed constitutional commission, both 
of which frequently make recourse to drafts prepared through even less popular channels.221  
Participatory mechanisms such as public meetings and the collection of constitutional sugges-
tions directly engage only a portion of the population and are often filtered by elected or ap-
pointed officials with incredible leeway.222  
 Sieyès, one of the founders of constituent power theorizing, confronts this problem in sev-
eral of his works. For him, a constitution can only be established by the nation, a singular enti-
ty that must be distinguished “from an immense flock of people scattered over a surface of 
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twenty-five thousand square leagues.”223 Constituted powers cannot decide upon matters that 
touch upon the present or future base of their authority, for to do so “would be a petition of 
principle or a vicious circle.”224 The constituent power resides in this unitary nation, its expres-
sion is the general will, and it cannot be alienated. Further, when exercising the constituent 
power, the nation “exercises the greatest and most important of its powers” and, because of its 
extra-legal nature, “must be free from every constraint, every procedural formality but that 
which it decides to adapt.”225  
In these and other passages, Sieyès puts forward a theory that tracks the conception of 
constituent power discussed above. He explains that constituent power is the sole source of all 
constituted power and constraints, that constitutions create and organize constituted powers, 
and that therefore only the constituent power can create a constitution. Since constituent 
power rests in the nation, its exercise being the general will, Sieyès claims that the nation must 
create its own constitution. And, because it is the source of all possible political constraints, 
the nation is inherently unconstrained when engaged in constitution-making.  
Applying this theory of constituent power to the practical demands of constitution-
making, specifically the writing of the French Constitution by the Estates Generale and the 
National Assembly, led Sieyès to the logistical problem mentioned above. As he admits: “a 
great nation cannot in real terms assemble every time that extraordinary circumstances may 
require.”226 Put differently, it is simply impossible to assemble the nation and create a constitu-
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tion. This is true for the obvious reason that an assembly of the entire nation, at least a mod-
ern one, cannot physically convene. Also, even if such an assembly were possible, it would be 
catastrophically stagnant due to its size and the deliberation necessitated by the constitution-
making process.227 
Sieyès was certainly not the first person to notice and struggle with the theoretical and 
practical difficulties plaguing attempts to use the legitimating will of the people to create a con-
stitution. In the 17th century, both Royalists and Tories in England attempted to utilize this 
vulnerability in order to undercut arguments made by their opponents, who purported to 
speak for the people.228 Also, about twenty years before Sieyès, Rousseau addressed the same 
problem:  
 
“Laws are, properly speaking, nothing but the conditions of the civil association. The People subject to 
the laws ought to be their author…but how will they regulate them? Will it be by common agreement, 
by a sudden inspiration? Has the body politic an organ to state its wills? Who will give it the foresight 
necessary to form its acts and to publish them in advance, or how will it declare them in time of need? 
How will a blind multitude, which often does not know what it wills because it rarely knows what is 
good for it, carry out an undertaking as great, as difficult as a system of legislation?”229  
 
Rousseau solved this conundrum by declaring popular institution building impossible. In its 
place, he imported the ancient deus ex machina, the Lawgiver, to construct a just system of 
through which the general will governs.230  
                                                
227 Note that Sieyès is primarily concerned with the drafting of the constitutional text, suggesting that he sees this 
process as the key constituent moment. 
228 Edmund S. Morgan, Inventing the People: The Rise of Popular Sovereignty in England and America  (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1988). 94-119. 
229 Jean Jacques Rousseau, "Of the Social Contract," in Rousseau: The Social Contract and Other Later Political 
Writings, ed. Victor Gourevitch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 68, ch. 6-10. 
230 Admittedly, this comparison with Rousseau might be misleading, for the distinction between higher and ordi-
nary law is ambiguous if not completely lacking in The Social Contract.  
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 Sieyès refused to give up on constituent power constitution-making despite its apparent 
impossibility. Rather than rely on a Lawgiver, he turned to a special type of representation. He 
writes, “it [the nation] has, on such occasions, to entrust the necessary powers to extraordinary 
representatives.” Because the people cannot physically convene and create a constitution, Sie-
yès allows them to entrust constituent power to extraordinary representatives who can actually 
assemble.  
 On its face this solution is ambiguous, for what does ‘entrust’ mean in this circumstance? If 
it indicates the delegation of constituent power to extraordinary representatives engaged in 
constitution-making, this subjects the nation to decisions reached by an external constituted 
body and amounts to locating constituent power somewhere other than the people themselves. 
This violates two central tenets of Sieyès’ own conception of the constituent power. Sieyès’ 
solution thus runs into an obstacle, stemming from the literal interpretation of popular sover-
eignty and extraordinary lawmaking that underlies constituent power theorizing. If the people 
alone exercise constituent power, but constitutions must be created by some sort of smaller 
body or bodies, how can a constitution ever be the product of constituent power?  
Sieyès overcomes this obstacle by veering into the metaphysical. He radically equates the 
will of the extraordinary representatives to the will of the nation, arguing that the assembly “is 
a surrogate for an assembly of the nation,” one that has “been put in place of the Nation itself 
as if it was it that was settling the constitution…their common will has the same worth as that 
of the nation itself.”231 Extraordinary representatives assemble and create a constitution as if 
they are the nation itself, with a will of equal worth. In other words, Sieyès links will with rep-
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resentation, thereby transforming (not transferring) the will of the nation into the will of the 
extraordinary representatives, and the unrestrained constituent power of the people into the 
constituent power of the extraordinary representatives.232  
If Sieyès’ vision of extraordinary representatives is tenable and theoretically sound, and for 
the sake of argument I assume this, it enables him to avoid the problems plaguing an account 
in which constituent power is delegated and transferred to a constituted body. When it comes 
to extraordinary representatives, constituent power is not located in something external from 
the nation, because the will and actions of the assembly are the will and actions of the nation. 
Further, conceptualized in this manner, extraordinary representatives do not and cannot ex-
ternally constrain the popular constituent authority, for their will and decisions are no longer 
external to those of the nation. Moreover, nothing external constrains the extraordinary repre-
sentatives either, for their Assembly “is not subject to any particular form” and can “assemble 
and deliberate as would the nation itself.”233  
2.3 MULTIPLE MOMENTS JUSTIFICATION 
To restate, for Sieyès, extraordinary representatives wield constituent power when writing the 
constitution. Delegate Onslow Peters, during the Illinois Convention of 1847, put this point 
more bluntly: “We are the sovereignty of the State. We are what the people of the State would 
be, if they were congregated here in one mass meeting. We are what Louis XIV said he was, 
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“We are the State”?234 Within this model of constituent power constitution-making, what role 
can ratification play? What would it mean to require representatives embodying the will of the 
people to submit their creation to the people for evaluation?  
Three possibilities present themselves. First, ratification is an attempt by some meta-
authority above the constituent power to control constitution-making. This interpretation can 
be rejected immediately because constituent power is that which cannot be constrained; it is 
the source of all political power. Second, ratification might be a procedure left over or specified 
by the previous regime or constitution to constrain and check future constitution-making at-
tempts. This interpretation can also be rejected, for it turns ratification into a prototypical ex-
ample of a constituted power trying to regulate the source of its own authority.  
Third, ratification is simply another moment during constitution-making when the con-
stituent authority emerges and acts. In the first instance, the constituent power takes the form 
of extraordinary representatives writing the constitution with the will of the people. In the se-
cond, constituent power manifests as the people review the constitution and decide if it is to 
their liking. This interpretation is an example of what we will call a multiple moment conceptu-
alization of the relationship between constituent power and constitution-making procedures. 
Here, the people create their constitution by taking discrete actions during two or more mo-
ments of the constitution-making process. At each of these constituent power moments the 
people act through a given procedure, institution, or mechanism.  
Thus, for example, a multiple moments conceptualization of the constitution-making pro-
cess that led to the 2002 Rwanda Constitution might claim that it contained three moments of 
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constituent power: the Constitutional Commission exercised constituent power while drafting 
the constitution; the National Assembly exercised constituent power when amending consti-
tution; and those voting in the ratification referenda exercised constituent power when they 
approved the constitution.235 In each of these moments, albeit differently, the constituent 
power manifested and took action, and in combination they enabled the constituent power to 
create its governing document. Banks and Alvarez seem to conceptualize ratification in just 
this way when discussing the opportunities Colombian constitution-makers missed by choos-
ing not to use popular ratification. They write, “Popular ratification…gives the people another 
chance to decide whether they want a new charter.”236 
A multiple moment justification is a type of constituent power justification that relies on a 
multiple moment conceptualization of constituent power and constitution-making. 
Multiple Moment Justification: Ratification should be implemented because it is one of 
several moments in the constitution-making process when the constituent power acts. 
 
As stated, this justification is severely underdeveloped. At the least, some sort of argument is 
needed to explain how ratification functions as a moment of constituent power and why, in the 
presence of other sites of constituent action, its implementation is required. For instance, if the 
constituent power operated during the drafting and amending phase in Rwanda, why did the 
constitution need to be submitted to a ratification referendum? Why were two prior moments 
of constituent power not enough? 
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However, developing the argument further is unnecessary because of a more basic flaw 
within a multiple moment justification: any moment of constituent power after the first is ei-
ther redundant or contradictory. Consider Sieyès’ characterization of the constituent assem-
bly. Since the will of the extraordinary assembly is necessarily the will of the people, the crea-
tion of the former is necessarily the creation of the constituent power. In other words, the con-
stitution produced by extraordinary representatives is and always will be the work of the con-
stituent power. Submitting the constitution to ratification, and conceptualizing ratification as 
another instance in which the constituent power acts, means that ratification involves the con-
stituent power deciding whether or not to adopt its own creation.  
Think of the two possible outcomes. If the constitution is approved, ratification is entirely 
redundant; if the constitution is rejected, the constituent power is contradictory and the pro-
cedure incoherent.237 On the one hand, the constituent power accepts the constitution it creat-
ed during ratification. There is no need to utilize a procedure that tasks an actor with accept-
ing its own creation, let alone justify the procedure on the basis of this function. On the other 
hand, if the constituent power rejects the constitution through ratification, the constituent 
power is incoherent and the ratification procedure contradictory. What does it mean for the 
constituent power to reject something it just created? Neither outcome provides a firm justifi-
cation for including a ratification procedure within a constitution-making process. Simply put, 
if constitution-making representatives embody the will of the people and exercise constituent 
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power, there is no justification for implementing ratification on the basis of the need for fur-
ther constituent action.  
The nineteenth century political scientist and historian, John Joseph Lalor, concisely spells 
out the redundancy of ratification for a Sieyesian theory of constitution-making and the con-
stituent power. Describing the ‘French theory of convention,’ he writes:  
“[T]hat by reason of the impracticability of an actual assemblage of the sovereign body itself, the con-
vention must be taken to be its plenipotentiary representative, and, as such, possessed of all the powers 
that the body would have were it ‘assembled on some vast plain,’ in a state of nature, without govern-
ment, but purposing to ordain and establish one by its original authority; ….a body which is virtually 
the people itself could not properly be required to refer its work to the people for approval. Hence, ac-
cording to this theory, if a convention frame or amend a constitution, no submission of it to the people 
need be made.”238 
This objection to justifying ratification by appealing to constituent power within a Sieyèsian 
framework applies to any attempt to justify ratification using a multiple moment justification. 
If previous moments in the constitution-making process involved the constituent authority 
determining the form and content of the constitution, i.e. creating the constitution, there is 
simply no reason to implement a redundant procedure in which the constituent power evalu-
ates its own work.  
3. OBJECTIONS & OTHER JUSTIFICATIONS 
Several objections to the above reading of Sieyès, and to my treatment of MMJ, are possible. 
For instance, one might claim that Sieyès explicitly endorses ratification in some of his later 
writings and that therefore my analysis is inaccurate. Alternatively, one might claim that ratifi-
cation is neither redundant nor contradictory, for if the people approve the constitution it 
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means that its creators were extraordinary, and if the people reject the constitution it means 
they were not.  Ratification thus serves as a means to ensure that the constituent power wrote 
the constitution.  
This objection presumes that during the ratification process the constituent power unam-
biguously makes its will known, such that its decision is final and beyond reproach and over-
rides all previous actions taken during the constitution-making process. When a constitution 
is rejected, it means that the constituent power never acted earlier in the process or was over-
ridden by some other actor. When a constitution is accepted it means that the constituent 
power approves of and creates the constitution, regardless of how it was created. Justifying this 
conception of ratification requires one of two things: either the knowledge that the constitu-
tion-making process went wrong before ratification, or the claim that all constitution-making 
procedures, other than ratification, might fall short of channeling constituent power. I consid-
er two justifications of ratification that proceed along these lines, as well as Sieyès apparent 
endorsement of ratification, in this section.   
3.1 SIEYÈS AND THE SECOND CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY 
An objector to the above reading of Sieyès might point to the following passage in the “Rea-
soned Exposition of the Rights of Man and Citizen,” where Sieyès seems to explicitly depict 
ratification as a moment of constituent power and recommend its implementation: 
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“They [the National Assembly] will, consequently, act as a constituting power. And yet, since the exist-
ing Assembly does not precisely meet the requirements for the exercise of such a power, they declare 
that while the constitution that they are going to give the nation is provisionally obligatory, it will only 
become definitive after a new constituent power, convened specifically for this purpose, will provide it 
with the sanction necessitated by a rigorous application of principles.”239   
This passage can be interpreted in one of three ways. First, it might be an instance in which 
Sieyès portrays ratification as a second moment of constituent power and thus endorses some-
thing like a multiple moment justification. This seems to be the interpretation of Lucien 
Jaume, who suggests that for Sieyès, alongside extraordinary representatives, “a procedure for 
ratification of the Constitution, once drafted, would have been required,” because “the nation 
would have to be consulted in order to express the view of whether this Constitution was real-
ly theirs—that is to say, the expression of their constituent power.”240 Note that even if such 
an interpretation is correct, it does not provide us with a reason for submitting a constitution 
created by the people to the people, nor does it provide an additional constituent power based 
justification for ratification, i.e. it does not salvage the multiple moment justification or help us 
construct a different type of constituent power justification. Instead, it simply portrays Sieyès 
as calling for a procedure that is unnecessary in the lights of his own theory. 
Second, Sieyès might not be calling for ratification at all. In chapter six of “What is the 
Third Estate?” Sieyès explains two ways in which the Third Estate could “put itself in posses-
sion of the place in the political order that is its due” through the National Assembly.241 The 
first path consists in the deputies of the Third Estate separating from the nobility and clergy, 
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equating their will with the constituent will of the nation due to their majority status, and en-
acting a constitution. The second path is identical to the first, except the deputies do “not en-
act anything definitively,” and instead create a provisional constitution. Afterwards, they must 
“demonstrate the need to give special powers to an extraordinary deputation” that would “set-
tle, above all else, the great matter of the constitution.”242 
In the passage, Sieyès might simply be articulating the second path for the Third Estate, 
recommending that the Constituent Assembly temporarily adopt a provisional constitution to 
govern France until a truly extraordinary constituent assembly convenes.243 This second as-
sembly would evaluate the provisional constitution and make any necessary changes.244 Ac-
cording to this reading, only the second assembly would be a site of constituent power, there 
would be no multiple moments of constituent action, and ratification, defined as the up or 
down vote on a constitution by actors uninvolved in the drafting process, would never occur. 
Thus, this interpretation provides no alternative constituent power justification. 
Third, Sieyès might be using ratification for ameliorative purposes and only recommend-
ing the procedure because of prior deficiencies in the National Assembly. Though Sieyès notes 
that “the existing Assembly does not precisely meet the requirements for the exercise of such a 
[constituent] power,” he does not spell out the shortcoming. Two seem likely. On the one 
hand, the membership of the National Constituent Assembly in July 22, 1789 (when the 
above was written) did not reflect Sieyès’ initial vision. The Assembly consisted of the same 
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delegates elected by the three estates to serve in the Estates-Generale in order to address the 
financial troubles plaguing France, not the sort of extraordinary representatives elected specifi-
cally for the purpose of creating a new Constitution that Sieyès wished for and theorized in 
the first sections of “What is the Third Estate?”  
On the other hand, the Assembly engaged in constitution-making and ordinary govern-
ance, thus becoming both extraordinary and ordinary lawmakers. This is something Sieyès 
specifically warned against; “In politics, mixing up and conflating power is what constantly 
makes it impossible to establish social order.”245 The combination of these deficiencies might 
have led Sieyès to conclude that the National Constituent Assembly did not possess the con-
stituent power of the people and did not necessarily articulate the general will. His endorse-
ment of ratification is thus an attempt to convoke the constituent power for the first time.  
This third interpretation of the passage points to another potential constituent power jus-
tification, the ameliorative function justification. 
Ameliorative Function Justification: Ratification should be implemented because it pro-
vides a moment of constituent power needed because of deficiencies that prevented an 
earlier moment or moments of constituent power from taking place.246  
 
Several things are worth noting about the ameliorative function justification. First, it implicitly 
endorses the dismissal of the multiple moment justification. By justifying ratification due to 
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deficiencies in prior constituent power moments, the ameliorative function justification im-
plies that in the absence of these deficiencies, ratification would be unnecessary. Second, it 
seems liable to run into all sort of practical problems, such as identifying a proper authority to 
judge whether or not deficiencies are present. Most importantly, however, it can be rejected 
because it is not a proper constituent power justification. 
The central question motivating this dissertation is whether general reasons exist for in-
cluding ratification procedures within designed constitution-making processes. This means 
that a constituent power justification, like any type of justification that would answer our 
question, must provide a normative reason for using ratification procedures from the begin-
ning of the constitution-making process. The ameliorative function justification, which only 
justifies ratification if specific problems emerge during the process of creating a constitution, 
does not provide such a reason and is thus not an acceptable constituent power justification. It 
turns ratification into an ad-hoc particular solution, rather than a justified component of con-
stitution-making more generally.247  
3.2 MULTIPLE ATTEMPT JUSTIFICATION 
A constituent power justification similar to the ameliorative function justification—one that 
seizes upon the intuition that ratification procedures provide a final opportunity for the people 
to stop a constitution-making process gone wrong—becomes possible if we adopt a slightly 
different conceptualization of the relation between constitution-making procedures and the 
workings of the constituent power. Up until now, in accordance with a multiple moment con-
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ceptualization, we characterized different procedures as having the potential to serve as actual 
moments when the constituent power manifested and took action in accordance with its will. 
Under this assumption, the actions of properly extraordinary representatives are the actions of 
the constituent power, and the outcome of a ratification referendum simply is the constituent 
power’s decision. 
However, there are numerous problems with this multiple moment conceptualization. For 
one thing, it takes its inspiration from Sieyès’ dubious claim that the will of extraordinary rep-
resentatives is the will of the constituent power, and then applies such logic to other constitu-
tion-making procedures. This requires that we assume that the constituent power enacts its 
will through various mechanisms and institutions without problem, which overlooks the fact 
that political procedures sometimes produce unexpected outcomes. The delegates of constitu-
ent assembly might behave contrary to the wishes of their constituents. Fringe political parties 
might submit a disproportionate amount of comments on a draft constitution. And certain 
segments of the population might simply refrain from voting during referendums. 
Similarly, the multiple moment conceptualization of constituent power overlooks the fact 
that individuals might have a variety of constitutional preferences, and that different aggrega-
tive procedures might result in different versions of the constituent will. It also ignores the fact 
that if the constituent power is a demos, such that it both acts within and is formed by the 
constitution-making process, it will look different from one constitution-making procedure to 
the next. Moreover, a multiple moment conceptualization fails to take seriously the uncon-
strained nature of constituent power, its inability to be accurately channeled through institu-
tions and procedures of any type. Finally, it overlooks the possibility that the constituent pow-
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er, like the individuals of which it is composed, might change its mind. In other words, the 
constituent power might change its views on what an acceptable constitution looks like 
throughout the constitution-making process.  
These sorts of problems disappear if we adopt what can be called a multiple attempt con-
ceptualization of constituent power. According to this conceptualization, no procedure is 
guaranteed to enable the constituent power to manifest and definitively take a stand on the 
constitution. Thus, the constitution-making process contains multiple procedures and mecha-
nisms designed, in combination, to ensure that the constituent power creates its constitution, 
and that this constitution matches its overall will, or at the least to increase the chances that 
both of these occur. I will call a constituent power justification that uses this conceptualization 
a multiple attempt justification: 
Multiple Attempt Justification:  Ratification should be implemented because it serves as 
one of several procedures that in combination help to ensure that the constituent pow-
er creates its constitution  
 
As noted, this justification is similar to the ameliorative function justification, yet rather than 
being an ad-hoc solution to particular deficiencies ratification becomes a standard component 
of the constitution-making process because of the assumed imperfection of any attempt to 
harness the constituent power when writing the constitution. 
However, the multiple attempt justification fails for two reasons. On the one hand, it justi-
fies ratification on the basis of the claim that a constitution-making procedure meant to serve 
as a moment of constituent power might err. However, ratification is the final procedure in a 
constitution-making process, and in all of its forms it has two definitive outcomes: a constitu-
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tion is either accepted or rejected. This means that either the multiple attempts justification 
excludes ratification from its central fallibility claim, or it recommends the inclusion of a pro-
cedure that it admits is fallible, yet has the final say on whether a completed constitution will 
go into effect. The former is contradictory, and the second is entirely unpersuasive.  Attempt-
ing to get around this flaw leads to additional problems. For instance, the introduction of a 
further ratification process to double-check the first runs the risk of infinite regress, for why 
should a third and not a fourth ratification process be instituted for similar reasons.248  
On the other hand, the multiple attempts justification seems to miss the entire point of 
constituent power theorizing more generally. Constituent power theory holds that the people 
must act and create their own constitution. Creating a constitution that aligns with the actual 
or considered preferences of the people is not the goal, nor is such an outcome sufficient. 
What matters for the purposes of constituent power is that the people actually take action. 
Thus, a multiple attempts justification, which conceptualizes the constitution-making process 
as a series of procedures that hope to approximate the will of the constituent power, misses 
this altogether and fails to enlist the normative force of constituent power theory.  
4. CONCLUSION 
On its face, constituent power theory appears to be the perfect candidate for justifying ratifica-
tion. The people must create their constitution if it is to be authoritative, and ratification 
seems to provide just such an opportunity. However, as I have argued, figuring out the exact 
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manner in which ratification justifies constituent power proves more complicated than this 
intuition suggests.  
In this chapter, I explored the theoretical background of constituent power and drew out 
its chief characteristics. Constituent power theory extends the distinction between ordinary 
and extraordinary to the realm of political power. It posits the existence of an ultimate source 
of authority that creates the constitution and legitimizes the state. This constituent power, 
identified solely with the people, legitimizes itself, cannot be constrained by external sources of 
authority, and remains independent from the constituted powers it produces. 
A constituent power justification justifies ratification by claiming that constitutions must 
be created by the constituent power and identifying ratification as playing some sort of role in 
enabling the constituent power to manifest and takes action. This makes identifying exactly 
when and where constituent power appears within the various procedures used to create a 
constitution an essential point of inquiry. As noted, constituent power theory is normally used 
retroactively to characterize constitution-making processes taken as a whole, and thus bringing 
the concept into contact with actual procedures is something that rarely occurs in the litera-
ture. 
Starting from Sieyès’ attempt to explain how the people could actually write a constitution 
when a mass assembly is impossible, I posited three possible constituent power justifications. 
The multiple moment justification claims that ratification serves as one of several essential 
moments of constituent power in the constitution-making process. The ameliorative function 
justification defends ratification by characterizing it as a moment of constituent power made 
necessary by prior deficiencies in the constitution-making process. Finally, the multiple at-
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tempt justification claims that the procedure was one of several imperfect attempts at creating, 
manifesting, and enabling the constituent power to act and make a constitution its own.  
Each of these justifications fails for different reasons. The first makes ratification a redundant 
or incoherent process, the second makes the procedure into an ad-hoc solution, and the third 
contradicts itself and misinterprets constituent power theory.  
However, the flaws of these procedures push us towards a final constituent power justifi-
cation that begs consideration. The multiple moment justification fails because any moment of 
constituent power manifestation makes all others unnecessary, such that the prior emergence 
of constituent power within a constituent assembly eliminates the need for ratification. How-
ever, what if no prior manifestation of the constituent power took place? What if the constitu-
ent assembly did not and was not supposed to be a moment of constituent action, meaning 
that ratification served as the sole site of constituent power? 
An ameliorative function justification cannot be a constituent power justification, for it re-
lies on observations made during constitution-making, thereby violating the ex-ante perspec-
tive of the latter. However, as an ad-hoc solution, the ameliorative function justification por-
trays ratification as a procedure through which the popular constituent power can act and cre-
ate an authoritative constitution in the absence of other constituent moments, suggesting again 
that a ratification procedure involving the people might be sufficient for the purposes of con-
stituent power theory 
One reason for the failure of the multiple attempts justification is that while the justifica-
tion is motivated by the claim that any constitution-making procedure might err in channeling 
or enabling the constituent power to act, it either must exclude ratification from fallibility or 
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else risk being unpersuasive. However, if one chooses the former and characterizes ratification 
as a moment in the constitution-making process when the constituent power inevitably acts, 
this eliminates the need for multiple attempts at constituent power. In other words, it suggests 
an image of constitution-making in which the constituent power acts only during ratification, 
i.e. where ratification is the sole site of constituent power.  
The idea that ratification serves as the only site of constituent power, which the failure of 
these justifications suggests, points to a final type of constituent power justification. According 
to it, ratification should be implemented because the constituent power must create its consti-
tution, and ratification is the only moment in the constitution-making process when the con-
stituent power is able to act and make a constitution theirs. This sole moment justification is 
immune to the deficiencies that plagued the justifications considered above and is the subject 
of the following two chapters. As I will show, it also happens to be the argument used by the 







THE DOMAIN OF CONSTITUENT POWER: 
The Berkshire Constitutionalists Explain Ratification 
  
“We beg leave to therefore to represent that we have always been persuaded 
that the people are the fountain of power. That since the Dissolution of the 
power of Great Britain over these Colonies they have fallen into a state of 
Nature. That the first step to be taken by a people in such a state…is the 
formation of a fundamental Constitution as the Basis and ground work of 
Legislation. That the Approbation of the Majority of the people of this 
fundamental Constitution is absolutely necessary to give Life and being to 
it. That than and not ‘till then is the foundation laid for Legislation. 
    
Thomas Allen 
  
Indeed, it was if all the imaginings of political philosophers for centuries 
were being lived out in a matter of years in the hills of New England. 
Gordon Wood249 
 
Does conceptualizing ratification as a moment of constituent power justify its use? As argued 
in the previous chapter, it does not if we understand ratification to be one in a series of such 
moments. For instance, in Sieyès’ theoretical landscape, ratification is simply an incoherent or 
redundant procedure, a second moment of constituent power that needlessly checks the work 
of framers already embodying the popular will. However, nothing about the nature of constit-
uent power entails its manifestation in any particular stage of the drafting process, and Sieyès’ 
argument is simply one result, albeit a popular one, of applying constituent power theorizing 
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to the procedures involved in creating a constitution. An alternative conceptualization of the 
emergence of constituent power, one different from Sieyès’ and the other variations considered 
above, might be able to explain ratification without resulting in similar redundancy or incoher-
ence. 
In fact, such an account exists. It is embedded within the constitutional theory of the 
Berkshire Constitutionalists, a political faction in Western Massachusetts that played an ac-
tive role in the events leading up to the creation of the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. 
Using a method of dissent they initially pioneered to protest British rule, the Constitutional-
ists successfully prevented the local courts of law from sitting in Berkshire County and the sur-
rounding towns from 1774 to 1780, effectively denying the civil authority of the newly inde-
pendent government any jurisdiction in the area. They led this virtual rebellion to protest 
what they saw as an illegitimate provisional government operating from Boston, to advocate 
for the principles of popular control of political authority, and most importantly to call for the 
creation of a new constitution.  
In the course of their battle with the state authorities, during which they remained ardent 
supporters of the patriot cause in the revolutionary war, the Constitutionalists articulated the 
first argument for why a constitution should be ratified, and their writings remain some of the 
most extensive theoretical discussions of the topic to date. Moreover, they provide a means of 
reconciling constituent power, constitution-making, and ratification, without resulting in the 
problems detailed above. Put simply, the Berkshire Constitutionalists argue that the exercise 
of constituent power is unalienable, emerging solely during ratification and never penetrating 
the drafting process. They thus take the basic premise of theories of constituent power—that 
  
122 
only the people can create and authorize a constitution—and interpret it literally. For the 
Constitutionalists, the people only create a constitution when every eligible voter has the op-
portunity to be a direct participant, which means being able to approve or reject the written 
constitution directly.  
In this chapter, I introduce the Berkshire Constitutionalists, explain their role in Massa-
chusetts’s constitutional development during the Revolutionary War, situate their writings 
within the contractual tradition popular at the time, and reconstruct their theory of constitu-
ent power. I then argue that this conceptualization of ratification as the first and only site of 
constituent power suggests a strong route for justifying the procedure, a sole site justification, 
which avoids the problems plaguing other forms of constitution power justification.  
1. HISTORICAL CONTEXT, THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The Berkshire Constitutionalists developed their theory of constituent power and ratification 
during the tumultuous series of political events that led to the replacement of the aging Prov-
ince Charter with the oft-celebrated Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. This period is well-
traversed ground—as one historian notes, “for generations, historians… have been obsessed 
with the Massachusetts constitution of 1780”—and is covered in many if not most treatments 
of Early American history and the development of American political thought.250 Nonetheless, 
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(Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1961), ix. 
  
123 
in this chapter I sketch out the history of constitution-making in Massachusetts, paying par-
ticular attention to the events that the Constitutionalists reacted to and played an active role 
within.  
This focus is warranted because the history of the Berkshire Constitutionalists is the his-
tory of those who first came up with, argued for, and successfully implemented ratification. 
Their actions led to the procedure becoming the ubiquitous component of constitution-
making that it is today, they began the practice of ratification, and are thus of obvious interest 
to anyone wanting to understand ratification generally. Moreover, the Constitutionalists did 
not write free-standing philosophical treatises and essays. Instead, their political theory must 
be distilled from a variety of documents firmly embedded within the constitution-making 
events of the time, a task that requires historical engagement for its success.  
In addition, focusing on this history has the benefit of revealing certain limitations of state 
constitution-making grand narratives.251 Consider Gordon Wood’s Creation of the American 
Republic, which despite its many attributes screens out state-specific political and theoretical 
variance by focusing on patterns of general state formation. For Massachusetts alone it filters 
out the early emphasis placed on ratification, fails to explore local political factions to any sig-
nificant depth, and overlooks the fact that higher law constitutional thinking arose in the mid 
1770s, rather than a decade or two later. In addition, Wood’s and similar accounts collapse the 
different reasons underlying the demand for ratification and constitutional conventions. Both 
serve to distinguish a constitution as higher law, but the call for ratification occurred earlier 
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Making in the American Revolution," Rutgers Law Journal 24(1992-1993): 24; Adams, The First American 
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and was primarily based on a particular conception of constituent power, rather than on the 
inability for a legislative body to limit itself.252 
At the same time, even when placed in their appropriate historical context, many of the 
Constitutionalists’ arguments appear incomplete, vague, or, even worse, mistaken. For in-
stance, they claim that the dissolution of British authority sent the colonies “into a state of na-
ture,” an assertion that appears to neglect the intermediary stage of civil society and thus con-
tradict most sophisticated accounts of the transition from and into the state of nature (PP, 
90).253 Or take their central argument regarding ratification, which boils down to the assertion 
that the people have an unalienable right to directly approve or reject their constitution. Unal-
ienability means that a right cannot be voluntary given away or exchanged, and it is unclear 
how one can justify ascribing such a property, usually reserved for rights pertaining to basics 
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like life, movement and belief, to something so specific and historically contingent as the for-
mal approval of a written constitution.  
In order to better understand these claims, and to reconstruct the Constitutionalists’ theo-
ry more generally, we need to examine not just the history, but also the constellation of politi-
cal ideas that informed the Constitutionalists’ approach. This seems like a daunting task, for 
like many during the Revolution, a variety of intellectual traditions likely influenced the Con-
stitutionalists. Ideas mattered in Early America, but the exact nature and pedigree of these 
ideas has been the subject of an interpretive dispute for over half a century. The most produc-
tive yet contentious debate, linked to a larger discussion in Anglo-American modern political 
thought more generally, lies between the liberal and republican schools of interpretation.254  
On the one side, scholars such as Becker, Hartz and Rossiter, later joined by more con-
temporary authors such as Appleby, argue that the predominant influence on political dis-
course and constitutional theory in early America was a Lockean-liberal political tradition em-
phasizing natural rights, an instrumentalist conception of government, and individualism.255 In 
opposition, scholars such as Bailyn, Pocock, and Wood claim that the republican tradition, 
with its focus on citizenship, political participation, virtue, and mixed government, played the 
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more central role.256 This debate becomes more complicated because neither side is monolith-
ic; for instance the origins of American republicanism lay in the works of English radical oppo-
sition Whigs for Bailyn and Italian civic humanism via English Machiavellians for Pocock. 
Moreover, debates within Anglo modern political thought regarding the number and nature of 
political ideologies in 17th and 18th century England, as well as recent works pointing to the 
influence of American religious institutions and colonial experiences in self-government, make 
the task of understanding ideas in Early America all the more difficult.257  
For our purposes, however, matters are simpler than this makes them appear. We are in-
terested in understanding the Berkshire Constitutionalists’ approach to founding a new gov-
ernment after the demise of British authority, not the relative influence of theoretical tradi-
tions on the formation of early American political thought more generally. As we will see, this 
specific subject matter, as well as the language used by the Constitutionalists and the authors 
they site, points solidly towards contractualism, a theoretical trope that cuts across schools of 
political thought in its usage.258 Thus, the writings of English Republicans such as Algernon 
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Sidney, radical opposition Whigs such as the authors of Cato’s Letters, and liberals such as 
Paine regularly appeal to contracts and compacts in which individuals cede personal liberties 
to create society and delegate limited powers to appointed rulers.259  
The pamphlets and newspaper articles from the time support this emphasis on contractual-
ism, for they indicate that Massachusetts was awash in social contract thinking. For instance, a 
1772 article in the Massachusetts Spy notes that “a man when he enters into society is only 
part of a whole; from this result many benefits of which he could not experience in a state of 
nature.” In their Proclamation of January 23, 1776, the General Court writes that “the Con-
sent of the People is the only Foundation of [government]…and therefore every Exercise of 
Sovereignty, against, or without, the Consent of the People, is Injustice, Usurpation, and Tyr-
anny.”260 This decision to use social contract theory in a proclamation designed to justify the 
Revolutionary War and elicit public support and obedience attests to the diffusion, if not the 
acceptance, of contractualist logic in the Commonwealth at the time.261  
In addition, social contractualism combined with, added to, and drew support from the 
century old practice in New England of consensually creating new religious and political com-
munities through covenants and compacts.262 This practice, likely originating in the old Puri-
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tan belief that the history of humanity is the history of covenants, was particularly alive in the 
Western towns, most of which were established, along with their churches, in the thirty year 
period preceding the Revolution.263 Further, by the mid-eighteenth century contractualism 
was fully embedded in Congregationalism, the dominant form of Protestantism in the colony, 
and its clergy integrated contractual ideas drawn from Scottish Enlightenment and Whig po-
litical thought into their theological dogma.264 Thus, the Constitutionalists acted in a context 
where both the theory and practice of contractualism was very much alive. So, rather than en-
gage with and take a position in the methodological and interpretive disputes of early Ameri-
can political thought, we can combine the social contract tradition with historical context to 
more fully understand the Constitutionalists’ arguments.265 
2. HISTORY OF THE BERKSHIRE CONSTITUTIONALISTS 
For our purposes, the struggle to create a constitution for Massachusetts began on May 20, 
1774, when the British Parliament revised the colony’s charter by passing the Massachusetts 
Government Act, one of the five ‘Intolerable Acts’ designed to punish the colonists for their 
ongoing dispute with the Governor.266 The purpose of the act was clear: as Lord North stated, 
                                                
263 Taylor, Western Massachusetts: 4; Kuehne, Massachusetts Congregationalist Political Thought: 35. 
264 Kuehne, Massachusetts Congregationalist Political Thought: 90-103; Abraham Williams, "An Election Sermon: 
Boston, 1762," in American Political Writing during the Founding Era: 1760-1805, ed. Charles S. Hyneman and 
Donald S. Lutz (Indianapolis: Liberty, 1983). 
265 This is not to imply that conceptions of the social contract were particularly uniform in the 18th century, so 
that focusing on them makes understanding the Constitutionalists’ theoretical background particularly easy. 
Rather, my point is that by focusing on a particular type of argument and considering its various versions and 
facets we can attempt to understand the intellectual context of the Constitutionalists’ writings without first de-
ciding upon a favorite ideology. 
266 “Massachusetts Government Act,” in William MacDonald, ed. Select Charters and Other Documents Illustrative 
of American History: 1606-1775 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1899), 122-30. 
  
129 
it was meant “to take the executive power from the democratic part of Government.”267 Local 
dissent erupted immediately, prompting Governor Thomas Gage to dissolve the General 
Court in June and issue writs for a new assembly to be convened on October 5th.268 To say 
that Gage’s actions backfired is an understatement. Rather than punish dissent by depriving 
the colonists of governmental power until the next election, Gage effectively cut himself off 
from fully functioning local political units that continued business as usual.269 Town govern-
ments remained in operation, committees of correspondences formed to enable communica-
tion across the commonwealth, local conventions supplemented the court systems (the chief 
means of royal control at the county level), and an increasing number of colonists began ques-
tioning the legitimacy of their now abrogated charter.270  
The events of 1774 not only fanned the flames of dissent in the northeastern counties and 
towns surrounding Boston, long the epicenter of resistance to British rule, but awoke radical-
ism in the Western counties of Berkshire and Hampshire as well. Traditionally, due to geo-
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graphic isolation, control by elite families loyal to the crown, and a general suspicion of Boston 
and its politics, the towns in these counties displayed relative indifference to the larger political 
and revolutionary questions of the day.271 Nonetheless, some radical Whigs resided in the re-
gion, foremost of whom was the Reverend Thomas Allen, the pastor of the Congregational 
Church in Pittsfield and the future “intellectual leader and mastermind” of the Berkshire Con-
stitutionalists.272 The events following the Intolerable Acts gave Allen the opportunity to 
break free from the conservatism and sometimes-outright Toryism of the region’s leaders and 
drum up support for the patriot cause. He became the head of the Pittsfield Committee of 
Correspondence and, along with his growing team of radical Whigs, traveled throughout the 
region advocating the revolutionary project.  
After a few minor political victories, Allen and his followers engineered a form of protest 
that went beyond the organized condemnations of the northeast.273 In August, the town of 
Pittsfield petitioned the Inferior Court of Common Pleas not to transact any business during 
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the term.274 The language used in the petition betrays the political ideas already in circulation 
at the time, for it includes the claim that “the people of this province fall in a State of Nature 
until our greavences are fully redressed by a final repeal of those injurious oppressive and un-
constitutional acts….”275 Three days later, a crowd of 1500 people prevented the judges from 
sitting.276 Soon after, on August 30th in the Hampshire County town of Springfield, an even 
larger crowd shut down the courts and forced court officials to swear not to enforce any part of 
the Massachusetts Government Act.277 These were the first instances of counties overthrow-
ing the royal courts of justice, and patriots across the state approved and soon mimicked the 
Berkshiremen.278 By September, all normal judicial procedures had ceased colony-wide.279 
2.1 EARLY RESISTANCE TO THE CHARTER-BASED GOVERNMENT (1775) 
Governor Gage responded to “the many tumults and disorders” and the “unhappy state of the 
Province” by cancelling the planned convocation of the General Court and resorting to abso-
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lute military rule.280 Despite this cancellation, representatives assembled in Salem and on Oc-
tober 7th formed themselves into a Provincial Congress. Three Provincial Congresses infor-
mally governed the Commonwealth until July 1775. These bodies had no constitutional or 
legal status, and were meant to be temporary fixes, nothing more than a means of loosely or-
ganizing the towns and linking them to the Continental Congress and to General Gage while 
talks with the British continued. However, the events at Concord and Lexington made recon-
ciliation with the crown unlikely and the need for a more stable and comprehensive govern-
ment became clear.281 On May 5th the Second Provincial Congress declared that “no obedience 
ought, in future, to be paid” to Governor Gage. Eleven days later they applied to the Continen-
tal Congress for advice on how to set up a more permanent government.282 
In June, the Continental Congress responded, recommending that the colony “conform, as 
near as may be, to the spirit and substance of the charter,” while treating the Governor and 
Lieutenant Governor “as absent and their offices vacant.”283 Though it essentially amounted to 
an admission that the unrevised charter remained valid, colonial leaders followed these rec-
ommendations precisely.284 The Provincial Congress dissolved, new elections were held, the 
first House of Representatives of the State of Massachusetts Bay convened on July 19, 1775, 
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and its members soon chose a new council to exercise gubernatorial powers until the return of 
an amicable royal governor.  
Revamping the old charter displeased many patriots, for it shackled the commonwealth to 
an ill-suited royal document that had been the chief instrument of its oppression. Moreover, 
the resultant government was inefficient and gave the power to appoint well-paid military and 
court officials to the General Court rather than local units, as was the custom under the Pro-
vincial Congresses.285 Discontent only increased when, five months later, the Continental 
Congress recommended that South Carolina and New Hampshire create new governments 
from scratch.286 To many in Massachusetts, it appeared that other states were being offered 
the opportunity to create their own government, while they were left with a recreated elite-
driven political framework that drew its only authority from the very thing they were fighting 
against. Mild protests spread throughout the commonwealth, with dissension reaching its 
peak in Berkshire and Hampshire, where Allen and his followers transformed from simple 
patriots to the Berkshire Constitutionalists, a quasi political party that quickly made its de-
mands known throughout the state.  
In December 1775, the Constitutionalists successfully pushed through two resolves at a 
convention of the Berkshire Committee of Correspondences: the towns would not recom-
mend supporting the provisional government and each would nominate four candidates for 
common pleas judges, with those getting the most votes being sent to the Council for approv-
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al.287 Soon after, a town convention in Pittsfield successfully directed the county courts to re-
main closed. These actions echoed those taken in Berkshire a year earlier, but now Allen’s 
group directed their opposition against the home-grown provisional government, rather than 
British authorities.288 Fearing that their actions would be misinterpreted, the Pittsfield con-
vention sent an explanation, written by Allen himself, to the General Court.289  
This Pittsfield Memorial explains the Constitutionalists’ “abhorrence of that Constitution 
now adopting in this province,” attributes its defects primarily to the replacement of local con-
trol with the “nominating to office by those in power,” and argues that there is no reason to 
create a government on top of the reviled charter, for the Continental Congress’s advice was 
open to interpretation and invalidated by that given to South Carolina and New Hampshire. 
The memorial closes with two demands for institutional reform: create an elected Governor 
and Lieutenant Governor and give local units the sole power of appointing individuals to civil 
and military offices.290 
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These demands, and other criticisms articulated by the Constitutionalists in the docu-
ment, derived from their straightforward application of revolutionary rhetoric and theory.291 
The Berkshire Constitutionalists wanted independence immediately, so they called for the 
creation of an elected executive, thereby rejecting the pretense that the new government oper-
ated in the temporary absence of the royal governor.292 They were avid participants in a revolu-
tion buoyed by a commitment to popular sovereignty, so they rejected the General Court’s de-
cision to appoint judicial and military officials without local consultation. And they shared in 
the conspiratorial paranoia that served as an accelerant for the revolution, the tendency to see 
“overwhelming evidence…that they were faced with conspirators against liberty,” and thus 
viewed with suspicion the appointment of former colonial power holders and members of the 
sitting legislature to these offices.293 
Having explained themselves, the Berkshire Constitutionalists continued their dissent into 
1776, growing in strength and influence in the process. A February meeting of Berkshire 
committees, which Allen called and opened by reading aloud Paine’s recently published 
Common Sense, resulted in the forced closing of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and the strip-
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ping of all recently appointed civil officers of their commissions.294 One month later, Allen 
similarly convinced twenty-eight towns in Hampshire County to forcefully close their Court 
of Quarter Sessions.295  
The continued and increased opposition to the provisional government, as well as the peti-
tions sent to the General Court from Western anti-Constitutionalists seeking relief from these 
“unthinking, rash, and designing men,” prompted the General Court to take further action. In 
May, they lowered judicial fee schedules and eliminated mention of the crown in its commis-
sions.296 By making the courts less expensive, and dropping the pretense of British authority, 
they hoped to reopen the courts by appeasing the Constitutionalists.297 
These efforts fell on deaf ears. By the time the General Court acted, the Constitutionalists 
had changed their institutional focus to a broader demand: that the General Court abandons 
the royal charter and initiates procedures to create a new constitution in toto. 298 As Allen ex-
plained:  
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“…if Commissions should be recalled and the Kings Name struck out of them, if the Fee Table be re-
duced never so low, and multitudes of other things be done to still the people all is to us as Nothing 
whilst the foundation is unfixed the Corner stone of Government unlaid. We have heared much of 
Governments being founded in Compact. What Compact has been formed as the foundation of Gov-
ernment in this province?” (PP, 92)  
 
These words appear in the Pittsfield Petitions. Written by Allen and sent by the town to the 
General Court on May 29th, it first reaffirms that the townspeople “by no means object to the 
most speedy institution of Legal Government,” being as “earnestly desirous as any others of 
this great Blessing,” and then outlines the “Principles real Views and Designs” of the Constitu-
tionalists, i.e. the theory underlying their dissent. 
Drawing from social contract theory, Allen asserts that “the people are the fountain of 
power,” that the “dissolution of the power of Great Britain over the Colonies” sent them into 
“a state of Nature,” and that the only way to exit such a state and enjoy civil government capa-
ble of warding off “Tyranny and Despotism” is “the formation of a fundamental Constitution 
as the Basis and ground work for Legislation” (PP, 90)299. He then notes that “a Representa-
tive Body may form, but cannot impose said fundamental Constitution upon a people,” for 
“the Approbation of the Majority of the people…is absolutely necessary to give Life and being 
to it.” He ends the petition making a single demand: “Your petitioners beg leave there to Re-
quest that this Honourable Body would form a fundamental Constitution for this prov-
ince…and that said Constitution be sent abroad for the Approbation of the Majority of the 
people in this Colony” (PP, 90-93). While the details of this argument will be fleshed out in 
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the next section, it is worth noting now that Allen’s emphasis is on the necessity of having 
people ratify the constitution, and that the identity of the framer or framers appears to be rela-
tively unimportant. 
The general demand for a new constitution spread throughout Massachusetts, gaining 
support from the Continental Congress’ May 15 recommendation that the colonies establish 
governments in which all powers were to be exerted “under the authority of the people,” and 
from the Declaration of Independence promulgated two months later; both of which appeared 
to put the legitimacy of anything but a locally created constitution into question.300 The Gen-
eral Court initiated the constitution-making process on September 17, 1776, asking the towns 
for permission to transform into a constituent legislature and create a constitution.301  
Specifically, in this ‘1776 request’ they asked towns to “give their consent that the present 
House of Representatives and the Council…shall agree on and enact such a Constitution and 
Form of Government… and will direct that the same be made public for the Inspection and 
Perusal of the inhabitants, before the Ratification thereof by the Assembly.”302 Four things are 
worth noting about the 1776 request. First, the offering of inspection privileges was not with-
out precedent. Since at least 1639 the various governments of Massachusetts Bay periodically 
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submitted fundamental laws and important questions to the people for review and, on occa-
sion, comment.303 Second, the plan to combine the General Court and the Council into one 
body was in fact unique, and suggests that even the General Court considered the normal bi-
cameral legislature insufficient to create a constitution.304 Third, the General Court ignored 
one of the Constitutionalists’ central requests, for they left final approval of the constitution to 
themselves, rather than the people. Fourth and finally, the General Court’s decision to have 
itself, an existing governing body, write and enact the constitution, followed the norm estab-
lished by earlier constitution-making efforts in the other colonies.305  
At least 132 towns responded to the 1776 request.306 Though a majority of these towns 
(92) approved it, the overall response likely displeased the General Court. Many of the towns 
did not respond, a significant number dissented, and a majority of the approving towns did so 
only under certain conditions. Though most of the dissenting towns agreed on the need for a 
                                                
303 For instance, in 1639 the General Court sent potential legislation to towns for review and comment by local 
elders, and more recently they had asked the towns for their opinion on the Declaration of Independence. See 
Charles Sumner Lobingier, The People's Law or Popular Participation in Law-Making: From Ancient Folk-Moot 
to Modern Referendum  (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1909). 79; Hartwell, "Referenda in 
Massachusetts and Boston," 249.  
304 Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America: 30.  
305 For example, earlier in 1776 functioning provincial congresses drafted and enacted new constitutions without 
popular review in South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and New Jersey. See Adams, The First American 
Constitutions: 66-72; Kruman, Between Authority and Liberty: State Constitution Making in Revolutionary 
America: 20-24. 
306 Towns responded to requests from the General Court by sending records of their voting results. These rec-
ords frequently included an explanation for the overall decision reached by each town, and are known as ‘Re-
turns.’ Below, all claims regarding the results of the 1776 request stem from my own analysis of the 126 surviv-
ing returns collected and printed by the Handlins, and six other returns that are either described or printed in 
other sources. The details of this analysis appear in Appendix 1. See "Returns of the Towns on the Resolution 
of September 17, 1776," in The Popular Sources of Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Hammett, "Revolutionary 
Ideology in its Social Context," 327; Harry A. Cushing, History of the Transition from Provincial to 
Commonwealth Government in Massachusetts  (New York: Columbia University, 1896). 189; Smith, History of 
Pittsfield: 356.  
  
140 
new Constitution, they objected to the proposal for several reasons. Six towns claimed that the 
members of the General Court did not have the power to create a constitution for they “were 
never elected by the people for that purpose.”307 Thirty-one towns took issue with the compo-
sition of the House, claiming that the representation was “very unequal and unsafe.”308 Eleven 
towns argued that it was a bad time to make a new constitution, for many potential voters 
were off fighting the war and the General Court had more pressing matters to deal with.  
Acton and Concord made the more sophisticated argument that an effective constitution 
should not be created by the very body it is meant to limit, for constitutions are meant to se-
cure certain rights and privileges from government encroachment, and “the Same Body that 
forms a Constitution have of Consequence a power to alter it,” and therefore “a constitution 
alterable by the Supreme Legislative is no Security at all.” 309 Thirty-three towns joined Acton 
and Concord in embracing the logical corollary of this objection by requesting that, “a Conven-
tion be Chosen by the Inhabitants of the Several Towns and Districts in this State to form 
and Establish a Constitution for this State.”310 These requests mark the first discussion of a 
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pure constitutional convention, a body of delegates elected for the sole purpose of writing a 
constitution, which some consider to be “the most distinctive institutional contribution…the 
American Revolutionaries made to Western politics.”311  
Seventy-four towns made a final objection, claiming that the General Court erred by not 
including popular ratification in the proposed constitution-making process, for the people had 
to have an opportunity to formally approve or disapprove of the constitution before enact-
ment. Despite being of Constitutionalist origin, the most striking examples of this objection 
are found in the returns from Boston and Lexington. Boston claims that, “We apprehend that 
the People have some higher privileges, than a bare Inspection and Perusal of the Constitution 
under which they are to live.”312 Similarly, Lexington’s return reads: “that… id does not appear 
from thence, that there is any just Provision made for the Inhabitants, as Towns, or Societies, 
to express their approbation, or the Contrary, in Order to Such Ratification by the Assem-
bly.”313  
More towns complained about the lack of ratification than any other objection. Previous 
scholars overlook this fact, likely because only twenty-four of the towns that asserted the need 
for ratification actually dissented to the General Court’s 1776 request. The remaining fifty-
two towns approved the request, but only under the condition that ratification took place, fre-
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quently by repeating an altered version of the General Court’s language. For example, the 
Hampshire towns of Greenfield and Colrain wrote: “…that the same [draft constitution] be 
made public for the inspection perusal and approbation of the people before the ratification 
thereof.”314 Conway specified the need of obtaining the “Consent or Rejection” of each town, 
while Sheffield demanded that the constitution only be accepted if “agreed to by the People att 
Large.”315 Thus, a majority of the towns in Massachusetts deemed the mere opportunity of 
perusal and inspection insufficient, and only a bare majority (68) approved the 1776 request. 
By 1776, the central tenet of the Berkshire Constitutionalists—that only the direct consent of 
the majority can give life to a constitution—seems to have gained widespread acceptance.  
2.2 CONSTITUTION-MAKING: FAILURE AND SUCCESS (1777-1780) 
After months of inaction, on May 5, 1777, the General Court announced that it would create 
a new constitution.316 Though it ignored (v) by keeping constitution-making within the legis-
lature, and did the same to (iii) and (iv) by not waiting until the cessation of the war, the Court 
responded directly to all other objections. Thus, it announced that the following session of the 
General Court would create the constitution, and asked each town to instruct their delegates 
to meet “in one Body with the Council, to form such a Constitution of Government.” This 
plan addressed objection (i), for members of the next House would be elected to both legislate 
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and create a constitution, as well as objection (ii), for each town would have the opportunity to 
send their full quota of delegates in accordance with the now fully circulated May 1776 law.317  
In response to (vi), the General Court announced that the constitution would only go into 
effect if it was approved by the public, defined as being “approved of by at least two Thirds of 
those who are free and twenty-one Years of Age, belonging to this State and present in the 
several meetings…”318 Specifically, each town was to hold a special meeting during which they 
would evaluate the draft constitution and draw up “a Return of their Approbation or Disap-
probation.” The General Court would then calculate whether a 2/3 majority had been 
reached. This marked the first proposed use of ratification in modern constitution-making, 
and signaled an important victory for the Berkshire Constitutionalists. Most of the towns ap-
proved the proposal and sent delegates to the legislature. The newly elected General Court 
resolved itself into a constituent legislature in June and submitted a constitution to the towns 
on February 28, 1778.319  
This first use of popular ratification resulted in the first instance of constitutional rejec-
tion. The constitution failed by a spectacular margin of five to one, with towns giving a wide-
range of reasons for their disapproval.320 The most famous criticism is memorialized in The-
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ophilus Parsons’ The Essex Result, which provides an excellent summary of many political 
principles in circulation at the time in its focus on the lack of a Bill of Rights, insufficient sepa-
ration of powers, and the unfairness of the proposed system of representation.321 The Western 
towns criticized the proposed constitution from a predictably more populist viewpoint, argu-
ing against property requirements for the franchise, the appointment of officers by the gover-
nor and council, and the use of life appointments for judges.322  
Throughout this entire period, the Berkshire Constitutionalists continued to shutdown 
the courts in the Western Counties, despite the General Court explicitly ordering them to de-
sist on several occasions.323 In August 1778, the Constitutionalists sent the General Court an-
other explanatory document. After defending the county against further charges of disloyalty 
and anarchy, and affirming that the courts would remain closed, this ‘Berkshire County Remon-
strance’ demands that the General Court convoke a constitutional convention, “a special con-
vention of Delegates from each Town in this State, for the purpose of forming a Bill of Rights 
and a Constitution or Form of Government,” and threatens secession in the absence of ac-
tion.324  
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Note that this demand does not seem to represent a new interest in the theoretical ad-
vantages of conventions—it completely lacks the principled justifications of other Constitu-
tionalist writings—but instead seems indicative of the growing opinion that the General Court 
had no interest in creating a new constitution. Such thoughts were fueled by rumors circulat-
ing the commonwealth, such as the one expressed by a convention of Hampshire towns: “We 
Fear that there is Designing men in this State that Intends by Delaying the Forming a Bill of 
Rights and a free Constitution to Lull People to Sleep, or Fatigue them other ways so as to 
obtain a Constitution to their minds, Calculated to Answer their own Ends and wicked Pur-
poses.”325 Thus, in the Remonstrance, the Constitutionalists likely joined the growing number 
of people who thought the only means to a constitution would be the circumvention of the 
General Court. 
Eventually, the General Court sent an investigating committee to Berkshire, which re-
turned to Boston bearing the ‘Statement of Berkshire County Representatives,’ written by Thom-
as Allen and dated November 17, 1778.326 In it, Allen neither mentions a convention nor 
threatens secession, but instead repeats and enlarges his core contractual arguments—that the 
people are the fountain of power, that a constitution is the foundation of government and leg-
islation, and that only the ratification of the people can give life to it—and makes one signifi-
cant addition: he claims that the right to ratify a constitution is unalienable, and that attempt-
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ing to give it away necessarily harms the people.327 As we will see, this addition marks the cul-
mination of Constitutionalist thought and the completion of their theory of ratification.  
On February 19, 1779, the House asked the towns of Massachusetts if they wanted to 
“have a new Constitution of Form of Government Made,” and if so whether they wanted to 
“empower their Representatives…to vote for the calling of a state Convention.”328 Though the 
strongest response came from their stronghold—every town in Hampshire and Berkshire 
County answered in the affirmative to both questions—the Constitutionalists did not reopen 
the courts.329 Instead, hoping to avoid legitimating the General Court in the event of another 
constitutional rejection, the Constitutionalists kept the courts closed throughout the year.330  
In June 1779, following an overwhelmingly positive response to the 1779 request, the 
General Court called for the election of convention delegates.331 On September 1, 1779, ap-
proximately 300 of them assembled in Boston as the Massachusetts Constitutional Conven-
tion. The initial draft of the constitution was the work of a small subcommittee consisting of 
the John Adams, Samuel Adams, and James Bowdoin, though John Adams did most of the 
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writing.332 In the following two sessions of the convention, delegates debated and revised this 
draft in a process described by John Adams as “Locke, Sidney, and Rousseau and De Mably 
reduced to practice.”333 
In February and early March, the delegates discussed the procedural details of ratifica-
tion.334 Unknowingly beginning a tradition of constitution-making bodies diverging from the 
constraints set by their creators, the delegates did not even consider the procedures described 
by the General Court in its 1779 resolve, which gave itself responsibility for tallying the votes 
and enacting the constitution if approved.335 Rather, after much confused debate, the conven-
tion presented the following scheme: copies of the constitution would be sent to each town, 
discussed in town meetings, and all qualified voters (freemen 21 years or older) would vote on 
each clause. The towns would then send these voting records, including objections to each re-
jected clause, to the Convention for tabulation. Delegates would return to the Convention, 
entrusted with the power to either implement the constitution if all clauses obtained a two-
thirds majority or alter the constitution to conform “to the Sentiments of two thirds of the 
                                                
332 Morison, A History of the Constitution of Massachusetts: 28-29; Cella, "The People of Massachusetts, A New 
republic, and the Constitution of 1780: The Evolution of Principles of Popular Control of Political Authority, 
1774-1780," 998. See also Samuel Eliot Morison, "The Struggle Over the Adoption of the Constitution of 
Massachusetts, 1780," in Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings, Volume L (Boston: Massachusetts 
Historical Society, 1917), 356. 
333 Cited in Handlin, "Introduction," 24.. In actuality the bulk of the revisions took place in the third session of 
the Convention, from late January to early March, when a harsh winter reduced the number of delegates to a 
maximum of 82 members.  
334 Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government for the State of Massachusetts Bay, from the 
Commencement of their First Session, September 1, 1779, to the Close of their Last Session, June 16, 1780.,   
(Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, Printers to the State, 1832). 158-69. 
335 "The Call for a Convention, June 1779," in The Popular Sources of Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966, 1966). For a 




Voters throughout the State” and then implement this revised version.336 This clause by clause 
voting procedure appears to be a final contribution by the Berkshire Constitutionalists, for 
both Pittsfield and Williamstown ordered their convention delegates to push for something 
similar.337  
Regardless of its source, the deficiencies of this ratification process are numerous, particu-
larly the plan for altering constitutional provisions approved by less than two-thirds of those 
voting. The plan neglects the possibility that a constitutional provision altered in order to sat-
isfy objectors might no longer be acceptable to those voters who originally approved it, and 
that towns might reject a provision of the constitution for different and conflicting reasons, 
making it impossible for the convention to use the voting returns to create a provision more 
congruent with the majority will.338  
However, the convention bypassed these sorts of complications in their efforts to address a 
more immediate problem concerning vote tabulation. Simply put, many towns did not follow 
the convention’s voting directions. For instance, Hancock only reported voting results for 
three amended clauses and for a vote taken on the entire constitution as amended. Hadley re-
ported the votes correctly for approved clauses, but gave the voting results on amended ver-
                                                
336 Journal of the Convention for Framing a Constitution of Government for the State of Massachusetts Bay, from the 
Commencement of their First Session, September 1, 1779, to the Close of their Last Session, June 16, 1780.: 168-69. 
Morison provides an excellent discussion of the debate regarding ratification procedures in Morison, "The 
Struggle Over Adoption," 358-63. 
337 "Votes of Towns in Choosing Delegates, July-October 1779," in The Popular Sources of Authority: Documents 
on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1966), 412, 14. 
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While it is certainly possible that Condorcet knew of the Massachusetts experience in 1789 when writing his 
essay, perhaps via  John and Samuel Adams and Benjamin Franklin, I am unaware of any evidence supporting 
this connection. Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 273-74. 
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sions of defeated clauses, rather than on the original defeated clauses themselves.339 Char-
lemont, Windsor, Rutland, and others only reported the results of a single vote on an amend-
ed version of the constitution.340 Other towns, such as Groton, submitted complete voting re-
turns but also voted that they would drop their objections and accept the original provisions if 
2/3 of the state approved of them.341 
When the committee appointed by the convention to tabulate the 181 voting returns be-
gan their work, they likely came to a simple conclusion: combining the disparate voting returns 
in a manner that would allow the convention to see whether each provision of the constitution 
obtained 2/3 approval was impossible. The solutions adopted by the committee and ultimate-
ly accepted by the convention was, as one historian notes, an act of political jugglery.342 Put 
simply, the committee ignored votes in favor of amended clauses or treated them as votes in 
favor of the original and counted votes such as Groton’s as votes in favor of the original consti-
tution.343 This means, as Morison notes, “that in computing the vote for a given article the re-
turns of practically all the towns that opposed it were either counted in favor of it or not 
counted at all.344 
                                                
339 "Returns of the Towns on the Constitution of 1780," in The Popular Sources of Authority: Documents on the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 
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340 Ibid., 347-48, 505, and 866. 
341 Ibid., 650. 
342 Morison, A History of the Constitution of Massachusetts: 21. 
343 Morison, "The Struggle Over Adoption," 396-99; Morison, A History of the Constitution of Massachusetts: 21-
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In this way, the committee found a two-thirds majority in favor of each article, and there is 
no evidence suggesting that any of the convention delegates objected.345 On June 15, 1780, the 
convention voted that “the People of the State of Massachusetts Bay have accepted of the 
Constitution as it stood in the printed form.” Elections were soon held for a new General 
Court and on October 25th the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts went 
into effect, with John Hancock being elected Governor a day later. This Constitution soon 
served as the blueprint for other state constitutions and the United States Constitution, and 
today it remains the oldest written constitution in active use anywhere in the world.346   
 Though the final product was certainly more conservative than their ideal constitu-
tion, the mere fact that a constitution ratified by the people came into existence marked the 
ultimate success of the Berkshire Constitutionalists. At the same time, it also marked the be-
ginning of the end for the movement, or at least a change in its nature, for the establishment of 
a new framework of government on popular grounds meant the oppositional stance that kept 
the courts closed until 1780 had to transform into one of support. Thus, their leaders quickly 
integrated themselves into the new political life of Massachusetts, eventually relocating the 
capital of Berkshire County to the town of Lenox, a Constitutionalist stronghold, and gaining 
control of the local court system, as evidenced by seven signers of the 1778 Remonstrance be-
coming justices of the peace within a year of ratification.347 In the end, however, their influence 
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article III of the Declaration of Rights (religion); Chapter II, Section I, Article II (required Governor to be 
Christian); and Chapter VI, Article X (amendment procedures). 
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reaches further than the confines of Massachusetts and even the United States. Thomas Allen 
and his Constitutionalists were the first to demand that the people ratify their constitution, a 
practice that spread throughout the states and then the world. Moreover, they provided the 
first and perhaps only sophisticated defense of ratification and it is to this that we now turn.348 
3.  CONSTITUENT POWER ROOTED IN CONTRACTUALISM 
Stitching together the various arguments made by the Constitutionalists yields a consistent 
theory of constituent power that, most importantly for our purposes, provides a justification 
for the use of ratification. This argument divides into five parts: (1) government is necessary 
and its power comes from the people; (2) only the majority of civil society is capable of con-
structing a legitimate government; (3) creating a constitution is the first step in this process; 
(4) constituent power operates during authorization rather than the drafting of a constitution 
or anywhere else in the process; and (5) the exercise of it is unalienable. From these five claims, 
the Berkshire Constitutionalists’ conclude that all constitutions must be ratified directly by the 
people before final enactment. In this section, I unpack, reconstruct, and explain this argument 
in order to show the theoretical edifice supporting the Constitutionalists’ activism.  
3.1 SOCIAL CONTRACT BASICS 
As mentioned earlier, the Berkshire Constitutionalists rooted their theory in the social con-
tract tradition. They embraced several of its central tenets, two of which are the following: gov-
ernment is a necessity and all power resides or stems from the people. The Constitutionalists traced 
                                                
348 They also had influence of a different sort, for participants in Shay’s rebellion adopted the Constitutionalists’ 
tactic of closing the courts in their fight against the state government in 1787.  
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the “absolute necessity of legal government” to its ability to “prevent [the] Anarchy and Confu-
sion” that arises in its absence, to ward off “the destructive nature of Tyranny and lawless 
power,” and to secure civil and religious liberties by helping the people “emerge from a state of 
Nature” (SB, 374; PP, 88, 93). In other words, the Constitutionalists held government to be 
the solution to the undesirable liberty-threatening state of nature that inevitably results from 
human deficiency and weakness.349 This particularly dire vision of the state of nature likely 
stemmed from the Constitutionalists’ wide reading of political thought in conjunction with 
their religious heritage; Puritanism emphasized government’s divine role in warding off the 
selfish actions of fallen man, while Congregationalism stressed its earthly role in securing the 
conditions necessary to retain God-given liberties despite man’s near-total depravity.350  
Like the Levelers and the Whigs before them, the Constitutionalists arrived at the second 
tenet of social contractualism—that “the people are the fountain of power”—by denying any 
other source of political power (PP, 90).351 Here, ‘power’ refers to moral power, i.e. the right to 
                                                
349 Thomas Paine’s Common Sense, which Allen read aloud to a 1776 Berkshire Convention, clearly articulates 
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ply the defect of moral virtue.” Thomas Paine, Collected Writings  (New York: The Library of America, 1995). 
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use physical force in accordance with natural law or right.352 In the political context, this power 
became “the right of making law for the society and of using that society’s force to execute the 
law and protect the society.”353 For the Constitutionalists, while the laws of nature and the be-
havior of human beings produce reasons to create a government, they do not assign authority 
to any particular person or group (SB, 375). Individuals “by nature are free, and have no do-
minion one over another.” Thus, the only remaining source of moral power is the rights or lib-
erties individuals hold over themselves in a state of nature; “power originates in the people” 
and it does not and cannot arise from divine commissions, natural power relations, or any oth-
er non-popular source.354 As one Congregationalist minister put it, “the Voice of the People…is 
the Voice of God.”355 
If power comes from the people, how does a government come to hold or wield it? A third 
foundational idea in the social contract tradition adopted by the Constitutionalists answers 
this question:  individuals transfer or entrust some of their natural liberties or rights to a gov-
ernment through a series of consensual actions referred to as contracts or compacts. Pittsfield 
referred to this idea directly in the instructions given to their delegate to the 1780 constitu-
tional convention, writing “as all men by nature are free, and have no dominion over another, 
                                                
352 See Morton White, The  Philosophy of the American Revolution  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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and all power originates in the people, so …all power is founded in compact.”356 Elsewhere, the 
Constitutionalists claimed that “Government is founded in Compact so it Origenates in the 
people” and that “Men form the social Compact” (SB, 375; V, 522).  
3.2 TWO TYPES OF CONTRACTUALISM 
This third foundational idea, that political power results from a consensual process during 
which individuals transfer their natural rights or liberties to a government, begs further discus-
sion. For, while there is relative uniformity regarding the necessity and popular foundations of 
government, the details of this transference process vary between the different versions of so-
cial contract theory available to the Constitutionalists. Though somewhat artificially, we can 
divide these versions into two types: Classic Contractualism and Simple Contractualism.  
Classic contractualism characterizes the social contract as a three-stage process culminat-
ing in a mutual arrangement between two parties, the ruler and ruled, in which the ruled 
transfer power in the form of obedience and allegiance to a ruler in exchange for protection 
and order. Pufendorf provides a seminal description of this process: first, individuals create a 
“single and perpetual group” of united “wills and strengths” through the Compact of Civil So-
ciety; second, the major part of civil society agrees “upon the form of government” in the De-
cree of Form; and third, rulers recognize the liberties of the people and “bind themselves to the 
care of the commons security and safety, and the rest to render them obedience” in the Com-
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pact of Submission.357 Two aspects of this account beg mention. First, the compact of submis-
sion resembles a legal contract, insofar as it involves two separate parties exchanging one thing 
for another and thereby binding themselves to specific performances. Second, the compact of 
civil society was normally considered perpetual, and the decree of form treated as a separate 
event from the compact of submission. In this sense, institutions of government, such as repre-
sentative bodies in mixed constitutional regimes, would be largely unaffected by the creation or 
demise of a compact of submission. Situating the first two steps of the social contract in the 
distant past heightened this effect. 
This classic contractual model was thus a boon to certain moderate British Whigs, for it 
allowed them to enlist yet tame the popular sovereignty arguments developed by radicals dur-
ing the English Civil War, such that they could justify resistance against a monarch on the ba-
sis of the people’s power (by pointing to the violation of the third compact) while simultane-
ously maintaining and strengthening their defense of the Ancient Constitution and the other 
institutions of governance (which were buried in the past and thus immune to royal misbehav-
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ior).358 William Atwood, Algernon Sydney, and James Ferguson, for instance, articulated ver-
sions of this argument in their defense of the Glorious Revolution.359  
In the colonies, classic contractual arguments of this sort were not only rampant, but even-
tually took on a form of their own. While traditionally the King’s coronation oath and the 
people’s acquiescence were taken to be the compact of submission, by the 1770s many colo-
nists identified it with the charter or founding document of their colonies.360 These ‘charters as 
compacts’ became especially critical to revolutionaries after their refusal to accept the extension 
of virtual representation outside the shores of Great Britain came to its inevitable conclusion: 
if British legislators did not represent the colonies, then they had no authority over them, and 
the charters became the sole remaining legal connection between the colonies and the 
metropole.361 This explains the near exclusive focus on royal misbehavior in the Declaration of 
Independence and the surrounding debate, for justifying the revolution now entailed showing 
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that the King’s repeated violations of the terms and conditions of the charter severed this 
link.362  
Despite its usefulness in conceptualizing and justifying the dispute with the British, classic 
contractualism offered little help to colonists concerned with founding new governments. On 
the one hand, as Gordon Wood explains, “The mutual contract between rulers and ruled be-
gan to seem inoperable once the character and the obligations of the two parties overlapped 
and combined and became indistinguishable.”363 In other words, classic contractualism’s de-
pendence on the compact of submission, the reciprocal juristic agreement between rulers and 
the ruled, broke down when representative institutions replaced independent magistrates as 
primary power holders. Representatives, even virtual ones, not only represented the will of the 
people but were members of the people, and thus explaining obedience as the result of a legal 
contract between two separate parties was neither necessary nor conceptually coherent.  
On the other hand, Americans during the revolution were intent on creating something 
new, which meant unsettling institutional arrangements rather than falling back on them. 
Thus, the Declaration of Independence effectively rejected both the theoretical and practical 
authority of the British Constitution and separated the colonies into new body politics. This 
rendered classical contractualism far less relevant, insofar as the tradition focused on protect-
ing the rights and liberties of Englishmen by burying the compact of civil society and the de-
                                                
362 Tate, "Social Contract in America," 377; Wood, Creation of the American Republic: 270-71, 82; Morgan, 
Inventing the People: 243-45.  
363 Wood, Creation of the American Republic: 283. 
  
158 
cree of form in the distant past and focusing on the repair of a distorted Ancient Constitu-
tion.364  
For these and other reasons, the Berkshire Constitutionalists, joined many Early Ameri-
cans in enlisting simple contractualism to understand and justify their constitutional project. 
As Wood explains:  
There was, however, another contractual analogy that ran through the Whig mind of the eighteenth 
century. This was the idea of the social compact, the conception John Locke had developed in his Se-
cond Treatise on Civil Government. …Although this Lockean notion of a social compact was not gen-
erally drawn upon by Americans in their dispute with Great Britain, for it had little relevance in ex-
plaining either the nature of their colonial charters or their relationship to the empire, it became increas-
ingly meaningful in the years after 1776.”365 
Simple contractualism, of which Locke is the central theorist, eliminates the compact of sub-
mission and presents a two stage account of the transference of power from individuals to the 
government.366 First, interested individuals create a civil society through a mutual compact. 
Second, this society creates an empowered government.367 At each stage, two rights or powers 
are ‘transferred’ or entrusted to the newly created entity: the power “to do whatsoever he 
thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the permission of the Law of Na-
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ture,” and “the power to punish the Crimes committed against the Law” (TT, II.128). The for-
mer becomes a government’s executive and federative powers and the latter becomes its legisla-
tive power.368 The combination of these two rights or moral powers, first transferred to the 
major part of civil society and then entrusted to a government, constitutes political power and 
rightful authority (TT, II.171).  
Three things are worth noting about this account. First, though personal consent is central 
for the transfer of power throughout, different voting thresholds apply to each stage. To create 
a civil society, “the consent of every individual” is needed, for only a person’s own consent can 
remove him or her from the state of nature.369 Consenting to form and join civil society simul-
taneously entails consenting and agreeing to “submit to the determination of the majority” in 
certain future political matters, which means that the second stage, the transition from civil 
society to civil government, proceeds through majority rule (TT, II.96-7).370 Second, this pro-
cess creates a right to be ruled directly by the majority or to have the majority create a new 
form of government.  
Third, simple contractualism presents an easily missed theory of constituent power (pro-
vided that one defines the second compact as creating extraordinary law), for, as Grant ex-
plains, “while political society does not possess special ‘constituent’ power distinct from the 
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‘ordinary’ power of government, the effect of Locke’s line of argument is much as if it did.”371 In 
other words, though Locke does not include different types of power differentiated by their 
content and holder in his account—for him political power is simply the combination of trans-
ferred individual powers—his theory logically confines the ability to create government to civil 
society and prevents this power from being usurped by a government or given up by society. 
This, for all intents and purposes, is a form of constituent power. 
As we will see, the arguments of the Berkshire Constitutionalists appear directly drawn 
from this simple contractualist tradition. Indeed, as one author notes, the culmination of their 
dissent, the Massachusetts ratification process itself, “represented the most ambitious effort in 
the revolutionary period to institutionalize and operationalize the Lockean liberal understand-
ing of the origin of government.”372 The material cited by the Constitutionalists to buttress 
their arguments supports this conclusion as well. For instance, Allen cites the self-described 
Lockean Richard Price, an 18th century Radical Whig pamphlet mostly comprised of restate-
ments and excerpts of the Two Treatises, and Philip Furneaux’s Lockean critique of Black-
stone’s classical contractualism.373  
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Further still, William Whiting’s “An Address to the Inhabitants of Berkshire County,” a 
response to several Constitutionalist tracts by a discontented former member of the Berkshire 
Constitutionalists, criticizes Allen by showing how he misinterprets and contradicts the con-
tractualism of “the great Mr. Locke.”374 The fact that Whiting, who knew Thomas Allen and 
eventually rejoined his group, thought that an exegesis on the details of Lockean contractual-
ism might be an effective means of persuasion attests to the significance of these ideas for the 
Constitutionalists. 
3.3   STATE OF NATURE OR CIVIL SOCIETY 
Whiting’s criticism of the Berkshire Constitutionalists begs closer examination, for it helps 
clarify how the Constitutionalists used simple contractualism and why they claimed that creat-
ing a constitution is the necessary first step out of the state of nature and into civil government. 
In regards to the latter, it is worth noting that neither Whiting nor the Constitutionalists de-
viated far from their simple contractual roots, yet their interpretations of how the theory ap-
plied to revolutionary Massachusetts diverge significantly. While partly due to the ever present 
gap between theory and practice, much of this divergence stems from two features particular 
to simple contractualism.  
First, it contains a critical ambiguity. While relatively clear when describing the steps and 
logic behind the social contract, the rights transferred, and the causes of government dissolu-
tion, Locke and similar writers are vague about the actualization of their theories. Nowhere is 
this truer than in discussions of what happens after the dissolution of government, i.e. how 
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civil society creates a new government and rules itself in the interim.375 Second, Locke’s social 
contract theory is relatively silent on the creation and function of a constitution, and to the 
extent that it mentions one at all, it is in reference to the Ancient Constitution lying at the cen-
ter of the debate raging between Filmer’s royalist proponents and radical Whigs.376 As I dis-
cuss below, the Constitutionalists and their American contemporaries’ possessed a new and 
dynamic conception of a constitution, and how this meshed with simple contractualism was an 
open issue.377 
In his address, Whiting attempts to convince his fellow Berkshire County citizens of the 
weaknesses of the Constitutionalists’ arguments. To do so, he focuses on two of their frequent 
assertions: “since the Dissolution of the power of Great Britain over these Colonies they have 
fallen into a state of nature,” and “that the first step to be taken by a people in such a state for 
the Enjoyment or Restoration of Civil Government amongst them, is the formation of a fun-
damental constitution” (PP, 90). As we have seen, the Constitutionalists used these claims to 
justify their denial of the provisional government’s authority, which they symbolized by shut-
ting down the courts. For them, the Declaration of Independence invalidated the sitting Gen-
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eral Court’s two possible sources of authority, the royal charter (already eroded by King’s des-
potism) and the Continental Congress’ 1775 advice on how to create an interim government 
(V, 526).378 This meant that until the majority of the people consented to a constitution, no 
government in Massachusetts existed, the people were in a state of nature, and they were 
therefore under no obligation to any constituted authority. As Allen wrote, “Hear then Goes 
Charter Covenants Compacts Laws and Constitution All is Redust to a parfect State of Na-
ture” (V, 521). 
Whiting begins his critique by attacking the first assertion. Citing Locke for support, he 
explains that individuals first leave the state of nature by consenting to form civil society and 
entrusting two of their alienable rights to the majority. Only then can the adoption of a consti-
tution or mode of government take place; constitutional government “is necessarily subse-
quent” to civil society, for no other agent is capable of such a creative act.379 Next, Whiting 
writes “no revolution in, or dissolution of, particular constitutions or forms of government, can 
absolve the members of the society from their allegiance to the major part of the community” 
(Whiting, 467). In other words, the destruction of its government does not automatically de-
stroy civil society and eliminate the authority of the majority.380 Locke ends the Second Treatise 
making just this point, noting that when government dissolves “it [the Supreme Power] reverts 
                                                
378 The Continental Congress’ advice was predicated on a future resolution between England and the colonies, 
and thus the declaration of independence negated it. 
379 Whiting quotes TT, II.99. As Grant points out, it is illogical for government to precede civil society because 
the purpose of the former is the protection and benefit of the latter. TT, II.212; Grant, John Locke's Liberalism: 
104. 
380 According to Locke, successful conquest by a foreign power is “the usual, and almost only way,” that civil socie-
ty dissolves. For other possible avenues of such dissolution, unmentioned but congruent with Locke’s thought, 
see Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 167-70. 
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to the Society, and the People have a Right to act as Supreme, and continue the Legislative in 
themselves, or erect a new Form” (TT, II.243).381  
This means, Whiting argues, “that even admitting the declaration of Independence did ac-
tually annihilate the Constitution of the province of the Massachusetts Bay; yet it did not anni-
hilate or materially affect the union or compact existing among the people” (Whiting, 467). 
Thus, Whiting enlists simple contractualism to show that the Constitutionalists made a mis-
take, for the demise of British authority did not send the people back into a state of nature. 
Rather, “the inhabitants of the state of Massachusetts Bay, are now in a state of some measure 
familiar to that which every community must pass through, while they are emerging from a 
state of nature to that of a free and equal government. They are…in a state of civil society” 
(Whiting, 470).  
If Whiting is correct, if the Constitutionalists’ actually ignored civil society by arguing that 
the dissolution of British rule sent everyone back into a state of nature, then they either grossly 
misinterpreted the social contract tradition or were simply distorting it for rhetorical purpos-
es.382 Several things attest to the latter interpretation. Most obviously is Allen’s repeated men-
tion of ‘the people,’ a concept without a referent in the state of nature. Similarly, he calls for a 
majoritarian threshold to be used for ratification, a decision-making procedure inoperable in a 
state of nature and, at least in terms of simple contractualism, only authoritative after the for-
                                                
381 Lawson makes a similar point: “The continuance and dissolution of a legal power is also to be observed. As for 
real majesty it always continues, whilst the community remains a community.” Lawson, Politica Sacra er Civilis: 
226. 
382 Using the state of nature for rhetorical purposes was not uncommon. For instance, Patrick Henry claimed that 
“Government is dissolved. …We are in a state of nature, sir,” in order to justify his proposal for representation 
in the First Continental Congress. See John Adams, The Works of John Adams, vol. 2 (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 1850). 366.  
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mation of civil society. In addition, we know that Thomas Allen was a proponent of Paine’s 
Common Sense, frequently quoting from the work publicly, and it seems unlikely that he or his 
followers overlooked the implications of the text’s first line: “Some writers have so confounded 
society with government, as to leave little or no distinction between them; whereas that are not 
only different, but have different origins.”383 
However, while Whiting’s critique succeeds if we understand the Lockean state of nature 
as a social or historical condition that a person is either in or out of, things are much less clear 
if we see it as a relational property, i.e. something that describes a particular moral relationship 
between one person and another. Under this reading, two people are in a state of nature with 
one another if and only if they are not current voluntary members of the same legitimate civil 
society.384 This squares with the myriad ways in which Locke uses the state of nature—for in-
stance it makes sense of the claims that a person can be in a state of nature with fellow citizens 
under a tyrannical government and with visiting aliens, minors, and idiots under a consensual 
and rightful government—and gives rise to at least one way to understand the Berkshire Con-
stitutionalists’ argument without attributing a mistake to them (TT, II.15, 18, 19, 60).  
Put simply, the Berkshire Constitutionalists’ assertions regarding the state of nature are 
unproblematic if they refer to the relationship between the people and any entity (other than 
the majority) that claims a right to rule in between the two contracts. Since only the majority 
has political power in a condition of civil society, and since, according to the Constitutionalists, 
the majority of Massachusetts had yet to create a new government, the use or attempted use of 
                                                
383 Paine, Collected Writings: 6. Years later, Paine strengthens this distinction in The Rights of Man: ibid., 552. 
384 This conception of Locke’s state of nature comes from Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 13-23. See also 
Grant, John Locke's Liberalism: 66. 
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force or political power on the people by any entity other than the majority would constitute a 
wrong coercive action taken against civil society and the individuals within. Specifically, it 
would be an example of usurpation, “the exercise of power which another has a right to,” and 
indicate that the coercer refuses to recognize the majority as the rightful common judge and 
holder of governing power. At the least, this sends the coercer into the state of nature in re-
gards to civil society.385 As Locke writes, “When any one, or more, shall take upon them to 
make Laws, whom the People have not appointed so to do, they make Laws without Authori-
ty” which means that “the People are not therefore bound to obey” and are able “to resist the 
force of those, who without Authority would impose any thing upon them” (TT, II.212).386  
According to this interpretation, members of civil society in Massachusetts remain out of 
the state of nature in regards to each other, but within it in regards to any entity other than the 
majority that claims or attempts to use political power, whether this is the refashioned General 
Court, the British government, or a particularly ambitious individual. Thus, without contra-
dicting themselves, violating basic Lockean tenets, or engaging in polemics, the Constitutional-
ists could simultaneously advocate for a majoritarian voting procedure only appropriate after 
the formation of civil society and claim that they were in a state of nature. This is the most 
plausible defense of the Constitutionalists’ state of nature claims, yet it relies on rejecting 
                                                
385 Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government: 202; Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 158-59; Locke, Two 
Treatises of Government: II.239, 40. ‘Serving as a common judge’ entails the exercise of executive, judicial, and 
legislative powers for Locke. See Grant, John Locke's Liberalism: 75.  
386 Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 160-63, 71-72. 
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Whiting’s next argument: that the provisional government rightfully ruled the Common-
wealth.387 
2.4   WHITING: GOVERNMENT BEFORE A CONSTITUTION 
Neither pedantry nor an educative impulse drove Whiting’s interpretive dispute with the 
Berkshire Constitutionalists. Rather, he hoped to convince the residents of Berkshire County 
to reopen the courts and admit the rule of law by persuading them that they were in a state of 
civil society and not a state of nature, that they therefore had to obey the majority, and that the 
majority of civil society in Massachusetts approved and or spoke through the General Court 
and its various subsidiary institutions. Thus, after attacking Allen’s state of nature claims, he 
next turned his attention to the Constitutionalists’ second assertion, the claim that govern-
ment requires a constitution: 
I think it evident to demonstration, that the common cry in this county, that we have no foundation of 
government, is altogether groundless. For, even admitting that we have no particular constitution yet, it 
hath been shown, that such a constitution is not so essential to government, that there can be no foun-
dation of government without it; but, on the contrary, that a compact or union among the people, by 
which they agree to submit themselves to be governed by the major part of the community, is itself, a 
sufficient and substantial foundation of government.” (Whiting, 476) 
Whiting, like the Constitutionalists and others during the period, equates the second compact 
to the adoption of a constitution and the creation of constitutional government. Thus, as evi-
dent from this passage, he claims that government is possible before the second contract, i.e. 
                                                
387 The above departs from the interpretations of the Constitutionalist/Whiting debate given by Woods and 
Peters. Woods claims that Whiting mistakenly equates the constitution with the form of government while the 
Constitutionalists equated it with the social compact itself. Peters disagrees with Woods and claims that Whit-
ing persuasively argues that there is no middle ground between the state of nature and civil society, something 
that the Constitutionalists refused to acknowledge. Peters, The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social 
Compact: 101f31; Wood, Creation of the American Republic: 286.  
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that non-constitutional government can exist in civil society, appropriately command obedi-
ence, and draw sufficient authority from the first compact. 
To make this argument, Whiting first exploits simple contractualism’s ambiguity about 
the workings of civil society between the two contracts. As noted, Locke argued that the major 
part of civil society gains it authority from the rights transferred from individuals as part of the 
first compact. In one of the few passages in which he discusses the topic, Locke suggests that 
the majority can abstain from the second contract and the creation of a separate form of gov-
ernment by choosing to rule society as a direct democracy, “making Laws for the Community 
from time to time, and Executing those Laws by Officers of their own appointing” (TT, 
II.132).388 Whiting begins from this premise, writing that, “the supreme judge…the major part 
of the community…have an undoubted right to enter upon, or postpone that manner [creating 
a form of government], when, and so long as they see fit,” but expands the means through 
which the majority can exercise political power far beyond the governmental form of direct 
democracy that Locke describes (Whiting, 467).  
As Whiting explains it, in order to address the “peace and safety of the community,” the 
majority in Massachusetts adopted “whatever modes and forms therefore, they had been ac-
customed to from the old charter, and still found would be useful and expedient for a free and 
independent society” (Whiting, 472). For Whiting, these modes and forms regained their au-
                                                
388 Two things beg mention. First, Locke is notoriously vague when it comes to discussing civil society’s ability to 
function, and means of functioning, in the absence of government. For excellent discussions on the matter see 
Grant and Simmons, whose interpretations I follow. Second, if one considers direct democracy a form of gov-
ernment, then government is possible without the second contract. In fact, as Grant notes, Locke sometimes 
uses the term government in just this manner. However, Locke and his followers mostly use the term to mean 
any configuration in which representatives exercise political powers granted to them as a trust. I mean only this 
when I use the term. See TT, II.96, 205, 211, 219; Grant, John Locke's Liberalism: 104-18; Simmons, On the 
Edge of Anarchy: 167-72. 
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thority through this process, for he repeatedly asserts that as members of civil society the Con-
stitutionalists had to obey them. This means that in a condition of civil society before the se-
cond contract, the majority is capable of ruling civil society through a representative and multi-
branch non-constitutional form of government legitimated only by the first contract. 
 This begs two questions: first, how can Whiting claim that the majority adopted or 
authorized the provisional government when even he admits that direct consent never oc-
curred? 389 Whiting never gives a clear answer, but the text indicates that he follows the logic of 
classic contractualism by stressing acquiescence and the lasting legitimacy of government insti-
tutions apart from the monarchy. For instance, he suggests that the use of the revised charter 
and the elections of members to the new General Court counted as acquiescence by the major-
ity from which a form of consent could be imputed.390 Put differently, his writings imply that 
the mere operation of the provisional government—successful elections, managing an army, 
levying taxes—signals that it is the concrete manifestation of the major part of civil society, or 
at least its designated ruler, for these activities require the majority taking action, giving con-
sent, or at the least not making objections. The authority of the provisional government is fur-
ther supplemented by the fact that it consisted in recycled institutions previously held to be 
authoritative. 
                                                
389 In fact, there was no ‘revised charter’ to consent to. Rather, the provisional government operated in accordance 
with the original Province Charter, as it had been interpreted and reformulated over the near decade since its 
adoption, with powers delegated to royal authorities now exercised by the Council and the General Court. 
390 See also, see "Response of the Worcester Committee of Correspondence, October 8, 1778," in The Popular 
Sources of Political Authority: Documents on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 370. See also Christian G. Fritz, American Sovereigns: The 




Second, if legitimate government can exist before the second compact, what exactly is the 
point of the second contract and the constitutional government it creates? Put differently, 
what is so special about a constitution? Elsewhere in his essay, Whiting notes that a constitu-
tion clarifies unalienable rights which the state is meant to protect, establishes general rules for 
the government of the armed forces, and lays out the branches of government (Whiting, 473). 
However, this cannot be what makes constitutional government unique for him, for the provi-
sional government and its revised charter more or less guaranteed a set of rights and set out a 
system of divided government, while the acts taken by the provincial congresses and retroac-
tively codified by the General Court served as general rules for governing the armed forces. 
This leaves three ways, hinted at in his essay, in which constitutional government is unique for 
Whiting: the constitution makes it “fixed and unalterable…for preventing usurpations, and for 
the security of future generations,” the majority approved its form directly, and its details are 
more rigidly clarified (Whiting, 374).  
In the end, Whiting alters simple contractualism when combining it with the idea of a 
constitution, for defining the second contract as the creation of constitutional government al-
lows him to introduce the possibility of an authoritative government existing between the two 
contracts. Whiting expresses his “wish that we had such a constitution of government and bill 
of rights firmly established,” for a permanent, clarified, and popularly approved government is 
certainly a desired end, but its absence does not mean that no government exists at all (Whit-
ing, 470). Thus, for Whiting, government existed in the Commonwealth even without a con-
stitution. Moreover, every member of civil society owed this government some level of obedi-
ence, for the majority spoke through its institutions and all members of civil society agreed to 
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follow the will of the majority as part of the first contract. The residents of Berkshire County 
had to either accept their membership into civil society and obey the General Court or re-
nounce their membership and give up any opportunity to be in the provisional government or 
future constitution-making endeavors, both of which fell under the purview of the majority of 
civil society (Whiting, 478, 467).  
2.5 BERKSHIRE RESPONSE: NO CONSTITUTION, NO GOVERNMENT 
The Berkshire Constitutionalists also combined constitutionalism with simple contractualism 
and agreed with Whiting on three key points: they understood the second compact as involv-
ing the creation of a constitution, ascribed constituent power to civil society, and portrayed its 
exercise in majoritarian terms. Moreover, they attributed similar functions to the constitution 
as Whiting. Nonetheless, the Constitutionalists diverged from Whiting in their emphatic in-
sistence that (legitimate) government without a constitution was impossible, “all is to us as 
Nothing whilst the foundation is unfixed the Corner stone of Government unlaid,” and that 
therefore no government existed in Massachusetts (PP, 92).  
This divergence stemmed from two points of disagreement between the Constitutionalists 
and Whiting. First, the Constitutionalists strictly adhered to simple contractualism and thus 
thoroughly rejected the notion of consent via acquiescence undergirding Whiting’s argument. 
If the provisional government continued to usurp the majority’s political power this would not 
somehow render it legitimate in their eyes, even if this went unnoticed by the bulk of the 
Commonwealth. However, while denying that acquiescence and longevity would morally legit-
imate a form of government, the Constitutionalists were quite aware that the passage of time 
makes it more difficult to effect institutional change. In fact, one reason the Constitutionalists 
  
172 
shut down the courts was to alert the rest of the Commonwealth to the illegitimacy of the pro-
visional government, to “conjure our Brethren in this state to awake from Unmanly slumbers, 
…[to] see with your own Eyes and Judge for your selves,” and thereby prevent acquiescence 
from defeating the possibility of popular government  (V, 527). As Allen wrote, “We have 
feared, we now realize those fears, that upon our submission we shall sink down into a dead 
Calm and never transmit to posterity a single Right nor leave them the least Knowledge of so 
fair an Inheritance” (SB, 378). 
Second, and more importantly, the Constitutionalists ascribed the following two central 
roles or purposes to a constitution that Whiting did not share or did not fully understand: a 
constitution protects the people from tyranny and authorizes the legislature and government. 
The following passage mentions both: “The fundamental Constitution is the Basis and ground 
work of Legislation, and ascertains the Rights Franchises, Immunities and Liberties of the 
people, Howr and how often officers Civil and military shall be elected by the people, and cir-
cumscribing and definig the powers of the Rulers, and so affoarding a sacred Barrier against 
Tyranny and Despotism” (SB, 375). 
The Constitutionalists’ Calvinist conception of human beings and their belief in power’s 
corrupting effect led to the ‘constitution as barrier’ conception. Men may “use all manner of 
Deceit and Craft,” “every Man by Nature has the seeds of Tyranny deeply implanted within 
him” (PP, 89, 91), and there is a “strong Byass of human Nature to Tyranny and Despot-
ism.”391 For the Constitutionalists then, it was a fact of nature that power could corrupt any 
man and transform him into a tyrant. This was not simply a hypothetical possibility, nor 
                                                
391 "Report of a Lecture by Thomas Allen on February 18, 1776," 70. 
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something confined to monarchs, for the Berkshire Constitutionalists and their ancestors had 
witnessed a variety of political actors undergo this transformation time and time again, leading 
to their conclusion that “Tyranny Triumps thro’ the world.” Corruption actively hampered 
revolutionary efforts, for “men who has drank of this baneful poison could not be confided in 
to aid and assist their Country in the present Contest,” and, in the Constitutionalists’ minds, 
many of the men supporting and taking part in the provisional government had already suc-
cumbed to this temptation of power (PM, 62; SB, 377).  
A description of a lecture given by Allen in February 1776 to the town of Richmond illus-
trates these points: 
“In Speaking of the Congress and General Court, the Said Mr. Allen frequently repeated the words, 
beware of men—and Said it concerned the People to See to it that whilst we are fighting against oppres-
sion from the King and Parliament, That we Did not Suffer it to rise up in our own Bowels, That he 
was not so much concerned about Carrying our Point against Great Brittain, as he was of having 
Usurpers rising up amongst ourselves, he further Endeavoured to Insinuate into the minds of the Peo-
ple that our Provincial Congress and General Court had been, and were Composed of designing 
men.”392 
In the face of this real possibility of tyranny, the Constitutionalists sought relief in a constitu-
tion. “We have Nothing else in View,” Allen wrote in the ‘Pittsfield Petitions,’ “but to provide 
for Posterity against the wanton Exercise of power which cannot otherwise be don than by the 
formation of a fundamental constitution,” which secures “sacred Rights and Immunities 
against all Tyrants that my spring up” (PP, 91-92). 
The Berkshire Constitutionalists claimed that no government could ever rightfully exer-
cise or possess political powers in the absence of a constitution, for any alternative opens the 
door to tyranny. What is so important about a constitution in this regard? How can it prevent 
                                                
392 Ibid., 71. 
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tyranny or put a stop to despotism? The Constitutionalists never answer these questions di-
rectly, but the following seems a likely response. Arguments such as Whiting’s, in which polit-
ical power is vested in representative governments without a constitution, rely on informal 
rules, habitual institutions, legislative practices and the general good behavior of government 
actors to prevent a fall into despotism. For instance, to combat the Constitutionalist’s claims 
that wicked men in the Commonwealth intended to enslave the people, Whiting defies “any-
one to show how it is possible for them, in our present circumstances, to effect it.” He sup-
ports his position by emphasizing that Councilors and Representatives take oaths “to be true 
to the people of the state” and that representatives will make good political appointments be-
cause “they are sufficiently apprized that if they do not…they will not be elected themselves 
again” (Whiting, 471).  
These sorts of reassurances would not do for the Constitutionalists, who believed that all 
men are corruptible and that, as the behavior of the British Parliament and the provisional 
government’s Councilors demonstrated, informal rules and traditions could be broken, oaths 
violated, elections altered or postponed, and legislative practices replaced with new legisla-
tion.393 Simply put, the formation of a non-constitutional government entrusted with political 
power creates a situation in which a common judge did not exist between the agents of gov-
ernment and the rest of civil society, i.e. produced a state of nature (in the relational sense) be-
tween the rulers and the ruled. What was needed then was a constitution, something above 
the purview of legislators and government officials that would organize and constrain them in 
                                                
393 The General Court made organizational changes via legislation regularly. For instance they recalculated repre-




a visible manner, i.e. make public the conditions of their trust and the limits of their power and 
clarify the proper juridical authority and means of resolution for the inevitable conflicts that 
power produces. Such a Constitution would make it “peculiarly out of the Power of Designing 
men to Enroach on the Inherent and Unalienable rights of the People,” and serve as 
“Lines...Drawn as rules of Government,” making “the Servants of the People…as much as may 
be in the Possession of the People.”394  
Without such a device, the majority could never grant political power to a government 
without endangering themselves, for “whatever Building is reared without a foundation must 
fall into Ruins” (PP, 91). In an essay quoted by Allen in V, Richard Price expresses similar 
sentiments, noting that political power is “delegation for gaining particular ends,” and that be-
cause “this trust may be misapplied and abused…employed to defeat the very ends for which it 
was instituted, and to subvert the very rights it ought to protect…all delegated power must be 
subordinate and limited.” For the Constitutionalists, such subordination and limitation re-
quired a constitution.395  
This brings us to the other central but related role of a constitution that Whiting did not 
seem to share or understand. “The fundamental Constitution is the Basis and ground work of 
Legislation,” Allen explains, and “Legislators stand on this foundation, and enact Laws agreea-
bly to it.” In other words, legislators and their legislation, and in fact the entire legal system 
and government, draw their authority from the constitution. On the one hand, claims such as 
                                                
394 "Instructions to Sandisfield Constitutional Convention Delegate, 1779," in The Popular Sources of Authority: 
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these simply express the distinction between higher and ordinary law that allows constitutions 
to serve as a barrier of tyranny in the above-mentioned fashion.396 Allen expresses this point by 
quoting from Furneaux’s commentary on Blackstone’s assertion that it “is the height of Politi-
cal Absurdity” to envision a government without the power “to alter every part of its law.” 397 
Furneaux claims that Blackstone is mistaken, for “free states would be unfree” if there did not 
exist some “Liberties and previleges” that “Society has not given out of their own Hands to 
their Governors.” These retained liberties and privileges, Furneux explains, are enshrined in 
the constitution in order to limit and organize government, and set the terms for the entrust-
ment of political power and the conditions under which it ends (SB, 376-377; V, 523-524).  
On the other hand, Allen suggests that legislators owe their very existence to the Constitu-
tion. A convention of Hampshire County towns issued a resolution expressing similar senti-
ments, stating that “No select Body of men can Lawfully Legislate them, unless the People 
have by Some mode or form Delegated their Power to them as their Representative, which 
form of Government we call a Constitution of a state or kingdom; by which there should be 
Proper Bounds set to the Legislative and Executive Authority, without which the People Can-
not be saf, Free or Happy.” The idea that legislators and legislation exist only because of a con-
stitution is not a rhetorical flourish or a mere legal statement, but instead suggests a deep ar-
gument in favor of constitutional government.  
                                                
396 Allen expresses this point by quoting from Furneaux’s commentary on Blackstone’s claim that “The bare idea 
of a State without a power See Tate, "Social Contract in America," 379. 
397 William Blackstone, Commentaries of the Laws of England in Four Books, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Philadelphia: J. B. 
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Consider a non-constitutional government in which legislative and legal authority stem di-
rectly from the people, meaning that authority in one sense depends on how decisions track 
the public will or interest. For the Constitutionalists, this would undo the entire point of en-
tering into civil society and creating a government; it would create the dangerous condition in 
which interpretive disputes arise without their being an identifiable and accepted common 
judge. The Berkshire Constitutionalists’ own fight with the provisional government is a perfect 
example of this scenario, insofar as it was a protracted conflict over the proper source of gov-
ernment authority with no common judge to resolve the dispute. Adopting a constitution 
helps avoid such situations by explicitly setting out bounds of authority and legislative proce-
dures understood by the major part of civil society, and institutionalizing means of resolving 
disputes if they arise. In this sense, legislative authority, and all governmental authority, comes 
from the constitution.398 As Allen’s citation of The Judgment of Whole Kingdoms explains: 
“Every subjects allegiance is first oweing to the Constitution and to the Ruler only in the 
fource and virtue of what Every member of the Political society is Bound unto by the Terms of 
the Original pact or settlement” (V, 522). 
The Constitutionalists’ thus opposed the provisional government by shutting down the 
courts, for without a constitution government was impossible, and therefore the provisional 
government was simply an illegitimate entity. However, not all of the Constitutionalists’ ac-
tions or words reflect this position. Consider the following passage, written after Whiting’s 
essay:  
                                                
398 Note that by legislative authority the Constitutionalists seem to have in mind all political power concerning 
the making, enforcement, and interpretation of laws.  
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“[we are not saying that] we have no Law, or that the Honorable Council and House of Representatives 
are Usurpers and Tyrants. Far from it. We consider our case as very Extraordinary. We do not consider 
this state in all Respects as in a state of Nature tho’ destitute of such fundamental Constitution. When 
the power of Government were totally dissolved in this state, we esteemed the State Congress as a nec-
essary and useful body of Men suited to our Exigencies and sufficiently authorized to levy Taxes, raise 
an Army and do what was necessary for our common defence and it is Sir in this Light that we view our 
present Honorable Court and for these and other reasons have inculcated a careful Adherence to their 
orders.”(SB, 378)  
At first glance this passage seems to contradict the very position that the Constitutionalists’ 
actions and previous arguments were so intent on supporting. During the previous four years 
they shut down courts, disobeyed orders to reopen them, denied that their actions constituted 
rebellion, and repeatedly claimed that the General Court and its judicial bodies lacked authori-
ty. Such actions unambiguously depicted the provisional government as an illegitimate entity 
that could neither expect nor demand political obligation on the part of the people, not as an 
“authorized,” “necessary and useful” body whose orders deserve adherence.399 At the least, this 
passage seems to reflect a shift in Constitutionalists thought towards something more akin to 
Whiting’s position.400 
However, upon closer analysis neither of these conclusions follows. The Constitutionalists 
only acknowledge two things: first, they accept that quasi-governmental institutions are capa-
ble of solving collective action problems—such as organizing a tax collection system or main-
taining an army—and that they as individuals in civil society are willing to permit them to do 
so in cases in which the actions being taken are desired and needed. This admission is not al-
together surprising, in that even Constitutionalist strongholds such as Pittsfield governed 
themselves throughout the revolution—“the Government of our respective Committees is le-
                                                
399 Allen expressed the latter view by citing the following line from The Judgment of Whole Kingdoms: “abstracting 
from the Constitution and the Obligations which it Lays us under no man can challenge a Right of Command-
ing us nor do we owe him any Duty of subjection and Obediance” (V, 522).  
400 Peters, The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact: 101n31. 
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nient and efficacious”—without, in their mind, a constitution or an established government 
(PM, 64). Moreover, there is nothing in simple contractualism that rules out informal organiz-
ing of this sort in civil society. Second, the Constitutionalists claim that the provisional gov-
ernment was authorized to carry out these sorts of actions. The implications of this are un-
clear, for the Constitutionalists do not explain what they mean by authorization. Perhaps they 
meant that the current holder of political power, effectively the major part of civil society, cre-
ated or endorsed the provisional government to accomplish the above-mentioned tasks. This is 
perfectly compatible with simple contractualism, and could simply be an example of what 
Locke describes as “Executing those Laws by officers of their own appointing” (TT, II.132)  
Regardless, what is crucial is that these acknowledgements do not lead to the conclusion 
that the provisional government itself is a legitimate government in the Lockean sense, i.e. an 
entity rightfully in possession of the legislative, executive, and federative powers, and thus en-
dowed with the rights to make, interpret, and enforce laws, and to have these laws obeyed 
whenever morally and legally acceptable (TT, II.143-46). This gives us a way to read and un-
derstand the Constitutionalists’ initially bewildering tendency to disobey and obey the provi-
sional government simultaneously. The Constitutionalists obeyed and supported the provi-
sional government when it executed tasks delegated to it by the majority of civil society in their 
capacity as a direct democracy, and when it took actions in the interest of the Constitutional-
ists that did not involve the exercise of political power. At the same time, the Constitutional-
ists disobeyed whenever the provisional government attempted to exercise powers it did not 
possess, such as the power to legislate, choose officers, or enforce a historical legal system now 
lacking in authority. 
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Thus, for the Constitutionalists a legitimate government did not exist in Massachusetts 
from 1774 until 1780, and by refusing to reopen the courts they did not rebel, but simply ig-
nored the orders of an illegitimate and usurping authority. Certain actions taken by the provi-
sional government served a useful and welcome purpose, but its attempts at exercising real po-
litical power were illegitimate and dangerous. A real government used political power entrust-
ed to it by the major part of civil society, and the terms of this trust must be codified in a con-
stitution. Thus, as the Berkshire Constitutionalists frequently explained, “the first step to be 
taken by a people in such a state for the Enjoyment or Restoration of Civil Government 
amongst them, is the formation of a fundamental constitution,” and until then the people “are 
but beating the Air and doing what will and must be undone afterwards” (PP, 90-91).  
3. CONSTITUTIONAL CREATION AND CONSTITUENT POWER 
As we have seen, the Berkshire Constitutionalists combined simple contractualism and the 
concept of a written constitution in a relatively straightforward manner; since government 
without a constitution was impossible they simply interpreted the second compact, constitut-
ing “a new Form of Government,” as creating a constitution (TT, II.132). Thus, creating legit-
imate government is tantamount to creating a constitution, constituent power belongs to civil 
society whose decisions follow the will of the majority, and therefore only the majority can cre-
ate a constitution. Of course, the idea that the majority must create the constitution is no less 
vague than the Lockean notion that the majority creates the second compact from which it 
descends. It requires further explanation before any attempt at application.  
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3.1   AUTHORIZATION AND THE LEGISLATURE 
At a minimum, creating a constitution requires writing the document. As discussed in the pre-
vious chapter, this presents a potential problem to those who hold that only the people possess 
constituent power, or in the terms of the Constitutionalists’ simple contractualism, that only 
civil society through majority rule can create a constitution. The problem is that the most in-
tuitive solution, having every member of civil society directly take part in a participatory pro-
cess designed to draft a document, is impossible for all but the smallest communities. Thus, 
constitution-makers must figure out alternate ways to translate the idea of popularly held con-
stituent power to the actual process creating a constitution entails. 
Several solutions present themselves. One is to have an individual or group write and enact 
the constitution, and somehow associate or identify its actions with the will of the majority. 
For instance, construing constituent power as something that can be entrusted or delegated 
enables principal-agent dynamics. The people hold constituent power, but they temporarily 
entrust it to a group of elected delegates who write the constitution at the people’s behest. Al-
ternately, Sieyès conceptualized constituent power as non-communicable, and bypassed the 
problem posed by the impossibility of direct authorship though a conception of extraordinary 
representation, in which special representatives embody and become identical to, rather than 
represent, the will of the people when creating the constitution.401  
Both of these options place emphasis on the identity of the framers and the characteristics 
of the drafting process, with the idea that only the right sort of framers in the right sort of 
conditions can actually embody the majority will. The first three objections of the Massachu-
                                                
401 Sieyès, "What is the Third Estate?," 139. 
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setts towns to the General Court’s first request, that (i) the representatives lacked the authori-
ty to create a constitution, (ii) that representation was too unequal, and (iii) that too many 
voters were off fighting, reflect concerns of this kind. Another solution might involve some 
sort of Lawgiver, who through certain extraordinary attributes is able to create a constitution 
that so perfectly aligns with the nascent will of the majority that its creation can be attributed 
to them.  
These solutions, and others like them, depict constitution-making as a monolithic process 
when it comes to its authority: that is, as one unbroken procedure undertaken by the constitu-
ent power. The Berkshire Constitutionalists took a different approach; they divided the pro-
cess into drafting and authorization with the latter involving the review and approval or rejec-
tion of the written document.402 They first articulated this two-step process of constitution-
making in the ‘Pittsfield Petitions: “ We Request that this Honourable Body [General Court] 
would form a fundamental Constitution for this province…and that said Constitution be sent 
abroad for the Approbation of the Majority of the people in this Colony” (PP, 91-92). Here, 
as in future writings, the Constitutionalists distinguish between the two stages of the constitu-
tion-making process and place constituent power in the second. This deemphasizes the draft-
ing of the constitution and the identity of the framers as sources of constitutional authority, 
and elevates the importance of the people’s authorization instead.403 “The Approbation of the 
                                                
402 Ratification is therefore a particular form of authorization, i.e. one conducted by a group or entity uninvolved 
in the drafting process and standing for or identical to the people.  
403 This explains why the Constitutionalists did not object to the General Court, whom they deemed illegitimate, 
writing the constitution, while many of their fellow Massachusettans made such objections even while support-
ing the General Court’s right to rule. The one exception to the Constitutionalists’ ambivalence about drafting is 
the argument made for a constitutional convention in the Berkshire County Remonstrance. However, as argued 
above, this argument likely stemmed from contextual rather than theoretical concerns.  
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Majority of the people of this fundamental Constitution,” the Constitutionalists claim, “is ab-
solute necessary to give Life and being to it” (PP, 90). In this sense, the people ‘create’ their 
constitution only when they authorize it, i.e. have the final word on its implementation 
through direct popular ratification.  
The Constitutionalists reached this position by assuming that constituent power only 
emerged during authorization and rejecting the possibility of it being exercised by anything or 
anyone other than the people themselves in a direct vote. They thus rejected any constitution-
making process in which an entity other than the majority authorized a constitution. Note 
that while in their writings they focus on instances in which the drafters simply enacted the 
constitution once written, thereby effectively authorizing it as well, their arguments also apply 
to instances in which the authorizing body is separate from both the drafters and civil society. 
This includes every type of ratification where the identity of the ratifier is something other 
than the people through popular referendum.  
Allen explains in the ‘Statement of Berkshire County Representatives’: 
“Legislators stand on this foundation, and enact Laws agreeably to it. They cannot give Life to the Con-
stitution: it is the approbation of the Majority of the people at large that gives Life and being to it. …A 
Representative body may form but cannot impose said Constitution upon a free people. The giving Ex-
istence to the fundamental Constitution of a free state is a Trust that cannot be delegated. For any ra-
tional person to give his vote for another person to aid and assist in forming said Constitution with a 
view of imposing it on the people without reserving to himself a Right of Inspection Approbation Rejec-
tion or Amendment, imports, if not impiety, yet real popery in politicks. …In this the very essence of 
true Liberty consists, viz. in every free state the Constitution is adopted by the majority.” (SB, 375)404 
 
                                                
404 “Popery in politicks” referred to the idea that there is an entity in the state with supremacy. For an example of 
such usage, see Granville Sharp, A Declaration of the People's Natural Right to a Share in the Legislature  
(Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 2009). xxxiv. 
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This passage, and others like it, contains two entangled arguments. The first attacks the possi-
bility of existing legislative bodies authorizing a constitution.405 According to the Constitu-
tionalists, such a plan circulated as early as mid 1776, when “several of the Justices newly cre-
ated without the Voice of the People” suggested that, “the Representatives of the People may 
form just what fundamental constitution they please and impose it upon the people” (PP, 91). 
To the Constitutionalists, such a plan was “the rankest kind of Toryism, the self same Mon-
ster we are now fighting against” (PP, 90-91). Later that same year, the General Court’s first 
request, to create and enact a constitution without any real town consultation, confirmed these 
suspicions. 
The Constitutionalists’ explanation for the inability of a legislative body to create a consti-
tution is a slight reformulation of the now familiar claim that a constituted body cannot con-
stitute itself, for the constitution, as Schmitt notes, “is the comprehensive foundation of all 
other ‘powers’ and divisions of powers.” This follows from two observations. On the one hand, 
like any organ of government, legislative bodies receive their power and authority from the 
people. However, for the Constitutionalists, political power can only rightfully be given to 
governmental organs organized and limited by formal rules. These rules come from the consti-
tution, and since constitution-making events take place in the absence of an operable constitu-
tion, any existing legislative branch or body of government lacks authority in general, let alone 
the power to create a constitution. “A Legal Representative is a Creature of the Constitution of 
a state, or Kingdom,” several Hampshire County Towns explained, in reference to General 
                                                
405 This assumes the absence of direct democracy where the legislative body is the people. 
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Court members, and “we Desire to know how such a Creature can Exist in a Legal Sense prior 
to that Constitution on which his being and Existance Depends.”406  
On the other hand, the act of creating a constitution involves creating the source of au-
thority for any governmental organ or branch. Adhering to the principle that the creator of 
something necessarily has more power than its creation, this makes it a contradiction for one 
of the branches to form the constitution, for that would make the branch the creator of its 
own creator, the source of authority for its own source of authority. As Allen notes, “the whole 
Legislature of any state is insufficient to give Life to the fundamental Constitution of such 
state, it being the foundation on which they themselves stand and from which alone the Legis-
lature derives its Authority” (SB, 377). 
 3.2   AN UNALIENABLE RIGHT 
The second argument for confining constituent power to the act of popular ratification ends 
up encompassing the first; the Constitutionalists claim that any type of representative or dele-
gated entity, not just a legislative body or other branch of government, is unable to create and 
authorize a legitimate constitution because constituent power cannot delegated, entrusted, or 
embodied. Put differently, the Constitutionalists claim that constituent power, or the right to 
create (authorize) a constitution, is unalienable. Admittedly, on its face this claim appears un-
persuasive, for unalienability is a property usually ascribed to only the most basic and essential 
rights. Such rights might include the right to live, the right to freedom of movement, and the 
right of conscience, but seem unlikely to include a right that only becomes actionable and rele-
                                                
406 "Opinions of Hampshire County Towns, March 30, 1779," 385. 
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vant upon the formation of civil society and the start of a constitution-making process. This 
intuition, however, needs to be put on hold until we have a better idea of what the Constitu-
tionalists meant by unalienability and why they ascribed it to a right to ratification.  
Unfortunately, Allen fails to provide a substantive definition of unalienability. Nonethe-
less, we can look at conceptions of rights in circulation at the time to approximate what the 
Constitutionalists meant by the term and reconstruct why they thought it applied to ratifica-
tion. Generally, in the context of seventeenth and eighteenth century philosophy, a ‘right’ re-
ferred to a moral power, the ability to effect or do something through the use of physical 
strength in a manner approved by or not in violation of reason and the natural law that it 
tracks. Many of the popular natural rights theorists at the time elucidated rights in this way. 
For instance Burlamaqui, following a tradition stemming back to Gerson through Suarez to 
Pufendorf, defined the term as “a power that man hath to make use of his liberty and natural 
strength in a particular manner…so far as this exercise…is approved by reason.”407 In more 
contemporary terms, this conception of a ‘right’ encompasses Hohfeldian moral powers, liber-
ties, and claim rights, and relates to but is not necessarily prior, secondary, or coextensive to 
the concept of ‘duty.’408 Note that we are already familiar with this conception of rights, for it 
                                                
407 Burlamaqui, The principles of natural and politic law: 69; Samuel Pufendorf, Two Books of the Elements of 
Universal Jurisprudence, trans. William Abbott Oldfather and Thomas Behme, The Works of Samuel 
Pufendorf (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2009). 91, 221; Quentin Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political 
Thought: The Age of Reformation, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). 121, 76; White, The  
Philosophy of the American Revolution: 186-92; Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: their origin and 
development  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). 25. 
408 Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions  (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919). In addition, 
contemporary accounts of rights, for instance the choice, interest, or benefit theories of rights, do not apply to 
‘rights’ in the political philosophy of this period.  
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is rights and their accompanying powers that are transferred between stages in simple contrac-
tualism. 
Unalienable rights are those rights that cannot voluntarily be given away or exchanged by 
their owner.409 Thus, alienability is distinct from forfeiture, prescription, defeasibleness, and 
the like; it is a property that describes how consensual acts can lead to the intentional transfer 
of a right, and has nothing to do with whether a right can be lost because of wrongdoing, taken 
away by force, or outweighed by competing considerations. Further, unalienable rights overlap 
but are not equivalent to those rights not ceded to civil society or government.410 The rights 
remaining with individuals after each of the two contracts include unalienable rights, but also 
include all natural rights, such as Locke’s “liberty…of innocent delights,” that do not need to 
be ceded in order to fulfill the purpose of civil society or government (TT, II.128).411 Finally, 
an unalienable right is not necessarily a natural right, i.e. a right that exists before any contract-
ing takes place. It is only a right that cannot be voluntarily transferred, and its genesis remains 
an open question.412 
                                                
409 A broad rather than narrow interpretation of unalienability is most appropriate for the time period, in that the 
consent of the possessor is neither necessary nor sufficient to justify encroaching the right. See Terrance 
McConnell, "The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights," Law and Philosophy 3, no. 1 (1984): 31. 
410 Thus, Peters is incorrect when describing unalienable rights as “criteria…by which the legitimate extent of 
political authority could be determined.” Peters, The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact: 75. 
See also Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 62.  
411 Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 62. See also Parsons, "The Essex Result, 1778," 330; "Instructions to 
Stoughton Constitutional Convention Delegate, 1779," in The Popular Sources of Authority: Documents on the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, ed. Oscar and Mary Handlin (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966), 
424, 2d.  
412 For the claim that, in revolutionary America, natural rights were never conceived of as acquired rights, see 
Philip A. Hamburger, "Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions," The Yale Law Journal 102, 
no. 4 (1993): 908. 
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With this conception in hand, we can examine how the Berkshire Constitutionalists un-
derstood ratification as an unalienable right. Consider the following two passages: 
“The people at large are endowed with certain alienable and unalienable Rights. Those which are unal-
ienable, are those which belong to Conscience respecting the worship of God and the practice of the 
Christian Religion, and that of being determined or governed by the Majority in the Institution or for-
mation of Government. The alienable are those which may be delegated for the Common good, or those 
which are for the common good to be parted with. It is of the unalienable Rights, particularly that of be-
ing determined or governed by the Majority in the Institution or formation of Government of which 
something further is necessary to be considered at this Time.” (SB, 374-75) 
 
“And he who would invest an Honorable House of Representatives with Power of forming A New 
Constitution and Imposing it upon the people without the Approbation of the Majority of the people at 
Large is Guilty of the Most horrid Impiety in yealding up that birthright which is in its own Nature as 
Incommunicable as that of seeing and Judging for ourselves in Matters of Religion and of Being saved 
for our selves.” (V, 527) 
In these passages, Allen refers to three unalienable rights. The first two relate to religion: the 
right of belief (inner worship) and the right of religious practice (external worship).413 The 
third and most important right for both our and the Constitutionalists’ purpose is, as de-
scribed in the SB passage, the right to be determined by the majority in the institution or for-
mation of government. Since we know that the critical moment in creating a government is the 
authorization of its constitution, this right can be restated as the right of civil society to au-
thorize its constitution through a majority vote before its implementation, and it is this refor-
mulated version that Allen mentions in the second passage. 
Two ambiguities or inconsistencies leap out from the Constitutionalists’ claims. First, the 
SB passage states that the rights to be discussed are those belonging to the people at large (civil 
                                                
413 The Constitutionalists were not entirely committed to the full ramifications of their stance on the freedom of 
internal and external worship, for they frequently confined religious freedom to the Christian religion or, more 
specifically, Protestantism. As Kuehne notes, this reflected a tendency in Massachusetts for religious liberty to 
be narrowly understood as “an individual’s right to public toleration of his Protestant denominational choice.” 
See "Returns of the Towns on the Constitution of 1780," 491, 93; Kuehne, Massachusetts Congregationalist 
Political Thought: 91; Morison, "The Struggle Over Adoption," 368-80. 
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society), yet the rights of external and internal worship adhere to individuals, regardless of 
whether or not they are in civil society, and never to civil society itself. Despite this, the plural 
subject makes sense when discussing the right to ratification, for individuals do not have an 
original right to be determined by the majority in the formation of government; rather, they 
endow civil society as a whole with some of their individual rights upon entering it, with the 
understanding that society acts through majority rule, and the combination of all such en-
dowments grants civil society the right and ability to govern and create a constitution.414  
Second, different conceptions of unalienability are needed to explain the three rights. By 
this I mean that in addition to a discussion of what a right is and what it means for one to be 
unalienable, a conception of unalienable rights also explains why some cannot be alienated, 
and no single explanation applies to the rights of inner and external worship and the right to 
ratify a constitution.415 Perhaps, as initially suspected of the state of nature claims, the Consti-
tutionalists used the language of unalienability solely for rhetorical purposes, despite the fact 
that ratification’s unalienability cannot be explained under a unified conception of the proper-
ty. While this conclusion is tempting and bolstered by the lack of any effort by the Constitu-
tionalists to make explicit just why civil society cannot entrust constituent power to delegates, 
it is too quick. Using different conceptions of unalienability without distinction was common-
place in the philosophical and religious works of the time.416 Thus, in what follows I lay out 
several conceptions of unalienability, each with a unique explanation for why a certain right 
                                                
414 Thus, a right to ratification could not be an unalienable right if they were equivalent to natural rights. 
415 Note that this applies even if one believes that rights are basic, i.e. in need of no additional justification. See 
McConnell, "The Nature and Basis of Inalienable Rights," 27. 
416 See, for example, Richard Price’s quick gloss on the unalienability of the rights to internal worship, external 
worship, self-legislation, and property; Price, "Two Tracts on Civil Liberty," 33. 
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cannot be alienated, and attempt to see which, if any, make sense of the Constitutionalists’ as-
sertions.  
Francis Hutcheson, who first introduced the terminology of alienable/unalienable rights 
and greatly influenced early American political thought, helps in this task. According to Hut-
cheson, to determine if rights are alienable or not, one must consider: “1st. If the Alienation be 
within our natural Power, so that it be possible for us in Fact to transfer our Right; and if it be 
so, then, 2nd. It must appear that to transfer such Rights may serve some valuable Purpose.”417 
Generalizing from Hutcheson, we can divide unalienable rights into two types: naturally unal-
ienable and morally unalienable. A right is naturally unalienable if it concerns an ability or 
power that a person cannot physically transfer to another. Hutcheson’s discussion of the right 
to private judgment or inward sentiment falls into this category, for he believes that both occur 
involuntarily. The mind automatically forms certain judgments in response to evidence, just as 
certain sentiments rise up in response to external stimuli. A right to either of these occurrences 
is naturally unalienable, because no matter what individuals do or want to do, they cannot give 
another person the ability to make judgments or form sentiments for them, let alone the rights 
to use these abilities.418  
Locke invokes something like natural unalienability in his toleration writings; he argues 
that one reason magistrates can never acquire the right to coerce in religious matters is because 
                                                
417 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, ed. 
Wolfgang Leidhold, The Collected Works and Correspondence of Francis Hutcheson (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2004), 185. I was led to Hutcheson by White’s discussion of inalienable rights. See White, The  
Philosophy of the American Revolution: 196-202. 
418 Even if one does not accept Hutcheson’s particular conception of cognition, the point stands, for attempting to 
give someone the power to make judgments for us would necessarily involve making the constant judgment that 
their judgments are the correct ones. 
  
191 
“no man can, if he would, conform his faith to the dictates of another,” for “to believe this or 
that to be true does not depend upon on our will.”419 Similar viewpoints abound in the robust 
discourse on religion in late 18th century Massachusetts; for instance, the Congregationalist 
Pastor Abraham Williams notes in his election sermon that “Human Law can’t control the 
Mind.—The Rights of Conscience are unalienable; inseparable from our Nature; —they 
ought not—they cannot possible be given up to Society.”420 In this way, natural unalienability 
explains the Constitutionalists treatment of the right belonging to inner worship as unaliena-
ble, insofar as a person cannot give another the ability to dictate their genuine faith and reli-
gious belief. However, the right to have the majority create the constitution does not fit into 
this category, nor does the right to practice a religion in a certain way. There is nothing physi-
cally impossible about civil society enabling some entity other than the majority to create its 
constitution, just as there is nothing physically impossible about an individual allowing some-
one else to dictate their religious practice.421  
A right is morally unalienable if it is possible for a person to control and alienate the activity 
or object in question, but not without violating moral law. Of course, this definition of moral 
unalienability could yield an endless number of variations, each correlated with a different 
conception of morality. However, in the context of early America, these variations narrow 
                                                
419 John Locke, "A Letter Concerning Toleration," in The Works of John Locke, Volume Five (London: Rivington, 
1824), 11, 40. This argument relies on Locke’s claim that coercion works on the will. 
420 Williams, "An Election Sermon: Boston, 1762," 8. 
421 Though popular at the time, there is something fundamentally contradictory about natural alienability, for it is 
hard to see how a person has a right to abilities and actions that he cannot control and objects that he does not 
possess. In this sense, the property of alienability is irrelevant, for non-existent rights have no properties. This 
confusion is particularly problematic for the theories of Pufendorf, Hutcheson, Jefferson, and the like, where 
rights are intimately connected with the will and intentions. As White notes, “if we deny that a man can per-
form an action, we should deny that he has a right to perform it. And if he has no right to perform it, he lacks a 
right which he can alienate or transfer to another.” White, The  Philosophy of the American Revolution: 199-200. 
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down to two: non-ownership moral unalienability and no-reason moral unalienability. A right that 
we do not possess is non-ownership morally unalienable. For instance, a person might be able 
to take some action x or use some object y but be unable to transfer the right to do x or use y 
because he does not possess the relevant right. 
This conception of unalienability appears within Locke’s discussion of the impossibility of 
voluntary enslavement or submission to absolute rule. Locke writes: “Nobody can give more 
power than he has himself, and he that cannot take away his own life cannot give another 
power over it” (TT, II.23).422 Locke of course is not suggesting that individuals do not possess 
the ability to take their own life or give another full power over it, which would be true if the 
right was naturally unalienable, but rather making the point that they cannot do either with-
out violating moral law, for they do not possess such a right over their lives. Underlying this 
claim is his belief that control over our own life, but not the right to end it at will, is entrusted 
to us by God.423 In fact, we explicitly do not have such a right, for God’s natural law imposes 
on us a duty of self-preservation that conditions the trust, and such duties always make contra-
ry rights claims impossible.424 We therefore cannot voluntary enter into a condition of slavery 
or absolute arbitrary rule because doing so involves the alienation of a right to destroy our life 
                                                
422 Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 115-16; White, The  Philosophy of the American Revolution: 210; Peters, 
The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact: 80; McConnell, "The Nature and Basis of 
Inalienable Rights," 45. Note that my interpretation diverges from these authors, in that they collapse what I 
call non-ownership moral unalienability into natural alienability, while I hold the two to be distinct. 
423 See also The Judgment of Whole Kingdoms and Nations: 18. 
424 Locke’s argument might also fit into another conception of moral unalienability popular in the late 18th centu-
ry: the idea that a right is unalienable if it stems from a duty. This conception, discussed by Burlamaqui, Jeffer-
son, and others, holds that alienating a right to do x derived from a duty to do x is impossible, for this would in-
volve taking on a duty not to do x and thus contradict the original duty. I leave this alternative type of moral 
unalienability out because of its similarity to non-ownership moral unalienability, and its absence from most 
discussions of unalienability in the Massachusetts dialogue at the time. See Burlamaqui, The principles of natural 
and politic law: 74; White, The  Philosophy of the American Revolution: 209-10.  
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or a right to totally control our life, and either right is non-ownership morally unalienable be-
cause we do not possess it and therefore cannot alienate it.425 
Non-ownership moral unalienability clearly does not explain the right to practice religion 
as one chooses, but what about the right to ratification? Consider two possible explanations: 
civil society cannot alienate the right to ratify the constitution because individuals possess it; 
and the majority cannot alienate the right to ratify the constitution because civil society pos-
sesses it. The first explanation fails because we know that civil society possesses the right to 
ratification, which stems from the rights of self-preservation and punishment ceded by indi-
viduals upon entering civil society. In this sense, individuals never possessed such a right be-
cause it does not exist before the creation of civil society. The second explanation also fails, for 
it makes the mistake of treating the majority as a distinct agent separate from civil society, ra-
ther than the means through which the will and decision of civil society is determined in ac-
cordance with the agreement made in the first contract. 
Finally, a right is no-reason morally unalienable if the reasons against alienating the right al-
ways win out over those in favor; i.e. its alienation is always irrational. This conception is a 
descendant of the Grotian idea of interpretive charity seized upon by English Radicals in the 
17th century, whom argued that while it is logically possible for free men to renounce all of 
their natural rights, charity dictates that we assume that our predecessors were rational, and 
therefore could not have intended to leave themselves and future generations without any crit-
                                                
425 Note that this only pertains to an individual’s ability to alienate a right. Thus, a right to life might be unaliena-
ble, but subject to forfeiture under certain conditions. Grotius first stated such a position when he wrote: “A 
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ical rights.426 Moving from classic to simple contractualism eliminates the focus on the original 
contract and the ancient constitution, turning the principle of interpretive charity into a gen-
eral form or type of unalienability that, I argue, best explains the right of ratification. Here, the 
irrationality of alienating certain rights is treated like a defeating condition, i.e. a condition like 
fraud, duress, or insanity, the presence of which automatically voids a contract, or in this case 
voids any attempt at alienation.427  
Noting that a right is morally unalienable because alienating it is necessarily irrational does 
not fully clarify this conception of unalienability, but instead shifts the point of ambiguity. In-
stead of asking why a right is unalienable, we now have to ask why there are never good 
enough reasons to alienate it. Many options suggest themselves. For instance, it might be irra-
tional to alienate a right if doing so made the exercise of reason impossible, made all other 
rights unstable, or if doing so degraded human dignity or made one less human. However, as 
attractive as such conceptions might be, they do not correspond to the actual arguments sug-
gested by the Berkshire Constitutionalists and the authors that likely influenced them.  
As cited above, Allen claims that “alienable [rights] may be delegated for the Common 
good, or those which are for the common good to be parted with.” This can be read in two 
ways. On the one hand, Allen simply explains that those rights delegated for the common 
good are alienable rights. On the other hand, Allen describes alienable rights as those rights 
the alienation of which can benefit the common good. This latter interpretation suggests that 
unalienable rights are those rights that harm the common good when alienated. From this, and 
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taking into consideration that Allen is referring explicitly to those rights held by civil society, 
the good of which is the ‘common good,’ we can define alienation against reason as alienating a 
right when doing so harms the good of the rights holder. This produces the following defini-
tion of no-reason moral unalienability: a right is unalienable if alienating it is always contrary 
to the good of its holder.  
Undergirding this conception is the idea that the alienation of a right, considered in isola-
tion, has a negative effect on a rights holder. A rational rights holder therefore only alienates a 
right if doing so, in some way, has a greater positive impact on their well-being, whatever this 
might entail. For instance, individuals in the state of nature give up their rights to be judges in 
their own cases and to take whatever actions they think lead to their self-preservation in order 
to better protect themselves, their remaining rights, and their property, results they purport-
edly take to be more valuable than the possession of their now alienated rights. Thus, unalien-
able rights are those rights that, for some reason, always leave the rights holder in a worse posi-
tion following alienation, regardless of his or her identity or context. In a sense, any attempt at 
alienating such a right is Pareto inefficient for the rights holders. 
This conception of no-reason moral unalienability is not unfamiliar. A version of it is 
common to many rights-based social contract theories. For instance, Hobbes demonstrates a 
similar logic when he writes: “Whensoever a man transfers his right or renounces it, it is either 
in consideration of some right reciprocally transferred to himself or for some other good he 
hope thereby…and therefore there be some rights which no man can be understood by any 
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words or other signs to have abandoned or transferred.”428 Likewise, in a discussion of the lim-
its of legislative power, Locke explains that “no rational creature can be supposed to change his 
condition with an intention to be worse” (TT, II.131). The Constitutionalists’ contemporaries 
also seem to have relied on this conception of unalienability at times, as evident by Theodol-
philus Parsons claim that certain rights are “are unalienable and inherent, and of that im-
portance, that no equivalent can be received in exchange.”429 
No-reason moral unalienability explains the remaining two unalienable rights mentioned 
in the passages above: the right to practice religion and the right to ratify the constitution. In 
regards to the former, the Constitutionalists’ explanation would likely follow Hutcheson’s, 
who wrote “the Right of serving God, in the manner which we think is acceptable, is not alien-
able;’ because it can never serve any valuable purpose, to make Men worship him in a way 
which seems to them displeasing to him.”430 In other words, since the point of practicing reli-
gion is to take actions one believes God desires and to be judged accordingly, allowing another 
person to dictate one’s religious practice eliminates the value of religious practice, adds noth-
ing, hurts the individual rights-holder as a result, and is therefore without reason.431 Since such 
                                                
428 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 66. 
429 Parsons, "The Essex Result, 1778," 330; Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: 137-38; Peters, The Massachu-
setts Constitution of 1780: A Social Compact: 80. Note that Locke relies on the irrationality of ceding certain 
rights to clarify the content of inexplicit consensual actions. He suggests that in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, we should assume that individuals do not consent to irrational terms, for instance agree to give away 
rights the absence of which harms them. For Locke, this is not a means of defining unalienable rights, but ra-
ther a way of intuiting what people vaguely consent to. Parson and Allen, if enunciating no-reason moral unal-
ienability, are doing something quite different; they are using irrationality to define a certain rights category. 
430 Francis Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in Two Treatises, The 
Collected Works and Correspondence of Francis Hutcheson (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2004). 185. 
431 As with internal worship, this stance on external worship bears the influence of the Constitutionalists’ theo-
logical commitments. Congregationalists, such as the Constitutionalists, likely subscribed to Calvin’s adoption 
of Luther’s two kingdoms conception, which held that secular government was profoundly distinct from reli-
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alienation is irrational, the right to practice one’s religion as one pleases is unalienable. We can 
understand Parsons as articulating a version of this argument in The Essex Result, when he 
notes that religious practice is a necessary means of fulfilling some of our duties that “for the 
discharge of which we are accountable to our Creator and benefactor, which no human power 
can cancel.” These duties are determined by individual reason, and therefore even external 
worship must be internally motivated. Thus, alienating the right to practice one’s religion 
makes it impossible to fulfill one’s duties to god, something that is detrimental to the good of 
an individual and for which “no equivalent can be received.”432 
In these terms, the right to ratification is unalienable because any alienation endangers or 
harms civil society (the rights holder) and is therefore without reason. This means that our 
reconstruction of the Constitutionalists’ account of the unalienability of ratification requires 
one last component—we need to understand why alienating the right is necessarily contrary to 
the good of civil society. Consider the following passage:  
[T]o suppose the Representative Body capable of forming and imposing this Compact or constitution 
without the Inspection and Approbation Rejection or Amendment of the people at large would involve 
in it the greatest Absurdity. This would make them greater than the people who send them, this sup-
poses them their own Creators, formers of the foundation upon which they themselves stand. This im-
ports uncontroulable Dominion over their Constituents for what should hinder them from making such 
a constitution as invests them and their successors in office with unlimited Authority, if it be admitted 
that the Representatives are the people as to forming and imposing the fundamental Constitution of the 
state upon them without their Approbation and perhaps in opposition to their united sense—In this 
the very essence of true Liberty consists, viz in every free state the Constitution is adopted by the Major-
ity. (SB, 377) 
 
                                                                                                                                            
gious government. See, for instance, the town of Granville’s discussion in their 1780 Returns, "Returns of the 
Towns on the Constitution of 1780," 557. 
432 Parsons, "The Essex Result, 1778," 330. Similarly, the Berkshire town of New Salem, explained that: “Reli-
gion must at all times be a matter between GOD and individuals, then we see not the least propriety or fitness, in 
the Peoples Investing their Legislature with any spiritual Jurisdiction Over the Subject.”"Returns of the Towns 
on the Constitution of 1780," 482-83. 
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We have already considered many of these claims. However, looking at the entirety of this 
passage helps us better understand how they fit together to form a coherent explanation for 
why constituent power cannot be alienated.  
Reconstructed, the Constitutionalists’ main argument tracks and expands their argument 
against non-constitutional government. An entity entrusted with constituent power, i.e. en-
trusted with the right to authorize the constitution before its final enactment, might authorize 
a constitution and form of government directly harmful to the people, and be completely with-
in its power when doing so. Moreover, there is no way to prevent this occurrence, for the Con-
stitutionalists believed that individuals in civil society cannot reliably control or check govern-
ing bodies in the absence of a constitution. In this sense, the dominion of those endowed with 
constituent power is indeed, as Allen suggests, uncontrollable.433 For example, a constitutional 
convention might be created for the restricted purpose of creating a particular kind of consti-
tution, with explicit instructions that it would dissolve upon the completion of its task. None-
theless, if entrusted with the power to create a constitution without consulting the majority, 
this convention could write and draft any constitution it wanted, including one that turned the 
convention into a perpetual government with near absolute powers, and then authorize and 
implement it. In the absence of a higher law document and a pre-existing means of regulating 
its behavior, it would be either difficult or impossible for individuals in civil society to prevent 
it from doing so.  
                                                
433 These concerns are especially applicable in instances where non-civil society authorizers also serve as drafters, 
and these, it appears, are the only instances the Constitutionalists considered.  
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Moreover, just as the Constitutionalists recognized the sociological truth of Whiting’s and 
the General Court’s acquiescence argument, i.e. that the passage of time made an illegitimate 
government appear legitimate, they must have also recognized that the authorization of a con-
stitution by a body endowed with constituent power would make the constitution appear le-
gitimate, even if the authorizers violated the terms of their trust. This effect would only be 
heightened by the tradition of covenanting and the general popularity of contractual and con-
stitutional thought in Massachusetts at the time, which likely made anything resembling a so-
cial contract appear somewhat legitimate. Thus, alienating the right to ratify a constitution, 
which amounts to alienating constituent power, involves giving an external body the moral 
power to take actions the effects of which are either long-lasting or permanently harmful to 
civil society, in a context in which institutional safeguards and regulatory mechanisms are ab-
sent. To the constitutionalists, no potential benefit could offset such risk, and therefore con-
stituent power is unalienable.  
 The results of this argument are clear. Regardless of the identities of the drafter or au-
thorizer, any attempt at enacting a constitution without direct popular authorization is an ex-
ample of a minority attempting to impose its will on the majority and, as Allen writes, “That 
the Majority should be governed by the Minority in the first Institution of Government is not 
only contrary to the common apprehensions of Mankind in general, but it contradicts the 
common Law of Justice and benevolence” (SB, 375).434 Enacting any constitution without 
popular ratification means that a minority governs the majority, something that not only vio-
                                                
434 As Lutz explains, colonial Americans in general tended to assume that majority rule was the only reasonable 
way to determine and enact the common good. Lutz, The Origins of American Constitutionalism: 29.  
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lates intuition, but also contradicts natural law. Here, natural law, the ‘common law of justice 
and benevolence’ mentioned by Allen, can be understood as the entire set of ideas that shapes 
and supports the simple contractual narrative.435 This meant that to refuse the Constitutional-
ists’ demand was to deny that all political power comes from the people, that individuals cede 
it to the majority, and that it is this majority alone that can create a constitution. 
4. CONCLUSION 
On its face, the concept of constituent power seems to be a likely candidate for justifying ratifi-
cation. Constituent power is popular sovereignty applied to constitution-making, and ratifica-
tion appears to be the perfect example of the popular sovereign expressing its will by accepting 
a constitution. However, as seen in the previous chapter, this intuition is complicated by fo-
cusing on the actual steps constitution-making entails and trying to identify exactly where and 
when the people exercise this unique power.  
The most famous articulation of constituent power—that of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès—
leaves no room for conceiving of ratification as a moment of constituent power. Sieyès’ ex-
traordinary representatives write the constitution, and their actions are the actions and expres-
sion of the popular will. This makes a separate moment of constituent power via ratification 
redundant in cases of constitutional approval and incoherent in cases of constitutional rejec-
tion. If extraordinary representatives speak as the people, there is no need for the people to 
                                                
435 ‘The law of Justice and benevolence’ was a common description given to natural law. For instance, George 
Turnbull wrote: “What rules does the law of nature prescribe to him? Doth it not prescribe to him these very 
immutable, universal laws of justice and benevolence, which have been already explained?” Johann Gottlieb 
Heineccius, A Methodological System of Universal Law: Or, the Laws of Nature and Nations, with Supplements 
and a Discourse by George Turnbull, trans. George Turnbull (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2008). 461. 
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review their own creation. Similar problems of redundancy and incoherence belie any form of 
such a multiple moment justification of ratification.  
Other constituent power justifications that attempted to make room for moments of con-
stituent action preceding ratification failed to persuade for other reasons. The ameliorative 
function justification, which claimed that ratification was a moment of constituent power 
made necessary by prior deficiencies in the constitution-making process, turned ratification 
into an ad-hoc solution rather than an essential aspect of the constitution-making process. 
The multiple attempts justification conceptualized ratification as one of several attempts to 
create, make manifest, and harness constituent power, but in the process contradicted both 
itself and the core of constituent power theory.  
In this chapter I argued that the Berkshire Constitutionalists developed a theory of consti-
tutionalism and constitution-making that combines constituent power and ratification with-
out producing these problems. To this end, after sketching the history of these Western dissi-
dents—important in its own right as the history of the first instance of ratification in the 
world—I reconstructed their theory, filling in the gaps and interpreting some of their vaguer 
statements by reference to the political and intellectual context in which they were enmeshed. 
The Constitutionalists, I argue, held that the basics of Lockean contractualism were true: the 
protection of liberty requires government, all political power comes from the people, and gov-
ernment must obtain its authority through a process consisting of two voluntary contracts. To 
this they added the idea of a written constitution, a document that formally structures and 
empowers the institutions of government and protects civil society from the effects of power 
combined with man’s innate corruptibility. The adoption of this constitution became the se-
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cond Lockean contract, and thus the Constitutionalists claimed that constituent power—the 
ability to create a legitimate constitution—belongs solely to the people in civil society.  
Creating a constitution involved two steps, writing and authorizing, and according to the 
Constitutionalists constituent power resided solely in the second. In other words, the people 
only exercise their unique ability to create a constitution when reviewing and approving or re-
jecting an already written constitution, i.e. when ratifying. This means that the identity of the 
drafters and the details of the drafting process are irrelevant in terms of constituent power, and 
helps explains why, at least initially, the Constitutionalists had no problem with previously 
constituted authorities such as the General Court writing the constitution, just so long as they 
eventually submitted their creation to the people. 
This division of the constitution-making process into two steps, and the confinement of 
constituent power to the second, is why the Constitutionalists’ theory escapes the problems 
that afflict all other constituent power justifications. The drafters of the constitution are nei-
ther identified with nor taken to embody the people in civil society, and their actions do not 
constitute the exercise of constituent power. At no point in the constitution-making process 
does constituent action occur prior to ratification. Thus, there is no possibility of redundancy 
or contradiction and ratification is neither reduced to an ameliorative function nor cast as one 
of several attempts at ascertaining the constituent will.  
Perhaps, one might want to conclude that even if authorization is the proper site of con-
stituent power, it can be carried out by extraordinary representatives, delegates, or some other 
entity distinct from the people acting in a referendum. The Constitutionalists’ conception of 
the people’s right to authorize their constitution as unalienable rebuts this objection. Alienat-
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ing constituent power, which non-popular ratification entails, necessarily harms civil society; 
this is why the right to exercise constituent power is unalienable. Not only must a constitution 
be ratified to go into effect, but the ratifying authority, according to the Constitutionalists, 
must always be the people directly. 
Framing constituent power as unalienable was the final theoretical move that allowed the 
Constitutionalists to place the full weight of contractualism behind their specific demand for 
popular ratification. As has already been mentioned, views on the state of nature, popular sov-
ereignty, contracting, and the like abounded in the press, sermons, speeches, and pamphlets at 
the time, and Allen and his Constitutionalists successfully articulated a theory that integrated 
all of them into an argument supporting one simple demand: submit the constitution to the 
people before formal enactment. While their larger political theory allows for the delegation of 
rights and powers between individuals and civil society and government, and while their sup-
port of representative government makes their belief in representation and fiduciary relation-
ships clear, the authorization of a constitution was something that the majority of civil society 
had to do for itself. As Allen starkly put it: “Representatives are the people as to Legislation; 
but as to the formation and Imposition of the Constitution upon the people they cannot be” 
(V, 525).436  
Thus, at the beginning of popular constitution-making in America, and perhaps the world, 
ratification procedures played a critical role. While the identity of framers and the manner in 
                                                
436Condorcet would express this position precisely less than twenty years later: “The people, in truth, delegated 
only the task of drafting a constitution, a task that they are unable to accomplish. Thereafter, their refusal or 
their acceptance expresses their general will.”  Jean-Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat marquis de Condorcet, "The 
Principle of, the Justifications for, the New Constitution," in Social and Political Thought of the French 




which they drafted constitutions were important, insofar as the right kind of framers would 
prevent vested interests from distorting the foundations of the government and lead to well-
structured fundamental law, the people only fully exercised their constituent power when vot-
ing up or down the proposed constitution. Under this formulation, ratification receives justifi-
cation from its function, i.e. as the sole means through which constituent power is exercised.437 
In the next section, the strength of this single moment justification (SMJ)—the final means 
through which a theory of constituent power might give reason to implement a ratification 
procedure—will be tested. 
                                                
437 Schmitt’s position on ratification constantly changes in Constitutional Theory. However, at one point he says 
something very similar to what I am describing here: “The people’s constitution-making will always expresses 
itself only in a fundamental yes or no and thereby reaches the political decision that constitutes the content of 






THE FATE OF SMJ: 
Meaningful Choice & Voter Ignorance 
 
 
“If a nation retained the power to ratify the constitution, it still would not 
really exercise this power. …Direct ratification would therefore not be true 
ratification, and the nation would seem to have exercised a right when it 
had not actually done so.”438 
Marquis de Condorcet 
 
“To most voters, constitutional revision is a highly esoteric subject, involv-





As we have seen, the Berkshire Constitutionalists articulated a robust justification for ratifica-
tion based on constituent power. Starting from two premises, that authoritative constitutions 
must be created through the exercise of the people’s constituent power and that this power is 
inalienable, this Sole Moment Justification (SMJ) holds that ratification is necessary because it 
is the sole opportunity in the constitution-making process for the constituent power to act. 
Since this argument isolates constituent power in the ratification process, and conceptualizes 
ratification as an actual moment in which the people can act, it avoids the redundancy, inco-
herence, and theoretical inconsistencies that bedevil other attempts to justify ratification by 
appealing to constituent power.  
                                                
438 Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 273.  
439 Albert Lee Sturm, Thirty years of State constitution-making, 1938-1968; with an epilogue: developments during 
1969  (New York: National Municipal League, 1970). 79. 
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In this chapter I argue that despite its pedigree and immunity from the problems that 
weakened other constituent power justifications, SMJ faces its own limitations and ultimately 
fails to justify the implementation of ratification. I make this argument in six steps. First, I 
show that SMJ only justifies ratification procedures in which the ratifying agent is a popular 
ratifier, i.e. the people voting in a national or provincial referendum. Second, I argue that the 
logic of constituent power requires that the people make a meaningful choice when exercising 
their constituent power. This means that, at a minimum, the people must be capable of under-
standing the constitution and making their decision on the basis of its contents. Third, I claim 
that we should expect the average person to be too ignorant to make a meaningful choice in a 
ratification referendum, and that this expectation undermines SMJ. In the fourth, fifth and 
sixth sections I explain and rebut three objections to my dismissal of SMJ: that constitutional 
framers will fall short of the meaningful choice threshold; that information shortcuts eliminate 
the problem of constitutional ignorance; and that education programs can eliminate infor-
mation deficits. I conclude summarizing my argument and explaining why it is not anti-
democratic. 
Throughout this analysis I assume, with the Berkshire Constitutionalists, that constituent 
power is unalienable and that it cannot operate earlier in the constitution-making process. 
Both of these assumptions might be challenged. The inalienable nature of constituent power 
stems from the claim that alienating it directly and unavoidably endangers the people, which 
itself lies on a Lockean and natural rights foundation that is considerably less stable today than 
in revolutionary America. Similarly, the Constitutionalists’ belief that constituent power can-
not operate prior to the ratification process seems weakened by the development of new pro-
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cedures and institutions that give the people a direct role in constitution-making before and 
during the drafting process itself. Nonetheless, I leave these assumptions unchallenged and 
instead focus on the claim that constituent action is even possible during popular ratification. 
In doing so, I both test the strongest version of SMJ possible and concentrate on its central 
proposition.440 
1. SCOPE 
SMJ only applies to those ratifying procedures in which the ratifying agent is the future citi-
zenry voting in a referendum; all other forms of ratification contradict the claim that constitu-
ent power is inalienable. Consider the procedures used to ratify the US Constitution, the 
Grundgesetz, and the Constitution of Eritrea. State legislatures submitted the draft US Consti-
tution to “a Convention of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof,” with the 
understanding that “the Ratification of the Conventions of nine States,” would “be sufficient 
for the Establishment.” The Constitution became operational in March 1789, having been rat-
ified by eleven conventions.441 Following World War II, the Lander prime ministers rejected 
the Allied demand for popular ratification and instead submitted the Grundgesetz to the Land-
tage (state parliaments) of West Germany. All of the Landtage, except for Bavaria, approved 
                                                
440 Note that relaxing the inalienability claim of SMJ means that the constituent power can be represented. This 
allows constituent power to act earlier in the constitution-making process, where it can actually have a greater 
effect on the contents and design of the constitution. This seems intuitively desirable, and without some inde-
pendent reason for confining constituent action to the ratification process, there seems little reason to postulate 
something like SMJ. Thus, in some sense, SMJ needs an inalienability requirement, whatever its basis might be. 
441 “Journals of Congress, Friday, 28 September” in The Documentary History of the Ratification of the 
Constitution Digital Edition, (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2009, 1976), 
http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/RNCN-01-01-01-0002. U.S. Const. art. VII. Whether the state 
conventions could amend the constitution was somewhat ambiguous, though no convention did so. For a dis-
cussion of this ambiguity, discussed in the Continental Congress, see Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People 
Debate the Constitution, 1787-1788  (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010). 58-68. 
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the draft and the German Basic Law went into effect in 1949.442 Finally, in Eritrea, the Consti-
tutional Commission submitted the constitution to an elected Constituent Assembly “man-
dated to ratify the Draft Constitution.” Though the Assembly ratified the constitution in 
1997, it has yet to go into full effect.443 
In each of these cases an agent or agents spoke for the people. Provincial conventions ac-
cepted the US Constitution in the name of the citizens of each state; in West Germany pro-
vincial legislatures did the same for the Basic Law; and in Eritrea a single constituent assembly 
approved the constitution. For these ratifying agents to have exercised constituent power by 
approving the constitution, they must have received it from the people through a prior process 
of alienation and delegation. This is the only way for a small subsection of the citizenry to 
serve as the constituent power and give life to the constitution. However, this renders SMJ 
inapplicable, for the inalienability of constituent power is not only a central tenet of the justifi-
cation, but also the primary reason for confining constituent power within the ratification pro-
cess. SMJ therefore not only fails to apply to any ratification procedure in which the ratifying 
authority is an agent of the people—this includes provincial assemblies, preexisting govern-
mental organs, constituent assemblies, and conventions—but also invalidates them complete-
ly. 
                                                
442 Koch, A Constitutional History of Germany in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: 339-44; Melissa 
Schwartzberg, Democracy and Legal Change  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 160. 
443 Government of Eritrea, "Proclamation No. 92: The Constituent Assembly Proclamation," (1996); Bereket 
Habte Selassie, "Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach," in Framing the State in Times of 
Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, DC: United States Institute 
of Peace Press, 2010), 73. Admittedly, the Eritrean Constituent Assembly were not ratifiers according to my 
earlier definition, insofar as they were given amending power, which they exercised, in addition to approval and 
rejection powers.  
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Put simply, SMJ characterizes ratification as a procedure designed to allow the direct exer-
cise of inalienable popular sovereignty by the people. It therefore must provide a way for the 
people to act directly on a constitution without making use of intermediary ratifying agents. 
The only ratification procedures that meet this requirement are those involving some sort of 
constitutional referendum. As Arato and Miklosi write, “the empirically available ‘people,’ as a 
mere multitude of individuals, is incapable of being drawn into the making of a constitution 
otherwise than ratifying it through a referendum.”444 Such a ratification procedure might em-
ploy numerous provincial referenda and aggregate the results, as Massachusetts did with the 
towns in 1780, or it might simply make use of one national referendum. This reduced scope 
does not undermine SMJ, but simply means that representative forms of ratification cannot be 
justified by claiming that ratification is the unique site at which constituent power is exercised. 
Practically, this restriction in scope has minimal effects, for most ratification procedures, as 
mentioned earlier, involve popular referendums.   
2. REFERENDA AND CHOICE 
SMJ is a normative argument that justifies ratification by construing the procedure as the sole 
and necessary means through which the people authorize their constitution. In other words, 
SMJ claims that the constituent power only takes action on the constitution during ratification 
and that when choosing whether to approve or reject a constitution the people create it and 
mark it as their own. Ratification is thus the moment when the popular sovereign enters the 
                                                
444 Andrew Arato and Zoltan Miklosi, "Constitution Making and Transitional Politics in Hungary," in Framing 
the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller (Washington, DC: 
United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 380. 
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constitution-making process, a moment that, for constituent power theorists, separates an au-
thoritative constitution from one without any authority at all. 
The individual votes of all those citizens participating in a ratification referendum deter-
mine its outcome and therefore the ‘action’ taken by the constituent power.  The choice a voter 
makes in the voting booth when presented with a draft constitution is therefore an essential 
one for SMJ. What must this choice look like? What conditions must be met? In other words, 
in order for ratification to play the role ascribed to it by SMJ, what kind of choice must the 
relevant portion of the population (majority or supermajority) make or be capable of making 
when they vote on the constitution?  
 
2.1 CHOICE NOT OUTCOME 
At the least, a choice must be physically possible. A referendum making use of a single option 
ballot, like a referendum during which armed soldiers demand that citizens vote a certain way, 
cannot reasonably be construed as the expression of the constituent power. Voters must be 
able to choose whether or not they wish to accept the proposed constitution if their decisions 
are to be aggregated and understood as the exercise of constituent power. To say otherwise 
would be to vacate constituent power theory of any meaning at all.  
Beyond being physically possible, what other requirements must the referendum vote meet 
in order to satisfy the logic of SMJ and constituent power more generally? Consider the fol-
lowing hypothetical situations: 
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H1.  Citizens vote on a constitution that was never publicly discussed or  
         distributed 
 
H2.  Constitution-makers discuss, distribute, and educate the populace on  
         Constitution A. On the day of the referendum, Constitution A is  
         secretly replaced with or amended into Constitution B. Most voters are  
         unaware of the switch. 
 
H3.  Citizens vote on a constitution written in a language that they cannot  
         understand. 
Could these referenda be understood as the expression of constituent power? Our intuition, 
rightly, suggests no. The people cannot exercise constituent power by voting on a constitution 
the contents of which they neither know nor understand; they cannot express their will 
through a referendum and create a constitution if they do not know what it is that they are 
voting on. Thus, it seems, voters must be able to access the contents of the document they are 
tasked with evaluating.  
Would knowledge of the outcomes of these referenda change our evaluation? For instance, 
if voters approved the constitutions in H1 and H3, and would have voted identically had they 
read and understood the constitutions, would H1and H3 then be  expressions of the constitu-
ent power? Similarly, if voters approved Constitution B in H2, but meant to approve Consti-
tution A, and Constitution B turns out to be objectively superior to both A and the status quo, 
does H2 become a moment of constituent action? Again, our intuitions suggests no. For the 
purposes of evaluating whether or not the constituent power took action during a referendum, 
the fact that voters accidentally made a choice that happened to align with their considered 
opinions, preferences, and values, or unknowingly voted for the objectively superior constitu-
tional outcome, seems immaterial.  
  
212 
Outcomes are irrelevant for our evaluation because of the task and meaning assigned to the 
referendum vote by SMJ. Constituent power theorizing emphasizes that only the people have 
the power and authority needed to create the extraordinary law that will govern them in the 
future, and SMJ claims that ratification referenda are necessary because they provide the sole 
means of enabling the constituent power to exercise this authority—to act—during the consti-
tution-making process. This moment of creative action is vital for constituent power theoriz-
ing. The above hypotheticals can never be construed as moments of constituent action, for the 
decisions made by the voters within them are not acts of creation. Voters cannot create a con-
stitution by voting on onethey have not seen; their choices are inevitably arbitrary relative to 
the content of the constitutions.   
Outcomes might be helpful to the task of evaluating whether or not the constituent power 
acted during a moment in the constitution-making process if the nature of the choice was a 
mystery. In other words, without any knowledge of what occurred during H1, it might rea-
sonably be claimed that we can suspect that the constituent power acted, that voters evaluated 
the contents of the constitution and decided that it was to their liking, on the basis that the 
outcome reflects their interests, beliefs, and preferences. However, we know that voters did 
not see let alone understand the constitution in H1, and thus the outcome is irrelevant because 
a creative choice was impossible. The outcomes of the referenda for the hypotheticals as writ-
ten would only be important if we were justifying ratification or the exercise of constituent 
power because it creates better constitutions, or constitution more closely aligned to the de-
sires of the electorate. CPJs, including SMJ, do not make such arguments. Thus the outcomes 
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of referenda are neither necessary nor sufficient when determining whether constituent action 
occurs. It is the nature of the choice made by voters that matters.  
This is similar to the consent theorist critique of hypothetical contractarian arguments.  
For consent theorists, consenting involves the according to another by the consentor of a spe-
cial right to act within areas normally prohibited to everyone other than the consentor.445 
Thus, if x fairly consents to y, this act of consent creates a new reason for x allowing y to occur. 
Hypothetical consent arguments claim that x should allow y because x would have consented 
to y if he were able or had the opportunity. Traditional consent theorists criticize these argu-
ments, claiming that they “do not supply an independent argument for enforcing their terms” 
and “illicitly appropriate the justificatory force of voluntarism while being…in no real way mo-
tivated by it.”446 In other words, hypothetical consent arguments have nothing to do with con-
sent, do not provide independent consent-based justification, and cannot substitute for the 
presence of real consent. Instead, they simply mask straightforward paternalistic claims in the 
guise of consent arguments. Similarly, pointing out the positive outcome of a ratification refer-
endum adds nothing to our discussion of the importance of the actual exercise of constituent 
power and whether or not ratification referenda serve as the moment when this action occurs. 
Just as hypothetical consent arguments rely on paternalistic claims and thus miss the core of 
consent theory, worrying about referenda outcomes mistakenly focuses on the conclusion of 
                                                
445 A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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446 A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
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constitution-making instead of the presence or absence of the constituent action central to 
constituent power theorizing. 
2.2 MEANINGFUL CHOICE 
As we have seen, what is crucial for constituent power theorizing is how voters decide and 
choose in a referendum, not the outcome of the vote. Specifically, in order to satisfy the logic 
of SMJ, voters must be capable of making what I call a meaningful choice. I define meaningful 
choice based upon the purpose of the referendum vote. For SMJ, the primary function of a 
ratification referendum vote is to allow the constituent power to consciously create and 
uniquely authorize a constitution, thus making it a product of their action and will. Since this 
is the central purpose of ratification, the subjective viewpoint of voters towards the constitu-
tion when making their decision becomes paramount. Voters must be aware of what they are 
creating; the constitution cannot be an accident. Voters must understand what they authorize; 
they cannot give higher lawmaking power to something they do not comprehend.  
Thus, as much as possible, the choice voters make in a referendum should reflect how they 
evaluate the constitution and compare it to the likely outcome of constitutional rejection. In 
order to do this, voters need to apply their own values, beliefs, interests, and knowledge when 
making their choice. The logic of constituent power, in other words, requires that actions tak-
en by the constituent power are not merely an exercise of will, but an exercise of will augment-
ed by reason. 
A voter therefore makes a meaningful choice while voting on a ratification referendum: if 
she understands that she is voting on a constitution and that her vote will help determine 
whether not the proposed constitution goes into effect; if she comprehends what the constitu-
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tion says and what kind of government it will likely create; if she can reasonably imagine the 
likely results of constitutional rejection, whether this be a continuation of the status quo, the 
resumption of civil war, or the beginning of another constitution-making process; and if she 
then compares the constitution with the possible results of rejection and, in accordance with 
her  interests and beliefs, chooses the alternative that she prefers.  
According to SMJ, the referendum is an instance in which, in the words of Lindhal, “the 
collective acts in the strong sense of exercising its constituent power in view of enacting a legal 
order ex novo.”447 For this to be possible, individual voters must be capable of making a deci-
sion on a constitution that stems from reasons relating to the actual contents of that constitu-
tion; the requirements of a meaningful choice are the minimum needed to ensure this possibil-
ity. That is, for SMJ to plausibly justify ratification, a majority or supermajority of the people 
must be capable of making an agent-relative sensible choice about their future constitution, i.e. 
a choice in keeping with their own values and interests as they perceive them. When this is 
possible, we can say that a constitution ratification referendum satisfies the threshold of mean-
ingful choice.  
2.3 OTHER CHOICE THRESHOLDS 
The nature of the meaningful choice threshold becomes clearer upon comparison with other 
more well-known choice situations and requirements.  Consider for example the demands 
placed on voters by minimalist conceptions of democracy. According to Schumpeter, the 
“democratic method is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in 
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which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the popu-
lar vote.” In other words, democracy is the institutional arrangement under which elites make 
decisions, the people select the elites, and the people compete to become one of these elites.448  
Minimalists relegate political questions and issues to elites, believing that the “psychic 
economy of the typical citizen” is unfit to handle such complexities.449 Thus, the sole require-
ment of citizens is to vote during elections, “to cast his vote to the party he believes will provide 
more benefits than any other.”450 Whether voters know anything about the issues their repre-
sentatives will have to address and how they are likely to address them is unimportant. In-
stead, voters simply need to vote, on the basis of something that makes sense to them, and the 
chosen elites will govern in a manner that benefits them personally without leading to their 
removal.451  
As we can see, the threshold of meaningful choice is significantly higher than that required 
by minimalist conceptions of democracy. For SMJ, voters need to be able to understand the 
constitution, the nature of the choice they must make, and the likely repercussions of their 
actions. Ratifiers must be able to decide whether or not they want to live in a state structured 
by a specific proposed constitution on the basis of their comprehension of what such a state 
would look like. For democratic minimalists, no such requirements are in place. A voter needs 
to be able to make a free choice in an election, but it matters not whether this choice is based 
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on a understanding of the ideology and political records of all candidates or a split-second 
evaluation of their haircuts.  
The requirements of the doctrine of informed consent are as robust as the previous were 
minimal.452 According to this doctrine in health care law and bioethics, physicians cannot ad-
minister treatment to patients unless they receive informed, voluntary, and decisionally-
capacitated consent.453 A patient is informed about the medical choice only if they appreciate 
the medical situation and prognosis, the nature of the recommended care, the potential alter-
natives, and the risks and benefits, and conclusively demonstrate their comprehension. Fur-
ther, this knowledge cannot be merely abstract and technical, for patients must also apply it to 
their own situation. As one author writes, “it is not enough to understand…that angioplasty or 
bypass surgery will probably relive chest pain but there is considerable perioperative mortality. 
In addition, the patient…must realize that her chest pain and shortness of breath might be im-
proved by angioplasty or surgery but that she might die because of surgery.”454 
A patient’s consent is voluntary if it is free from coercion, which includes explicit and im-
plicit threats as well as any potential curtailment of options that arise from the patient’s belief 
                                                
452 This is similar to the standard set by The U.S. Department of Health & Human Services for human subjects 
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that she will be harmed or deprived of benefits, even when such fears are unfounded.455 The 
consent must also take place in the absence of undue inducement, where the possibility of a 
potential reward for agreeing to treatment might cloud individual judgment.456 Finally, in-
formed consent requires that patients possess an active decisional capacity, i.e. they must have 
the capacity to understand and communicate, the ability to reason and deliberate, be in posses-
sion of a set of values and goals that can be applied directly to the medical choice at hand, and 
genuinely understand that they have a choice.457 
The threshold required for a choice to be considered an instance of ‘informed consent’ is 
considerably higher than that required for it to be meaningful. Meaningful choice does not 
require individual voters to demonstrate their sustained contemplation of the issue in question 
or their personalization of what it otherwise abstract and technical information. It is simply 
sufficient for a voter to understand what a constitution means and to decide whether she pre-
fers the likely result of its rejection or the system of government she imagines it will create. 
This decision might be based on un-interrogated values, weak preferences, or beliefs created in 
the absence of considering all known alternatives, but as long as it stems from considering the 
contents of the constitution, the voter’s choice is acceptably meaningful.  
The threshold for meaningful choice is similarly lower than that demanded by certain the-
ories of deliberative democracy, which claim that truly legitimate expressions of the will of the 
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people must be preceded by authentic deliberation.458 Such authentic deliberation entails sin-
cere citizens presenting and arguing their viewpoints, employing reasons potentially acceptable 
to all, listening to others, recognizing each other as equals, and respecting different concep-
tions of the good, all in a condition of actual substantive equality.459 None of this is demanded 
by SMJ and the meaningful choice ratification referenda must involve.460 A voter entirely igno-
rant of any competing constitutional viewpoints to her own and who refuses to acknowledge 
the equality of her fellow citizens is still fully capable of making a meaningful choice on a refer-
endum.461  
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3. VOTER IGNORANCE 
In his brief essay on ratification, Condorcet writes: “Given the current state of education, there 
is no doubt that most citizens are not sufficiently enlightened to judge a constitutional plan. In 
order to do so, they would need to know the reasons behind each clause and be able to work 
out their consequences. Most citizens lack the ideas needed to do this. Direct ratification 
would therefore not be true ratification, and the nation would seem to have exercised a right 
when it had not actually done so.”462 Condorcet’s claim, I argue, is as true today as it was in 
1789, and will likely remain true for the foreseeable future. SMJ thus fails because the average 
voter in a constitutional referendum will be too ignorant on constitutional matters to satisfy 
even the most minimal conception of meaningful choice.  
The sort of knowledge needed to make a meaningful choice in a ratification referendum is 
specialized, takes significant time and effort to learn, and the average person, whether in a sta-
ble democracy, post-conflict territory, or deteriorating autocracy, has little reason to set about 
acquiring it. For instance, we should no more expect the average person to know how to re-
build a car engine or perform a pneumonectomy, than to understand the meaning, advantages, 
and disadvantages of including a minimum threshold for representation within a proportional 
representation electoral system. This makes ratification referenda unable to serve as the sole 
moment of constituent action within constitution-making. In this section I explain why this 
expectation of ignorance is warranted, and explore relevant empirical work supporting this 
claim.  
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From the start, two clarifications are in order. First, in claiming that the average person 
lacks sufficient knowledge about constitutional-design to make a meaningful choice, I am not 
making the anti-democratic argument that individuals are too stupid for self-government. On 
the one hand, I am only pointing out that the information needed for constitution design is 
neither common knowledge nor something we should expect an ideally active, participatory, 
civic-minded citizenry to possess. Perhaps those in healthy constitutional democracies should 
be familiar with the details of their own constitution, for this equips them with the appropri-
ate tools to monitor those in power and protect themselves and each other from government 
mischief. However, even if this were true, this sort of knowledge does not translate into the 
same information needed to evaluate a newly proposed constitution and compare it with the 
likely result of rejection.   
On the other hand, the criterion of meaningful choice, and the level of comprehension and 
knowledge it demands, applies only to ratification referenda conceptualized as the sole mo-
ments of constituent power. If voters fail to meet the demands of meaningful choice in ordi-
nary elections, initiatives, or referendas, this does not necessarily signal a problem. Thus, 
claiming that voters are too ignorant to vote meaningfully in a ratification referendum, due to 
the high information constraints stemming from the logic of constituent power in SMJ, does 
not mean that voters are too ignorant to govern themselves in any other context.  
Second, when talking about the level of knowledge and information needed to make a 
meaningful choice, I am not suggesting that an informed voter is one who has the right consti-
tutional preferences or makes the best constitutional decisions. Rather, I simply mean a person 
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who possesses sufficient information to understand the constitution and form preferences on 
constitutional design.  
3.1 EXPECT CONSTITUTIONAL IGNORANCE 
Why are voters likely to be too ignorant to make a meaningful choice? To answer this, we 
need clarify what exactly a voter needs to know in order to vote meaningfully in a referendum. 
As mentioned, the task of a ratifier is to determine whether he or she prefers a proposed con-
stitution to the status quo or whatever else is likely to result from constitutional rejection. 
Such a ratifier must “have sufficient knowledge and judgment to reject a proposed constitution 
that is inferior and accept one that is not.”463 This, as McWhinney puts it, is “an inherently 
technical domain, demanding some degree of constitutional expertise.”464  
Specifically, a ratifier needs to know everything necessary to: comprehend the purpose and 
function of constitutions; understand the basic implications of most provisions; anticipate 
their likely outcome alone and in combination with other provisions; approximate the fit be-
tween the constitution and the current political and social context; judge the internal legal co-
herence of the constitution; and understand how the text compares to other possible alterna-
tives. Voters can only decide whether a proposed constitution or the likely outcome of rejec-
tion best matches their existing values by possessing such knowledge. Without it, it is hard to 
see how the people’s approval or rejection of a constitution is a meaningful decision reached by 
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the constituent power regarding it self-government, for it would represent a judgment on a 
matter not understood.465 
The complexity of merely evaluating a constitution, which is only half of the task facing 
the ratifier (the other is anticipating and evaluating the likely result of rejection), can be 
demonstrated by considering the Venezuelan Constitution approved in 1999. On its face, it 
seems like a strong example of a modern progressive constitution. It declares that Venezuela is 
both a state of law and justice, incorporates an extensive list of civil and social human rights, 
and makes women’s rights a central focus. It creates an innovative system of five governmental 
powers by creating an ‘electoral power’ and a ‘public power’ in addition to the legislative, execu-
tive, and judiciary. The electoral power consists of a national electoral council in charge of reg-
ulating and safeguarding proper electoral procedures in state elections as well as civil society 
and union elections when invited or ordered by the Venezuelan Supreme court. The citizen 
power assures that each of the other four powers adhere to their constitutionally determined 
functions, and consists of the attorney general, the defender of the people, and the comptroller 
general.466 
However, lurking beneath these cheery provisions lays several dangerous constitutional 
features. The constitution grants the legislative branch the power to appoint and remove the 
justices of the highest court as well as most members of the fourth and fifth branch, frequently 
                                                
465 Interestingly, court cases exist in which the judiciary has struck down referendum-based laws on the grounds 
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by simple majority vote and without having to provide proof of misconduct or other objective 
grounds for removal.467 This effectively eliminates the independent power of the heads of the 
nonelected branches and thus reduces any balancing effect three of the branches of govern-
ment might have on the other two.  The legislative branch is explicitly given the option of del-
egating lawmaking power to the president without limit, and the president obtains the power 
to dissolve the national assembly in the event of three votes of censure against the executive 
appointed vice-president.468 Moreover, the constitution exempts the military, for the first time 
in Venezuelan constitutional history, from any civilian control other than the executive it-
self.469 In sum, amidst the 360 articles and over 100 pages that compose the Venezuelan con-
stitution, are a series of provisions that taken together create a constitutional blueprint for 
what became Chavez’s effectively authoritarian regime. This conclusion would remain hidden, 
however, to all those without a relatively high level of knowledge and expertise about constitu-
tional design and comparative institutions. 
Thus, at a minimum, ratifiers need to know the basics of constitutional and democratic 
theory, institutional design, jurisprudence, the current distribution of power and interest, and 
the foundations of the existing political order if present. Only with such information can a 
voter actually make a decision on the merits. Unfortunately for SMJ, there is no reason to be-
lieve that the average citizens anywhere will possess such esoteric or arcane knowledge. No 
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public education system has implemented such topics into their curriculum and it is hard to 
imagine one doing so in the future. There is little personal incentive and opportunity for indi-
viduals to acquire such information. In a stable democracy, as mentioned, there is little reason 
for the average citizen to acquire comparative constitutional knowledge. Most struggle with 
understanding their own constitution. As one scholar notes, “Few voters have more than a 
cursory knowledge of their…constitution, and it is hard for them to develop an interest in ab-
stract principals that do not seem to have a direct bearing on day-to-day, bread-and-butter 
issues.”470 For citizens in other regimes, such information is likely hard to access and still rela-
tively unimportant for all but the most engaged revolutionaries. This expectation of voter ig-
norance is further supported by several empirical studies. 
3.2 VOTER IGNORANCE IN FACT 
The ignorance of voters when it comes to general political issues is a well-established object of 
study. Political scientists began focusing on the political ignorance of the average U.S. citizen 
in the mid-twentieth century. Assuming a democratic ideal of an electorate able to choose be-
tween parties and pick out candidates on the basis of a comprehensive understanding of plat-
forms and issues, they found that “by such standards voters fell short.”471 Contemporary work 
supports and expands upon these initial observations: Snidermand et al notes that “large num-
ber of citizens plainly lack elementary pieces of political information;” Delli Carpini and 
Keeter conclude that most citizens are largely ignorant when it comes to what government is, 
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what it does, and who it consists of; Lupia and McCubbins note that “study after study docu-
ments the depth and breadth of citizen ignorance;” and Neuman reports that “even the most 
vivid concepts of political life…are recognized by only a little over half the electorate.”472  
While the methodology of some of these studies is controversial, and the relevance of their 
findings for functioning democracies remains in dispute, it nonetheless remains true, as Bartels 
writes, that “the political ignorance of the American voter is one of the best documented fea-
tures of contemporary politics.”473 Put simply, the average American is far too ignorant when it 
comes to basic political facts and the fundamentals of government to independently make in-
formed choices during ordinary elections.474 Of course, though the most documented, political 
ignorance is not the unique domain of American voters. A study by the Australian government 
in 1994 concluded that there exists “widespread ignorance and misconceptions of Australia’s 
system of government, about its origins, and about the way in which it can serve the needs of 
citizens.” MacAllister notes that most Australian citizens remain ignorant about the operation 
of parliament, the nature of the legal system, and especially how different institutions of gov-
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ernment relate and interact with each other.”475 Denver and Hands demonstrated similar levels 
of political ignorance in Great Britain.476  
Two things are worth noting here. First, the type of information these studies test for con-
cerns, at least partly, details about institutional structure and the basic workings of govern-
ment. While some claim that such knowledge is irrelevant for voters in functioning representa-
tive systems, it is precisely the sort of information a ratifer would need in order to compare a 
draft constitution with his current political situation. Second, the United States, Australia, 
and Great Britain are all long-standing and stable functioning democracies characterized by 
high levels of transparency, national civic education programs, high levels of general education, 
a well-developed civil society, and an independent media, all of which make it easier for the 
average citizen to acquire basic political knowledge. Citizens of countries or territories emerg-
ing from autocracy, civil war, frequent regime changes, or sustained political instability, with-
out a tradition of democracy or constitutionalism, i.e. citizens in territories most prone to con-
stitution-making today, are even less likely to have the opportunity to acquire political 
knowledge of this kind. 
Now, the studies mentioned above mainly focus on the claim that many voters are too ig-
norant to independently make decisions in normal elections. When it comes to referenda and 
initiatives, ignorance appears to be as or even more widespread.477 This should come as no 
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surprise, for as Bowler and Donovan note, “If…voters lack factual information, a constraining 
ideology and an ability to deal with issues in highly publicized candidate races, how can they 
be expected to sort through the complex policy choices they face in the low information setting 
of direct democracy?”478 In other words, referenda often address unfamiliar topics and pertain 
to particular policies and issues that require a great degree of technical information to compre-
hend.479 And, as scholars from Weber to Schumpeter to Dahl have noted, citizens do not and 
should not be expected to obtain the levels of expertise needed to decide on the complex issues 
that make up even that average policy question tackled by politicians day to day.480 Complicat-
ing matters further, referenda usually fall outside the normal schedule and machinery sur-
rounding elections and their corresponding campaigns. Thus, when compared to election 
votes, referenda demand a more complex decision, require uncommon political knowledge, 
and take place in an environment where information channels are unfamiliar, less available, or 
both. 
Examples of voter confusion in referenda abound. In 1998, 79% of polled Californians 
agreed that ballot measures were often too complicated and confusing for voters to understand 
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what happens if the initiative passes.481 Cronin reports that a large majority of voters in Colo-
rado, Oregon, Washington, and California agreed that “the initiative and referendum 
measures on the ballot are usually so complicated that one can’t understand what is going on,” 
while Qvorthup notes that 90% of voters on a New Zealand referendum on electoral reform 
were unable to give reasons for their decision to vote for or against the introduction of propor-
tional representation.482 Magleby demonstrates that over ¾ of the electorate of California 
Proposition 10 either wrongly voted for rent control when they intended to oppose it or 
wrongly voted against rent control when they intended to support it.483 Similar findings exist 
even for Switzerland, where referenda are frequent political occurrences. For instance, on the 
basis of their analysis of 41 ballot measures, Gruner and Hertig concluded that less than 20% 
of the voters were well-informed of the issues at hand. Christin, Hug and Sciarini, looking at 
ballot measures from 1981 to 1999, found that 30% of all voters could not give reasons for 
their votes, while 50% were unable to give more than one.484 
The general ignorance of voters in referenda is so well-attested that it forms the basis of 
most recent discussion of referendum voting. As Luskin notes, “with the fact of widespread 
public ignorance now firmly established, there has been a shift from ‘denial’ to ‘extenuation.’”485 
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Scholars interested in defending the practical and normative advantages of direct democracy 
no longer argue that voters fully or even partially comprehend the relevant issues. Instead, they 
concentrate their efforts on explaining how “relatively uninformed voters…cast the same votes 
they would have cast if better informed” and how voters uninformed about the details, specific 
subject matter, and consequences of most referenda nonetheless figure out what outcomes 
match their preferences.486 
As discussed, ignorance is often greater for ordinary referenda in comparison to elections 
because the former fall outside the main currents of politics, concern less familiar issues, and 
involve decisions of greater complexity than selecting a representative. This is even truer for 
constitutional ratification referenda. Constitutional design issues are further away from the 
daily lives of voters and the ordinary course of politics.487 Political agents and institutions 
normally operate in accordance with the extraordinary law that governs and creates them. 
When pieces of this extraordinary law become the center of conflict, the issue is usually nar-
row and rarely rises to a question of major institutional change. Moreover, “constitutional 
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Reform Elections," The American Political Science Review 88, no. 1 (March 1994): 63.See also Bowler and 
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matters tend, under most circumstances, to be the exclusive preserve of political elite,” and 
thus escape the attention of average voters. 488 
Comparing a proposed constitution to the status quo or likely result of constitutional re-
jection is undeniably more complex than evaluating the likely consequences of even the most 
technical referendum. Constitutions can contain hundreds of provisions on almost every as-
pect of political life, and evaluating them requires imagining what sort of government they 
would create in combination, while referenda usually pertain to a few specific issues and pose 
narrow alteration to existing law and policy.  In other words, “the issue decided by… [a ratifi-
cation] referendum relates to  multi-dimensional rather than single issue choice. Choosing a 
constitution involves several issues including institutions of government, decision-making 
rules, political rights, and so on.”489   
Moreover, as we will see, the usual means of obtaining information and becoming in-
formed are even more fractured and unreliable in the context of a ratification referendum 
when compared to elections or ordinary referenda. Cue-givers are usually new, confused, or ill-
informed. Objective information campaigns are frequently absent or dubious, and voters are 
subjected to “sharply contested, but ill-defined and unsubstantiated, visions of alternative po-
litical futures,” and “bombarded by conflicting claims about the costs and benefits of accepting 
or rejecting a referendum proposal.”490  
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The limited empirical work on ratification referenda supports this expectation of igno-
rance. For instance, Eurobarometer 214 indicates that 1/3 of European voters had not heard 
of the Constitution for Europe after its signing in 2004, and over half got basic questions 
wrong regarding its content.491 Hobolt demonstrates that a third of Dutch voters and a quar-
ter of Spanish voters attributed their negative vote on the referendum to lack of information 
and subsequent confusion.492 Similar findings exist for constitution ratification referenda on 
the country level. For instance, Higley and MacAllister reveal that a large portion of voters on 
the Australian Constitutional Referendum of 1999 not only had “dim knowledge about how 
the existing constitutional system works and little or no insight into what the proposed chang-
es would involve,” but that the competing campaigns recognized “voter ignorance of the com-
plex institutional issues involved” and thus “aimed at basic voter sentiments.”493 In addition, 
81% of a representative sample of voters on the Charlottetown Accord of 1996, which was 
effectively a vote on a new Canadian constitution, or at least a major restructuring of the origi-
nal document, agreed that “most people didn’t understand what the referendum was all 
about.”494 
                                                                                                                                            
by the People,” 22-23, for an explanation as to why the groups supporting and attacking the constitution fre-
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Because of the likelihood of such voter ignorance, SMJ fails. The justification requires that 
ratification referenda be capable of serving as the sole moment of constituent power in the 
constitution-making process, but the likely presence of uninformed citizen ratifiers incapable 
of making a meaningful choice on the proposed constitution undermines its capability to do 
so. Ratification referenda cannot be relied upon to give voice to the constituent power, and 
therefore SMJ cannot justify their implementation.  However, before we can accept this 
conclusion, which means giving up on the capacity of constituent power to justify ratification 
altogether, several objections must be addressed. Specifically, three powerful defenses of SMJ 
might be made against my claim that voters are too ignorant to make a meaningful choice 
when voting in a ratification referendum: (1) the threshold of knowledge is so high that even 
constitutional framers will fall below it; (2) information shortcuts allow citizens to vote com-
petently even without the required level of information; and (3) education campaigns can and 
are used to sufficiently educate voters. In the following sections I address each one of these 
objections.  
4. IGNORANT FRAMERS 
The first defense of SMJ claims that the level of knowledge demanded by the meaningful 
choice threshold is so unreasonably high that the actual framers of the constitution will not 
meet it. Most constitution-makers are not constitutional scholars and experts in institutional 
design, and we should not expect future framers to be any different. Thus, the standard of 
meaningful choice is an indefensible basis for criticizing SMJ, for it faults citizens for not being 
more informed than the authors of the constitution. Here, framers or authors refer to all those 
  
234 
who have a direct hand in writing, debating, amending, and voting on the constitution before it 
reaches its final form. This includes members of some roundtables, constitutional conventions, 
constitutional commissions, and national assemblies. 
This claim gains traction because there is little reason to think that most members of a 
democratically elected or representatively appointed constitution-making body will be suffi-
ciently knowledgeable to make a meaningful choice. Mueller mentions an extreme case of this 
when he notes that “in this age of television and mass-media dominance,” there is a danger of a 
“convention filled with pop singers and athletes who, among other deficiencies, lack expertise 
on constitutional matters.”495 In fact, this intuition of framer ignorance seems to be true for 
members of many known democratic constitution-making bodies. Consider the 1991 Constit-
uent Assembly in Colombia; its members ranged from traditional party delegates, ex guerillas, 
Indian leaders, businessmen, social and labor leaders, peasants, journalists, academics, lawyers, 
and clerics.496  Similarly, the members of the 25 person Stjornlagarad, Iceland’s 2011 Consti-
tutional Council, included an Economics professor, ethicist, farmer, pastor, theatre director, 
physician, and a consumer spokesperson.497 
Discounting the relatively small group of delegates with significant legal and political 
knowledge—the academics, the constitutional lawyers, and the particularly informed politi-
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cians—most of the delegates in both constitution-making processes knew too little about the 
purpose and role of constitutions, the basics of institutional design, and the exact working of 
their existing government to meet the threshold of meaningful choice. This diversity and lack 
of constitutional and institutional design knowledge is not unique to the Colombia and Ugan-
da framers, and will likely characterize future constitution-making bodies as well.498 
However, this level of ignorance will only be true for members of constitution-making 
bodies before the drafting process begins. The process of creating a constitution is usually 
highly educative, and can be designed to ensure and encourage this result. The education of 
framers during constitution-making can be divided into two phases: training and drafting. By 
training, I refer to the period within the constitution-making process when framers receive, 
seek out, and process massive amounts of relevant research and information. These include 
information and records of constitution-making in other countries and states; issue papers 
prepared by volunteer and hired constitutional consultants; and constitution-making hand-
books produced by NGOs, IGOs, and academic institutions.499 For instance, members of the 
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Nepali Constituent Assembly received a book entitled Creating the New Constitution: A guide 
for Nepali Citizens, prepared by International IDEA, which explains Nepali constitutional his-
tory and “provides an analysis of different options that emerge when making a new constitu-
tion.”500  In addition, framers receive demographic data, local constitutional and political histo-
ries, and reports on the strengths and weaknesses of present and past institutions. The mem-
bers of the 1867 New York Constitutional Convention, for example, received two large con-
vention manuals detailing all contemporary American state constitutions and comprehensive 
statistics on every aspect of New York State.501  
Much of this training and reception of constitutional information takes placed during 
within structured educational programs. For instance, during the Namibia constitution-
making process “lectures, seminars, discussions, and workshops were held on a wide range of 
topics pertaining to constitutions, systems of government, the role of political parties in a mul-
tiparty democracy, and the international protection of human rights.”502 Framers in Rwanda 
underwent similar training in constitution building seminars.503 These programs, according to 
IDEA’s instructions for them, serve as a means of educating framers on the nature and pur-
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poses of constitutions generally, the possible scope of constitutions, how constitutions are 
used, the legal language of constitutions, the importance of the structure of a constitution, the 
main elements of constitutions, the main variations and options for designing key elements of 
the constitution, international law and constitutions, and how the existing or any previous 
constitutions functioned. However, “the purpose of educating constitution-makers about the-
se issues is not to turn them into constitutional lawyers…the aim is to help them translate 
their aspirations into constitutional terms.”504   
 In addition, constitution-making bodies sometimes invite international and local constitu-
tional experts to give testimony or guidance and tour other countries for constitutional advice. 
International advisory boards visited Eritrea; the Nicaraguan Constitutional Assembly con-
sulted local constitutional scholars; and the secretariat to the Constitutional Loya Jirga in Af-
ghanistan prepared background papers with assistance from NATO and UN.  Ugandan con-
stitutional commissioners visited the United States and several European countries to discuss 
constitutional options; members of the Nepalis Constituent Assembly observed direct demo-
cratic processes in Switzerland; and delegates from the Indonesian People’s Consultative As-
semblies observe the working of constitutional courts in Thailand and South Korea.505  
Finally, through a variety of inclusive procedures including travelling commissions, nation-
wide surveys, comment solicitation, town-hall meetings, and the submissions of drafts for pub-
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505 Ebrahim, Fayemi, and Loomis, "Promoting a Culture of Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth 
Africa: Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of Government."; Benomar, "Constitution-Making After 
Conflict: Lessons for Iraq," 91; Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process. 58-60. 
Note that Interpeace suggests that constitutional trips by framers are frequently used as excuses for shopping 
trips and escape. 
  
238 
lic review, constitution-makers seek out and obtain public opinion data related to constitu-
tional desires and previous experience with political institutions. For instance, the Ugandan 
Constitutional Commission received memoranda summarizing the viewpoints expressed in 
over 800 local government council meetings attended by the public, toured the country hold-
ing town-hall meetings, solicited essays on the constitution by primary and university stu-
dents, and collected relevant newspaper op-eds and general comments by interested individu-
als. In all, over 25,000 submissions were received and processed by the commission.506 Similar-
ly, Zimbabwe’s commission held 5,000 meetings, conducted a nationwide poll, and adminis-
tered a questionnaire.507 Framers not only receive such massive amounts of relevant constitu-
tion-making information, but they are given the time and resources to process it. Framers usu-
ally create the constitution on a full-time basis and are paid for doing so; this allows them to 
devote themselves to becoming competent. They are also supplied with legal assistants and 
researchers to assist them. 
 Framers also learn while drafting, i.e. the process during which constitution-makers actu-
ally make the constitution. Drafting a constitution requires that framers interact, for a group 
with diverse preferences cannot draft a complex document in isolation from one other. Well-
designed democratic constitution-making processes involve a diverse group of delegates that 
disagree with one another on several levels. They have differing preferences in regards to con-
stitutional issues such as the design of the branches of government, the balance of power be-
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tween them, the rights to be guaranteed, and future amendment processes. For each of these 
issues there are numerous possible provisions upon which delegates may disagree. Also, con-
flict may arise over the precise wording of provision, even if there is no substantive disagree-
ment. 
 Since the delegates’ task is to create and agree upon a single constitution meant to be long 
lasting and stable, and such multi-layered disagreement exists, the convention becomes the site 
of a cooperative mixed motive conflict, i.e. a situation in which the delegates have conflicting 
motives to cooperate (they need to produce a constitution) and to compete (they each want 
the final constitution to be as close to their ideal constitution as possible).508 The convention 
thus involves arguing, bargaining, learning, and voting, and stops only when the required 
number of delegates agree to one of potentially many equilibria, i.e. to a particular draft of the 
constitution that contains numerous provisions which were once the subject of dispute.509 
 Most or all of the delegates supporting the final text do not endorse a constitution that per-
fectly aligns with their ideal preferences either before or after deliberation, but rather support 
the draft constitution because they believe that it is the best version (or one of several equally 
optimal constitutions) that can be produced by the convention given the preferences of the 
participants and external constraints, and because they prefer it to the expected outcome of 
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convention failure. In other words, an agreed upon constitution embodies a mutually accepta-
ble allocation of concessions.510  
This arguing, bargaining, and voting process, made necessary by the need to create an 
agreed upon constitution, promotes further learning. Constitution-makers are basically forced 
to listen to differing values, opinions, interests, and beliefs. This grants them new perspectives 
on issues and enables them to see the complexities of every constitutional decision. After edu-
cation programs, “most constitution-makers understand some of the constitutional issues as 
stake, but likely only those issues that affect them and their own communities.”511 Through 
deliberation, these information imbalances can be remedied. Furthermore, the need to per-
suade and compromise forces framers to refine and become more familiar with their own intu-
itions, knowledge, and preference set, as well as become acquainted with those of their allies 
and opponents from one discussion to the next. 
Constitution-makers need to be far more informed than a citizen ratifier capable of mak-
ing a meaningful choice in a ratification referendum. This is generally true of any creator com-
pared to those tasked to evaluate their creation. A meaningful choice requires that one possess 
sufficient information to roughly evaluate a constitution, understand its provisions, envision 
the sort of government it will create, and compare this to a similar evaluation of the present 
political system or whatever else is likely to emerge from constitutional rejection. Framers need 
to know much more than this; in a sense their task is to compare the status quo to all possible 
constitutional alternatives rather than just one.  
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Though they might start out as ignorant as the average citizen ratifiers, the constitution-
making process provides many opportunities for framers to become so informed. Constitu-
tion-making manuals, expert advice, demographic information, public comments and meet-
ings, issue papers, educational seminars and classes, all of these combine to ensure that framers 
become competent enough to complete their task. Furthermore, the arguing, bargaining, vot-
ing, and learning process necessitated by the need to create and compromise on a single draft 
constitution forces further learning. 
Citizen ratifiers do not undergo the educational experience of drafting a constitution. 
They do not argue and bargain and compromise with each other, for they are not involved in 
creating a constitution. Instead, they simply have to vote yes or no on a referendum. Ratifiers 
might be exposed to some of the educational material given to framers during training, but 
they likely have insufficient time to read, reflect, and process the received information. More 
importantly, as I will discuss in section 6, designers of constitution-making processes have 
some degree of control over the education of constitutional framers. The same is not true for 
citizen ratifiers. No one can guarantee that ratifiers will read the education material given to 
them, attend constitution-making seminars, and differentiate between relatively objective edu-
cational resources and referendum propaganda.  In the end, many constitution-makers in pre-
vious instances of constitution-making have emerged from the process far more competent 
than a citizen ratifier must be to make a meaningful choice, and future constitution-making 
processes can be designed to have similar effects. This defense of SMJ thus fails. 
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5. INFORMATION SHORTCUTS 
The second defense of SMJ against voter ignorance claims that citizen ratifiers do not need 
detailed factual or encyclopedic knowledge about the constitution or the likely effects of its 
rejection. Instead, they can employ information shortcuts to arrive at the same decision they 
would reach if fully informed. This objection makes use of recent studies of information and 
voting that arose in response to the findings of political ignorance mentioned above and their 
use by critics of democracy. The central point of these studies, the authors of which I call ‘the 
heuristics school,’ is that even with limited factual knowledge, voter can make competent polit-
ical decisions by using rules of thumb “to figure what they are for and against in ways that 
make sense in terms of their underlying values and interests.”512 These rules or heuristics in-
clude such things as partisan cues, candidate ideology, elite or interest group endorsement, 
likeability and appearance, polls, and past election results.513 
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5.1 HEURISTIC SCHOOL 
Drawing from findings in behavior decision theory and cognitive psychology, the heuristics 
school begins from the premise that individuals are “limited information processors” who nec-
essarily use shortcuts to make reasonable decisions while preserving cognitive resources.514 In 
other words, individuals use heuristic principles to decide most of their choices, from the un-
demanding and trivial to the complex and important, on the basis of very simple types of in-
formation.515 As Kahneman, one of the progenitors of heuristic research in cognitive psycholo-
gy recently wrote: “people who are confronted with a difficult question sometimes answer an 
easier one instead.”516 Though imprecise, making decisions in this way is necessary because it is 
impossible for individuals to know detailed information about or conduct research on the con-
sequences of the thousands of choices that confront them daily.517 When used appropriately, 
these heuristics enable individuals to successfully accomplish the tasks confronting them with-
out having to worry about every little factual detail.  
The heuristics school applies this insight to the realm of political decision, finding that 
“limited information need not prevent people from making competent vote choices since voters 
rely on cues and heuristics to overcome their information shortfalls.”518 Here, a vote is deemed 
competent or correct if it “is the same as the choice which would have been made under condi-
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tions of full information.”519 Central to this argument is the distinction between knowledge 
and information. “Knowledge is the ability to predict accurately the consequences of choices,” 
i.e. to determine which candidate will most likely maximize a voter’s personal utility, and “in-
formation is the data from which knowledge may be derived.” Moreover, “many kinds of in-
formation can lead a voter to reach the same conclusion.”520 The heuristic school argues that 
while knowing the sort of detailed political facts tested in political information surveys might 
make a voter knowledgeable to the extent that she can choose candidates and support referen-
da that align with her interests, preferences, and believes, the same is true for knowing a differ-
ent sort of information, i.e. the type of data—elite cues, partisan alignment, interest group 
preferences, etc—processed in accordance with heuristic principles.  
Thus, proponents of heuristics and cues claim that “limited political knowledge [infor-
mation] in the part of the citizenry need not present an insurmountable barrier for democratic 
governance.”521 In the right conditions, a voter who does not know what the New York City 
Comptroller does, let alone anything about the candidates running for the office, might vote 
along partisan lines and reach the same decision she would reach after weeks of research on the 
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matter. A voter might not know or comprehend the details of a referendum requiring firearm 
manufactures to install a new safety feature on their weapons, but by simply following or doing 
the opposite of what the NRA recommends, they can arrive at a vote that reflects their exist-
ing values, interests, and beliefs on the issue.522 
 Applying these arguments to ratification referendum, this second objection defends SMJ 
by claiming that voters can rely on partisan cues, elite endorsements, and other such simple 
types of information to vote as if they were fully aware of the provisions of the proposed con-
stitution and capable of comparing a proposed system of government to their present political 
situation. This argument appears to be supported by studies on Quebec’s sovereignty referen-
da of 1992, the 1994 Norwegian referendum on EU membership, and the various referenda 
on the 2005 Constitution for Europe.523 Though none of these are ratification referenda for a 
national constitution, each are high stakes referenda concerning constitutional issues that 
would have significantly readjusted their respective constitutional order and thus are useful 
comparisons. 
 In all of these instances, voters appear to have relied on heuristics to reach a decision on 
the complex referendum in front of them. In an explanation that applies to all of these cases, as 
                                                
522 In one of the landmark studies of voting heuristics, Lupia studies voting on a referendum designed to regulate 
the insurance industry in California and found that voters “who possessed low levels of factual…knowledge 
about the initiatives,” used shortcuts to “emulate the behavior of those respondents who had relatively high lev-
els of factual knowledge.” Lupia, "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedia: Information and Voting Behavior in 
California Insurance Reform Elections," 72. See also Christin, Hug, and Sciarini, "Interests and information in 
referendum voting: An analysis of Swiss voters." 
523 Harold D. Clarke, Allan Kornberg, and Marianne C. Stewart, "Referendum Voting as Political Choice: The 
Case of Queec," British Journal of Political Science 24, no. 2 (2004); Schuck and De Vreese, "Public Support for 
Referendums: The Role of the Media."; Hobolt, "Taking Cues on Europe? Voter competence and party 
endorsements in referendums on European integration."; Andrew Glencross and Alexander Trechsel, "First or 
Second Order Referendum? Understanding the Votes on the Eu Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member 
States," West European Politics 34, no. 4 (2011). 
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well as ratification referenda, Clarke et al write that: “Decisions on ‘big’ issues…are not ab-
stract exercises in constitutional design using copious information about the payoffs of alterna-
tive outcomes. Rather, operating in situations of great uncertainty, voters use heuristics pro-
vided by the political context in which the referendum occurs. Prime candidates are party 
identifications, party leader images, and governance performance evaluations.”524  
5.2 THREE PROBLEMS WITH THE HEURISTIC DEFENSE 
Appealing to information shortcuts cannot save SMJ for three main reasons. First, the heuris-
tics school might be wrong. Those generally critical of the heuristics school, particularly its use 
of information shortcuts to downplay the implications of factual political ignorance, claim that 
voters might not rely on information shortcuts regularly, that there is no evidence that voters 
actually vote competently when using them, and that if used,  heuristics are only helpful to in-
formed voters.525 Bartels, for instance, notes that “it is easier to assume than to demonstrate 
that cues and shortcuts do, in fact, allow relatively uninformed voters to behave as if they were 
fully informed,” and on the basis of six presidential elections in the US, concludes that “the 
behavior both of individual voters and of the electorate as a whole deviates in significant and 
politically consequential ways from the projected behavior of a ‘fully’ informed electorate.”526 
                                                
524 Clarke, Kornberg, and Stewart, "Referendum Voting as Political Choice: The Case of Queec," 354-55. 
525 Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology; Bartels, 
"Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections."; James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk, 
"Conceptual Foundations of Citizen Competence," Political Behavior 23, no. 3 (2001); Mary N. Franklin, Cees 
van der Eijk, and Michael Marsh, "Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for 
Europe in the Wake of Maastricht," West European Politics 18(1995); Delli Carpini and Keeter, What 
Americans know about politics and why it matters. 
526 Bartels, "Uninformed Votes: Information Effects in Presidential Elections," 195, 98. 
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Supporting these critics are studies purporting to show that referendum outcomes “be-
come tied to the popularity of the government in power, even if the ostensible subject of the 
referendum has little to do with the reasons for government popularity (or lack of populari-
ty).”527 Thus, Clarke et al demonstrate that the outcome of the 1992 constitutional referen-
dum in Canada indicated the citizens desire to sanction the ruling political party more than 
their preferences on the subject matter of the proposed amendments.528 In general, much re-
search indicates that referenda frequently devolve into “second-order elections,” where voters 
“make extensive use of irrelevant cues such as long term party loyalties or momentary rough 
evaluations of the party in government” and thus arrive at decisions divergent from fully in-
formed citizens voting on the issues.529 In other words, it is entirely possible that citizens 
might use information shortcuts to make complex voting decisions, but that the shortcuts they 
use are unrelated to the vote and in no way correlated with what their informed decision 
would be.530 If such criticisms of heuristics are right, information shortcuts become a weak de-
fense for SMJ. 
                                                
527 Franklin, Eijk, and Marsh, "Referendum Outcomes and Trust in Government: Public Support for Europe in 
the Wake of Maastricht," 1. 
528 These included enlarge house of commons with 25% of the seats allotted to Quebec, equal Senate representa-
tion, More power to provinces, recognition of Quebec as a distinct society, and aboriginal self-government. 
Clarke and Kornberg, "The Politics and Economics of Constitutional Choice: Voting in Canada's 1992 
National Referendum." Another example of this phenomenon is the 1962 French referendum on changing the 
constitution, which was more a plebiscite for de Gaul than anything else. See David B. Goldey, "The French 
Referendum and Election of 1962," Political Studies 11, no. 3 (1963). I thank Jon Elster for pointing me to this 
example. 
529 Henrik Oscarsson, "The Ideological Response: Saying No to the Euro," in The Dynamics of Referendum 
Campaigns: An International Perspective, ed. Claes H. de Vreese (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 206. 
See also Qvorthup, "A Comparative Study of Referendums: Government by the People," 2005. 
530 In fact, such a worry seems supported by the original psychological research on heuristics, which emphasized 
the inevitable introduction of bias and miscalculation into individual decision-making reliant on shortcuts. 
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler, "Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss 
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Second, even members of the heuristic school admit that information shortcuts sometimes 
fail to guarantee competent decision-making. This occurs when they misfire, are used incor-
rectly, or become inaccessible, and, I argue, the context of ratification referenda increases the 
likelihood of such malfunction. 531 Shortcuts misfire when applied appropriately but nonethe-
less lead to non-preferred outcomes, are used incorrectly when applied to an incompatible 
domain or different setting, and are inaccessible when one cannot decipher or identify the 
simple information normally processed with the heuristic principle. For example, consider that 
Ted, my neighbor, is a contractor, and that I make home-improvement decisions using the 
heuristic that I will just do what he recommends. If Ted gives me bad home improvement ad-
vice, the heuristic misfires. If I consult Ted on automotive repair, or if I consult a different 
neighbor, I misapply the heuristic. If Ted moves, slips into a coma, or becomes incomprehen-
sible, the heuristic is inaccessible. 
Certain conditions make political shortcuts more likely to fail in these ways. Heuristics are 
likely to misfire when cue-givers are ignorant about the subject matter in question.  This is 
why Lupia and McCubbins emphasize the importance of reliable advisors and advocate for the 
implementation of legal and institutional solutions designed to ensure such reliability.532 Vot-
                                                                                                                                            
Aversion, and Status Quo Bias," The Journal of Economic Perspectives 5, no. 1 (Winter 1991); Tversky and 
Kahneman, "Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases." 
531 These distinctions are my own, but for similar criticisms of heuristics, see Bartels, "Uninformed Votes: 
Information Effects in Presidential Elections."; James H. Kuklinski and Paul J. Quirk, "Reconsidering the 
Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion," in Elements of Reason: Cognition, Choice, and the 
Bounds of Rationality, ed. Arthur Lupia, Matthew McCubbins, and Samuel Popkin (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000). 
532 Lupia and McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know. In addition, 
Lupia and Johnson explain that heuristics might misfire when experts are themselves not well informed, and 
this is especially likely in closed societies, where effective channels of communication do not exist. Arthur Lupia 
and Richard Johnston, "Are voters to blame? Voter competence and elite maneuvers in public referendums," in 
  
249 
ers tend to misapply heuristics when they do not possess particular sorts of background in-
formation. As Delli Carpini and Keeter note, “the heuristics model is based on low infor-
mation rationality, not no information rationality.”533  Lau and Redlawsk make this point more 
clearly, using dynamic process tracing to show that “heavy reliance on political heuristics actu-
ally made decision making less accurate among those low in political sophistication,” where 
political sophistication is defined as general knowledge of the political landscape. Thus, voters 
are likely to misapply heuristics when they lack the contextual and historical information 
needed to know which elites, interest groups, parties, or media source supports outcomes con-
ducive to their own values and preferences.534 Finally, heuristics are likely to be unavailable 
when regular cue-givers are either absent, fail to send signals on the subject matter at hand, or 
contradict each other. 
The context of ratification referenda makes the misfiring, misapplication, and indecipher-
ability of heuristics highly likely. Most generally, shortcuts operate when politics resembles a 
repeated game. Here, even without being fully informed, players can make competent political 
decisions because experience has taught them or their community that relying on specific deci-
sion-making proxies leads to desirable outcomes in context of low information. However, con-
stitution-making occurs in moments of disruption—when the game is not repeating but dete-
riorating, breaking, or already broken. Thus, reliable heuristics lose their reliability. Specifical-
ly, the subject matter of a ratification referendum—the evaluation of a constitution—is com-
                                                                                                                                            
Referendum Democracy" Citizens, Elites, and Deliberation in Referendum Campaigns, ed. Matthew Mendelsohn 
and Andrew Parkin (Toronto: St. Martin's Press, 2001). 
533 Delli Carpini and Keeter, What Americans know about politics and why it matters: 52. 
534 Kuklinski and Quirk, "Reconsidering the Rational Public: Cognition, Heuristics, and Mass Opinion."  
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plex and deals with issues unfamiliar to both average citizens and most standard elites and ad-
visors. A local newspaper, ethnic interest group, tribal or community leader, or informed 
neighbor might competently understand elections or an ordinary referendum and give more or 
less consistent voting advice that matches an individual’s preferences, but be wildly confused 
and hence unreliable when it comes to constitutional evaluation, a subject matter outside of its 
normal purview.  
In addition, constitutional referenda concern the rules of a new political system, and thus 
do not necessary align with the interest groups and political parties that formed within an old 
one. Parties and interest groups frequently split over proposed constitutions as a result, mak-
ing their normal cues hard to decipher. Moreover, the coalitions that favor or oppose a draft 
constitution are likely to be new and unpredictable, for constitutions unsettle vested interests, 
benefiting and harming groups with little or nothing in common previously. For instance, the 
coalition that opposed the 1970 Arkansas draft constitution consisted of local judges and 
prosecutors, minor county officials, and the liquor industry, making any signals sent by them 
hard to interpret.535 More generally, constitutional ratification referenda are relatively infre-
quent, in that save for a few exceptions, most individuals will be unable to look at history and 
experience to understand patterns and form reasonable heuristics. This means that there is a 
lack of accumulated experience and reliable expectations with which individuals can form heu-
ristics, or apply to existing heuristics. Finally, constitution-making frequently occurs in politi-
                                                
535 Elmer E. Cornwell, Jay S. Goodman, and Wayne R. Swanson, State constitutional conventions : the politics of the 
revision process in seven states  (New York: Praeger, 1975). 170-73; Kay Collett Goss, The Arkansas State 
Constitution : A Reference Guide  (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1993). 10-12. 
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cal contexts of great instability, meaning that previous systems of information shortcuts are 
likely disrupted and new ones yet to form.  
Direct evidence of such heuristic failure in constitutional ratification referenda does not 
exist for lack of study, but evidence from normal constitutional referenda provides some sup-
port for this claim of heuristic failure. The Australian Republican Referendum in 1999, one 
such example, concerned two questions: the first asked voters if they wanted Australia to be-
come a Republic with the Queen and Governor General being replaced by a President ap-
pointed by 2/3 of the Commonwealth parliament; the second asked whether a preamble 
should be placed at the beginning of the constitution.536 55% of those voting in the referendum 
rejected it, though opinion polls showed voters favoring the creation of a republic two to one 
throughout the 1990s.  
Luskin et al claim that “voters got the referendum quite wrong,” in that if fully informed 
they would not have favored rejection.537 The authors base their conclusion on the outcome of 
a Deliberative Poll held two weeks prior to the referendum, where a random sampling of vot-
ers strongly favored the referendum once exposed to extensive information and deliberative 
opportunities.538 This suggests that if used, heuristics did not lead voters to a competent deci-
sion. A study by Higley and McAllister provides a partial explanation for the shortcut failure. 
They explain that voters lacked knowledge on the existing constitutional system and how the 
                                                
536 Though this constitutional referendum did not amount to a ratification referendum, the changes were sub-
stantial and many of the same conditions that would weaken heuristics for ratification referenda were present. 
537 Luskin et al., "Deliberation and Referendum Voting," 10. 
538 For more about Deliberative Polling, see 3-4 of this article and Robert C. Luskin and James S. Fishkin, 
"Deliberative Polling, Public Opinion, and Democracy," in American Association for Public Opinion Research 
Annual Meeting (Saint Louis, MO1998). 
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proposed change would work, and that the normal heuristics they used were indecipherable. 
Specifically, party and leader cues were contradictory; “Labor were divided on the method of 
election for the head of state, and the Liberals were divided on the republic issue itself. Moreo-
ver, the Prime Minister…opposed the referendum that his government had proposed.” In the 
absence of knowledge or comprehensible heuristics, “though perhaps supportive of the princi-
ple at issue, [voters] choose a cautious stance and vote NO.”539 
The 2000 Danish national referendum on the euro provides further evidence of cue-giver 
confusion and subsequent heuristic inaccessibility and misfiring. Political parties at the ex-
treme left and right joined forces in a No campaign, leaving the centrist parties weakly united 
for a Yes. Campaign messages were confused and vague, and voters received no clear heuristi-
cal data to act upon.540 Like the Australian case, this confusion resulted from the subject of the 
referenda, which like the subject of constitutional ratification referenda, fell outside the normal 
political landscape.  LeDuc sums up the results of such heuristical malfunction in European 
referenda when he writes: “numerous examples in the comparative literature on referendums 
showing that the outcome of a referendum can be quite different than the actual division of 
public opinion on the underlying issue, sometimes even when opinions are strongly held.”541 
                                                
539 Higley and McAllister, "Elite Division and Voter Confusion: Australia's Republic Referendum in 1999," 859.  
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Third, and most importantly, even if we magically knew that most voters in future consti-
tutional ratification referenda would rely on information shortcuts, and that these shortcuts 
would always lead them to a competent vote, this still would not rescue SMJ. As discussed 
above, SMJ requires that referenda meet the threshold of meaningful choice, which concerns 
how a voter makes her choice—by her ability to vote on a constitution for reasons relating to 
her evaluation of its contents in comparison with the likely result of constitutional rejection, 
and not on the outcome of referendum.  
The claim that heuristics enable ignorant voters to make the same decisions as informed 
voters is comforting in the face of worries about the health of democracies filled with ignorant 
citizens, for it explains how even if politically ignorant, voters are still making choices that they 
want, still arriving at political outcomes that they prefer, and that therefore democracy still 
provides a way of ensuring that a government rules in accordance with the will of its citizenry.  
However, as mentioned, this outcome-based focus is anathema to the logic of constituent 
power underlying SMJ, where primary importance is ascribed to the direct intentional exercise 
of the people’s sovereign power for non-consequentialist reasons. This is why a happy outcome 
to a referendum in which voters never looked upon the constitution did not satisfy SMJ, for 
voters cannot create a constitution they never see. In addition, if consequentialist reasons mo-
tivated SMJ, there would be no room for the inalienability claim. Thus a representative form 
of constitution-making guaranteed to arrive at a constitution acceptable to the people would 
eliminate the need for ratification, as would an accurately representative ratification process. 
Thus, even if heuristics allowed constitutionally ignorant voters to make agent-relative sensible 
ratification decisions, the votes would not be an adequate instance of the people deciding upon 
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their constitution, for they would still be unable to comprehend and own their decision. In 
other words, heuristics do not enable an unaware voter to make a meaningful choice. 
6. EDUCATING THE PEOPLE 
The third objection to the claim that voter ignorance defeats SMJ is perhaps the most obvious. 
If the people are too ignorant to evaluate the constitution on its merits, we should simply edu-
cate them beforehand. Of course, educating citizens to combat voter ignorance is not a new 
idea. This is why most ordinary referenda and initiatives include education efforts, and why 
civic education is an essential component of public education. When it comes to constitution-
making, framing bodies, along with the assistance of sitting governments, NGOs, IGOs, civil 
society organizations, the media, and constitutional consultants, frequently design and imple-
ment massive voter outreach and education programs.542 In fact, over half of the last 194 in-
stances of constitution-making involved such programs, many of which coincided with the 
consultative procedures used by framers to surmise public opinion. The recent advent of par-
ticipatory constitution-making has increased the importance of these campaigns, for advocates 
of participation emphasize that only an informed and educated public can form and express 
coherent opinions on the constitution.  
Constitutional education programs employ a wide variety of tactics to educate the public 
over the course of the constitution-making process, making use of print materials, television 
and radio programs, cultural events, websites, social networking channels, civic workshops, 
town hall meetings, public hearings, and travelling information panels. Consider the education 
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efforts made during the most recent constitution-making events in Brazil, South Africa, Eri-
trea, and Uganda. In Brazil, the entire proceedings of the constituent assembly were broadcast 
on public television. The acting congress set up a media center to ensure that news outlets ex-
plained everything to the public; this resulted in 716 television programs, 700 radio programs, 
3000 hours of video, and 4,871 interviews with members of the assembly.543 South African 
framers distributed posters, brochures, leaflets, a biweekly newletter entitled “Constitutional 
Talk”, booklets, and comic books. They produced a weekly television program and radio show, 
set up a multi-lingual “Constitutional Talk Line,” held 486 workshops targeted at disadvan-
taged communities and numerous constitutional public meetings, set up an official website, 
and distributed 4.5 million copies of the draft constitution.544  
 Eritrean framers launched an extensive educational program specifically tailored to address 
the country’s 80% illiteracy rate. Using songs, travelling plays, concerts, poetry, and illustrated 
books, the program engaged with an estimated 500,000 members of the population.545 In 
Uganda, the education process lasted four years and included seminars for 10,000 community 
leaders, the dissemination of previous constitutions and specially prepared information pack-
ets, 800 educational seminars led by constitution commissioners, seminars for government 
employees, over forty multi-lingual radio programs, twenty television programs, 15 press con-
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ferences, countless information seminars held by previously trained leaders, and meetings or-
ganized by local council officials aimed at engaging all members of the population.546  
 Despite the prevalence and extent of these educational programs, claiming that they can 
sufficiently lower voter ignorance and confusion is farfetched for two reasons. First, these pro-
grams have yet to accomplish this, or at least there is no evidence to suggest that they have. In 
other words, the long standing practice of educating voters about elections and referenda has 
yet to do much about lessening voter ignorance. Most of the findings on voter ignorance men-
tioned in section 2 measured voter knowledge after the implementation of such programs. 
Elections and ordinary referenda usually take place after comprehensive elections but voters 
remain in the dark about the relevant issues.  
 Expensive and extensive multi-media educational programs preceded the referenda on the 
EU constitution, yet a third of respondents in a Eurobarometer survey reported never having 
heard of the constitutional treaty, and over half said they knew little about its substance. Simi-
larly, 54% of survey respondents in Uganda agreed that the constitution was too complicated 
for them to understand, and 33% could not answer a question about the purpose of the consti-
tution, despite its lauded and comprehensive campaign.  
In both South Africa and Eritrea, where comprehensive education programs sought to 
prepare citizens for participation, most public suggests received by framers were unrelated to 
constitutional issues or “not susceptible to being translated into the language of a modern con-
stitution.”547 
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Admittedly, it is impossible (and likely incorrect) to say that voter education programs 
have no effect. Sufficient comparative studies do not, to my knowledge exist. Nonetheless, it is 
enough to observe that previous educational programs did not educate voters sufficiently to 
make a meaningful choice possible, and there is little reason to think that more extensive edu-
cational programs could do any better in the future. The level of political ignorance such pro-
grams would need to overcome is simply too massive. A meaningful choice requires that voters 
know enough about constitutionalism and institutional design to evaluate a constitution, com-
pare it to the likely result of rejection, and make a decision based upon this comparison. The 
fact that educational programs for single-issue referenda and ordinary elections fail to inform 
voters about these simpler issues and decisions suggests that creating a successful ratification 
education program, for the purposes of SMJ and meaningful choice, is improbable or impossi-
ble.  
 Second and more importantly, combating constitutional ignorance through education is 
made exceedingly difficult by the ratification campaigns that immediately begin upon promul-
gation of the draft constitution. These campaigns have a goal that is both easier to meet and in 
direct tension with that of education programs. The purpose of an education program is to 
teach citizens about constitutionalism and institutional design so that they can understand the 
constitution-making process, effectively participate within it, and eventually review the draft 
constitution to be voted upon. Ratification campaigns, on the other hand, want to persuade 
voters to vote a certain way on the draft by any means possible. Educating citizens is as im-
portant to a ratification campaign as confusing or misleading them; both are appropriate 
means of bringing voters to the desired decision.  
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 The effect of political campaigns on voters is a relatively new area of study. This is largely 
due to the long-standing and well-supported assumption that campaigns are of little relevance. 
According to this logic, voters make their decisions on the basis of partisanship, long-standing 
beliefs, and other uncontrollable environmental factors, as evidenced by the ease of accurately 
predicting election and referenda outcomes well before the start of political campaigns.548 This 
suggests that campaigns, or at least how they are run, have little to no effect on voters.549 How-
ever, recent studies of campaign effects have shown that these original assumptions were too 
strong. Campaigns, or at least how they are run, are only irrelevant when the public has long-
standing opinions on a political choice and make it within the context of a well-developed sys-
tem of heuristics. However, certain conditions make campaigns and media effects extremely 
effective, and ratification referenda just so happen to take place in contexts where all of these 
conditions are present.550  
  Campaigns are likely to be most influential when: voters need to make complex decisions; 
the subject matter is new and there is little history of public debate on it; traditional leaders 
and other cue-givers are uninformed or in conflict with one another; other reliable heuristics 
are absent or inapplicable; voters are either uninformed or recently informed about the rele-
                                                
548 James E. Campbell and James Garand, Before the Vote: Forecasting American National Elections  (Thousand 
Oaks, California: Sage, 2000). 
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vant issues; voter choice is structured in a new and unfamiliar way; voters are unlikely to have 
long-standing relevant opinions; voters are exposed to contradicting messages; and local lead-
ers unhindered by normal party or ideological discipline have incentives to position themselves 
around a referendum in order to maximize expected positive blow-back.551  
These conditions make citizen attitudes unstable and campaign delivered information like-
ly to be influential, and all of them apply to the context of ratification referenda. The subject 
and issues of constitution-making is foreign to voters, elites, and parties. The type of political 
decision required is also new; “to citizens in both systems of plurality and proportional repre-
sentation, a referendum poses a change to well-known electoral choice.”552 Voters are also 
largely ignorant, and those that are informed are newly informed, meaning their opinions are 
recent, not backed up by experience, and thus more easily changed and replaced. Constitution-
making is rare and thus there is little history of public debate. Ratification campaigns thus take 
place in contexts where voters, despite any proceeding educational programs, are extremely 
likely to be influenced by calculated campaigns 
Of course, being influenced by a ratification campaign is not necessarily detrimental to 
making a meaningful choice. That is, a meaningful choice threshold does not require the unre-
alistic absence of persuasion or non-objective discussions of the constitution. A campaign that 
sought to persuade informed voters that they should have specific values, and that these specif-
ic values conflict with the actual text of a proposed constitution would not affect a person’s 
capacity for making a meaningful choice. The same is true for a campaign that emphasized the 
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weaknesses or strengths of one possible outcome of constitutional rejection, or the inefficiency 
of the government likely to result from the proposed draft.  
Ratification campaigns become detrimental to education programs and the capacity for 
meaningful choice because, they address who voters are confused, ignorant, or newly informed, 
are designed to convince them to vote a certain why, and take place in a context in which insti-
tutions and laws regulating campaign conduct are non-existence or ineffective. Thus, cam-
paigns occur where their target is prone to manipulation, they have incentives to manipulate, 
and obstacles to manipulation are relatively absent. The result, as one author notes, is that “ef-
forts at self-education are thwarted by manipulative campaigns designed to oversimplify the 
issue and appeal to the electorate’s worst instincts.”553  
Campaigns manipulate voters in one of several ways: they foreground particular true facts, 
changing their meaning by eliminating context or means of comparison; provide misinfor-
mation or strategically incomplete information; prime one aspect of a vote and make it deter-
minate; or prime an issue or factor that is unrelated to the vote entirely. Examples of all forms 
of manipulation are readily found throughout the history of ordinary referenda and constitu-
tional ratification campaigns.554 In both the Danish and Swish referenda on the Euro, held in 
2000 and 2003 respectively, the no campaigns relied on unrelated issue priming, choosing to 
refrain from making arguments related to the substance of the referenda and instead turning 
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the vote into one on patriotism, nationalism, fears of a central bank, and personal commit-
ments to social welfare.555  
In the campaigns leading up to the Albanian Constitutional referendum in 1997, both 
sides “spent a relatively limited amount of time on substantive issues.”556 The Democratic Par-
ty, leading the charge of the ‘No’ campaign, resorted to misinformation. For instance, they at-
tacked Article 18, a ban on arbitrary discrimination, by claiming that it violated the ECHR 
and was meant to restrict individual liberties. In response, the ‘Yes’ campaign resort to a defen-
sive position, meaning that voters, 90% of whom approved the constitution, likely did so on 
the basis of limited and distorted information.557  
In Poland in 1997, the Polish state electoral commission launched an extensive infor-
mation campaign meant to educate the public about the new constitution and lay out argu-
ments for and against it. However, “this effort largely descended into an electoral campaign in 
the nature of propaganda rather than education.” Opponents of the constitution, for instance, 
provided incomplete information on several articles, such that constitutional provisions relat-
ing to future collaboration with international organizations, child maturity and freedom of 
consciousness, and a consultative Monetary Policy Council, were framed as attempts to de-
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prive Poland of its sovereignty, take children away from their parents, and give state finances 
to a powerful unaccountable agency.558  
Similarly, the proposed constitutions of the 1970 Arkansas State Constitutional Conven-
tion and the 1968 Rhode Island Convention both immediately became the site of numerous 
and conflicting public relations campaigns that resorted to rumor-mongering, exaggerated in-
terpretations of constitutional provisions, and simultaneous celebrations and condemnations 
of the drafting process.559 Those opposed to the Arkansas draft, for example, successfully con-
vinced a large portion of the electorate that the constitution would benefit elites and increase 
taxes, though neither of these claims followed logically from the text.560 The ‘Yes’ campaign to 
the 1992 Canadian Constitutional referendum employed similar scare tactics, subsequently 
reinforcing voter feelings of manipulation by elites.561  
 Finally, it is worth noting that the manipulation wrought by ratification campaigns usually 
goes unchecked by educational programs, and that this should be expected. The driving forces 
behind education programs—constitution-makers, civil society organizations, and the sitting 
government—will take sides on the draft constitution upon its release, if not sooner. Their 
incentive for neutrally educating citizens will be overridden by the competing incentive to con-
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vince them to vote a certain way, and education programs will either cease or transform into 
ratification campaigns. While some external NGOs or IGOs might wish to continue neutral 
education programs, the effects of these will be severely limited by the likely absence of local 
support.  
 The 2005 referendum on the Kenya Constitution is a perfect example of education pro-
grams morphing into manipulative campaigns upon promulgation of the draft document. The 
government, NGOs, and local civil society organizations immediately ceased education efforts, 
choosing instead to support either the pro-constitution Bananas or anti-constitution Orange 
campaigns, neither of which made significant efforts to discuss the contents of the constitu-
tion. Both campaigns were led by political elites using the opportunity to position themselves 
in advance of the 2007 elections, and both did their best to turn the vote into one on ethnicity, 
rather than on constitutional design.562 In addition, the Orange campaign falsely claimed that 
the constitution disadvantaged younger citizens, enlarged presidential power, legalized abor-
tion, and gave the president a life-long term, and simultaneously reframed support of the con-
stitution as explicit support for the unpopular Kibaki government.563 The Banana campaign 
responded weakly, choosing instead to engaged in indirect vote-buying than disseminating in-
formation about what the constitution entailed.564 
 To review, the final defense to my claim that voter ignorance defeats SMJ is that voters can 
be educated. This defense fails to rescue SMJ for two related reasons. First, educational pro-
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grams already take place for elections, ordinary referenda, and ratification referenda, yet elec-
torates remain largely uninformed. The size of the chasm between voter knowledge and what 
it takes for voters to make a meaningful choice on a ratification referendum makes it hard to 
imagine any future education programs having regular success where so many others have 
failed. Second, and far more importantly, education programs are likely to be overwhelmed by 
powerful ratification campaigns that appear immediately upon promulgation. These cam-
paigns operate in a context in which campaign effects are known to be high and upon an elec-
torate especially prone to manipulation.  As Condorcet notes, when the electorate are given 
the right to ratify a constitution, “the men who really exercised this right would be those 
whose eloquence, reputation, and standing earned them temporary sway.”565  
 Of course, while I claim that we should expect education attempts to be outdone by ratifi-
cation campaigns, and while this claim receives indirect support from the near impossibility of 
finding a recent instance of a ratification referendum in which constitutional issues seem to 
have led to the outcome, this expectation may be proven false. In other words, it might be pos-
sible to educate voters to such an extent that a meaningful choice becomes possible, and it 
might be possible for ratification campaigns to refrain from or ineffectively manipulate and 
confuse voters. However, this possibility is not good enough to save SMJ, for while framer ed-
ucations campaigns can be designed to almost guarantee informed framers, the reception of 
voters to educational efforts and the nature and effects of the spontaneous ratification cam-
paigns will always be extremely unpredictable. As LeDuc notes, 
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“the most volatile referendum campaigns are likely to be those in which there is little partisan, issue, or 
ideological basis on which voters might tend to form an opinion easily. Lacking such information, they 
take more time to come to a decision, and that decision becomes highly unpredictable and subject to 
change over the course of the campaign, as new information is gained or new events unfold….The po-
tential volatility in such circumstances is very high, because there little in the way of core beliefs or atti-
tudes to anchor the opinions formed.”566  
With such volatility, education programs cannot be relied upon to raise voters out of igno-
rance, meaningful choice cannot reasonably be guaranteed, and therefore ratification cannot be 
justified as a moment in the constitution-making process where constituent action can be ex-
pected.  
7. CONCLUSION 
As explained in chapter three, a constituent power justification defends the necessity of ratifi-
cation by appealing to the long-standing tradition of constituent power and its conceptual as-
sociates popular sovereignty, ordinary and extraordinary law, and fear of government oppres-
sion and domination. Specifically, a constituent power justification claims that ratification is a 
necessary component of the constitution-making process because constitutions must be creat-
ed by the constituent power, and ratification plays some sort of essential role in making this 
happen. However, bringing constituent power theorizing into contact with the mechanics of 
the constitution-making process and clarifying the kind of role ratification might play reveals 
weaknesses in this type of justification. 
If ratification is one of many instances of constituent action in the constitution-making 
process it becomes redundant or incoherent. If the procedure plays an ameliorative role, mak-
ing up for prior failures to convoke or manifest the constituent power, it becomes a mere ad-
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hoc solution. And, if ratification becomes one of several attempts meant to enable the consti-
tution power to act, the concept of constituent power itself becomes lost from the justification. 
Thus, as I argued, the multiple moment justification, the ameliorative function justification, 
and the multiple approximations justification failed to justify the use of ratification proce-
dures.    
However, the particular failings of these types of constituent power justifications suggest a 
final possibility. Rather than envisioning ratification as one of many possible moments of con-
stituent action or constituent action approximations, ratification can be understood as the sole 
moment during the constitution-making process when the constituent power acts. This sole 
moment justification escapes the deficiencies plaguing other forms of CPJ by limiting constitu-
ent action to ratification. Moreover, as seen in chapter four, it is the type of argument made by 
the Berkshire Constitutionalists; the Massachusetts revolutionaries who successfully claimed 
for the first time in history that citizens have a right to ratify any constitution mean to rule 
over them. Their arguments not only first justified and conceptualized the procedure of ratifi-
cation, but they remain the most comprehensive explanation for why ratification is a necessary 
component of constitution-making.  
However, as argued in this chapter, SMJ ultimately fails to explain the need for ratifica-
tion. The justification claims that ratification is necessary because it is the sole moment in the 
constitution-making process where the constituent power acts and creates its constitution. It 
makes this argument by characterizing constituent power as inalienable, which means that 
SMJ only justifies ratification procedures that make use of referenda. However, in order for a 
referendum vote to serve as a site of constituent action, individual voters must make a mean-
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ingful choice on the constitution. That is, they must choose whether to accept a proposed con-
stitution on the basis of their understanding of the document and the likely result of its rejec-
tion. This type of choice is made necessary by the purpose of the referendum, to enable the 
constituent power to create something. Creation entails that the creator has some level of 
comprehension over its creation. Making this claim does not import a thick conception of 
what it means for the people to express its will, but instead relies on the simple idea that some-
thing cannot be taken to be the intentional creation of an agent if he did not understand what 
it was he was willing and creating.   
This standard of meaningful choice is unlikely to be met in constitutional referenda, for 
voters will almost certainly be too ignorant to make the necessary comparison. This is not be-
cause voters in constitution-making countries will be especially stupid. Rather, voter ignorance 
is expected because the information required to evaluate a draft constitution is technical, hard 
to obtain, and without value for the average citizen in any other circumstance. Voters are 
known to usually lack the information needed to independently choose political representa-
tives or vote on specific referenda on their respective merits, and the greater obscurity of the 
knowledge needed to evaluate a draft constitution makes it even less likely for it to be present 
in a sufficient percentage of the ratifying population. Thus, since we should expect voters to be 
unable to make a meaningful choice, ratification procedures cannot be relied upon to provide 
the sole moment of constituent action, and thus SMJ, along with other types of constituent 
power justifications, cannot justify ratification. 
Note that this argument is not anti-democratic. The inability of voters to make a meaning-
ful choice on a proposed constitution says nothing about their ability to competently vote in an 
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election or ordinary referenda, even one that pertains to constitutional issues. This is so be-
cause the standard of meaningful choice only applies to ratification referenda that purport to 
be the site of constituent action. Voters must comprehend fully what they are voting on be-
cause their actions are meant to combine and form the actions of a constituent power creating 
extraordinary law. When voters go to the ballot box to vote for a president or legislator, to de-
cide upon a tax referendum, or even to make a decision upon a particular constitutional 
amendment, their actions are not meant to be those of the constituent power. Theories of de-
mocracy, at least most prominent ones, do not demand such a high level of knowledge. 
Attempts to rebut the dismissal of SMJ, I argue, ultimately fail. Specifically, the meaning-
ful choice threshold is not too high, as evidenced by the fact that framers cannot meet it, be-
cause framers usually become quite informed while writing the constitution, and constitution-
making processes can be designed to almost guarantee this outcome.  Information shortcuts 
cannot be relied upon to overcome voter ignorance for two reasons. On the one hand, ratifica-
tion referenda take place in a context where heuristics are known to malfunction. On the other 
hand, even if heuristics worked perfectly, they would not eliminate the problem posed by voter 
ignorance. Meaningful choice requires that voters understand what it is they are creating, 
while information shortcuts and heuristics only provide an explanation for how voters, despite 
their confusion, nonetheless choose outcomes that reflect their underlying preferences, inter-
ests, and beliefs. The existence of reliable heuristics cannot save SMJ, for voters can fail to 
make a meaningful choice in a ratification referendum even if the outcome would have been 
identical had they been informed.  
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Finally, constitutional education programs cannot be relied upon to educate voters and 
make meaningful choice likely. Such programs fail to eliminate voter ignorance in ordinary 
elections and referenda, where the level of knowledge demanded is less, and appear to have 
failed in previous ratification referenda. This is likely due to the fact that education programs 
immediately devolve into or are replaced by ratification campaigns upon the release of draft 
constitutions. These campaigns operate in a context in which campaign effects are known to 
be highest and voters are especially prone to manipulation. As a result, the basis of voter deci-
sions on constitutional ratification referenda are likely to be unrelated to its content, or at the 
least entirely unpredictable.  
 Thus, SMJ fails to justify ratification. Constituent power is the creative power of the 
people to make (and unmake) their constitution. If it emerges in ratification only, which is the 
claim of SMJ, the process must plausibly serve as the expression of the popular will. In other 
words, ratification must be a clear instance in which the people as a whole decide upon and 
create the foundations of their future government. However, the general ignorance of ratifiers 
in matters of constitutional-design challenge the ability of ratification to serve this purpose, 







LEGITIMACY & RATIFICATION 
   
“An important justification for people’s participation is said to be the legit-
imacy that it confers on the constitution. If people have participated, they 
are more likely to have a commitment to it, even if they have not fully un-
derstood the process or the constitution, or indeed even if their participa-
tion was largely ceremonial.” 
Yash Ghai & Guido Galli567 
 
“Legitimacy is a mushy concept that political analysts do well to avoid.” 
Samuel P. Huntington568 
 
In this chapter, I address what is possibly the most intuitive and certainly the most discussed 
justificatory source for ratification: legitimacy. Few seem to think about, let alone study, the 
reasons for incorporating ratification within constitution-making; however, those that do usu-
ally make reference to the procedure’s alleged legitimating effects. The idea is fairly simple. 
The desired outcome of constitution-making is not merely a written document, but one that is 
legitimate. Ratification, the arguments goes, makes this outcome more likely.  As Elster notes, 
ratification “is intended to confer downstream legitimacy on the constitution.”569 Why might 
this be? 
The constitution-making best practices literature that emerged in the last ten or so years 
frequently links ratification to legitimacy, though how and why is usually unexplained or left 
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underdeveloped. Miller, for instance, claims that, “referendums can be valuable in constitution 
making, conferring a degree of legitimacy on the process and its outcome.” Ndulo and Selassie 
also link ratification with creating a legitimate constitution. Ndulo traces ratification’s legiti-
mating effect to the procedure’s ability to ensure that a constitution is not “perceived as being 
imposed on a large segment of the population, or having been adopted through manipulation 
of the process by one of the stakeholders.” Somewhat similarly, Selassie explains that the use 
of a special constituent assembly to ratify the Eritrean constitution was necessary because of 
“the issue of legitimacy,” the central assumption of which is “that the government is established 
by and on behalf of the people.”570 
Some authors group ratification with other participatory procedures such as assembly 
elections and public consultations and promote all of them because “broad public participation 
contributes to the constitution’s legitimacy.”571 Examples of this participation equals legitimacy 
logic abound.572 A recent UN Guidance Note from the Secretary-General advises all constitu-
tion-makers to focus on the “the impact of inclusivity and meaningful participation on the le-
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gitimacy of new constitutions.” Vivien Hart, in an essay on democratic constitution-making, 
concludes that “the legitimacy of constitutional agreements at the end of the twentieth century 
depends upon openness in two senses: a process both open-ended and open to participation.” 
Similarly, Wing notes that, “participation in constitutionalism…is a central factor in deter-
mining the legitimacy and durability of democratic transitions in Africa today,” and Medhanie 
explains that participatory constitution-making secures the consent of elites, stakeholders, and 
society as a whole, and that such consent is important because it “is actually the source of the 
constitution’s legitimacy.”573 
Medhanie’s comments point to another reason for thinking legitimacy is the justificatory 
key to our inquiry: the long tradition of consent-based accounts of political authority. Starting 
in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, thinkers such as Buchanan, Hooker, Al-
thusius, and Hobbes, soon to be followed by Pufendorf, Lock, and later Rousseau, developed 
conceptions of legitimate government predicated on an original or ongoing act of individual or 
collective consent. These accounts continue to influence political thinking to this day, and 
though they differ in regards to their details and implications for political obligation, state 
form, revolution, and the like, all seem to provide some sort of explanation for why constitu-
tions must be ratified. Simply put, a constitution, and the government and state it structures, 
must be consented to by its citizens in order to obtain coercive authority over its populace. 
The explanatory power of such consensual accounts of legitimacy remains even if we reject the 
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contractual metaphor at their base.574 Constitutions may be coordination devices and conven-
tions, rather than contracts, but at the beginning, some sort of popular consent remains neces-
sary. 
Finally, a growing body of empirical work points to the legitimating effects of participation 
in creating systems of rules. For instance, in several studies about the importance of legitimacy 
on observed legal compliance, where legitimacy is defined as a citizen’s belief that she ought to 
obey the law, Tyler finds that individual experience with political and legal authorities plays a 
central role. In particular, he claims that “procedural justice is the key normative judgment in-
fluencing the impact of experience on legitimacy,” and that “one important element in feeling 
that procedures are fair is a belief on the part of those involved that they had an opportunity to 
take part in the decision-making process.”575 Similarly, on the basis of several lab experiments, 
Frohlich and Oppenheimer found that subjects who had a hand in choosing distributional 
principles “are more confident in their choices and more satisfied, and their confidence grows 
in contrast with their counterparts who have a [identical] principle imposed on them.”576 Nu-
merous other studies provide further support for the idea “that personal influence in the pro-
cedure generates legitimacy,” and that “direct voting in referendums is one such way to exercise 
influence in the process.”577 These sorts of findings suggest that ratification procedures, partic-
ularly referenda, might play a major role in creating a legitimate constitution. 
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In this chapter, I follow these leads and examine whether ratification has these purported 
legitimating effects, and whether they provides sufficient reasons for its implementation. First, 
however, certain difficulties have to be addressed that stem from the term and concept of legit-
imacy. As we saw in chapter two, discussions of representation tend to get bogged down in 
disagreements about what representation is a concept of. Is it a political relationship? Does it 
have to be institutional? Does it admit to degrees? With legitimacy, a different problem faces 
us. The concept is often used confidently in both academic and everyday settings. People usu-
ally know what they are referring to when they discuss legitimacy, and their audience likely 
knows as well. The concept is unambiguously, as far as these things can go, connected to its 
object. However, difficulty arises because we use the term legitimacy to refer to a variety of 
different concepts, and thus different objects and properties.  
These concepts are related, they all have something to do with validity, acceptance, and 
right, but they are nonetheless distinct. In other words, what it means for something to valid, 
acceptable, or right differs from one concept of legitimacy to the next. For example, I might get 
angry at a Supreme Court judgment and call it illegitimate, claim that as a result the legitimacy 
of the court is in question, yet admit that the decision was legitimate as a matter of law. I refer 
to something different in each of these instances, but in none of them am I misusing the term. 
 My general intuition is that the seemingly self-evident link between ratification and consti-
tutional legitimacy weakens when both the meaning of legitimacy and the actual mechanism of 
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legitimation are treated with greater precision. Thus, my task in the first section of this chap-
ter is to gain an understanding of what legitimacy can mean in a political context, and how it 
might apply to a constitution at all. To do this I divide political legitimacy into three different 
concepts: moral legitimacy, sociological legitimacy, and legal legitimacy. Next I apply these 
concepts to constitutions, and argue that legal legitimacy collapses into sociological legitimacy 
when it comes to higher law.  
In the remainder of this chapter I examine how ratification might promote the moral and 
sociological legitimacy of a constitution. For both concepts of legitimacy, ratification might 
have one of two effects. The procedure might affect the contents of a constitution, such that 
the constitution becomes legitimate on substantive grounds, or the constitution might become 
legitimate simply because it resulted from ratification, regardless of its contents. There are 
numerous possible arguments one might make explaining how ratification might legitimate a 
constitution through these two mechanisms, but I concentrate on what seem to be the most 
plausible. In addition, I limit the discussion to ratification by referenda, for this is the most 
common ratification procedure and the one usually cited in discussions of legitimacy. I con-
clude the chapter drawing my findings together and seeing where this leave ratification.  
1. WHAT IS LEGITIMACY? 
Confusion and disagreement surrounds the concept of legitimacy because, among other fac-
tors, the term is used differently depending on author, context, and purpose.  
While the term is consistently used to indicate that something is valid or right, what it actually 
means for something to be valid or right is frequently left unexplained or underdeveloped. In 
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order to more precisely evaluate the possible legitimating effects of ratification, I hope to clari-
fy the concept. Specifically, I argue that when it comes to the political context, legitimacy splits 
into three different types or concepts, each evaluated according to different sorts of criteria.578 
Roughly put, something is morally legitimate if there is an acceptable moral justification for its 
claim to authority; sociologically legitimate if a significant portion of the relevant population be-
lieves it to be justified or morally legitimate; and legally legitimate if it is lawful according to the 
legal order of which it is a part.579  
Of course, as we will see, there is significant overlap and frequent causal connections be-
tween these types of legitimacy. Government officials might be morally legitimate authorities 
because they were lawfully elected and thus legally legitimate; a judicial interpretation might be 
unlawful because it violates the bounds of morality; a rule might become lawful simply because 
people believe it to be right; and all instances of sociological legitimacy rely on basic beliefs in 
moral legitimacy. Despite this inevitable overlap and connection, it is nonetheless worth dis-
tinguishing between each of three types of legitimacy, for doing so brings increased clarity to 
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discussions of constitutional legitimacy and will assist us in evaluating how a constitution-
making procedure might help create a legitimate constitution.580 
Before proceeding, it begs mention that a significant portion of the argument below, most 
obviously the strict distinction between moral and legal legitimacy, assumes that the basic ten-
ets of legal positivism are true. At the least, it requires accepting Austin’s foundational claim 
that “the existence of law is one thing; its merit and demerit another.”581 In other words, the 
existence and identity of law depends exclusively “on behavior capable of being described in 
value-neutral terms, and applied without resort to moral argument.”582 This is not the place to 
defend the merits of legal positivism against competing jurisprudential considerations; instead 
I simply assume its truth and admit that my arguments will have less resonance to natural law 
theorists and other non-positivists.583  
1.1 MORAL LEGITIMACY 
Moral legitimacy is the conceptual center around which both legal and sociological legitimacy 
revolve. Neither of the other two legitimacy types makes sense without it. Most generally, 
moral legitimacy relates to “moral justifiability or respect-worthiness,” the latter usually inter-
preted as necessitating some sort of duty of compliance toward that which is morally legiti-
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mate.584 More precisely: x is morally legitimate if x’s claim to authority is morally justified.585 
This definition makes use of the concept of practical authority, which a person or group pos-
sesses “if their authoritative utterances are themselves reasons for action.”586 Something has 
practical authority if its demands or instructions in a particular arena provide reasons for ac-
tion meant to exclude, replace, or override those reasons directly related to the action being 
requested.587  
Consider a state, the most common political subject of moral legitimacy. A state claims to 
be authoritative when it asserts a right to rule and demands some sort of deserved and dutiful 
compliance. In other words, when it claims a right to issue commands and directives relating 
to keeping the public order, maintaining the state, and exercising coercive force, and demands 
some form of non-selfish compliance from its citizenry. A state claiming such authority ex-
pects citizens to comply with its edicts simply because it makes them. Citizens are expected to 
pay their taxes because the state demands payment, not because tax payments contribute to 
                                                
584 Fallon, "Legitimacy and the Constitution," 1786. Note that in response to philosophical anarchists, several 
authors have claimed that moral legitimacy does not necessary entail political obedience. See M.B.E. Smith, "Is 
there a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?," Yale Law Journal 82(1973); Rolf Sartorius, "Political 
Authority and Political Obligation," Virginia Law Review 67, no. 1 (1981); Allan Buchanan, "Political 
Legitimacy and Democracy," Ethics 112, no. 4 (2002); Kent Greenawalt, Conflicts of Law and Morality  
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987). 47-59.  
585 The account of moral legitimacy I sketch below is inspired by the conception of authority developed by Joseph 
Raz. See Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 23-99; Joseph Raz, 
Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009). 126-66; Raz, The Authority of Law: 3-33, 233-91. Note that in defining legitimacy in this man-
ner, I reject conceptions that link political legitimacy solely with justified coercion and the creation rather than 
justification of political authority. See, for example, Arthur Ripstein, "Authority and Coercion," Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 32, no. 1 (2004); Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy  (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998); 
Buchanan, "Political Legitimacy and Democracy.". 
586 Raz, The Morality of Freedom: 35. In general, see ibid., 23-99. 
587 Raz describes authoritative reasons as preemptive, meaning that they are “not to be added to all other relevant 
reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.” Ibid., 20-37. I add 
override in order to take into competing conceptions of practical authority that characterize the reasons pro-
duced by authority as being extremely weighty, rather than fully preemptive.  
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public infrastructure and national security or because failing to do so results in expensive au-
dits. In claiming such authority a state is asserting that there are sufficient moral reasons to 
treat its edicts as preemptive in this fashion.   
States claiming to be authoritative are morally legitimate, they have morally legitimate au-
thority or de jure authority, when “their claim [to have a right to rule] is justified and they are 
owed a duty of obedience as a result.”588 These two facets of moral legitimacy are related, in 
that the existence of good moral reasons for a state’s claim to authority generates the relevant 
duties of obedience. The nature of the obedience, the type of duty produced by morally justi-
fied authority, and the recipient of the duty remain controversial topics. Obedience might 
amount to not actively undermining the state, not interfering with the state, obeying some or 
all of the state’s commands, or even assisting and supporting the state. The generated duty 
might be content-dependent or independent, absolute, prima facie, or preemptive. Citizens 
might owe obedience to the state itself, its government, or the people in whose name it acts.589 
I remain neutral on these questions; moral legitimacy simply consists in a morally justified 
claim to authority and an owed duty of obedience of some sort.  
 Morally legitimate authority is distinct from de facto authority. A state is de facto authorita-
tive when its claim to authority is successful rather than morally justified. Such a state claims a 
right to rule, acts as if it has a right to rule, and succeed in establishing and maintaining its 
                                                
588 Ibid., 26; Raz, The Authority of Law: 6. 
589 Simmons claims that legitimate states impose binding content-independent duties, while Dworkin claims that 
a legitimate state generates content-dependent duties. Raz claims that the commands of a legitimate authority 
produce preemptive reasons for following them, while Shapiro claims that it simply produces particularly 
strong content independent duties. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations: 122-
57; Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986). 191; Raz, The 
Morality of Freedom: 38-69; Scott Shapiro, "Authority," in The Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence and 
Philosophy of Law, ed. Jules L. Coleman and Scott Shapiro (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
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rule.590 In modern contexts, this success is usually but not necessarily due to the fact that the 
citizenry believe in the state’s moral validity.591 The idea here is that it is extremely difficult for 
a government to effectively rule a modern polity unless a significant portion of the population 
believes that it has the right to do so. Whether this belief is warranted and the state is actually 
morally legitimate is irrelevant for the purposes of determining de facto authority.592 Thus, a 
state can claim to be authoritative without being a de facto or a legitimate authority, can be a 
de facto authority without being a legitimate authority (this is a mere de facto authority), and 
can be a legitimate authority without being a de facto authority. 593 
 Note that morally legitimate authority is distinct from the naked exercise of coercive pow-
er, even when it is done for good moral reasons. For instance, a street gang might justifiably 
coerce members of a community to combat an encroaching fire, but this does not amount to 
morally legitimate authority because they do not claim a right to rule and do not expect com-
pliance because of who or what they are.594 In addition, an entity that effectively rules a territo-
                                                
590 Raz, The Morality of Freedom: 26. 
591 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 195. 
592 While it is conceptually possible to imagine a non de facto morally legitimate authority, certain views on what 
actually makes an authority morally legitimate might make this impossible. For instance, if one of the primary 
moral justifications for having a political authority is to secure stable social co-ordination, and this is only pos-
sible (without violating other significant moral principles) if the authority is de facto, then all legitimate political 
authority is necessarily effective and de facto. However, as Raz notes: “this is the result of substantive political 
principles… It is not entailed by a conceptual analysis of the notion of authority, not even by that of the concept 
of political authority.” Raz, The Authority of Law: 9. One example of a non de facto yet morally legitimate au-
thority might be the Polish government in exile in London in 1940. Nonetheless, while it did not successfully 
rule Poland, the government in exile was recognized as authoritative by the bulk of the Polish population. Raz, 
Between Authority and Interpretation: On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason: 128. 
593 For an interesting distinction between two types of mere defacto authority, distinguished by reluctant ac-
ceptance of an authority’s claim to authority on the one hand, and the outright rejection of it on the other, see 
Anthony Bottoms and Justice Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in 
Criminal Justice," The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 102, no. 1 (2012): 148-49. 
594 Raz, The Morality of Freedom: 25-26. 
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ry might fail to be de facto or morally legitimate. Consider an army governing a newly con-
quered populace. It might effectively impose its will on the bulk of the population, but fail to 
be a mere de facto authority or a morally legitimate authority because it does not claim to have a 
right to rule. Moreover, even if it did make such a claim, it might fail to be morally legitimate if 
its structure is so unjust that the right to rule cannot be justified.595 De facto and legitimate 
state authorities are therefore distinct from merely effective states because they involve moral 
reasons in some way.  
1.2 SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY 
Sociological legitimacy is already familiar to us through the concept of de facto authority. As 
mentioned, a state is de facto authoritative if it claims to be authoritative and succeeds in being 
so. Sociological legitimacy is one of the most common reasons for its success; it is the citizen-
ry’s belief that the regime’s claim to authority is morally justified and their resultant acquies-
cence or obedience.596 
This legitimacy type descends from Max Weber, who described it as one of the most im-
portant factors in state survival. For Weber, a legitimate political regime is one characterized 
by legitimitätsglaube being present within the citizenry.597 Thus, to speak in circles, a regime is 
legitimate if its citizens believe it to be legitimate. As he explains: “that basis of every system of 
authority, and correspondingly of every kind of willingness to obey, is a belief, a belief by virtue 
                                                
595 Raz, The Authority of Law: 9. 
596Gilley summarizes the concept:  “legitimacy is a citizens willingness to comply with a system of rule, out of not 
selfishness, experience or habit, but rather a considered belief in the moral validity of the rule.  Gilley, The Right 
to Rule: How States Win and Lose Legitimacy: 3.  
597 For an excellent discussion of Weber’s conception of legitimacy, and its faults, see Robert Grafstein, "The 




of which persons exercising authority are lent prestige.”598 Using our disaggregated conception 
of legitimacy, we can say that for Weber, a regime is sociologically legitimate to the degree that 
its citizens believe it to be morally legitimate.599 Weber believed that obedience follows such 
beliefs. The type of obedience needed is what criminologists and socio-legal scholars term ‘le-
gitimate normative obedience,’ i.e. obedience due to a belief in the rightful authority of offi-
cials, rather than due to instrumental reasons or general moral beliefs in proper behavior.600  
We can thus define sociological legitimacy in the following manner: x is sociologically le-
gitimate if a significant portion of the population that x claims authority over believes x to be 
morally legitimate and complies with its directives as a result.601 As Lipset defines the term, 
“[sociological] legitimacy involves the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain 
the belief that existing institutions are the most appropriate and proper ones for the society.”602 
The concept of sociological legitimacy is thus a descriptive concept, for it describes whether or 
not a certain percentage or number of citizens have certain attitudes or beliefs towards a politi-
cal object, and whether they act a certain way because of them.603 It is therefore “a question of 
                                                
598 Max Weber, The theory of social and economic organization  (New York: Free Press, 1997), Book. 382. 
599 Weber famously traces this belief in legitimacy to three sources: tradition, charisma, and legality.  
600 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law; Bottoms and Tankebe, "Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to 
Legitimacy in Criminal Justice," 120. 
601 This definition is necessarily reductive, insofar as a properly robust explanation would have to explain the na-
ture of these beliefs, their source, and there relation to shared beliefs and values.  
602 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, 2nd ed. (London: Heinemann, 1983). 86. 
Note that sociological legitimacy might be maintained and supported by a belief that one’s fellow citizens con-
sider an authority morally legitimate, and perhaps will impose sanctions in response to deviance, but that these 
sorts of beliefs are nonetheless distinct from those beliefs that constitute sociological legitimacy. Horne ignores 
this distinction in her social norm approach to legitimacy. Christine Horne, "A Social Norms Approach to 
Legitimacy," American Behavioral Scientist 53(2009). 
603 Sociological legitimacy is thus variable between time periods, groups, and governmental organs.  
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fact,” as Friedrich notes, “whether a given rulership is believed to be based on good title by 
most men subject to it.”604  
Sociological legitimacy is thus distinct from moral and legal legitimacy, both of which are 
evaluative concepts, in that its measurement is completely dependent on attitudinal and behav-
ioral characteristics of a given set of individuals, rather than reliant on objective or semi-
objective external criteria.605 Sociological legitimacy remains a normative concept, however, in 
that it concerns beliefs in moral legitimacy and the obedience that such beliefs entail.606 Thus, 
attempts to completely reduce the concept to rationally calculated obedience, misuse the 
term.607 Finally, note that, at least theoretically, the fact that x is sociologically legitimate nei-
ther means that x is or is not morally legitimate. Moral legitimacy only follows sociological le-
gitimacy to the degree that citizens possess moral competence. 
1.3 LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
The final type of legitimacy is legal legitimacy. As Fallon notes, “that which is lawful is also 
legitimate.”608 This definition needs to be refined, however, in order to separate legal legitima-
cy from mere lawfulness. Something is only legally legitimate if it is lawful according to the 
                                                
604 Carl Friedrich, Man and His Government  (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963). 234. 
605 As Clark notes, “the test for legitimacy is not the truth of the philosopher, but the belief of the people.” Ian 
Clark, "Legitimacy in a Global Order," Review of International Studies 29(2003): 80. 
606 Fallon notes a weak sense of sociological legitimacy that means observed popular acquiescence, regardless of 
reason. While legitimacy is certainly employed by some political scientists in this way, most likely due to its rel-
ative ease of empirical measurement, I claim that such usage overly distorts the concept. For instance, according 
to this weaker sense of sociological legitimacy, the governments of Mugabe, Pinochet, and Than Schwe were 
sociologically legitimate. Fallon, "Legitimacy and the Constitution," 1795-96. 
607 Ronald Rogowski, Rational Legitimacy: A Theory of Political Support  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1974). 




legal system in which it exists or operates, while something can be lawful according to a variety 
of legal systems.609 Put more precisely: x is legally legitimate if x is lawful according to the legal 
system of which x is a part. In this sense, legal legitimacy is equivalent to the positivist concep-
tion of legal validity. Specifically Raz’s version of legal validity, which defines something as le-
gally valid “if and only if…it belongs to a legal system in force in a certain country or is en-
forceable in it.”610  
Two additional features of legal legitimacy are worth clarifying. First, ascribing legal legit-
imacy to an object involves making a legal statement, i.e. a statement in which “the fact that 
certain laws belong to certain legal systems” is a “necessary condition of the truth.”611 The 
truth conditions of legal legitimacy, unlike moral and sociological legitimacy, consist in specific 
legal facts rather than moral properties or actually existing beliefs. Second, legal legitimacy as a 
concept nonetheless relies upon normative and sometimes even moral presuppositions. Asser-
tions of legal legitimacy establish that something has the legal effects that it claims because it a 
valid component of the relevant legal system. This is why legal legitimacy is identical to legal 
                                                
609 Thus, the Kenyan legal system tells us something about the legal legitimacy of Kenyan laws and edicts, but 
says nothing in regards to laws created in Russia or anywhere else. One could sensibly claim that a Russian law 
is lawful according to the Kenyan legal system, but the existence of a Russian law that is legally legitimate ac-
cording to the Kenyan legal system is a conceptual impossibility. Similarly, Raz writes: “The gist of the legalists 
approach is that the lawful government is that authorized by the positive law of the land.” Joseph Raz, "On 
Lawful Governments," Ethics 80, no. 4 (1970): 301. See also Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State: 117. 
610 Raz, The Authority of Law: 153. 
611 Raz, "On Lawful Governments," 300. In a sense, Raz’s discussion in this article about the three different con-
texts in which the concept of a legal system is deployed, and the confusion wrought by failing to distinguish be-
tween these contexts, anticipates Fallon’s tripartite legitimacy distinction. Ibid., 302-04. Note also that I follow 
Leslie Green in interpreting Raz’s discussion of lawful government as an as an explanation of legal legitimacy: 
Green, "Law, Legitimacy, and Consent," 797. Finally, for a discussion of legal statements, see H.L.A. Hart, 
Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983). 21-48.. 
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validity, which means “the specific existence of norms.”612 Legal systems presume their own 
normativity, and thus claiming that a specific law or political action properly belongs to an ac-
cepted legal system is to suggest that the law or political action deserves compliance as a result. 
Thus, it is not uncommon for assertions of legal legitimacy to assume the moral legitimacy of a 
legal system as a whole.613  Legality and morality are still distinct, but this further shows to the 
inevitable linkage between different types of legitimacy.  
2. LEGITIMATE CONSTITUTIONS 
We now need to apply these three concepts of political legitimacy to constitutions. What does 
it mean for a constitution to be morally, sociologically, or legally legitimate? In this section I 
argue that while we can sensibly talk about legitimate and illegitimate constitutions when it 
comes to moral and sociological legitimacy, the same is not true for legal legitimacy. Legal le-
gitimacy collapses into sociological legitimacy when it comes to higher law and is thus irrele-
vant for our inquiry. 
2.1 MORALLY AND SOCIOLOGICALY LEGITIMATE CONSTITUTIONS 
A morally legitimate constitution is a constitution with morally justified authority; it is a con-
stitution that justifiably structures a given state, creates its legal system, sets limitations on 
government power, and is owed some form of respect and compliance as a result. Morally le-
gitimate constitutions demand that a specific right be protected from government infringe-
                                                
612 Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State: 30. 
613 Raz explains that “if the constitution and the other rules that establish legal authorities are morally justified, so 
are the authorities that the establish, and the laws made by those authorizes are morally binding.” Joseph Raz, 
"On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries," ed. Larry Alexander, 
Constitutionalism: Philosophical Foundations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 189. 
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ment, or that one organ of government has such and such a check on another organ, not be-
cause of the individual merit of the right or the check, and not because citizens agree with the-
se provisions, but because the constitution demands it and moral reasons exist for respecting 
this demand. To use Frank Michelman’s term, a morally legitimate constitution is ‘respect-
worthy,’ in that it creates a legal and political system the inhabitants of which have good rea-
sons to respect even when they disagree with specific laws or policies and fail to change 
them.614  
The assertion of a constitution’s moral legitimacy, like any application of moral legitimacy 
to the political domain, assumes that the exercise of political authority, or in this case structur-
ing the exercise of political authority, is problematic in the absence of sufficient moral justifica-
tion. In other words, it assumes that in the absence of good moral reasons it is wrong for a 
state, individual, or institution to make political and legal rules, enact them, and demand com-
pliance. This stems from a core belief in the inherent freedom of individuals, or at least their 
freedom from limitations and coercion externally imposed by others.  
Finally, it begs mention that how we determine whether a constitution’s claim to authority 
is morally justified depends on the comprehensive moral theory we endorse. For instance, ac-
cording to Rawls’ liberal principle of legitimacy, a morally legitimate constitution is one “the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the 
light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason.”615 For Raz, a legiti-
mate constitution would be one that meets the normal justification thesis and the independ-
                                                
614 Frank I. Michelman, "Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-worthy Governmental System," Fordham Law 
Review 72(2004): 346-47. 
615 John Rawls, A Theory Of Justice, Revised ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). 137. 
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ence condition, meaning that “a person would better conform to reasons that apply to him an-
yway…if he intends to be guided by the authority’s directives than if he does not” and “the 
matters regarding which the first condition is met are such that with respect to them it is bet-
ter to conform to reason than to decide for oneself, unaided by authority.” For Simmons and 
perhaps Locke, a legitimate constitution would simply be that constitution directly consented 
to by the populace.616 These and other theories will be taken into consideration below when 
ratification’s legitimating capability is tested.  
A sociologically legitimate constitution is a constitution that a relevant portion of the pop-
ulation believes is morally legitimate and treats as authoritative as a result.617 This means, for 
instance, that citizens consider the constitution to be the constitution, that the government 
functions in accordance with the constitution’s provisions, that legal reasoning stops at the 
constitution, and that most people believe that all of this occurs for good moral reasons. The 
provisions of a sociologically legitimate constitution, as well as the institutions that it struc-
tures, are thus thought to be appropriate, deserving of respect, and generally justified. Moreo-
ver, they are actually complied with because of such beliefs. In other words, most citizens liv-
ing in a state structured by a sociologically legitimate constitution believe that their constitu-
                                                
616 Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and Obligations: 123-56. 
617 Measuring sociological legitimacy, regardless of context or object, is inherently difficult. When it comes to 
constitutions a variety of approaches, all of which are necessarily reductive and imperfect, have been used. Wid-
ner uses the level of violence five years after constitution-making in post-conflict countries. Moehler uses consti-
tutional support, measured through four survey questions designed to assess whether respondents felt that the 
constitution included their views, represents the national political community as a whole, is worthy of compli-
ance, and should be preserved. De Raadt takes a more elite-based focus, relying on incidents of constitutional 
conflicts in the area of executive-legislative relations as well as disputes about the competencies of constitutional 
courts, while Elkins et al rely on constitutional durability. Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton, "The Lifespan of 
Written Constitutions."; Moehler, Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution Making; 
Widner, "Constitution Writing in Post-Conflict Settings: An Overview."; Widner, "Constitution Writing and 
Conflict Resolution."; Jasper de Raadt, "Contested Constitutions: Legitimacy of Constitution-making and 
Constitutional Conflict in Central Europe," East European Politics and Societies 23, no. 3 (2009). 
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tion is appropriate and morally justified as a whole, and that its dictates should be obeyed ac-
cordingly.618  
Sociological legitimacy is the legitimacy type most frequently relied upon in the constitu-
tion-making literature. Ndulo, for example, refers to a legitimate constitution as one the peo-
ple feel that they own, and therefore respect, defend, and obey, and Banks and Alvarez claim 
“that constitutional legitimacy is determined by the people’s acceptance of the Constitution, 
the fit between the new set of rules and society.”619 Most explicitly, Arato and Miklosi explain 
that they “are ultimately concerned with the sociological sense of the term legitimacy as estab-
lished by Max Weber, having to do with a significant part of a population…considering a po-
litical order as a whole or the government based on it…justified or valid.”620  
2.2 THE IRRELEVANCE OF LEGAL LEGITIMACY 
Unlike moral and sociological legitimacy, a conceptual problem emerges when one applies legal 
legitimacy to a constitution. A legally legitimate constitution would be a constitution that is 
legal according to the legal system of which it is a part. However, in constitutional govern-
ments the constitution creates the legal system; it lies at the end of any chain of legal reasoning 
regarding the lawfulness of an object or action and undergirds all legal rules and regulations. 
Thus, claiming that a constitution is legally legitimate seems confused, for the criterion of legal 
legitimacy, lawfulness, is partially set by the object whose legitimacy is being asserted.  
                                                
618 Of course, citizens might believe that one provision of the constitution is outdated or flawed and needs to be 
changed, while still maintaining that the document as a whole is justified. In addition, note that the matter of 
sociological legitimacy of a constitution is different from the sociological legitimacy of the government. Thus, a 
sociologically illegitimate government might operate in a state structured by a sociologically legitimate constitu-
tion. This is especially likely if said government is seen as departing from the provisions of the constitution.  
619 Banks and Alvarez, "The New Colombian Constitution: Democratic Victory or Popular Surrender," 43. 
620 Arato and Miklosi, "Constitution Making and Transitional Politics in Hungary," 385n4. 
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There are two possible solutions to this conundrum. The first is that constitutions can 
contain reflexive standards of legal legitimacy. Many constitutions contain sections that seem 
to serve this purpose. For instance, the final provision of the 1948 Constitution of the Italian 
Republic states:  
“This Constitution shall be promulgated by the provisional Head of State within five days of its approv-
al by the Constituent Assembly and shall come into force on 1 January 1948. The text of the Constitu-
tion shall be deposited in the Town Hall of every Municipality of the Republic and there made public, 
for the whole of 1948, so as to allow every citizen to know of it.”621  
 
This provision, one might argue, makes the Italian Constitution self-legitimizing, for it con-
tains steps that, if followed, produce a lawful constitution. Moreover this seems appropriate, 
for the constitution defines the legal system of Italy, of which the constitution is a part, and 
therefore no other source of legality is possible.622  
Despite the frequency of constitutions including such provisions, this solution makes little 
sense. On the one hand, the implication of a constitution that violates its own enactment pro-
visions is unclear. When something is legally illegitimate it is not legal and lacks legal force; an 
invalid law is not a law, and an invalid legal command is not part of a legal system. Thus, if the 
constitution provides its own criterion of legal legitimacy, and it fails to satisfy it, then the con-
stitution is legally invalid, which implies that it cannot serve as a source of legal legitimacy for 
anything, itself included. For instance, if the Italian Constitution was promulgated ten days 
after its approval and only publicized in northern municipalities, it should be illegal and legally 
                                                
621 Italian Const. Final and Transitional Provisions, XVIII 
622 The Hungarian Round Table is another example of such reflexive legitimacy. According to Arato, they 
“claimed a potential, retroactive democratic legitimacy. If, as the argument went, the population voted under 
the new electoral rules, within the new procedural framework, this would, after the fact, legitimate the agree-
ment.” Arato, Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy: 149. 
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illegitimate. However, by being legally illegitimate, it is not lawful and cannot serve as a source 
of lawfulness for anything, meaning that it is not actually legally illegitimate for there is no ac-
ceptable source of constitutional legality. This circularity plagues any attempt to locate the 
source of legal legitimacy for a constitution in the same constitution, for legitimacy presuppos-
es the possibility of illegitimacy, which requires that the relevant criterion is separate from the 
object being evaluated.  
On the other hand, constitutional self-legitimation simply contradicts or falls short of 
what people mean when they use the term legal legitimacy. This is best demonstrated by a hy-
pothetical put forward by Frederick Schauer. He presents and signs a new constitution for the 
United States, the first and final articles of which read: “Article 1. Frederick Schauer or those 
he may designate shall possess all of the legislative powers of the United States,” and “Article 
VI. The Constitution shall be established and in force upon signing by the individual named 
in Article 1.” This constitution is lawful and in force according to its own terms, i.e. by satisfy-
ing its own internal conditions of validity it became legally legitimate. The same is true for the 
actual U.S. Constitution, which also satisfied its own internal conditions of legitimacy. The 
fact that the U.S. Constitution is the legally legitimate constitution of the United States, while 
Schauer’s is not, points to the insufficiency of a purely internal criterion of legal legitimacy. 
We can make this distinction, as Schauer notes, “not because of anything internal to one doc-
ument or the other, because internally they are equally valid. Rather, we know that one is the 
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Constitution and the other is not because of what we know empirically and factually about the 
world.”623  
The second solution claims that the legal or political system being replaced can provide the 
relevant criteria of lawfulness by dictating how future constitutions are to be made or what 
they must include. Here, legal legitimacy is meant to come from legal continuity. Examples of 
this abound in constitution-making history: Louis XIV demanded that he receive a veto over 
and within the constitution; the Allied powers demanded the creation of a highly decentral-
ized government in West Germany and the popular ratification of the constitution; the Na-
tional Resistance Movement’s government in Uganda passed a series of acts dictating the ap-
pointment of constitutional commissioners, the make-up of the constituent assembly, and the 
manner in which its members could campaign; and the South African Interim Constitution 
specified the process of constitution-making and constrained the final document’s content by 
imposing thirty-four binding constitution principles.624 In 1992, the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court retroactively endorsed this vision of legality when it claimed: “the exchange of systems 
                                                
623 Frederick Schauer, "Amending the Presuppositions of a Constitution," in Responding to Imperfection: The 
Theory of Practice of Constitutional Amendment, ed. Sanford Levinson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 153. 
624 Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the Constitution-making process," 373-75; Ebrahim, Fayemi, and Loomis, 
"Promoting a Culture of Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa: Recommendations to 
Commonwealth Heads of Government," 121; Aili Mari Tripp, "The Politics of Constitution Making in 
Uganda," in Framing the State in Times of Transition: Case Studies in Constitution Making, ed. Laurel E. Miller 
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2010), 162-66. Note that such constraints on the 
constitution-making process have mixed success; the French Assembly ignored both of the King’s requests and 
the German framers resisted much of the desired decentralization, while framers in Uganda and South Africa 
closely followed the instructions given to them. 
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took place on the basis of legality…in a formally unimpeachable manner through adhering to 
the lawmaking rules of the previous lawmaking order.”625 
According to this argument for legal continuity, the legal legitimacy of these constitutions 
depends upon the degree to which they and their creators followed the mandates of the previ-
ous legal authority. This solution, while tempting, is mistaken for several reasons. For one 
thing, it arbitrarily makes legal legitimacy impossible for those constitutions created in a con-
text where constitution-making directives are absent. The constitutions of completely new 
states, or states in which the previous regime had nothing to say about the creation of its re-
placement’s constitution, could never be legally legitimate. In addition, this solution perversely 
gives existing regimes the power to set the terms of legal legitimacy for the constitutions that 
are meant to replace them. 
Most importantly, however, allowing existing regimes to determine the legal legitimacy for 
new constitutions confuses the legal purpose of constitution-making and the actual role of a 
constitution from a legal standpoint. Constitutions are the ultimate legal foundation for a ju-
ridical system and their creation necessarily negates the legal authority of any previous founda-
tion.626 It therefore makes little sense for the legal legitimacy or lawfulness of a constitution to 
depend on its observance with a command or stipulation from its precursor, for to do so sug-
gests that this prior legal source, rather than the new constitution, is juridically superior. If a 
constitution is to serve as the new source of all future legal norms, it cannot obtain its own le-
                                                
625 Cited in Arato, Civil society, constitution, and legitimacy: 103. For further discussion of the decision, see Alajos 
Dornbach, "Special Reports: Retroactivity Law Overturned in Hungary," East European Constitutional Review 
7(1992). 
626 Unless a new constitution refers to the old constitution, or judicial interpretation consults prior legal systems 
when appropriate precedent is absent.  
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gal legitimacy from a prior system.627 To summarize, since something is legally legitimate if it is 
lawful according to the legal system of which it is a part, and constitutions create and define 
legal systems rather than operate within them, legal legitimacy in the normal sense does not 
apply to constitutions.  
2.3 COLLAPSE INTO SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMACY 
Despite this conclusion, it remains possible to differentiate a lawful constitution from one that 
is not. We know that the constitution adopted in 1787 in Philadelphia is valid higher law for 
the United States while the Articles of Confederation are not.628 We know that the Constitu-
tion of the Federal Republic of Brazil is not a lawful constitution for Suriname and Guyana. 
Such judgments are possible because the legality of constitutions is determined by social facts. 
The same is true for ordinary law in a stable legal system, except that the relevant social facts 
are of a particular type: legal facts. A given law is a law if it is an actual component of a legal 
system, meaning that its origins followed the proper legal procedures and its contents do not 
violate higher legal norms, i.e. if it is legally legitimate. When it comes to constitutions, such 
reasoning is inapplicable, for constitutions are the final and highest source of legal facts and 
norms. The relevant social facts are therefore not strictly legal, but instead relate to specific 
attitudes and behavior of the relevant population and legal officials.  
                                                
627 Another possibility might be that constitutions receive their legal legitimacy by following the dictates of inter-
national law. However, at this point such an argument is unpersuasive because, as of yet, it is not widely accept-
ed that international law can play such a role (it would increase the role of international law extensively) but al-
so because there “is no firm evidence of rules applicable to the process of constitution making.” See Franck and 
Thiruvengadam, "Norms of International Law Relating to the Constitution-Making Process," 14. 
628 This is despite the fact that Article VII of the U.S. Constitution violated the Articles of Confederation by 
allowing for secession, removing amendment power from the Continental Congress and state legislatures, and 
specifying a new means for constitutional revision. Ackerman, We the People 2: 34-35. 
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We can identify the constitution of a given polity by looking for the document that is 
treated like higher law; i.e. the document that lies at the end of judicial reasoning, that deter-
mines and limits the interaction of governmental organs, that prescribes how laws are actually 
created, and that safeguards fundamental rights. The people and government of Suriname and 
Guyana do not follow the Brazilian constitution or treat it as authoritative, and it is therefore 
not the legal constitution for these countries. In contrast, the document ratified in Philadelph-
ia in 1789 is valid law in the United States because governmental organs, political officials, and 
the majority of the population in the U.S. treat it as such. As Fallon notes, the U.S. Constitu-
tion “is law not because it was lawfully ratified, as it may not have been, but because it is ac-
cepted as authoritative.”629  
This logic maps onto Hart’s discussion of the primary rule of recognition: the rule that 
identifies the ultimate source of legal validity in a legal system. As Hart writes, “to say that a 
given rule is valid is to recognize it as passing all the tests provided by the rule of recogni-
tion.”630 This rule of recognition consists in the practice of legal and political officials; i.e. a rule 
pointing to x as the source of legal validity consists in the fact that legal and political officials 
treat x as the ultimate source of legal validity.631 In a constitutional setting, the rule of recogni-
tion points to the constitution as the ultimate source of legal validity. Therefore, the legal legit-
                                                
629 Fallon, "Legitimacy and the Constitution," 1805. 




imacy of a constitution hinges on the practice of recognizing the constitution as the actual and 
proper constitution of the polity in question.632 
One question remains: in a constitutional setting who must apply the rule of recognition? 
According to Hart, rules of recognition apply to legal and political officials; it is their habits 
and actions that make x the ultimate source of legality. If Hart is correct and similar logic ap-
plies to constitutions, than ratification will have no effect on legal legitimacy, for nothing about 
the procedure is bound to significantly or predictably affect the behavior of future officials to-
wards the constitution. However, for newly constitutionalized polities, especially constitution-
al democracies, it seems as if something more is needed than a rule of recognition only applica-
ble to officials for a constitution to be legally legitimate. One can imagine Schauer’s constitu-
tion also including provisions appointing his friends and family to all governmental positions, 
all of whom are inclined to treat his constitution as the ultimate source of legality, yet this 
would not make his constitution the lawful one.  
For a new constitution to be legally legitimate, not only do legal and political officials need 
to recognize it as the proper law of the land, but also a significant portion of the population 
needs to do the same. The citizens under the newly created constitutional government must 
see the constitution as the rightful, appropriate, and authoritative constitution. In other 
                                                
632 Note that a constitution is the ultimate source of legal validity pointed to by a rule of recognition and not the 
rule of recognition itself. Constitutions are codified higher law that can be amended, repealed, and intentionally 
replaced by enactment, while rules of recognition are social practices that cannot change until the social practic-
es that they are change. This mistake is regularly made in the constitution-making literature. See for instance 
Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blout’s claim that “Because the constitution…provides the ultimate rule of recognition 
for lawmaking processes, it requires the greatest possible level of legitimation in democratic theory.” This claim 
is completely confused, for a social practice is not something that is or is not legitimate, in any sense of the con-
cept. Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?," 206; Raz, "On the 
Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,"  160-61.  
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words, for new constitutions, legal legitimacy depends on the practice and behavior of govern-
ment officials, which ratification will not effect, and the sociological legitimacy of the constitu-
tion.633  Therefore, when examining the effects of ratification on creating a legitimate constitu-
tion, only moral and sociological legitimacy are relevant.634 
3. CREATING LEGITIMACY – OUTCOME & PROCESS 
How might ratification help create a morally or sociologically legitimate constitution? Ratifica-
tion is a procedure, so we need a procedural explanation of moral legitimacy, i.e. an explana-
tion that links a specific outcome (a legitimate constitution) to a specific procedure (ratifica-
tion). There are two general ways in which a procedure can positively effect the actual or per-
ceived normative status of an outcome: it can substantively alter the nature of the outcome, 
such that it meets or comes closer to meeting some independent normative criteria; or, it can 
serve as the normative criterion itself and validate its own outcome. For ease of reference, I call 
the former a substantive effect and the latter a procedural effect.635  
                                                
633 See Fallon, "Legitimacy and the Constitution," 1804. 
634 In certain contexts, adhering to the directives of previous legal authorities might improve sociological legitima-
cy. For instance, in a state replacing a sociologically legitimate constitution with a new one for reasons unrelated 
to instability or loss of authority, following the procedures set out by the old constitution might enhance the le-
gitimacy of the new constitution. I discuss this below in the section covering procedural sociological legitimacy. 
635 Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson suggest a similar distinction when they write: “Participatory constitution mak-
ing can generate legitimacy beliefs through two different mechanisms. The first focuses on citizens’ ability to 
choose effect constitutional alternatives…the other mechanism focuses on the additional value of taking part in 
the constitution-making process itself.” Peter Esaiasson, Mikael Gilljam, and Mikael Persson, "Which decision-
making arangements generate the strongest legitimacy beliefs? Evidence from a randomised field experiment," 
European Journal of Political Research 51(2012): 787. 
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3.1 SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCESS LEGITIMACY 
Looking at Rawls’ discussion of perfect, imperfect, and pure procedural justice helps clarify the 
substantive and process effect distinction.636 Perfect and imperfect procedural justice share a 
common characteristic feature: “there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a 
criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which is to be followed.”637 For 
perfect procedural justice, it is possible to devise a procedure that is sure to lead to an outcome 
that meets this criterion, while for imperfect procedural justice this cannot be guaranteed. 
Rawls illustrates perfect procedural justice by describing the division of a cake, where the in-
dependent criterion of justice is an equal distribution. Under certain assumptions, assigning 
the division to one person and having her take the last piece after the others choose guarantees 
equal pieces, for the assigned person will divide the cake equally in order to maximize the size 
of her piece.  
Imperfect procedural justice departs from perfect because the procedures are fallible. An 
example is a criminal trial; the known independent criterion of justice is that a defendant is 
declared guilty only if she committed the crime she is charged with, but trial procedures can-
not be designed to guarantee just verdicts. Even the most well tailored trial procedures will 
sometimes convict the innocent or set the guilty free.638  
                                                
636 Rawls, A Theory Of Justice: 74-76. 
637 Ibid., 74-75. 
638 The distinction between perfect and imperfect justice can be challenged on the grounds the perfect procedural 
justice is simply imperfect procedural justice with a higher probability of obtaining the just outcome. See 
Martin Gustafsson, "On Rawls's Distinction between Perfect and Imperfect Procedural Justice," Philosophy of 
the Social Sciences 34(2004). 
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In contrast, “pure procedural justice obtains when there is no independent criterion for the 
right result: instead there is a correct or fair procedure such that the outcome is likewise cor-
rect or fair, whatever it is, provided that the procedure has been properly followed.”639 Here, 
the nature of the distribution that results from a fair procedure is not used to determine the 
justness of the outcome, for no demonstrative evaluative criterion exists apart from the proce-
dure itself. This is why Rawls emphasizes that a “distinctive feature of pure procedural justice 
is that the procedure for determining the just result must actually be carried out; for in these 
cases there is no independent criterion by reference to which a definite outcome can be known 
to be just.”640 Rawls illustrates pure procedural justice through a stylized gambling example. 
Assuming just background conditions and starting positions, fair and freely entered into bet-
ting procedures produce just outcomes. This has nothing to do with the resultant distribution 
of money, but rather with the fairness of the procedure and the intent of all participants to 
play.641 
Perfect and imperfect procedural justice are examples of substantive effects, for they in-
volve procedures altering the nature of an outcome so that it meets or is more likely to meet an 
independent evaluative criterion. Pure procedural justice involves a procedural effect, for fol-
                                                
639 Rawls, A Theory Of Justice: 75. A page earlier Rawls qualifies pure procedural justice by noting that “the out-
come is just whatever it happens to be, at least so long as it is within a certain range.” This is a critical qualifica-
tion, though Rawls does not pick it up again to my knowledge, for it is hard to imagine a conception of justice 
that is pure enough for any outcome to be ruled just because of the justice of its generation.  
640 Ibid. 
641 Of course, Rawls makes this distinction too strongly, or at the least his followers tend to treat it too strongly, 
for the background conditions and assumptions are the main force of justice rather than the procedure itself. By 
this I mean that the fair gambling rules produce an automatically just outcome because we assume: that the 
players understand them, enter into the game freely, are not drunk or insane, are not intimidating one another, 
have equal information, are fully in control of their actions, understand the repercussions of playing, etc. Thus, 
while there is no independent criterion of judging the final outcome of instances of pure procedural justice, we 
have suspicions as to what they might be because of our knowledge of these assumptions and conditions.  
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lowing the proper procedure makes the outcome just, and there is no clear criterion to deter-
mine the justness of the outcome other than the procedure itself. Applying a modified version 
of this distinction to constitutions and legitimacy, we can say the following. A constitution-
making procedure, alone or in combination with others, might involve procedural legitimation; 
i.e. a constitution might be legitimate simply because it resulted from a particular constitution-
making procedure or set of procedures. Here, the procedure can serve as a necessary or suffi-
cient condition. In other words, something might be legitimate because a certain procedure 
produced it, or might be illegitimate if a certain procedure did not. In both of these instances, 
the procedure directly affects the legitimacy of the constitution rather than the actual provi-
sions the document contains.642 
Alternatively, a constitution-making procedure, alone or in combination with others, can 
legitimate a constitution by influencing its contents and making it more likely to meet some 
known criterion of legitimacy; this is substantive legitimation. This criterion of legitimacy does 
not have to be exact or able to be spelled out thoroughly ahead of time. Unlike Rawls’ distinc-
tion, our concern here is that the procedure affects the contents of the constitution, and the 
contents of the constitution are what makes the document legitimate or illegitimate. 
                                                
642 Rawls discusses legitimacy in terms of procedural legitimation in his reply to Habermas in Political Liberalism. 
He explains that, “a legitimate procedure gives rise to legitimate laws and policies made in accordance with it,” 
and defines a legitimate procedure as “one that all may reasonably accept as free and equal when collective deci-
sions must be made and agreement is normally lacking.” In a sense, this creates an odd double procedural legit-
imation, insofar as procedural criteria is used to select a procedure which is to select laws or policies that are 
therefore legitimate. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, Expanded ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005). 427-28. Due to the confused nature of this account, I will not be discussing it further. 
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3.2 FOUR PATHWAYS TO CONSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY 
Combining the two concepts of legitimacy applicable to constitutions with the procedural and 
substantive distinction produces four pathways through which a constitution-making proce-
dure might legitimate a constitution, and therefore four different ways that ratification might 
contribute to legitimacy. First, ratification might play a role in procedural moral legitimation: a 
constitution is morally legitimate because it was ratified, or because it resulted from a constitu-
tion-making process that included ratification. Here, as with all procedural effects, the result-
ant constitution’s moral justification flows from the specific procedure rather than the details 
of its contents. Something about the procedure of ratification, by itself or in combination with 
other procedures, produces a constitution that is morally legitimate because of its genesis.  
Second, ratification might serve the purpose of procedural sociological legitimation: a consti-
tution is more likely to be considered morally legitimate by those it purports to govern because 
a portion of them or their delegates had the opportunity to ratify it. Advocates of participatory 
constitution-making implicitly make this sort of argument when they claim that “a high level 
of popular participation” is “necessary for a constitution to be regarded as legitimate and rele-
vant by the citizenry” and identify ratification amongst those procedures best suited to engage 
the people.643 Arguments concerning procedural sociological legitimation and participation are 
                                                




further bolstered by a growing literature on the increased cooperation effects of endogenously 
chosen institutions.644  
The third pathway is substantive moral legitimation: ratification affects the contents of a 
constitution such that it is more likely to fall within the boundaries of morality. I use the term 
boundaries because I assume that morality underdetermines the contents of a constitution.645 
By this I mean that according to any plausible conception of morality choosing specific consti-
tutional provisions requires decisions based on non-moral reasons. This follows from two ob-
servations. On the one hand, many moral values are incommensurable, meaning that moral 
reasons do not exist for choosing between them.646 For instance, moral principle A might give 
reason to maximize liberty while moral principle B supports a guaranteed minimum standard 
of living for all citizens. Framers designing a constitution might disagree over a specific provi-
sion or institution that favors one of these principles over the other, but they will be unable to 
give good moral arguments for preferring to live under a constitution that emphasizes A over 
B or vice versa.  
Moral arguments are unavailable to these framers because liberty and a minimum standard 
of living, for the sake of this argument, are incommensurable, i.e. valuable in a way that cannot 
                                                
644 For a review of this literature, as well as a representative experiment, see Matthias Sutter, Stefan Haigner, and 
Martin G. Kocher, "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma 
Situations," Review of Economic Studies 77(2010). 
645 Raz mentions that morality underdetermines the contents of a constitution in Raz, "On the Authority and 
Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,"  171-74, 93n20. 
646 For discussions of incommensurability see Raz, The Morality of Freedom: 321-66; James Griffin, 
"Incommensurability: What's the Problem?," in Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason, ed. 
Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997); David Wiggins, "Incommensurability: Four 
Proposals," in Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1997); Donald Regan, "Value, Comparability, and Choice," in Incommensurability, 
incomparability, and practical reason, ed. Ruth Chang (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).  
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be compared. Thus, the most that moral reasons relating to authority can do is to create 
boundaries within which constitutions are morally legitimate. In order to create a constitution 
specific enough to be functional, framers will have to choose between competing incommen-
surable values and principles. Such choices can and are motivated by good reasons, frequently 
related to context, but these reasons are not the sort of moral reasons that determine whether 
the constitution’s claim to authority is morally justified.647 
On the other hand, even settled moral values underdetermine institutional choice. For in-
stance, a democratic republican theory might include the following moral principle: a legiti-
mate constitution must provide formal mechanisms that allow the governed to equally influ-
ence political officials, so that they can help determine the contents of the laws and policies 
these officials enact. Even if this principle was widely accepted and had no competitors, any 
number of constitutional arrangements might reasonably meet it. For instance, a representa-
tive government limiting campaign contributions and making use of proportional representa-
tion would be as legitimate as one employing single-member constituencies with plurality vot-
ing, the right of recall, and publicly funded elections. This is just an example, and perhaps 
there are good causal and moral reasons for choosing one of these alternatives over the other. 
My point, however, is that even if we disregard the problem posed by incommensurable moral 
values, the conditions of moral legitimacy will never fully determine the specifics of a constitu-
                                                
647 Or moral reasons unrelated to the moral justification of authority. For instance, in the above example, the ex-
istence of a long-standing impoverished and mistreated minority population might give reason for preferring B 
over A, and while these will be moral reasons, they are not moral reasons related to the moral legitimacy and 
justified authority. Raz calls the latter ‘merit reasons.’ See Raz, "On the Authority and Interpretation of 
Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,"  174. 
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tion. Thus, it is appropriate to speak of the boundaries of a morally legitimate constitution 
rather than attempt to spell out its exact contents.  
Fourth and finally is substantive sociological legitimation: ratification affects the contents of a 
constitution such that it is more likely to appear morally legitimate to the citizens it purports 
to govern. The idea here is that certain attributes of a constitution are more conducive to mak-
ing it authoritative in the eyes of its citizenry, and that ratification makes such attributes more 
likely to appear within the text. Remember, however, that these attributes are not necessarily 
the same as those that make a constitution actually morally legitimate.  
Both forms of substantive legitimation might seem unlikely, for ratification is a process in 
which a drafted constitution is approved or rejected as a whole.648 Ratifiers receive a finished 
product, they can neither insert desired provisions or vote out those they find problematic, and 
thus their effects on the text appear rather limited. 649 Nonetheless, ratification can affect the 
contents of a constitution through one of two pathways: by preventing illegitimate constitu-
                                                
648 As mentioned, the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention attempted a more dynamic method of ratifica-
tion in which voters were given the opportunity to vote on each separate provision. This proved to be an un-
workable procedure, and resulted in votes being manipulated in order to produce the required consensus. Con-
dorcet discusses the inherent flaws in such a ratification process, some of which I will discuss below. Condorcet, 
"On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 273. 
649 I am excluding those rare instances in which ratifiers are asked to vote separately on certain provisions separat-
ed from the main text. There seem to be three reasons to do this. First, separating a controversial issue might 
prevent an entire constitution from being rejected over a single provision that met with disapproval, and prevent 
opponents to the constitution from using such an issue to sway ratifiers against the constitution. Second, plac-
ing a controversial issue to the side might isolate public debate around the segmented provision, therefore 
shielding the constitution as a whole from scrutiny and negative opinion. Third, framers might simply let ratifi-
ers decide on an issue for which there is no conclusive agreement. To my knowledge this practice is isolated to 
constitution-making in the U.S. States. For instance, the 1969-1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention seg-
mented two provisions having to do with the method of election for members of the House of Representatives 
and judicial selection, giving voters two alternative to choose from for each. Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: 
Failed U.S. State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s," 20; Janet Cornelius, Constitution 
Making in Illinois, 1818-1970, Rev. ed. (Urbana: Published for the Institute of Government and Public Affairs, 
1972), Book. 154-55. 
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tions created by framers from coming into effect; or by preventing illegitimate constitutions 
from being written by framers in the first place. Put differently, ratification can serve as a filter 
for illegitimate constitutions or affect the behavior of the framers. Taken together, the various 
ways in which ratification can legitimate a constitution are shown in the following table: 
  
 Sociological Legitimacy Moral Legitimacy 
Procedural 






(1) Substantive Soc. Legitimation: Filter 
(2) Substantive Soc. Legitimation: Framers 
 
 
(1) Substantive Moral Legitimation: Filter 
(2) Substantive Moral Legitimation: Framers 
 
 
In the sections that follow I consider these pathways. I choose one or two arguments for each 
and examine their persuasiveness for justifying ratification. I do not purport to be comprehen-
sive—there are many different arguments one could make explaining how ratification proce-
durally or substantively legitimates a constitution. Instead, I focus on arguments that appear in 
the relevant literature or seem particularly plausible. 
4. PROCEDURAL LEGITIMATION 
As mentioned, procedural legitimation occurs when a constitution is legitimate because of how 
it was made, rather than its contents. The fact that ratifiers approved a constitution either 
contributes to the moral reasons in favor of its claim to authority (moral legitimacy) or appears 
to do so from the perspective of those it now governs (sociological legitimacy). 
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4.1. PROCEDURAL MORAL LEGITIMATION 
The logic of a procedural moral legitimation argument should be familiar, for the past three 
chapters discussed a procedural legitimation argument. Put in the language of moral legitima-
cy, a theory of constituent power holds that a constitution’s claim to authority is only morally 
justified, meaning that sufficient moral reasons exist for its right to structure the state (and 
citizens have a duty to obey accordingly), if it is the product of the constituent power. Thus, 
according to a CPJ, the people must exercise their constituent power and create the constitu-
tion for it to be morally legitimate, and ratification is justified because it makes this possible. 
For the reasons covered in the previous chapters, this particular procedural justification fails to 
persuade.  
Another argument that links ratification with procedural moral legitimation comes from 
what I call pure consent theory, a particular offshoot of the social contract or consensual tradi-
tion in the history of political thought. This argument links legitimacy with direct acceptance 
of the constitution but differs from constituent power arguments in that the relevant moral 
unit of concern is the individual rather than the collective.650 In other words, while constituent 
power arguments emphasize the importance of the people taken as a whole accepting the con-
stitution and making it their own, pure consent theory focuses on the direct acceptance of the 
constitution by each person under its jurisdiction. 
                                                
650 This distinction between constituent power theory and pure consent theory can be understood by envisioning 
two different conceptions of the social contract. As noted in chapter 4, constituent power theory adheres to the 
Lockean two-step model. The people first transfer political power to civil society, and then civil society exercises 
constituent power to create its government. For pure consent theory, there is only one step. People individually 
transfer their political power, and take on obligations, by directly consenting to the state.  
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 Starting from the premises that individual autonomy, understood as control over the 
course of one’s life, is of the utmost importance, and that moral authority is exclusively con-
cerned with the right to impose new duties by binding directives and to have these directives 
obeyed, it argues that the only way to obtain such authority over an individual is through their 
direct consent. Here, consent is understood as a performative action through which a subject 
undertakes an obligation and therefore agrees to restrict her future choice. Such consent 
changes the moral relationship between an individual and the other party, and therefore must 
be informed, non-coerced, and free from duress.651 Ratification, a pure consent theorist might 
argue, is a necessary component of the constitution-making process because it allows individu-
als to directly consent to their governing document and undertake obligations. This gives the 
constitution, and the state that results, a morally justified right to rule over all those consent-
ing.  
This argument can be challenged in two ways. On the one hand, we might rehearse the 
numerous objections to the premises of consent theory, especially its constitutional applica-
tion. Raz, for example, claims that consent only bars the consentor from raising complaints 
against an authority, but can never justify an unjustified authority. The fact that a population 
                                                
651 Contemporary authors that place consent within their accounts of political authority include Plamenantz, 
Murphy, Green, Rawls, and Simmons. For the most part, these theories can be divided into two types. The first 
has little to do with the importance of consent and more with what is best for people or what is fair. This cate-
gory includes theories of hypothetical consent, which utilizes consent as a means to generate intuitions about 
what a legitimate government must look like. The second type emphasizes the act of consent, conceptualizing it 
as the sole criterion of moral legitimacy, and thus distinguishes between a legitimate authority and a morally de-
sirable one. Only this second type of consent theory, explained best by Simmons and Green, involves pure pro-
cedural legitimation, and thus it is my sole focus. Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: Essays on Rights and 
Obligations; Raz, The Morality of Freedom; Rawls, A Theory Of Justice; Leslie Green, The Authority of the State  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Plamenatz, Consent, Freedom, and Political Obligation, 2nd ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968); Mark Murphy, "Surrender of Judgment and the Consent Theory of 
Political Obligation," in The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings, ed. William Edmundson 
(Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999).  
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consents to a genocidal autocracy will never make this authority morally legitimate. Consent 
theorists respond to such objections by arguing that the only consent that matters is rational 
or reasonable consent, and consenting to such a regime fails either test. However, in these in-
stances, Raz explains, “it seems reasonable to suppose that…the only reasons which justify 
consent to authority also justify the authority without consent.”  
Michelman makes a different argument with similar effects. He claims that constitutions, 
at least good ones, are necessarily vague, open to interpretation, and flexible when it comes to 
the very moral concerns that would factor into an account of legitimacy based on informed 
consent. The kinds of things people would need to know in order to consent and take on obli-
gations to a constitution are the very things that will be decided once the constitution goes into 
effect. Thus, a consent-based account of moral legitimacy is impossible. Alternatively, Hardin 
persuasively argues that adopting a constitution does not entail future commitments and obli-
gations, for as a coordination device it simply raises the costs of trying to do things some other 
way. The logic of consent arguments, based on an exchange of obligations, duties, and power, 
is therefore inapplicable.652 
On the other hand, we can accept consent theory and critique it on its own grounds. This 
will be my main focus. Now, a well-known objection to most consent theories is that they are 
limited to the first generation of citizens, for few if anyone consents to the government they 
are born into. This applies to the attempt to justify ratification through pure consent theory, 
for it suggests that the constitution would be morally illegitimate for those born after ratifica-
                                                
652 Raz, "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some Preliminaries,"  163-64; Hardin, 
Liberalism, Constitutionalism, and Democracy: 113; Michelman, "Ida's Way: Constructing the Respect-worthy 
Governmental System," 362-63; Frank I. Michelman, "Is the Constitution a Contract for Legitimacy?," Review 
of Constitutional Studies 8, no. 2 (2003): 120-21. 
  
308 
tion.653 Moreover, the constitution could not become morally legitimate through some other 
way, for instance by producing desired public goods, just distributions, or needed coordination 
effects, for the very reasons that make consent necessary in the beginning preclude alternative 
sources of moral legitimacy from being relevant later.654 For pure consent theorists, moral le-
gitimacy is simply the “logical correlate of the (defeasible) individual obligation to comply with 
the lawfully imposed duties that flow from the legitimate institution’s processes.”655 Since such 
obligation requires individual consent, for there is no other way for an authority to obtain the 
right to issue directives that serve as preemptive reasons for an individual, the quality of a con-
stitution and its beneficial effects, regardless of their magnitude, can never morally legitimate a 
constitution when the opportunity for consent has passed.656 
                                                
653 Condorcet seems to endorse both a conception of pure procedural legitimacy and this objection. This is why 
he writes: “we simply fix the duration of the new constitution at the term beyond which it would cease to be le-
gitimate; that is, at 18 or 20 years.” Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 270. 
654 In other words, other explanations of how a design procedural morally legitimates its outcome might only 
apply to the first generation, but allow different sources of moral legitimacy to come into play later on. Pure 
consent theory cannot allow this, for its arguments are motivated by the claim that personal consent is the only 
way a someone can gain justified control over an aspect of a person’s life.  
655 Simmons makes this point by distinguishing between a justified state and a legitimate one. Whether or not a 
state is justified depends on the general qualities of a state. Is it just? Does it promote human happiness? Does it 
uniquely solve a pressing social problem? A state that is morally justified in this way might be worth having and 
supporting, for moral agents might have good reasons to pursue ends such as justice, happiness, and coordina-
tion. Nonetheless, “a particular state’s being justified in this way cannot ground any special moral relationship 
between it and you,” for no matter how wonderful a state may be and how many moral reasons exist for sup-
porting it, the quality of a state can never give it “any special right to impose on you additional duties.” Simmons 
goes on to explain how Kant and many neo-Kantians, such as Rawls and Nagel, confuse justification and legit-
imacy and therefore miss the importance of actual given consent. See Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy: 
Essays on Rights and Obligations: 122-57. 
656 Note that attempts to explain the moral legitimacy of a non-consensual political institution through appeals to 
its positive attributes leave the realm of procedural legitimation. Procedural legitimation, as explained above, is 
premised on the absence of independent criteria that can be of use when evaluating an institution. Many con-
sent-based accounts of political legitimacy, in their attempts to ward of attacks from philosophical anarchists, 
import these external criteria and therefore eliminate the need for emphasizing consent at all. As Raz notes,  “it 
seems reasonable to suppose that, regarding such matters, the only reason which justify consent to authority al-
so justify the authority without consent.” Raz, "On the Authority and Interpretation of Constitutions: Some 
Preliminaries,"  164. 
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 One response to this line of argument might be the following: it is true that constitutions 
are morally illegitimate for future generations not given a chance to consent to them, and this 
is why we need to create mechanisms through which people can consent to a constitution after 
its initial ratification. Both Condorcet and Jefferson give support to his argument. Condorcet 
posed a solution to the lapsing authority of old constitution, recommending that “we simply 
fix the duration of the new constitution at the term beyond which it would cease to be legiti-
mate; that is, at 18 or 20 years,” with these numbers representing “the time it takes for half of 
the citizens alive when the law was passed to be replaced by new ones” depending on whether 
the age of majority was fixed at 25 or 21 respectively.657 Jefferson, likely inspired by Condorcet, 
wrote that we should “provide in our constitution for its revision at state periods,” for each 
generation has “a right to choose for itself the form of government it believes most promotive 
of its own happiness.”658 Specifically, he proposes that citizens be given the opportunity every 
nineteen to twenty years to vote on whether or not to create a new convention. Thus, this ar-
gument goes, we should constitutionally mandate that voting citizens be regularly consulted as 
                                                
657 Admittedly, Condorcet departs from a strictly individualistic conception of consent and reciprocal obligation 
and instead endorses societal level consent of a particular type. He writes: “any law accepted by the plurality of 
inhabitants of a nation can be taken as having unanimous support: given the need either to accept or to reject 
the law and to follow the plurality opinion, anyone who rejects a proposed law will already have decided to 
abide by it if it is supported by the plurality.” Here Condorcet combines an argument similar to a two-contract 
interpretation of Locke, according to which a majority decision indicates unanimous consent because of a prior 
unanimous agreement to abide by whatever the majority decides, with his own jury theorem. The prior agree-
ment to abide by what the majority decides follows rationally from the fact that, given a large body of voters 
with a probability of greater than half of voting correctly, the decision reached by the majority will almost cer-
tainly be the correct one. I thank Iain McLean for providing clarification on this matter. Condorcet, "On the 
Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 272, 76. 
658 “Letter to Samuel Kercheval, July 12, 1816” in Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson: Writings, ed. Merill D. 
Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984). 1401-02. “Letter to Samuel Kercheval} For further infor-
mation about Jefferson’s interaction with Condorcet, see Iain McLean and Arnold B. Urken, "Did Jefferson or 
Madison understand Condorcet's theory of social choice?," Public Choice 73(1992). 
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to whether or not they accept their constitution or wish for something different. Through this 
mechanism, constitutions would remain morally legitimate.659  
Such a mechanism is not only possible, but exists in the constitutions of fourteen U.S. 
States. These constitutions contain provisions mandating the periodic submission of a refer-
endum to the electorate concerning whether or not a constitutional convention should be 
called.660 For instance, the secretary of state in Rhode Island must submit the question “Shall 
there be a convention to amend or revise the constitution?” to the qualified electorate every ten 
years from the most recent convention.661 Not implausibly, this question can be construed as a 
way in which citizens have the opportunity to consent to their constitution. Citizens have the 
choice to accept the constitution and consent to it by voting against a new constitutional con-
vention, or to withhold their consent by voting the opposite.  
                                                
659 Common attempts by consent theorists to show that citizens do in fact consent to their governments would 
also apply to constitutions. These chiefly include arguments asserting that individuals tacitly consent through 
residence, political participation, paying taxes, etc. I do not discuss these arguments here, for I believe that earli-
er critics have conclusively shown them to be mistaken. Hume, for instance, provides perhaps the earliest and 
most devastating attack on tacit consent and other non-explicit acts of consent when he notes, “we may as well 
assert, that a man, remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he was carried 
aboard while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the moment he leaves her.” For an example of 
such attempts to show consent when it appears to be absent see: Henry Beran, The Consent Theory of Political 
Obligation  (London: Croom Helm, 1987); Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and 
Citizenship  (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970). 111-14; Locke, Two Treatises of Government: 
ch. 8, §119-22, p.347-49. For criticisms see George Klosko, Political Obligation  (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 122-40; Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations: 75-100; David Hume, Essays: Moral, 
Political, and Literary, ed. Eugene F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1985). 475. 
660 These states are: Alaska; Connecticut; Hawaii; Illinois; Iowa; Maryland; Massachusetts; Missouri; Montana; 
New Hampshire; New York; Ohio; Oklahoma; and Rhode Island. See The Book of the States: 2011,   
(Lexington: The Council of State Governments, 2011). 17. For a discussion about the genesis of these auto-
matic convention referenda, see John J. Dinan, "'The Earth Belongs Always to the Living Generation': The 
Development of State Constitutional Amendment and Revision Procedures," Review of Politics 62, no. 4 
(2000). 
661 R.I. Const. art. XIV, § 2 
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 There are reasons for not implementing automated constitutional referenda. Madison 
mentions some of them in his 1788 letter to Turberville, where he warns of the dangers of call-
ing another constitutional convention: “it would…give greater agitation to the public mind; an 
election into it would be courted by the most violent partizans on both sides; …[it] would be 
the very focus of that flame which had already heated men of all parties.”662 In addition, rou-
tinized convention referenda are susceptible to manipulation by sitting legislatures and other 
power holders adverse to the possibility of a decrease in their power. These incumbents can 
use the convention question to show that institutional change is a regular possibility, while 
simultaneously taking steps, such as timing the vote to ensure minimal participation and leav-
ing the referenda unsponsored and unadvertised, to ensure that a convention never occurs.663  
Regardless, even if one overlooks the possible disadvantages of such devices, they still do not 
make a conception of moral legitimacy that hinges on individual consent anymore persuasive 
in justifying ratification. This is because both constitutional convention and ratification refer-
enda use a majority or supermajority voting threshold.664 It is therefore almost guaranteed that 
constitutions will go into effect, and later be approved by negative votes on the convention 
question, despite the objections of many voters. For these voters, the constitution would be 
                                                
662 “Copy in Substance of a Letter to G. L. Turberville, Esq., Nov, 2, 1788” in Madison, The Writings of James 
Madison: 1787-1790, 4: 299. 
663 See Gerald Benjamin, "The Mandatory Constitutional Convention Question Referendum: The New York 
Experience in National Context," Albany Law Review 65(2002). 
664 Despite suggestions by Rousseau, Tullock and Buchanan, and others, to my knowledge no constitution has 
come into force under a voting rule requiring unanimity. It is likely that implementing a unanimity rule would 
make constitutional adoption impossible. Rousseau, "Of the Social Contract," book 1, ch. 5, §3. P.49; James M. 
Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, vol. 3, 
The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999). ch. 7. 
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morally illegitimate.665 The same is true for those who voted in favor of a constitution, but did 
so after being coerced or manipulated. It also holds for individuals who did not vote, either 
because they forgot, did not want to, could not get to the polls, or were not allowed.  
In addition, pure consent theory demands that individuals intend to consent when they 
do, for obligations do not adhere if a person accidently agrees to undertake them, or under-
takes them without knowing their substance.666 If I am stretching at a meeting when someone 
asks for volunteers to raise their hands, I am not obliged to volunteer for it was not my intent. 
Similarly, if I promise to see a movie with a friend on Saturday, and later find out that the 
movie is only playing in a theater eight hours away, I am not obliged to attend the movie be-
cause I did not understand what was involve and did not intend to commit to such a long 
journey. 667 Applied to ratification, such a standard means that voters who do not and cannot 
understand the implications of a proposed constitution, can also not intentionally consent to 
its terms and undertake the appropriate obligations. As shown in the last chapter, we have rea-
sons to expect that many if not most voters will be uninformed during ratification. The same 
reasons also lead us to expect that citizens will be ignorant when it comes to understanding the 
implications of a vote for or against a constitutional convention. 
                                                
665 For Condorcet, they would not be illegitimate, for in accordance with his jury theorem the majority would 
arrive at the correct answer, and the minority would or should consent to the majority outcome because they 
also desire a right outcome. Unfortunately, this line of argument is no longer persuasive, particularly in consti-
tutional settings, for the assumption of greater than half voting competence, as well as the existence of a right 
outcome, are highly questionable. 
666 For further discussions about what it takes to consent, see Raz, The Morality of Freedom: 80-85; Simmons, 
Moral Principles and Political Obligations: 75-83. 
667 I assume in this example that my ignorance is blameless and therefore excusable. Things might be different if 
my friend lives 8 hours away, far from any form of public transportation, and cannot drive. In this instance I 
should have known that to commit to a movie with him likely meant driving to where he lives. 
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In attempting to justify ratification through its role in consent-based procedural legitima-
tion, one comes to the unwanted conclusion that constitutions are morally illegitimate for 
non-voters, the uninformed, the disenfranchised, the intimidated, and the coerced. Mecha-
nisms designed to secure consent in future generations are susceptible to the same problems. 
This means that for large segments of the populations, possibly even a majority, there might be 
no good moral reasons for the constitutions claim to authority, and therefore no correspond-
ing independent reasons to respect and uphold its provisions. For some, namely philosophical 
anarchists whose project involves showing that no existing or possible government could ever 
by morally legitimate, this conclusion is welcome. However, if one’s aim it to justify ratification 
by its ability to morally legitimate a constitution, a conception of moral legitimacy that sug-
gests that any existing constitution is illegitimate for a substantial portion of its citizenry is 
unpersuasive. Pure consent arguments therefore do not justify ratification on the basis of its 
ability to procedurally legitimate a constitution.  
4.2 PROCEDURAL SOCIOLOGICAL LEGITIMATION 
Ratification involves procedural sociological legitimation when people consider a constitution 
morally legitimate simply because it was approved in a ratification procedure.668 Advocates of 
participatory constitution-making attribute such an effect to ratification when they claim that 
procedures can legitimate a constitution by increasing participation, “that public involvement 
in the constitution making process is essential for constitutional legitimacy,” and that ratifica-
tion, as “the modal form of participation in constitutional design,” is justified on these 
                                                




grounds.669 Again, such arguments emphasize the effects that procedures have on belief rather 
than on the constitution itself. These types of arguments are attractive; it is easy to believe that 
a positively valenced political concept such as participation leads to legitimacy, and in operat-
ing democracies this may frequently be the case.670 Nonetheless, we need an explanation for 
this purported effect, something that many advocates of participatory constitution-making 
seem to forget. How might ratification contribute to content-independent sociological legiti-
macy? 
4.2.1 Present Belief 
The simplest explanation is that people believe ratification is necessary for legitimacy, such 
that its occurrence helps legitimize a constitution and its absence does the opposite. This relies 
upon a preexisting social norm or belief being present in the people, one that links the moral 
authority of a new constitution to whether or not it was ratified. We can imagine specific con-
texts in which such a social norm or belief might develop, most of which reflect path depend-
ency. One would likely be present in a polity with a long-standing tradition of amending con-
stitutions or approving new constitutions via referenda.671 For example, if the Swiss govern-
                                                
669 Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?," 206; Katy Le Roy, "Public 
Participation in Constitution-making: The Pacific Islands," (Interpeace, 2011), 45. Preuss makes similar claims 
when he asserts: “The main reason why the importation, much less the imposition, of constitution in the course 
of coerced regime change is likely to fail is the fact that the authority of constitutions rests largely upon the le-
gitimacy of the processes through which they are generated; substance, although of course important, plays a 
secondary role.” Ulrich K. Preuss, "Perspectives on Post-Conflict Constitutionalism: Reflections on Regime 
Change Through External Constitutionalization," New York Law School Law Review 51(2006): 494. 
670 For good overviews of the arguments for and against participation in constitution-making see Devra C. 
Moehler, "Public Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda," The Journal of Modern African 
Studies 44, no. 2 (2006): 277-80; Elkins, Ginsburg, and Blount, "The Citizen As Founder: Public Participation 
in Constitutional Approval." 
671 Similarly, Bowler and Donovan found that those who expected democracies to provide avenues of participa-
tion other than elections were more likely to support the use of ordinary referendums. Shaun Bowler, Todd 
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ment implemented its Federal Constitution of 1999 without submitting it to referendum, the 
people would likely have rejected its moral authority. The same is true if a U.S. state attempt-
ed to implement a new constitution without submitting it to the electorate.672 In both con-
texts, the people associate and expect constitutional change to conclude with a referendum, 
and departing from this would arouse suspicion and arm opponents of the constitution with 
an easy way to cast it in a negative light.673  
A norm or belief linking legitimacy to ratification might also exist in a polity governed by a 
constitution that remains sociologically legitimate and includes a provision requiring ratifica-
tion. Such instances are rare however, because constitution-making usually occurs upon the 
deterioration of present day authorities.674 Nonetheless, state constitution-making in the U.S. 
again provides an example. Today, twenty-seven state constitutions include such provisions. 
                                                                                                                                            
Donovan, and Jeffrey A. Karp, "Enraged or Engaged? Preferences for Direct Citizen Participation in Affluent 
Democracies," (2007). 
672 Since 1780, U.S. states have adopted 146 different constitutions. 97 of these were popularly ratified and many 
more were submitted to referenda and rejected. All but three constitutions promulgated without ratification 
preceded the civil war. Only three 20th century constitutions were not submitted to the voters for approval—
the 1913 and 1921 Lousiana constitutions and the Virginia Constitution of 1902. The Virginia convention 
planned to submit their draft to the people—The General Assembly had passed a law to this effect—but de-
cided against it because the constitution was written to disenfranchise black voters, and they expected black 
voters and sympathetic whites to vote against it as a result. Subsequent constitutions for both Louisiana and 
Virginia include provisions requiring referenda for all new constitutions. Today, twenty-seven state constitu-
tions include provisions requiring popular ratification for all new constitutions proposed by constitutional con-
ventions. In general then, there is a strong expectation for constitutions to be approved by the electorate before 
going into effect. See LA Const. art. XVIII § 2; VA Const. art. XII § 2; Sturm, Trends in state constitution-
making, 1966-1972 [by] Albert L. Sturm: 11; The Book of the States: 2011: 16; Sturm, "The Development of 
American State Constitutions," 1; G. Alan Tarr, Understanding State Constitutions  (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1998). 24. 
673 In other words, this argument also works if conditions are such that people can be convinced that a constitu-
tion not ratified is illegitimate. For instance, most U.S. residents likely have no idea that state constitutions are 
nearly always ratified. However, if a state constitution-making process decided to forego ratification, opponents 
of the process could easily weaken the legitimacy of the constitution that emerged by pointing out that its fram-
ers departed from tradition or law by failing to make use of a cherished direct democracy device. 
674 Elster, "Forces and mechanisms in the Constitution-making process," 370. 
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For instance, section 3(c) of article XII of the Missouri Constitution reads: “Any proposed 
constitution or constitutional amendment adopted by the convention shall be submitted to a 
vote of the electors of the state at such time.” U.S. states create new constitutions in times of 
stability—constitution-making occurs in order to solve institutional inefficiencies or reflect 
recent demographical changes rather than to create a political authority where one is absent—
and therefore old constitutions maintain their legitimacy until they are replaced. Thus violat-
ing constitutionally specified procedures such as ratification would negatively impact the per-
ceived legitimacy of the new constitution. 
Similarly, we should also expect such a norm or belief in polities where a recent constitu-
tion-making attempt failed due to rejection during ratification, even if such a norm was absent 
pre-rejection. Albanian constitution-making in the 1990s provides an example of just such a 
context. In 1994, President Berisha submitted a draft constitution to the people for ratifica-
tion in a referendum. There was no precedent for this action, no one else called for a referen-
dum, and the recognized transitional constitution at the time required supermajority approval 
in Parliament and no popular approval. Berisha, whose party lacked the votes to push through 
their desired draft, made recourse to a referendum in the hopes of implementing the constitu-
tion in the face of opposition. The plan backfired when 59 percent of those voting in a No-
vember referendum rejected the constitution.675 When a new government took office in 1997, 
                                                
675 Opposition parties opposed the draft constitution because, among other reasons, it enlarged the powers of the 
president and reduced those of the judiciary. Berisha originally proposed that the draft be submitted to a sepa-
rate constituent assembly for approval, but after all parties other than the DP condemned this plan, he decided 
to use the referendum. This entailed pushing through a law in parliament amending the transitional constitu-
tion to allow the President to propose referendums without parliamentary approval. In the weeks leading up to 
the November referenda, the opposition parties banded together to highlight Berisha’s constitutional violation 
and to encourage voters to vote against Berisha by rejecting the constitution. Turnout for the vote was about 
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constitution-making began anew. In such circumstances it is hard to imagine a new constitu-
tion coming into effect without popular approval. Any attempt to do so would have easily fit 
into a narrative of elite control and popular manipulation. Thus, it is not surprising that the 
new government made use of referendum ratification.676 In November of 1998, fifty percent of 
all eligible voters went to the polls; ninety percent of them approved the constitution.677  
4.2.2 Self-choice & Procedural Justice 
These specific contextual and path dependent explanations of procedural sociological legitima-
cy are insufficient for our purposes. While in certain instances implementing ratification might 
lead to sociological legitimacy because of predictable social norms or beliefs based on past his-
tory and institutional experience, for most constitution-making events, in both the present and 
future, conditions will be different or such a judgment will be impossible to make. What we 
need, then, is a more general reason to believe that ratification leads to sociological legitimacy 
for content-independent reasons.  
I will consider two related possibilities: First, perhaps individuals are just more likely to 
consider self-chosen systems of rules legitimate, and ratification is a procedure that enables 
individuals to choose or feel that they have chosen their own system of rule. This explanation, 
“focuses on the additional value of taking part in the constitution-making process itself; it 
                                                                                                                                            
80%. "Constitution Watch: Country-by-country updates on constitutional politices in Eastern Europe," East 
European Constitutional Review 4, no. 1 (1995): 2-4. 
676 An OSCE report notes: “since the failed 1994 referendum, all parties agreed that new constitutions need to be 
approved by referendum.” 
677 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, "The Republic of Albania: Referendum on the 
Constitution, 22 November 1998," (1999), 5; "Constitution Watch: Country-by-country updates on 
constitutional politices in Eastern Europe and the ex-USSR," East European Constitutional Review 7, no. 4 
(1998): 2, 3. 
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works to the extent that arrangements generate stronger legitimacy beliefs when chosen en-
dogenously than when exogenously imposed.”678 Ndulo makes this type of argument when he 
touts ratification because of its ability to prevent a constitution from being “perceived as being 
imposed.”679 Ghai and Galli similarly explain that: “If people have participated, they are more 
likely to have a commitment to it, even if they have not fully understood the process or the 
constitution, or indeed even if their participation was largely ceremonial.”680  
Stronger legitimacy beliefs from participation might arise for a variety of reasons: it is 
harder for people to complain about outcomes they create; participation leads to greater famil-
iarity with outcomes and familiarity is conducive to legitimacy; participation inculcates a sense 
of duty towards what results; people tend to exaggerate the positive and downplay the nega-
tives in outcomes for which they feel responsible; or participation increases the opportunity 
for generating consensus beliefs.681 There is an array of empirical findings, particularly in the 
experimental literature, which support these psychological conjectures. For instance, as men-
tioned above, Oppenheimer and Frohlich found that subjects who choose their own distribu-
tional principles were “more confident in their choices and more satisfied” than those who had 
an identical principle imposed on them. Sutter et al. discovered a significant positive effect of 
endogenous institutional choice on the level of cooperation in comparison to the same exoge-
                                                
678 Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson, "Which decision-making arangements generate the strongest legitimacy 
beliefs? Evidence from a randomised field experiment," 787. 
679 Ndulo, "Zimbabwe's Unfulfilled Struggle for a Legitimate Constitutional Order," 193. 
680 Ghai and Galli, "Constitution Building Processes and Democratization," 14. 
681See Fearon, "Deliberation as Discussion."; Carol Pateman, Participation and Democratic Theory  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970); Barber, Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for  New Age; Philipp Dann 
et al., "Lessons Learned from Constitution-Making: Processes with Broad Based Public Participation," 
(Briefing Paper No. 20: Democracy Reporting International, 2011), 4.  
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nously implemented institutions in groups participating in public goods games. Similarly, 
Esaiasson et al. observed that voting and deliberation led to higher levels of legitimacy beliefs 
in school children; Grossman found that Ugandan coffee farmers were more likely to contrib-
ute to public good when their leaders were elected; and Olken demonstrated that Indonesian 
villagers were far more satisfied, willing to contribute, and perceived greater benefits from de-
velopments projects chosen through plebiscites rather than local assemblies.682 
Second, perhaps individuals are more likely to consider a procedure just if they participate 
in it, and more likely to consider an outcome legitimate if its stems from a just procedure. Rati-
fication should be implemented because it indirectly promotes the legitimacy of a constitution 
by making the constitution-making process appear just. Tyler’s oft-cited process-based model 
of regulation supports this argument; it claims that legal and political compliance are heavily 
influenced by people’s subjective judgments about the justice of the procedures through which 
authority is exercised.683 Specifically, Tyler claims that a powerful reason for why people obey 
the law is because they believe authorities deserve obedience (sociological legitimacy), and that 
                                                
682 Frohlich and Oppenheimer, Choosing Justice: An Experimental Approach to Ethical Theory: 121; Benjamin A. 
Olken, "Direct Democracy and Local Public Goods: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," American 
Political Science Review 104, no. 2 (2010); Persson, Esaiasson, and Gilljam, "The effects of direct voting and 
deliberation on legitimacy beliefs: an experimental study of small group decision-making." Sutter, Haigner, and 
Kocher, "Choosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations." 
Guy Grossman and Delia Baldassarri, "The Impact of Elections on Cooperation: Evidence from a Lab-in-the-
Field Experiment in Uganda," American Journal of Political Science 56, no. 4 (2012). 
683 Tyler, Why People Obey the Law; Tom R. Tyler and Yuen J. Huo, Trust in the Law: Encouraging Public 
Cooperation with the Police and Courts  (New York: Russell-Sage Foundation, 2002); Tom. R Tyler, 
"Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law," Crime and Justice 30(2003); ibid.; Tom R. 
Tyler, Patrick E. Callahan, and Jeffrey Frost, "Armed, and Dangerous(?): Motivating Group Adherence 
Among Agents of Social Control," Law & Society Review 41(2007). Tyler is a psychologist and a criminologist, 
and initially his work concentrated on compliance with the police and courts. However, his work has been ex-
panded and tested in a variety of contexts including prisons and corporations. 
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people are far more likely to develop such legitimacy beliefs due to procedural justice evalua-
tions rather than perceived outcome fairness or outcome favorableness.684  
Participation, Tyler argues, increases the chances that a procedure or process appears just 
by affecting the three main antecedents of procedural justice evaluations. The first, ‘quality of 
decision-making,’ relates to the perceived fairness of the procedures used to reach the decision. 
This includes evaluations related to the perceived neutrality of the decision-maker, opportuni-
ty to have one’s say, the competence of the final decision-maker, and overall consistency in de-
cision-making over similar cases. The second, ‘quality of treatment,’ concerns whether or not 
individuals are treated with dignity and respect throughout the decision-making process, and 
the third is focused on the degree to which an individual understand the actions of a decision-
maker and their reasons for taking them.685 Participating in a procedure positively effects all 
three antecedent evaluations and thus leads to perceived procedural justice. Through partici-
pation people express themselves and come to believe they counter existing bias, feel included 
and taken seriously as a person, and gain experience-based knowledge on the outcome and the 
factors that led to it.686 
                                                
684 Tom R. Tyler, Jonathan D. Casper, and Bonnie Fisher, "Maintaining Allegiance towards Political 
Authorities," American Journal of Political Science 33(1989). For similar findings see James L. Gibson, Gregory 
A. Caldeira, and Lester Kenyatta Spence, "Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose? Testing 
Legitimacy Theory with a Survey Based Experiment?," Political Research Quarterly 58(2005); Margaret Levi, 
Audrey Sacks, and Tom R. Tyler, "Conceptualizing Legitimacy, Measuring Legitimating Beliefs," American 
Behavioral Scientist 53, no. 3 (2009). 
685 Tyler, "Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law," 298-300; Bottoms and Tankebe, 
"Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice," 144-46.  
686 For an overview of why people are so concerned with the perceived fairness of decision-making settings and 
processes see John R. Hibbing and John R Alford, "Accepting Authoritative Decisions: Humans as Wary 
Cooperators," American Journal of Political Science 48, no. 1 (2004). 
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Appealing to these explanations to justify the implementation of ratification procedures is 
unpersuasive for two main reasons. On the one hand, more is needed to explain why the ar-
guments and findings concerning participation and legitimacy in normal political processes or 
workplaces also apply to the realm of constitution-making. Even if people are more likely to 
believe that a law or policy or project choice is legitimate if they help create it, the same may 
not be true when it comes to the creation of the rules that determines how such laws or poli-
cies or project choices are to be made and what they may or may not contain. Creating a con-
stitution is different than choosing a distributive policy, deciding upon a range of development 
projects, taking part in judicial proceedings, electing a legislative representatives, or completing 
a corporate project, in ways that seem likely to matter. For instance, the outcome of constitu-
tion-making has less of an observable or immediate impact on an individual, decisions taken 
regarding the look and feel of a new constitution take place outside the bounds of an operating 
system of norms and rules, and the uniqueness of the constitution-making event might make 
normative evaluations, such as those relating to procedural justice, difficult or at least less than 
automatic. We cannot simply assume that legitimating beliefs arise in the same way and for 
the same reasons when we move to a completely different decision-making context. 
The scant research on constitution-making and legitimacy provides some support for this 
suspicion.687 Moehler’s work on the creation of the 1995 Ugandan constitution, a constitu-
tion-making process frequently praised for its inclusive and participatory nature, is the most 
comprehensive study of this topic. Drawing upon both qualitative and quantitative analysis, 
                                                
687 As Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount note: “The claim that participatory design processes generate constitutions 
with higher levels of legitimacy and popular support has been subject to only limited study.” Ginsburg, Elkins, 
and Blount, "Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?," 215. 
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Moehler concludes that, “contrary to the optimistic predictions of most academics and activ-
ists, my evidence indicates that participation did not have a direct effect on constitutional legit-
imacy” and “participants were no more or less supportive of the constitution than were the cit-
izens who did not get involved.”688 Instead, Moehler found that local elites, rather than public 
participation, influenced whether citizens viewed the constitution as legitimate. One reason 
this occurred, a reason relevant to the importation of Tyler’s process-based model of legitima-
cy to constitutions, is because “in transitioning states, most citizens lack the information and 
skills to assess the fairness of the constitution-making process on their own, and so they turn 
to local leaders for guidance.”689 Thus, supporters of the constitution used the inclusion of par-
ticipatory processes to convince some citizens that the constitution-making process was fair, 
but this did not prevent opposition leaders to convince their followers otherwise.  
Comparative case studies on participatory and non-participatory constitution-making are 
inconclusive, with author’s findings determined by the cases selected.690 Samuels concludes 
that participatory constitution-making empowers the people and creates public support, high-
lighting the success of the highly participatory Rwanda and South Africa constitution-making 
experience, and the failure of the elite-driven processes in Nigeria and Bahrain.691  On the oth-
                                                
688 Moehler, "Public Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda," 276, 301. See also Moehler, 
Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory Constitution Making. 
689 Moehler, "Public Participation and Support for the Constitution in Uganda," 276. 
690 This is not to mention the immense difficulty of parsing out the effects of procedures across constitution-
making events that take place in polities with vastly different histories, ethnic composition, experiences with 
democracy, education levels, and political systems.  
691 Kirsti Samuels and Vanessa Hawkins Wyeth, "State-building and Constitutional Design after Conflict," 
(New York: International Peace Academy, 2006). Banks argues, using Iris Marion Young’s conception of in-
ternal exclusion, that the Rwanda constitution-making experience was characterized by participation without 
power, such that participatory opportunities gave those without power little additional influence on the out-
come. Note, however, that Banks does not address whether those without power knew that they had little addi-
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er hand, de Raadt reaches the opposite conclusion through a study of post-Soviet constitution-
making in Central and Eastern Europe, concluding “open constitution-making procedures do 
not necessarily produce legitimate constitutions and that closed constitution-making is no cer-
tain cause for contestation.”692 Jackson, through an analysis of constitution-making in Germa-
ny and Japan in the 1940s, Eastern Europe and South Africa after 1989, and the 2005 Iraqi 
constitution, concludes that participatory processes, like non-participatory processes, some-
times create legitimate constitutions and sometimes do not.693  Finally, a recent experiment 
meant to stimulate participatory constitution-making in high school classrooms found  “no 
support for the idea that participation in constitution making in and of itself generates strong-
er legitimacy beliefs.”694 
                                                                                                                                            
tional influence in the proceedings. If they were ignorant of internal exclusion in might make little difference in 
regards to sociological legitimacy whether or not they actually obtained additional power through participation. 
Banks, "Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and Opportunities." 
692 He focuses on constitution-making in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and 
Slovaki. de Raadt, "Contested Constitutions: Legitimacy of Constitution-making and Constitutional Conflict 
in Central Europe," 317. 
693 Vicki C.  Jackson, "What's in a Name? Reflections on Timing, Naming, and Constitution-making," William 
and Mary Law Review 49(2008). In addition, the fate of the 1996 Eritrean constitution and the 1997 Thailan 
Constitution attest to the fact that incredibly participatory processes can produce constitutions that neither cit-
izens nor elites deem legitimate. The Eritrean constitution has yet to be implemented fifteen years after being 
ratified in a two-step process by both the National Assembly and a special ratificatory constituent assembly, 
while the Thai constitution almost immediately lost the support of the coalition that created it, was soon violat-
ed extensively by Prime Minister Thaksin who nonetheless maintained popular support, and eventually died in 
a 2006 coup. Selassie, "Constitution Making in Eritrea: A Process-Driven Approach."; Bjorn Dressel, 
"Thailand's Elusive Quest for a Workable Constitution, 1997-2007," Contemporary Southeast Asia 31, no. 2 
(2009). 
694 Esaiasson, Gilljam, and Persson, "Which decision-making arangements generate the strongest legitimacy 
beliefs? Evidence from a randomised field experiment." This experiment attempted to test the effects on legiti-
macy of participatory constitution-making, direct democracy, and procedural fairness. While fascinating, I have 
severe reservations about the external validity of the experiment, particularly when it comes to constitution-
making. It is in no way clear to me whether the fact that students who chose the means of deciding whether to 
allocate $290 to a charity or a class party were no more satisfied with the outcome than those with a decision-
making mechanism exogenously imposed on them tells us anything about the effect of participation on citizens 
trying to create a constitution.  
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On the other hand, even if we accept that participation helps legitimize constitutions, this 
does not sufficiently justify ratification. Constitution-making involves numerous procedures, 
many of which might help promote legitimacy through participation. The question is whether 
ratification is particularly suited to this task and whether it adds anything that other participa-
tory procedures cannot and do not already provide.695 As discussed in chapter one, there are 
five basic stages in the constitution-making process: initiation, drafting, debating, approving, 
and ratifying.  
In the initiation stage, citizen can participate by electing delegates to the constitution-
making body and taking part in the campaigns surrounding these elections. This becomes pos-
sible if the constitution-making process is to involve a constituent legislature, legislating con-
stituent assembly, or a constitutional convention. This is quite common; by one estimate 62.6 
percent of all constitution-making processes between 1975 and 2002 made use of one of these 
elected bodies.696 In addition, the first three stages provide extensive opportunity for public 
participation through consultation procedures. In the initiation phase, the public can weigh in 
on the procedures to be used to create the constitution and the sort of issues the constitution 
is supposed to address; in the drafting phase they can suggest specific provisions, institutional 
mechanisms, or rights to be included in the text; and in the debating phase they can voice their 
concerns over the draft and give input to settle divisive issues. Designers of constitution-
                                                
695 I say ‘do not’ already provide because, as I will discuss below, the sort of arguments that justify ratification on 
the basis of participation and legitimacy assume that a whole host of other procedures are implemented as well.  
696 Widner, "Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution," 8. Unfortunately, note that Widner does not ex-
plain how many of these bodies were already sitting before constitution-making began. Similarly, according to 
the data from Ginburg, Elkins, and Blount’s random sample of 460 of the 806 national constitutions created 
from 1789 to 2005, 81% were created using a process involving an elected body. Ginsburg, Elkins, and Blount, 
"Does the Process of Constitution-Making Matter?." 
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making processes can use a variety of mechanisms to consult the people on these issues, includ-
ing: non-binding issue-specific referenda; requests for written submissions; deliberative semi-
nars; town hall meetings; questionnaire based surveys; deliberative seminars, town hall meet-
ings, soliciting comments through the internet, phone lines, texting, and various social media 
outlets. 
Examples of such participatory procedures abound.697 The Ugandan Constitutional 
Commission developed its agenda of constitutional reform through a variety of participatory 
processes implemented before drafting began. These included holding and attending 140 dis-
trict seminars, with an estimated attendance of 70,000 people, and soliciting constitutional 
ideas through newspapers and a nation-wide student essay context.698 In Zimbabwe, the con-
stitutional commission established by Mugabe toured all eleven provinces of the country, hold-
ing 4,321 open meeting during which individuals could express their views on the contents of 
the constitution. Over 500,000 people attended these general meetings, and 150,000 more 
attended specialized meetings meant to target overlooked minority groups.699 Constitution-
makers in Kosovo setup an interactive website (www.kushtetutakosoves.info) in which citizens 
could read drafts as they were being produced, make comments, and exchange their views.700 
In Eritrea, public meetings on constitutional proposals were held in 157 locations involving 
more than 110,000 participants, with an additional 11,000 Eritreans participating in similar 
                                                
697 Other examples were discussed in section four of the previous chapter. 
698 Allegedly, on the basis of these mechanisms, the commission successfully lobbied for constitution-making au-
thority to be placed in a an elected constituent assembly rather than the legislature. Brandt et al., Constitution-
making and Reform: Options for the Process. 348-49; Moehler, Distrusting Democrats: Outcomes of Participatory 
Constitution Making: 281. 
699 Hatchard, "Some Lessons on Constitution-making from Zimbabwe," 211. 
700 Brandt et al., Constitution-making and Reform: Options for the Process. 127. 
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meetings in locations outside the country.701 In South Africa, constitution-makers organized 
workshops with civil society organizations, established a well-used telephone talk line, held 
general meetings, and solicited comments during all three stages leading to the final draft.702 
If participation leads to legitimate constitutions, it is unclear why these procedures are not 
enough. The arguments sketched above claim that people are more likely to deem an outcome 
just if they feel a sense of ownership over it, identify with the results, and believe themselves to 
be connected to the decision-making process. In particular, Tyler’s process-based approach 
holds that people are most likely to consider an outcome legitimate if the procedure that pro-
duced it was just, where procedural justice evaluations are effected by antecedent considera-
tions such as having one’s say, being treated as a person and taken seriously, and understand-
ing the mechanics of a procedure and the reasons why decision-makers acted in a certain way. 
All three of these antecedents can be met through elections and public consultation, and the 
civic education campaigns that precede them and the partially transparent constitution-
making procedures that coincide with them. A person who talked with a constitution-making 
delegate, attended a constitutional workshop, commented on an online draft constitution, 
elected a delegate to a constituent assembly, watched deliberations in the assembly, or a did a 
combination of such things, is likely to feel that they participated and that the constitution 
which results is partly their creation. It is unclear what the additional opportunity of ratifica-
tion would add.  
                                                
701 Miller, "Designing Constitution-Making Processes: Lessons from the Past, Questions for the Future," 633. 
702 Ibid., 63-; Nico Steytler, "South Africa," in Constitutional Origins, Structure, and Change in Federal Countries, 
ed. John Kincaid and G. Alan Tarr (London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005); Skjelton, A People's 
Constitution: Public Participation in the South-African Constitution-Making Process. 
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5. SUBSTANTIVE LEGITIMATION 
If ratification cannot procedurally legitimate a constitution, perhaps it has substantive legiti-
mation effects instead. In other words, perhaps the fact that a constitution is ratified makes it 
more likely that its contents fall within the bounds of morality or appear to do so for a signifi-
cant portion of the relevant populace. How might this occur? Ratification is a process through 
which an already drafted constitution is approved or rejected as a whole, so its effects on the 
substance of the text are rather limited.703 That is, ratifiers cannot directly insert desired provi-
sions or vote out those they find problematic, for they are given a finished product and asked 
to vote it up or down.704 Instead, ratification might affect the contents of a constitution and 
substantively legitimate it in one of two ways: by preventing illegitimate constitutions created 
by framers from coming into effect; or by preventing illegitimate constitutions from being 
written. This applies for both moral and sociological legitimacy.  
                                                
703 I am excluding those rare instances in which ratifiers are asked to vote separately on certain provisions separat-
ed from the main text. There seem to be three reasons to do this. First, separating a controversial issue might 
prevent an entire constitution from being rejected over a single provision that met with disapproval, and prevent 
opponents to the constitution from using such an issue to sway ratifiers against the constitution. Second, plac-
ing a controversial issue to the side might isolate public debate around the segmented provision, therefore 
shielding the constitution as a whole from scrutiny and negative opinion. Third, framers might simply let ratifi-
ers decide on an issue for which there is no conclusive agreement. To my knowledge this practice is isolated to 
constitution-making in the U.S. States. For instance, the 1969-1970 Illinois Constitutional Convention seg-
mented two provisions having to do with the method of election for members of the House of Representatives 
and judicial selection, giving voters two alternative to choose from for each. Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: 
Failed U.S. State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s," 20; Cornelius, Constitution Making in 
Illinois: 154-55. 
704 As mentioned, the Massachusetts Constitutional Convention attempted a more dynamic method of ratifica-
tion in which voters were given the opportunity to vote on each separate provision. This proved to be an un-
workable procedure, and resulted in votes being manipulated in order to produce the required consensus. Con-
dorcet discusses the inherent flaws in such a ratification process, some of which I will discuss below. Condorcet, 
"On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 273. 
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5.1 RATIFICATION AS FILTER 
One might argue the following: a very good reason to implement ratification procedures is that 
they contribute to the creation of legitimate constitutions by serving as a final safeguard. If 
framers create a sociologically or morally illegitimate constitution, either intentionally or acci-
dentally, the people or their delegates will act as a filter and reject it during ratification.  Thus, 
ratification contributes to constitutional legitimacy by preventing illegitimate constitutions 
from coming into to force. This sort of argument is similar for both types of legitimacy. On 
the one hand, ratifiers are moral experts ready to identify provisions that violate morality; on 
the other, ratifiers are experts on what the people will consider morally illegitimate provisions. 
Note that this sort of argument mainly supports ratification by referenda, for the same con-
cerns about a constitution-making body creating an illegitimate constitution apply to a repre-
sentative ratification body as well. Since our perspective is that of designer of constitution-
making processes before constitution-making begins, any measures we would take to increase 
the changes that a non-popular ratifying body would act as an appropriate filter can also be 
taken for the constitution-making body itself. 
5.1.1 A Condorcet Interlude 
Condorcet defends ratification using this type of argument in On the Need for Citizens to Ratify 
the Constitution. Condorcet begins his essay assuming the existence of an innate right to ratify 
and considering three possibilities: the people give their right to the framing assembly; give 
their right to some other political body; or retain their right. In other words, he evaluates no 
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ratification, ratification by a representative body or existing political institution, and direct rat-
ification. 
He rejects the second option, ratification by a body separate from the framing assembly, 
for a variety of reasons. Many of these were referenced in previous chapters. For instance, he 
claims that allowing an existing institution to serve as ratifier is mistaken, for these institution 
may no longer be authoritative and will likely decide according to self-interest rather than the 
good of the nation.705 Creating a new constitutional convention to ratify the work of the first 
points to infinite regress, for a body elected to ratify the constitution would need the power to 
make changes if it rejected the constitution, “in which case a third would have to be elected to 
ratify these changes, and so on.”706 In addition, both national and regional ratifying conven-
tions still involve entrusting representatives with the right to ratify, and therefore “approval by 
such a Convention would contribute nothing more to rights than approval by a National As-
sembly which was authorized to establish a constitution.”707  
Direct ratification fares no better. Condorcet first notes that a nation could never express a 
will on something as complicated as a constitution. If a large enough percentage of voting as-
semblies rejected the constitution, it would be impossible to tell from their votes what needed 
to change in order to create an acceptable document. If small voting assemblies voted on each 
                                                
705 Condorcet was specifically addressing the possibility of the assemblies that appointed members to the Nation-
al Assembly being given the responsibility to ratify. Ibid., 275. 
706 Ibid., 274. This seems like a relatively weak argument, for many reasons. One is that Condorcet does not con-
sider the possibility of the constitution-making process simply ending upon rejection by the ratifying body. 
This, of course, was likely due to contextual reasons in France, i.e. it simply was not a good option, or even pos-
sible, for the constitution-making process to end without creating a new form of government. In the heat of the 
Revolution, the alternatives to a constitution were violence. 
707 Ibid., 274, 76. 
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clause separately, “the clauses approved by a plurality would form an incomplete constitution,” 
and attempting to correct the rejected provisions would lead to a disjointed document. 708 
Condorcet even notes that given the tremendous difficulty of determining the will of an as-
sembly of 100 people—a task made easier by joint discussion, explanations, and ease of com-
munications— “determining the plurality will become virtually impossible” when it comes to 
individual voters and assemblies. Condorcet mentions that individuals, unlike those entrusted 
with the power to make a constitution, are more likely to stray from impartiality due to vanity 
and selfishness.709 Finally, he claims that the people are simply too uneducated to judge a con-
stitutional plan. Moreover, they are easily persuaded, meaning that the people who actually 
exercised the right to ratify would be those whose eloquence and persuasion happened to carry 
the day. Condorcet asks which is preferable: “for the nation to entrust its right to men who are 
chosen expressly to exercise it, or to allow it to be seized by anyone able to do so.”710 
At this point, only the first option remains: citizens give up their right to ratify to the 
framers and no ratification takes place. Condorcet suggests that this is an acceptable outcome, 
for while it is true that he may “not accept a great many of its proposals,” is nonetheless better 
to have a constitution written and approved by elected framers than to preserve an individual 
right to ratify and, in the process, risk rejection. “Would slight imperfections in the constitu-
tion cause more harm,” he asks, “than would result from a delay of perhaps several years, dur-
                                                
708 Ibid., 273-74. 
709 “Would I not be led astray by false ideas of perfection, and by the vain hope of making myself appear more 
worth of the honour which has been refused to me?” Ibid., 277. 
710 Ibid., 273. 
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ing which time France would be without a constitution, or would have only an uncertain 
one?”711 
It is here that Condorcet launches his substantive moral legitimacy argument. He claims 
that his prior analysis concerning the dangers of submitting a constitution to the people is only 
true when it comes to constitutions that offend mere opinion. However, he writes: “If my 
rights and those of my fellow citizens are violated, then I must of course make a forceful pro-
test. I need not worry about delaying the establishment of an unjust constitution; on the con-
trary, my aim must be to prevent such a constitution from ever being established.” Condorcet 
goes on to suggest a two-step direct ratification procedure narrowly tailored to address rights 
violations. First, the assembly should write a declaration of rights and submit it to the citizen-
ry. All citizens will be “required to pronounce, not whether it has been well or badly drafted, 
but whether it omits any of the true rights of man or contains any principles which violate one 
of these rights.” Next, the assembly should submit the constitution to the citizens. Once again, 
citizens should not “judge whether it is well or badly organized, but…confirm that it contains 
no violation of the declaration of rights, or else to point out any particular clause which does 
constitution a violation.”712 
                                                
711 Ibid., 277. 
712 Ibid. Splitting the constitution-making process into two is not as outlandish as Condorcet’s proposal might 
initially seem. In a sense, the practice of laying down guiding principles before the drafting process, made popu-
lar by the thirty-four guiding principles set by the Multi-party Negotiating Process in South Africa, reflects a 
similar approach. The South African constitution-making process, structured by the guiding principles, was 
such a success that it was later replicated in Burundi and Angola in 2005 and 2010, and recently recommended 
for a future European constitution-making process by Bruce Ackerman. However, to my knowledge, guiding 
principles have never been submitted to a referendum or popularly reviewed. In fact, their creation is usually the 
least participatory and open part of constitution-making. For instance, the constitutional principles in South 
Africa were created by leaders of the main political parties in partially secret conditions and enacted by the 
Apartheid government; the United States, South West African People’s Organization, and the UN wrote the 
principles to be used in the 1989 Namibia constitution-making process; and President Sadat set principles for 
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We can overlook the two-step nature of Condorcet’s proposal and instead concentrate on 
his two main assumptions: that it is possible to ask individuals to vote on the basis of specific 
types of reasons; and that people who are too uneducated to evaluate a constitution can still 
understand whether or not that same constitution violates their human rights. Neither of the-
se assumptions are plausible, and as I argue below they are just a few of the reason why con-
ceptualizing ratification as a filtering device for illegitimate constitutions is unpersuasive. 
4.1.2 A Faulty Filter 
Conceptualizing a ratification procedure as a filter for illegitimate constitutions runs into sev-
eral problems—I will sketch out four. First, it is impossible to control how ratifiers evaluate a 
constitution. Justifying ratification because of its ability to filter assumes that ratifiers will 
make their decisions on the basis of legitimacy. In other words, it assumes that ratifiers will 
reject illegitimate constitutions because they are illegitimate and accept legitimate ones because 
they are legitimate. However, we cannot be sure that ratifiers will vote in this way, for other 
considerations might come into play and trump legitimacy evaluations.  
To better understand this claim, consider the following. Condorcet’s conception of ratifi-
cation as a filtering mechanism seems to be a moral application of his jury theorem. If we as-
sume ratifiers have a greater chance than half of identifying a morally illegitimate or legitimate 
constitution, a widespread popular ratification procedure would almost guarantee that morally 
                                                                                                                                            
the Egyptian process in 1971. In general, despite the success of South Africa, constitutional principles are set by 
people in power in order to limit the possibilities of constitution-making. Brandt et al., Constitution-making and 
Reform: Options for the Process. 62-66; Ebrahim, Fayemi, and Loomis, "Promoting a Culture of 
Constitutionalism and Democracy in Commonwealth Africa: Recommendations to Commonwealth Heads of 
Government," 119-25; Bruce A. Ackerman and Miguel Maduro, "How to make a European constitution for 
the 21st century," The Guardian, 3 October 2012. 
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illegitimate constitutions never came into force. For Condorcet, this would mean that voters 
are more likely than not to identify significant rights violations in the text. The greater size of 
the electorate as a whole would make it far more likely to reach the right legitimacy evaluation 
than the smaller number of framers actually responsible for the draft. Popular ratification, 
then, would be a justified procedure within the constitution-making process because of its 
unique ability to track moral truth. 
This argument presupposes that voters look at a constitution, ask themselves if it is legiti-
mate, and vote according to their evaluation. In other words, it assumes that the criterion of 
the right answer is whether or not a constitution is morally legitimate, and that all voters are 
aware of this. Condorcet attempts to build this presumption into his proposal by urging the 
assembly to remind voters that they are to vote against the constitution only if it violates their 
fundamental rights, a decision he believes all are capable of making. He concludes making this 
very point—“By limiting the individual right of the citizens to pronouncing only on what it or 
is not contrary to their rights, we are enabling them to retain control over the establishment 
and maintenance of the social order precisely to the extent that their enlightenment per-
mits”—and suggesting that at some point in the future, when individuals become more en-
lightened, all laws might be examined by the people in a similar fashion. 
This argument fails because there is no way to ensure that voters adopt legitimacy as the 
metric for decision-making during ratification. Ratifiers might reject a constitution because 
they hate the sitting government and believe that voting down the constitution is an effective 
form of punishment. They might approve a constitution because, as discussed in chapter 2, 
they liked how their framing delegates acted. They might reject a constitution because they 
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view it as a political bargain rather than as a document meant to maximize the public good.713 
Or, they might accept a constitution simply because it represents a change from an undesirable 
status quo. The latter reason is especially likely in contemporary cases of constitution-making 
during or immediately after the cessation of conflict. In these instances, voters are extremely 
likely to approve a constitution because they perceive any possibility that might lead to stabil-
ity or the end of violence as desirable. The extremely high percentage and turnout of referen-
dum ratification votes in favor of dubious constitutions in post-conflict African and Latin-
American states might suggest that something like this is occurring.714 
If ratifiers use different evaluative criteria when deciding whether to approve or reject a 
constitution during ratification, then Condorcet’s jury theorem cannot apply and ratification 
will not serve as filter for legitimacy. The acceptance of a constitution would only signal that a 
majority of the electorate had reasons, or what they thought were reasons, for approving the 
constitution. Each one of these reasons might only be shared by a small percentage of the elec-
                                                
713 Voters in the state of New York likely voted down the constitution produced by the most recent constitution-
al convention for this very reason. Specifically, they perceived the Democrats in the convention of inappropri-
ately currying favor with Catholic voters by including a provision allowing funding for religious primary 
schools. See Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: Failed U.S. State Constitutional Conventions in the 1960s and 
1970s." 
714 For example, on March 2, 1992, 97% of all eligible voters turned out for a referendum on a new constitution 
for Burundi; 90.23% of those voting approved the text. Genocidal conflict had plagued Burundi since 1972, 
with an increase in violence beginning in 1988 and the reemergence of Hutu and Tutsi conflict beginning in 
1991. Many voters in Burundi likely decided to approve the constitution without giving a second thought as to 
whether they considered the document, or the process that produced it, legitimate. Whether a constitution 
commanded sufficient moral reasons for its claim to authority was likely far less important than the simple de-
sire for something different. This brings us to a more general point about understanding ratification as a filter. 
The logic of such an argument, like balancing arguments more generally, assumes that the status quo is, at the 
least, somewhat acceptable. Only with this assumption can a mechanism like ratification serve as a check on 
procedural decisions made previously. The fact that the status quo is often so terrible during constitution-
making possibly explains the incongruence between the well-documented status quo bias in ordinary referenda, 
and the fact that constitutions are almost always approved during ratification referenda. Reyntjens, 
"Constitution-Making in Situations of Extreme Crisis: The Case of Rwanda and Burundi." 
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torate, and in this case the jury theorem would not help guarantee that even these non-
legitimacy evaluations were correct. Legitimate constitutions might be accepted or rejected, 
illegitimate constitutions might be accepted or rejected, and there would be no way to tell 
when a particular outcome represented an accurate assessment of the legitimacy of the text. 
Second, voter ignorance once again raises complications. If voters are too uninformed to 
properly evaluate a constitution and compare it to the status quo, then they are also likely too 
uninformed to judge whether a constitution is morally illegitimate. This is particularly prob-
lematic because illegitimate constitutions are likely to be illegitimate for subtle reasons. If 
framers accidentally created a constitution that falls outside the bounds of morality, than its 
moral flaws will likely be less than obvious. If they intended to create a constitution that is ille-
gitimate, and they know that ratifiers will reject an illegitimate constitution, then they will do 
all they can to hide their morally problematic provisions. 
As mentioned, Condorcet writes as if rights violations, his criterion for moral illegitimacy, 
would be immediately obvious to the average voter. He repeatedly claims that “every citizen is 
capable” of identifying a rights violating provision. However, he soon seems to admit that mat-
ters are unlikely to be that simple. After explaining the ease in which citizens would identify 
problematic constitutional provisions, how “only a few clauses of the constitution could 




“We must ensure that equality is scrupulously respected in the way in which people are given citizenship 
rights and allowed to enjoy these rights. We must also ensure that there is equality in the National As-
sembly; that the various provinces are proportionally represented according to the principle which con-
forms with national equality; that judicial power is independent of any particular authority, but subject 
to the laws; that the government, also bound by the laws, can make neither laws nor exemptions, nor-
exercise arbitrary power. In this way, we shall protect rights, and while the constitutional laws may be 
good or bad, they could no longer be unjust.”715 
 
When such constitutional complexities are involved in evaluating a constitution, it is hard to 
see how ratification through referenda is meant to function as a filter when many of the ratifi-
ers are uninformed. 
For example, perhaps one moral boundary for a legitimate constitution is that it cannot in-
tentionally weaken the political rights of any minority group. Imagine that a constitution is put 
to referendum that includes provisions setting up a first past the post electoral system using 
voting districts that divide up a minority ethnic enclave, effectively disenfranchising the group 
in the absence of significant internal migration. Such a constitution would be immoral accord-
ing to the above-mentioned criteria, but a voter would have to read the constitution, under-
stand it, know enough about electoral design, and resist the inevitable bombardment of misin-
formation that would accompany the ratification campaign, in order to reach the proper 
judgment. The idea of ratification as a filter assumes that ratifiers are able to use their votes to 
exercise quality control on the constitution. If they are uninformed, however, this becomes 
impossible.716 
                                                
715 Condorcet, "On the Need for the Citizens to Ratify the Constitution," 278. 
716 Note also that moral ignorance might disable ratification’s filtering effect as well as factual ignorance. Ratifiers 
might simply be unaware what makes a constitution’s claim to authority justified, or what the general public 
considers a morally legitimate constitution to be.  
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Third, ratifiers might want to implement a morally illegitimate constitution. For instance, 
voters in Alabama overwhelmingly approved the state’s 1901 constitution, which included 
provisions for racial segregation and poll taxes and was written, according to the President of 
the convention “to establish white Supremacy in this State.”717 Similarly, if the Croatian Con-
stitution of 1990 was submitted to the people in a referendum, it is entirely possible that the 
majority Croatian population would have endorsed the draft, despite the fact that the consti-
tution specifically excluded Croat Serbians from being considered one of the constituent na-
tions of the republic.  
 Finally, it is worth noting that historically, ratification’s performance as a filter for illegiti-
mate constitutions is inconsistent. Referenda led to the approval of Chavez’ authoritarian con-
stitution in 1999 and the rejection of Mugabe’s oddly decent constitution in 2001. Voters in 
Kenya rejected a proposed constitution in 2005 yet ratified an extremely similar document in 
2010. In Rwanda in 2003, voters overwhelmingly approved a constitution that violated nu-
merous political and social rights. These findings are in no way conclusive, but they do point 
to a possible weakness in conceiving of ratification, especially by way of referenda, as a filtering 
device for both morally and sociologically illegitimate constitutions. 
5.2. CONSTRAINING THE FRAMERS 
Perhaps ratification leads to a substantively legitimate constitution by helping prevent framers 
from writing a morally or sociologically illegitimate one. As discussed in chapter one, ratifica-
tion affects the contents of a constitution through two mechanisms. On the one hand, consti-
                                                
717 Cited in Wayne Flynt, "Alabama's Shame: The Historical Origins of the 1901 Constitution," Alabama Law 
Review 53(2002): 70. 
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tution-makers must restrict their goal constitution to a range they believe is acceptable to the 
known ratifiers. This mechanism, which I will call goal constraint, applies regardless of the 
sort of motivations that a delegate has. A delegate interested in pursuing his own self or group 
interest needs to be sensitive to what ratifiers will accept just as much as a delegate solely inter-
ested in creating a durable just constitution.718 Elster notes the minutes of the Federal conven-
tion “are very revealing in this respect, with their constant references to what might or might 
not be approved by the ratifying conventions.”719  
Second, ratification also serves as means of influencing the behavior of framers by limiting 
the sorts of provisions they can write to those that can be justified or explained in accordance 
with existing norms. Following Elster, I will call this imperfect constraint. Elster explains how 
such a mechanism functions in the context of constitutional assemblies, noting that “for vari-
ous reason it may be difficult for a member to cast a vote without justifying it before the other 
members of his constituency” and that such justifications are likely to be governed by norms of 
impartiality. In other words, a delegate will find it in his interest to cast his arguments in the 
language of impartiality, either “to avoid the opprobrium associated with the overt appeal to 
private interest in public debates,” “to present his position in a way that precludes compromis-
ing or bargaining;” or “to persuade others if he believes they are susceptible of being swayed by 
impartial argument.”720 Elster explains that, among other things, this has the effect of limiting 
                                                
718 I also explore this extensively in Lenowitz, "Rejected by the People: Failed U.S. State Constitutional 
Conventions in the 1960s and 1970s." 
719 Elster, "Securities Against Misrule: Juries, Assemblies, Elections," 383-83. 
720 Jon Elster, "Deliberation and Constitution Making," in Deliberative Democracy, ed. Jon Elster (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 101-02. 
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the sorts of ideal points a delegate can pursue, for certain positions will too obviously stem 
from self-interest and not admit to impartial justification. 
This argument applies, though perhaps not as strongly, on provisions written in the text, 
regardless of the publicity of the proceedings. By this I mean that certain constitution-making 
decisions would be impossible if they too plainly appeared to be the result of sheer self-interest 
or partiality. If a given constitutional provision resists any plausibly public justification, a con-
stitution-making body will have to alter it until it does, or eliminate the provision all together. 
This is because a ratification procedure, of any type, shines lights on decisions made during 
drafting. Such procedures are frequently characterized by discussions of constitutional choices, 
with opponents and proponents of the constitution focusing on any provision that might seem 
morally dubious. A norm of impartiality, strengthened by ratification, will help constrain 
framers by decreasing the chances that partial constitutions, tailored to promote the interests 
of the few over the many, are written in the first place.  
Ratification’s role as a goal constraint and an imperfect constraint might contribute to the 
legitimacy of a constitution in a relatively straightforward manner. A framer might know that 
the designated ratifying authority will reject a constitution if its falls outside of the bounds of 
morality, or what the ratifier perceives as the bounds of morality. Such a framer will therefore 
shift his goal constitution—this is ratification as a goal constraint—to ensure that none of its 
provisions will trigger illegitimacy concerns on behalf of the ratifier. The imperfect constraint 
works if we assume that one of the criterion of both moral and sociological legitimacy is that a 
constitution appears impartial. The framer or constitution-making will create a constitution 
that admits to impartial justification, regardless of their motives, because of their knowledge of 
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the norm of impartiality. Both of these arguments are initially convincing, and in fact they rep-
resent perhaps the best means through which ratification can help legitimize a constitution, 
and therefore the best means of justifying ratification altogether. Nonetheless, I argue, they are 
slightly less convincing then they initially appear for the following reasons.  
 First, ratification’s function as a goal constraint and imperfect constraint requires that con-
stitution-makers believe that ratifiers, whomever they are, will reject constitutions that appear 
impartial or illegitimate more generally. As I discussed above, there might be little reason for 
this belief and constitution-makers, then, might not hold it. For example, a constitution-maker 
creating a constitution for Burundi might plausibly believe that voters will not reject a consti-
tution if it is slightly illegitimate, or completely legitimate, because she knows that voters will 
approve anything in the hopes of changing their status quo. Such a framer might feel no con-
cern with writing in provisions to benefit a particular group or minimizing certain rights. Simi-
larly, a constitution-maker might believe that voters are so uninformed about constitutional 
design that there is little likelihood for them to identify a morally dubious provision. Both ig-
norance and other decision-making factors can decrease the chances that ratification can serve 
as a means of content control, and if ratifiers know this, ratification’s goal and imperfect con-
straint functions will be less effective. 
The second weakness relates to incompleteness in the above argument. It is not exactly 
correct to say that ratification’s function as a goal and imperfect constraint depends on fram-
ers’ beliefs that ratifiers will reject a partial or illegitimate constitution. Rather, it depends on 
their belief that ratifiers cannot be convinced or misled to approve a constitution despite its 
actual or perceived moral deficiencies.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, ratification 
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campaigns almost always accompany ratification referenda. The same is true for other ratifica-
tion types, though these campaigns might be more or less public depending upon the publicity 
of ratification procedure. These campaigns are incredibly effective due to the technical nature 
of constitution-making evaluation, the high stakes nature of the decision, the frequently un-
stable nature of the status quo, and the disruption of normal cue-givers.721 Constitution-
makers can also make recourse to other devices to ensure that their draft will gain majority 
approval. For example, Evo Morales’ Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS), holding a slight majori-
ty in Bolivia’s constituent assembly, pushed a consultative referendum through congress asking 
voters their opinions on the maximum size of landholdings. The intention of this referendum 
was to galvanize the indigenous population for the upcoming ratification referendum by fram-
ing the constitution as yet another political contest with the non-indigenous parties.722  
The belief by framers that they can persuade or mislead voters to accept constitutions that 
they might otherwise reject due to legitimacy weakens the goal and imperfect constraint effect 
of ratification. This does not mean that ratification would have no effect—certain provisions 
might be so obviously morally problematic that they would resist any attempted persuasive or 
manipulation—but it weakens it ability to legitimate through this pathway substantially.  
                                                
721 Framers can also encourage ignorance by limiting the time between promulgation and ratification, though such 
a strategy would only make sense if one believed that ratifiers were more likely than not to approve the constitu-
tion in the absence of additional information. Such a strategy appears to be incredibly common. Pinochet sub-
mitted Chile’s 1980 constitution without any public discussion under incredibly time constraints; while the 
constitutional commission in Romania only allowed 16 days for the electorate to review the draft. Widner, 
"Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution Project". 
722 John Crabtree, "Bolivia: New Constitution, New Definition," opendemocracy.net, 22 January 2009; Brandt et 




This chapter discussed what is arguably the most popular and intuitive justification for ratifi-
cation—the claim that the procedure helps create legitimate constitutions. I argued that dis-
cussions of legitimacy are often confusing because legitimacy is used to mean different things 
across contexts. Specifically, in the first section of this paper, I argued that political legitimacy 
divides into three types. Something is morally legitimate is its claim to authority is morally 
justified; sociologically legitimate if a significant portion of the population believes it to be 
morally legitimate and obeys as a result; and legally legitimate if it is legally valid according to 
the legal system of which it is a part.  
Moral and sociological legitimacy apply to constitutions without problem. A constitution 
is morally legitimate if there are good reasons for its claim to be the ultimate source of legal 
authority in a polity, and sociologically legitimate if people believe that such reasons exist and 
treat a constitution as if it were morally legitimate as a result. However, legal legitimacy does 
not apply in the same way. Constitutions are the source of legality within a given political and 
legal system, and therefore there is no legal system under which they might be legally valid. 
Attempting to appeal to preceding legal systems or reflexive legitimating criteria within the 
constitution does not solve this dilemma, for the former contradicts the legal meaning and 
purpose of a new constitution and the latter is circular. The sense in which constitutions none-
theless appear to be legally legitimate or illegitimate can be explained by noting that legal facts 
are simply a particularized version of social facts, and that when it comes to constitutions so-
cial facts fill in when legal facts run out. Put more clearly, the apparent legal legitimacy of con-
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stitutions is actually based upon their sociological legitimacy, and thus legal legitimacy is irrel-
evant for the purposes of examining the capacity for ratification to legitimate constitutions.  
I next explained how ratification, like any procedure, might contribute to the normative 
status of its outcome. On the one hand, it might have a procedural effect. When it comes to 
legitimacy, this means that ratification might legitimate a constitution simply because the pro-
cedure was carried out. A constitution would be legitimate not because of its content, but ra-
ther because it resulted from ratification itself. On the other hand, ratification might have a 
substantive effect, i.e. ratification might actually have effect the contents of a constitution, such 
that it is more likely to meet some independent standard of legitimacy. 
Combined, the distinction between sociological and moral legitimacy and procedural and 
substantive effects produces four pathways through which ratification might legitimate a con-
stitution: procedural moral legitimation; procedural sociological legitimation; substantive 
moral legitimation; and substantive legal legitimation. The enunciation of these pathways is 
perhaps the major contribution of this chapter, for it sets a framework through which the al-
leged legitimating effects of a whole host of constitution-making and decision-making proce-
dures might be analyzed and tested. 
In the reminder of the chapter I examined a few arguments that fit within these four 
pathways. Procedural moral legitimation was represented by both CPJs and pure consent the-
ory, both of which, I argued, fail to justify much of anything. I then looked at three potential 
arguments for how ratification might lead to procedural sociological legitimacy. The first, the 
existence of specific norms and beliefs linking ratification to legitimacy, is context specific and 
likely inapplicable to most cases of constitution-making. Put simply, we have little reason to 
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believe that the populations of present and future polities involved in constitution-making be-
lieve that a constitution cannot be legitimate unless it is ratified. The second and third argu-
ments claim that ratification increases participation, and that participation is known to in-
crease the legitimacy of outcomes.  
These arguments have two weaknesses. For one thing, there is little evidence linking em-
pirical findings about participation and ordinary political decision-making to the rather specif-
ic context of constitution-making. If we believe that constitution-making is a unique context, 
we cannot simply assume that behavioral and psychological mechanisms that operate during 
ordinary times apply without problem. In addition, even if we accept that participation leads 
to legitimacy, this does not necessarily provide reasons for recommending ratification as one of 
the optimal components of constitution-making design. Many other tasks are completed prior 
to ratification, and each one of these provides extensive opportunities to involve citizens in the 
process of constitution-making without risking the fate of the constitution-making process in 
its entirety. In addition, these procedures, which include face-to-face deliberations, public dia-
logue, town hall meetings, etc., seem to provide better options for participation than mere vot-
ing. However, I should note that the possibility of other participatory procedures legitimating 
constitutions does not give us reason not to use ratification. Such a determination would re-
quire weighing the pros and cons of ratification and its likely effects with other participatory 
components of constitution-making, and I did not perform such an analysis. 
In the next section of the chapter I turned towards substantive sociological and moral le-
gitimation. I claimed that ratification might help ensure that contents of a constitution meet 
conditions of actual or perceived moral legitimacy through one of two ways: it might filter out 
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illegitimate constitutions or prevent illegitimate constitutions from being written. The filtering 
argument, first made by Condorcet, has several weaknesses. Primarily, it assumes that ratifiers 
are informed enough to identify illegitimate constitution and that they will make their ratifica-
tion decision based upon this criterion. I argue that neither assumption is plausible, and that 
therefore the filtering mechanism might not work. Finally, I examined two ways in which rati-
fication affects the behavior of framers and briefly discussed how this might lead to legitimate 
constitutions. Specifically, ratification may impose a goal constraint by giving constitution-
makers reason to only pursue constitutions they believe ratifiers will accept, and an imperfect 
constraint by preventing framers from including provisions that cannot be justified impartially. 
I note that though these are persuasive arguments, the conclusions of the previous analysis give 
us reason to doubt the performance of these mechanisms. Ratifiers might accurately believe 
that framers will not cast their vote on the basis of legitimacy or worry about impartiality—
perhaps because of ignorance or an undesirable status quo—or that they can persuade ratifiers 
to accept an illegitimate constitution with partial provision. This does not prevent the con-
straint from functioning entirely, but weakens their overall expected effects. 
Legitimacy is the most popular and likely the best source of justification for ratification. 
However, explaining how exactly ratification, or any constitution-making procedure for that 
matter, leads to legitimate outcomes is a difficult task. Thus far, little literature exists which 
attempts to do this. Here, I gave a preliminary overview of what seem to be the most plausible 
or referenced mechanisms of legitimacy for ratification. I found that all such arguments con-
tain considerable weaknesses. These are not insurmountable, and my brief discussion of each 
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mechanism is in no way conclusive, but in the absence of further research simply claiming that 








How blind is man in future things! 
 Solon of Athens723 
 
 
Ratification is on the horizon for several countries. The Libyan Constitutional Commission 
has less than thirty days to finish a draft and thirty more days to organize and hold a referen-
dum. In Iceland, the results of a recent referendum on constitutional proposals will be used to 
finalize a draft constitution, slated for ratification in spring of 2013. In both Zimbabwe and 
Iraqi Kurdistan, referenda will take place as soon as, or if, the major parties reach consensus on 
a constitution. Finally, the constitutional assembly of Egypt is rushing to finish their constitu-
tion in order to submit it to voters before the Supreme Constitutional Court rules on a case 
seeking the assembly’ disbandment. The results of ratification will decide the fate of each of 
these constitution-making processes. In this dissertation, I asked whether or not there are rea-
sons for using these procedures at all. 
To reiterate, I was not after a context specific or general social-scientific explanation for 
why ratification occurs. Such an investigation would be worthwhile, but it was not my focus. 
Instead, I was looking for normative justifications in favor of including ratification within the 
optimal constitution-making process. These reasons would be ex ante and not contingent on 
                                                
723 Attributed to Solon in Plutarch, Plutarch's Lives, trans. John Dryden, vol. 1 (Boston: Little Brown and 
Company, 1900). 179. 
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specific environments. Our intuitions tell us that ratification is valuable in this way. For Amer-
icans, where the ratification of the U.S. Constitution is treated with biblical importance, this is 
likely especially true. How can the procedure that produced the Federalist Papers be anything 
other than a good thing? However, intuitions are not reasons. They can be mined for reasons, 
but are not reasons in themselves. In the previous chapters I attempted to explore the founda-
tions of what seemed to be the most plausible intuitions in support of ratification. 
The first intuition is that ratification has something to do with representation. Framers 
are often conceptualized as representatives of the people, and ratification seems like one way, 
perhaps the only way, to keep them in check. In other words, ratification seems like an excel-
lent accountability mechanism, and if representation is something desirable in a constitution-
making process, than ratification might be desirable for that same reason. However, this intui-
tion falls short. While accountability mechanisms are necessary for the creation and mainte-
nance of representation, ratification cannot coherently serve as one. The function of ratifica-
tion, and the central task of a ratifier, is to approve or reject a proposed constitution, while ac-
countability mechanisms are a means for principals to indicate whether their agents truly rep-
resented them. These two tasks might point in opposite directions; a ratifier might wish to 
sanction their representative framer for failing to represent, while simultaneously approving 
the constitution. In such instances of evaluative divergence, ratification-as-accountability 
mechanism necessarily fails at one of its given tasks. Ratification, then, cannot serve as an ac-
countability mechanism, does not play a role in a representative process, and is therefore not 
justified on the basis of the value of representation.  
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Next, I turned to the theory of constituent power, which embodies the intuition that con-
stitutions must be made by those they are to govern. Constitutions are often written to en-
courage this belief. The Constitución Española starts by announcing that “The Spanish Na-
tion…proclaims its will”, and the constitutions of South Africa, the United States, South Ko-
rea, Ghanaand many others begin with the words “We, the people.” Perhaps ratification is a 
means of putting teeth to such expressions. I considered several ways this could occur. Ratifi-
cation might be one of several moments in constitution-making during which the people act. 
This explanation lacks coherence because prior moments of constituent action turn ratifica-
tion into a redundant process or a contradictory one. Ratification could be a moment of con-
stituent action when prior attempts at manifesting the people fail. This argument is plausible, 
but does not produce the sort of ex ante reasons we are looking for. Ratification could be one 
of several moments meant to approximate the constituent power. Among other flaws, this 
misses the point of constituent power theory, which gains normative traction from its empha-
sis on the people taking action, not indirectly approximating their will. The failure of all three 
of these explanations pushes us towards a final way in which ratification might enable constit-
uent power.  
This argument, which I call the single moment justification, claims that ratification is jus-
tified because it is the sole moment in the constitution-making process where the people actu-
ally take action on their constitution and make it their own. I developed this argument by 
looking at the writings of Thomas Allen and his Berkshire Constitutionalists, a group of Mas-
sachusetts revolutionaries whose protests led to the first ratification procedure in history, the 
ratification of the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution. Allen argued that the people possess an 
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unalienable right to ratify their constitution, for alienating the right would necessarily harm 
civil society. This means that constituent action only takes place during ratification, and that 
only the people, acting directly, can ratify the constitution. 
Unfortunately, despite the passionate nature of the Constitutionalists’ arguments and the 
rich theoretical foundations of their claims, the single moment justification fails. The reason is 
simple: constituent power logic requires that voters in a ratification referendum make a mean-
ingful choice—a choice that they know reflect their beliefs, interests, and values—and voters 
do not know enough about constitutions to prudently compare a draft to the likely reversion 
point. Framers obtain the requisite knowledge through intense research, deliberation, and 
structured educational programs, but ratifiers do not undergo similar processes. Two attrac-
tive objections to these arguments fail to save the single moment justification. Information 
shortcuts cannot assuage concerns about ignorance like they do in the realm of ordinary poli-
tics, for the conditions of constitution-making increase the likelihood that they misfire and 
meaningful choice requires intentional action rather than inadvertent competence. Educational 
programs are unlikely to educate voters sufficiently, for the knowledge gap is massive and the 
effects of these programs are quickly undone by ratification campaigns whose purpose is to 
persuade by any means possible. 
The final intuition discussed links ratification to legitimacy: ratification is valuable because 
it helps create legitimate constitutions. This intuition is powerful and opaque, as arguments 
from legitimacy often are, for legitimacy is a tricky concept that is used haphazardly across 
contexts. Consider the claim that referendums legitimize outcomes. On the one hand, this 
seems absolutely correct. For example, the referenda on the Belfast Agreements in Northern 
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Ireland and the Republic of Ireland clearly helped legitimize the agreement and paved the way 
for peace and the termination of conflict. When voters in Venezuela rejected a constitutional 
referendum that would have allowed Chavez to seek reelection indefinitely, the outcome be-
came legitimate. On the other hand, this seems wrong. The 1934 referendum making Hitler 
Führer und Reichskanzler did not make his ascension to this post legitimate, and neither did the 
passing of Proposition 8 make banning gay marriage legitimate in California. In a sense, our 
intuitions about legitimacy and the effects of referenda seem to depend on whether we agree 
personally with the outcome in question. 
Much of this confusion, I argued, stems from a conflation of different forms legitimacy can 
take. In the political context, legitimacy divides into three. Something is morally legitimate if 
moral reasons justify its claim to authority and demand compliance as a result; something is 
sociologically legitimate if people believe that it is morally legitimate and comply as a result; 
and something is legally legitimate if it is lawful according to the legal system of which it is a 
part. When it comes to constitutions and constitution-making, only moral and sociological 
legitimacy are relevant, for constitutions are the source of legal validity within a legal system 
and thus cannot be evaluated by any other juridical standard, and when we distinguish be-
tween legally legitimate and illegitimate constitutions we are simply relying on sociological le-
gitimacy evaluations rather than legal ones. 
Procedures can change the normative status of an outcome in one of two ways. They can 
alter the nature of an outcome such that it is more or less likely to meet some independent 
normative criteria, or they can serve as the normative criteria themselves. I call the latter a sub-
stantive effect and the formal a procedural effect. Combined with the two types of legitimacy 
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relevant to constitution-making, this distinction between substantive and procedural effects 
produces four pathways through which ratification could legitimate constitutions: procedural 
moral legitimation; procedural sociological legitimation; substantive moral legitimation; and 
procedural moral legitimation. 
I discussed a few examples of how ratification might legitimate a constitution through the-
se pathways. Procedural moral legitimation is represented by constituent power justifications, 
refuted in the previous chapters, and pure consent theory. The latter claims that constitutions 
are only morally legitimate if individuals consent to their authority and take on obligations to 
obey. Besides classic generational problems, this argument fails to justify because the standard 
of morally relevant consent excludes ignorant voters and the coerced, and ratification neces-
sarily uses a majority or supermajority threshold. In combination, these mean that most con-
stitutions are illegitimate for the majority of their population, an outcome that does little to 
help justify ratification.  
I considered two arguments for how ratification could involve procedural sociological le-
gitimation. On the one hand, the voting public might believe that ratification makes a consti-
tution legitimate, or that a lack of ratification makes it illegitimate. This argument relies on the 
existence of a specific norm and belief that we have little reason to believe is generally present 
in all or most constitution-making contexts, and thus cannot serve as the basis for ratification’s 
justification. On the other hand, ratification increases the degree of participation in the consti-
tution-making process, and procedural participation is thought to increase the legitimacy of 
outcomes for a variety of reasons. We have two reasons to doubt this line of argument. First, it 
requires that we import findings about individual and collective behavior within operative and 
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settled political, legal, and social structures to the unique setting of constitution-making. Se-
cond, even if we disregard this importation concern, prior opportunities within the constitu-
tion-making process for participation seem capable of having the desired legitimating effects 
and appear more suited to do so. 
Arguments for both substantive moral and sociological legitimation take the same form 
because ratification, as an ex post procedure, only effects the contents of a constitution in lim-
ited ways. It can serve as a filter, where ratifiers reject illegitimate constitutions and thus en-
sure the legitimacy of those that come into effect. Or, it can alter the behaviors of constitution-
makers by making them restrict their constitutional goals in anticipation of what ratifiers will 
accept or limit their provisions to those that admit to public impartial justification. The filter-
ing argument is weakened by its implicit assumption that ratifiers are informed enough to 
identify illegitimate constitutions (more pertinent for moral legitimacy) and that they will base 
their ratification decisions upon legitimacy, for neither of these assumptions can be made with 
any confidence.  Similarly, the argument that ratification will alter the contents of the con-
stitution by effecting its drafters requires that framers believe that ratifiers are knowledgeable 
enough to identify partial provisions and illegitimate constitutions, will weigh legitimacy sig-
nificantly when making their decisions, and cannot be persuaded to overlook this factor. 
Again, there is good reason for doubting that framers will possess such beliefs.  
Where does this leave us? Can we say that it is always a bad idea to implement ratification, 
or that there are never good reasons for doing so? No. Unfortunately, the findings and impli-
cations of this project are too modest to reach this conclusion. For one thing, I only addressed 
three general arguments for justifying ratification. These appeared most likely, plausible, and 
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common, but others are of course possible. In addition, my discussion of legitimacy was incon-
clusive, for each legitimation pathway requires further examination and, especially when it 
comes to sociological legitimacy, many of the arguments I made turn upon the presence or lack 
of findings from empirical investigations that do not yet exist.  
Further, the very context-specific and path-dependent reasons I excluded from considera-
tion might very well apply in certain contexts. When the Mubarak regime fell, protestors 
called for a new constitution to be ratified in a referendum. This provides reason enough for 
justifying ratification. In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF is doing everything it can to wreck constitu-
tion-making, including suing the Zimbabwe Conference Select Committee, demanding the 
distribution of a 3000 page report it cannot afford, bussing supporters to deliberative forums, 
confiscating draft constitutions meant for stakeholder meetings, and intimidating opposition 
leaders. In such a context, using a ratification referendum might be the only way of giving the 
resultant document a weak sense of sociological legitimacy and associating it somewhat with 
the will of the 13 million people in the country. 
Nonetheless, at the least, this dissertation shows reasons to doubt the automatic use of a 
procedure whose worth has simply been assumed rather than explained. Moreover, it shows 
that intuitions about constitution-making procedures, especially those based on experiences in 
ordinary political contexts, ill-defined normative concepts, or intentionally abstract founding 
myths are often unreliable. We read about and understand constitution-makers as representa-
tives, but they cannot play this role. We assume that constitutions are made on the basis of the 
people’s will, but it is unclear what this means or how it can be possible. And, we debate legit-
imation without grasping what the concept means or identifying how procedures can actually 
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produce it. More constitutions are made today than ever before, and this trend will likely con-
tinue. If we want to give countries advice about how to go about creating their founding doc-
uments, this needs to be done on the basis of conceptual clarity, well-developed normative ar-
guments, and behavioral and psychological assumptions that take the unique context of consti-
tution-making into consideration, not because a particular process feels good, or because eve-
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